The Chagossian story

On 23 January Olivier Bancoult gives evidence to UK MPs about the treatment of his people by the Bri

Four times a year Olivier Bancoult, 43, walks the 600 yards or so from his house in Mauritius' capital Port Louis to St George’s Catholic cemetery.

There he visits the graves of his father, two of his older brothers and his younger sister, Noellue.

Bancoult says a prayer at each of the graves before returning home. "It began with Noellue," he explains of his long campaign to achieve justice for the islanders forcibly expelled from their homeland by the British authorities between 1965 and 1971.

They were moved to make way for the American military base on Diego Garcia.

The Chagossians’ ancestors had first arrived on the Chagos Islands, 1200 miles north of Mauritius, in the late eighteenth century. They were brought as slaves from Madagascar, Mozambique and Senegal by the French to work on the coconut and sugar plantations.

An additional wave of migrants in the form of indentured labourers from south India were brought in by the British once slavery was abolished (the islands changed hands in 1835 after the Napoleonic Wars).

Over time the Chagossians created a distinctive culture. The Bancoult family lived on the island of Peros Banhos, one of the larger islands in the Chagos group. Like their compatriots, they led a simple and carefree life.

"I was only four when I left so I cannot remember much," says Bancoult. "But according to my parents everyone had their own house and a job. After work people would go fishing; the catch was shared - it was like living in one big family."

The image is in sharp contrast to the desperate lives most of the islanders now lead in the crowded slums of Port Louis.

There they are firmly lodged at the bottom of the Indian Ocean island’s social pyramid – Bancoult claims that around 70% of Chagossians of working age are unemployed compared to a national rate of 9%. "It may be paradise for the tourists who come here but not for our people," he says.

These facts go some way to explain his ongoing fight to allow the Chagossians to return to the archipelago.

In 1968 Olivier’s sister, Noellue, was seriously injured in a collision with a donkey and cart and so the whole family of eleven members journeyed to Mauritius for medical help. Unfortunately, it was too late for the little girl and she died.

When her grieving family tried to return home there was no boat to take them back. They were informed by the British authorities the Chagos Islands had been sold.

Puzzled, distraught and with very little money the Bancoult family moved to Cassis, an area of densely packed corrugated iron shacks built on the outskirts of the Mauritian capital, where some other exiled Chagossians had already sought refuge.

A year later, probably due to the stress of exile, Bancoult’s father suffered a massive heart attack and stroke which left him incapacitated until his death in 1976.

Supporting the family fell to Bancoult's mother, Rita, who held down three different jobs as a domestic.

Life was hard and the Bancoult family were affected by further tragedies. "Two of my brothers died, one succumbed to alcohol in 1990 and the other to heroin in 1995," recalls Bancoult. "And the same was true of many other Chagossian families."

In fact, the effect on the Chagossians in those early days were often catastrophic. Left to rot on the margins of Mauritian society, out 1,500 people, fifteen died of starvation; several committed suicide.

Many other islanders turned to theft, drink, drugs and prostitution as a way of coping - a social pattern that unfortunately persists to this day.

Olivier Bancoult fared differently from many Chagossians of his generation. The bright boy of the family he was encouraged by his mother and one of his teachers who provided him with extra free tuition.

He did well at school getting top marks in his exams, went on to train as an electrician and now works for the municipality of Port Louis.

"I was very lucky to get help," he says modestly. And he is very careful not to blame his fellow Chagossians for not achieving more. "I do not criticise them in any way. They have had to cope with unbelievable pressures and they have done the best they could in very difficult circumstances." He pauses and adds: "What you have to remember is that the British have tried their best to destroy Chagossian culture."

In any event, Bancoult has put his talents to good use. "We set up the Chagos Refugee Group in 1983 so that the young people would not forget where they came from. We wanted them to know something about their culture and to help them get a better education as well," he explains.

Bancoult also forged links with a London-based legal team including Richard Gifford and Sir Sidney Kentridge, 84, an expert on Commonwealth law, who first came to prominence when he was part of Nelson Mandela’s defence team.

Bancoult is full of praise for their efforts: "They are all very special lawyers who believe in a respect for human rights. The Chagossians are very proud of every one of them and it has been a special privilege to have Sir Sydney Kentridge on our side."

The combination worked to good effect. In November 2000, Bancoult and his lawyers won a spectacular victory in the High Court which quashed all previous government orders excluding the Chagossians from their homeland.

After some hesitation then foreign secretary, the late Robin Cook, stated: "The government will not be appealing." He declared that he was not prepared to defend "what was done or said 30 years ago".

It was a brave statement and may well have contributed to Cook's removal from his position as foreign secretary.

Certainly all of his successors - Straw, Beckett and now David Miliband - have been careful not to get on the wrong side of Washington on the Chagossian issue.

The American airbase on Diego Garcia is regarded by the US as key to military missions in the Middle East and elsewhere.

But the political docility in London has come at a high price for the Chagos islanders forcing Bancoult and his legal team to earn a further victory in the High Court in 2006, a judgement which was upheld in the Court of Appeal in 2007. The government has now lodged an appeal and the case will go to the House of Lords for a final ruling. So much for Robin Cook's stance.

On 23 January Olivier Bancoult appears before the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee where he has been invited to give oral evidence about the forced removal of the Chagossians from their islands more than 40 years ago.

Is this a sign of progress at long last?

"Well, I am an optimist," says Bancoult. "I am looking forward to the opportunity to put our case before the committee members. Of course, we are sad - very sad - about those who have passed away without returning to Chagos.

"The British government should put an end to all this. It has gone on too long - it is time for us to go home."


Dr Sean Carey is Research Fellow at the Centre for Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism (Cronem), University of Surrey.

Jeremy Corbyn. Photo: Getty
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Lexit: the EU is a neoliberal project, so let's do something different when we leave it

Brexit affords the British left a historic opportunity for a decisive break with EU market liberalism.

The Brexit vote to leave the European Union has many parents, but "Lexit" – the argument for exiting the EU from the left – remains an orphan. A third of Labour voters backed Leave, but they did so without any significant leadership from the Labour Party. Left-of-centre votes proved decisive in determining the outcome of a referendum that was otherwise framed, shaped, and presented almost exclusively by the right. A proper left discussion of the issues has been, if not entirely absent, then decidedly marginal – part of a more general malaise when it comes to developing left alternatives that has begun to be corrected only recently, under Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell.

Ceding Brexit to the right was very nearly the most serious strategic mistake by the British left since the ‘70s. Under successive leaders Labour became so incorporated into the ideology of Europeanism as to preclude any clear-eyed critical analysis of the actually existing EU as a regulatory and trade regime pursuing deep economic integration. The same political journey that carried Labour into its technocratic embrace of the EU also resulted in the abandonment of any form of distinctive economics separate from the orthodoxies of market liberalism.

It’s been astounding to witness so many left-wingers, in meltdown over Brexit, resort to parroting liberal economics. Thus we hear that factor mobility isn’t about labour arbitrage, that public services aren’t under pressure, that we must prioritise foreign direct investment and trade. It’s little wonder Labour became so detached from its base. Such claims do not match the lived experience of ordinary people in regions of the country devastated by deindustrialisation and disinvestment.

Nor should concerns about wage stagnation and bargaining power be met with finger-wagging accusations of racism, as if the manner in which capitalism pits workers against each other hasn’t long been understood. Instead, we should be offering real solutions – including a willingness to rethink capital mobility and trade. This places us in direct conflict with the constitutionalised neoliberalism of the EU.

Only the political savvy of the leadership has enabled Labour to recover from its disastrous positioning post-referendum. Incredibly, what seemed an unbeatable electoral bloc around Theresa May has been deftly prized apart in the course of an extraordinary General Election campaign. To consolidate the political project they have initiated, Corbyn and McDonnell must now follow through with a truly radical economic programme. The place to look for inspiration is precisely the range of instruments and policy options discouraged or outright forbidden by the EU.

A neoliberal project

The fact that right-wing arguments for Leave predominated during the referendum says far more about today’s left than it does about the European Union. There has been a great deal of myth-making concerning the latter –much of it funded, directly or indirectly, by the EU itself.

From its inception, the EU has been a top-down project driven by political and administrative elites, "a protected sphere", in the judgment of the late Peter Mair, "in which policy-making can evade the constraints imposed by representative democracy". To complain about the EU’s "democratic deficit" is to have misunderstood its purpose. The main thrust of European economic policy has been to extend and deepen the market through liberalisation, privatisation, and flexiblisation, subordinating employment and social protection to goals of low inflation, debt reduction, and increased competitiveness.

Prospects for Keynesian reflationary policies, or even for pan-European economic planning – never great – soon gave way to more Hayekian conceptions. Hayek’s original insight, in The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, was that free movement of capital, goods, and labour – a "single market" – among a federation of nations would severely and necessarily restrict the economic policy space available to individual members. Pro-European socialists, whose aim had been to acquire new supranational options for the regulation of capital, found themselves surrendering the tools they already possessed at home. The national road to socialism, or even to social democracy, was closed.

The direction of travel has been singular and unrelenting. To take one example, workers’ rights – a supposed EU strength – are steadily being eroded, as can be seen in landmark judgments by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Viking and Laval cases, among others. In both instances, workers attempting to strike in protest at plans to replace workers from one EU country with lower-wage workers from another, were told their right to strike could not infringe upon the "four freedoms" – free movement of capital, labour, goods, and services – established by the treaties.

More broadly, on trade, financial regulation, state aid, government purchasing, public service delivery, and more, any attempt to create a different kind of economy from inside the EU has largely been forestalled by competition policy or single market regulation.

A new political economy

Given that the UK will soon be escaping the EU, what opportunities might this afford? Three policy directions immediately stand out: public ownership, industrial strategy, and procurement. In each case, EU regulation previously stood in the way of promising left strategies. In each case, the political and economic returns from bold departures from neoliberal orthodoxy after Brexit could be substantial.

While not banned outright by EU law, public ownership is severely discouraged and disadvantaged by it. ECJ interpretation of Article 106 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has steadily eroded public ownership options. "The ECJ", argues law professor Danny Nicol, "appears to have constructed a one-way street in favour of private-sector provision: nationalised services are prima facie suspect and must be analysed for their necessity". Sure enough, the EU has been a significant driver of privatisation, functioning like a ratchet. It’s much easier for a member state to pursue the liberalisation of sectors than to secure their (re)nationalisation. Article 59 (TFEU) specifically allows the European Council and Parliament to liberalise services. Since the ‘80s, there have been single market programmes in energy, transport, postal services, telecommunications, education, and health.

Britain has long been an extreme outlier on privatisation, responsible for 40 per cent of the total assets privatised across the OECD between 1980 and 1996. Today, however, increasing inequality, poverty, environmental degradation and the general sense of an impoverished public sphere are leading to growing calls for renewed public ownership (albeit in new, more democratic forms). Soon to be free of EU constraints, it’s time to explore an expanded and fundamentally reimagined UK public sector.

Next, Britain’s industrial production has been virtually flat since the late 1990s, with a yawning trade deficit in industrial goods. Any serious industrial strategy to address the structural weaknesses of UK manufacturing will rely on "state aid" – the nurturing of a next generation of companies through grants, interest and tax relief, guarantees, government holdings, and the provision of goods and services on a preferential basis.

Article 107 TFEU allows for state aid only if it is compatible with the internal market and does not distort competition, laying out the specific circumstances in which it could be lawful. Whether or not state aid meets these criteria is at the sole discretion of the Commission – and courts in member states are obligated to enforce the commission’s decisions. The Commission has adopted an approach that considers, among other things, the existence of market failure, the effectiveness of other options, and the impact on the market and competition, thereby allowing state aid only in exceptional circumstances.

For many parts of the UK, the challenges of industrial decline remain starkly present – entire communities are thrown on the scrap heap, with all the associated capital and carbon costs and wasted lives. It’s high time the left returned to the possibilities inherent in a proactive industrial strategy. A true community-sustaining industrial strategy would consist of the deliberate direction of capital to sectors, localities, and regions, so as to balance out market trends and prevent communities from falling into decay, while also ensuring the investment in research and development necessary to maintain a highly productive economy. Policy, in this vision, would function to re-deploy infrastructure, production facilities, and workers left unemployed because of a shutdown or increased automation.

In some cases, this might mean assistance to workers or localities to buy up facilities and keep them running under worker or community ownership. In other cases it might involve re-training workers for new skills and re-fitting facilities. A regional approach might help launch new enterprises that would eventually be spun off as worker or local community-owned firms, supporting the development of strong and vibrant network economies, perhaps on the basis of a Green New Deal. All of this will be possible post-Brexit, under a Corbyn government.

Lastly, there is procurement. Under EU law, explicitly linking public procurement to local entities or social needs is difficult. The ECJ has ruled that, even if there is no specific legislation, procurement activity must "comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaty, in particular the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality". This means that all procurement contracts must be open to all bidders across the EU, and public authorities must advertise contracts widely in other EU countries. In 2004, the European Parliament and Council issued two directives establishing the criteria governing such contracts: "lowest price only" and "most economically advantageous tender".

Unleashed from EU constraints, there are major opportunities for targeting large-scale public procurement to rebuild and transform communities, cities, and regions. The vision behind the celebrated Preston Model of community wealth building – inspired by the work of our own organisation, The Democracy Collaborative, in Cleveland, Ohio – leverages public procurement and the stabilising power of place-based anchor institutions (governments, hospitals, universities) to support rooted, participatory, democratic local economies built around multipliers. In this way, public funds can be made to do "double duty"; anchoring jobs and building community wealth, reversing long-term economic decline. This suggests the viability of a very different economic approach and potential for a winning political coalition, building support for a new socialist economics from the ground up.

With the prospect of a Corbyn government now tantalisingly close, it’s imperative that Labour reconciles its policy objectives in the Brexit negotiations with its plans for a radical economic transformation and redistribution of power and wealth. Only by pursuing strategies capable of re-establishing broad control over the national economy can Labour hope to manage the coming period of pain and dislocation following Brexit. Based on new institutions and approaches and the centrality of ownership and control, democracy, and participation, we should be busy assembling the tools and strategies that will allow departure from the EU to open up new political-economic horizons in Britain and bring about the profound transformation the country so desperately wants and needs.

Joe Guinan is executive director of the Next System Project at The Democracy Collaborative. Thomas M. Hanna is research director at The Democracy Collaborative.

This is an extract from a longer essay which appears in the inaugural edition of the IPPR Progressive Review.