Collymore's twitter rant about "football snobbery" was misplaced

The gulf between critic and fan.

When Stan Collymore says something, people tend to listen. More accurately, perhaps, people have no choice but to listen as the former Liverpool striker and enfant terrible has one of the most distinctive styles of any UK based broadcaster.

To be completely fair, such is the vanilla flavour of much of the content available on the airwaves, it is fair to say that Collymore and his talkSPORT radio presence provides good value.

The 42-year-old spent much of 2012 uprooting previously anonymous students and bringing their deluge of racist abuse to light. In many ways, to his vast credit, his one man war has done much to ensure that the casual fan thinks twice before launching into a flow of offensive bile.

In 2013, Stan has a new war, and with it, a different foe. It is increasingly apparent that Collymore’s biggest bugbear is what he perceives as a deep-rooted snobbery from football bloggers masquerading as writers, directed at a wide variety of pundits.

As a relevant, former pro, Collymore has taken upon himself to defend the honour of those pundits who have taken no small amount of stick from the keyboard warriors and blogging snobs; “Whose major selling point is usually a degree of some sort.”

One could argue that perhaps such qualifications are better for a career in sports journalism than ill-fated spells at Fulham, Bradford and Aston Villa but that is neither here nor there.

Collymore has not always been the most self-aware individual. As recently as 2006 he spoke up the prospect of making a return to top-level football requiring, in his mind, only a month of preparation to get back up to Premier League standard.

Nevertheless, despite his dubious track-record for public proclamations, his strangely formatted Twitlonger post, stumbles across a particular sticking point, despite being largely wrong in his conclusions.

He is right to suggest that Twitter provides football fans an unparalleled stage for delivering misinformed, tribalistic and unpleasant comments to an array of public figures, but, having reignited his career on the platform, Collymore is hard pushed to complain when he encounters a bit of non-offensive hostility from his 375,000 followers.

At times, Collymore’s piece is beyond parody- the broadcaster coming across as punch-drunk from the amount of abuse he has endured via social media, to create a paranoid ‘black is white’ argument.

His fierce defence of the football pundit is a perfect illustration of the breakdown between the average fan and any number of bumbling former pros plying their "trade" on TV sofas each weekend.

Are we as consumers and subscribers wrong to expect some sort of quality control from our panellists? Do we not have the right to be a touch embarrassed when Ray Parlour fails to grapple with Guillem Balague over the merits of the Premier League or when David Pleat fails to pronounce the name of a single Juventus player correctly?

Instead of accepting that former players are given a humongous advantage in terms of getting on in the media, Collymore attacks what he perceives as the self-entitlement of the bloggers and writers, many of whom, least we forget, are writing for nothing and to a tiny audience.

“A degree in journalism gives them the belief that their hard University work and study should somehow put them automatically in the front of the line for a plum job in whichever industry they choose. And in football, the number who think this way is increasing.[sic]”

You have to accept his premise that an erudite and expressive footballer with a strong television presence is going to carry more immediate respect from an audience than a journalist without a football background. But what happens when said player erodes that goodwill with season after season of poorly prepared rubbish?

I would like Stan to enter into one of the oft-referenced internships with a site like Goal.com or Football Fancast- websites designed to provide content from football fans and aspiring journalists- the vast majority of whom will never achieve a by-line in a national paper or even attain work experience in a Sky Sports studio.

I know from personal experience that any sense of entitlement evaporates pretty swiftly at 3am on any given Wednesday when you’ve committed to writing three pieces that day and are due at work in less than five hours. If Stan were to complete one of these schemes, all the time watching Jimmy Bullard struggle to string four words together on Soccer Special, he might realign his argument.

Instead, Collymore latches onto Gary Neville as a prime example of a former player turned brilliant pundit, but for every respected former England full back he provides, I could throw Robbie Savage, Don Goodman and Jimmy ‘this is what we in the game call’ Armfield back at him by way of retort.

Despite his merits, had he not been a footballer, Stan Collymore is highly unlikely to have ‘made it’ as a broadcaster- his colourful past and mercurial talents as a footballer remain his unique selling point. That he is outspoken and confrontational is only something he has been allowed to develop once afforded his own platform- obviously something your garden variety graduate is not afforded.

“Well, I've been interested in broadcasting since childhood” proffers Collymore. Well, to be fair, I’ve been interested in cinema since I was a kid- does that entitle me to play Jason Bourne?

Collymore, and others, need to accept that football and journalism are completely independent from one another and to be proficient at the former does not guarantee success in the latter. The ‘entitled’ bloggers know this already- they’re just waiting for Stan to catch up.

Stan Collymore. Photograph: Getty Images

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The Asian Financial Crisis 20 years on

In the four years between 1993 and 1996 the tiger economies of Asia led the world in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) growth and stock market returns as foreign and local investors piled in and embraced the opportunity.

In the four years between 1993 and 1996 the tiger economies of Asia led the world in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) growth and stock market returns as foreign and local investors piled in and embraced the opportunity. But trouble was brewing and Thailand was the canary in the coal mine. Strong growth was being funded by ever increasing levels of debt and with offshore interest rates far more attractive than those available at home, US dollars became the funding currency of choice.

While currencies remained pegged to the US dollar risks were minimal but as a growing trade and current account deficit and rising inflation led to increasing overvaluation of the Thai Baht, speculation grew and short-term money started to move out of the Thai currency.

In July 1997, after a futile attempt to stem the outflow, the Thai central bank removed the peg triggering an immediate 25% fall in the currency - by the end of the year it had lost half of its value. The impact on the economy was devastating. Interest rates initially spiked making dollar debt significantly more expensive. Loans started defaulting, peaking at almost 50% of total loans in 1999. The figures reflect the severity of the downturn: GDP took five years to return to pre-crisis levels, consumption – the use of good and services by households - was four years, and private sector loan growth only returned to positive territory in 2002.

Although Thailand was the trigger, the ticking time bomb of unhedged foreign currency debt and a  prolonged period of over-exuberance prevailed across all of South East Asia.  The Philippines and Malaysia were also significantly impacted but the most significant downturn occurred in Indonesia, which, although running a current account deficit only half the size of Thailand, saw its currency go from 2000 rupiah to the US dollar to 16000, and bank loan books fill up with defaulting loans.

Contagion and a severe lack of confidence dented the whole region and although Hong Kong managed to hold on to its peg to the US dollar, a prolonged period of high interest rates and slower growth resulted in a 40% fall in residential property prices and a deflationary period that took many years to recover from. Even South Korea, which was the 11th largest global economy at the time, had to call in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as interest rates ballooned and the currency weakened.

The recovery, which on average took more than 5 years, was supervised by stringent IMF requirements and has put Asian economies on a much firmer footing. With a few exceptions Asian currencies are free floating, meaning their value is determined by the foreign exchange (forex) markets through supply and demand, and as a result they have much more flexibility to reflect domestic economic cycles ensuring that pressures don’t build. Current and trade accounts, with the exception of India and Indonesia, are now in surplus, with the practice of unhedged foreign borrowing all but ended. Short term foreign debt in ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) nations has dramatically dropped from 160% to now less than 30%.

The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008 was borne out of exuberance in the West but not in the East and although Asian economies were impacted by the slowdown in global growth, Asian economic credibility was never called into question.

The only economy that is showing a worrying trend is China. A credit boom following the GFC has seen debt-to-GDP balloon from 160% in 2008 to 260% in 2017. The nature of this debt however is different from that accrued by South East Asian Countries in the late 1990’s. Firstly, most of the debt lies with state owned enterprises (SOEs) and is hence backed by the >$3tn worth of foreign exchange reserves, and most of it is denominated in renminbi. Secondly, although China operates a managed exchange rate regime against a basket of trading currencies, the capital account is closed which restricts the amount of speculative flows. Finally, a lot of the debt is owned by domestic institutions and is long term in nature which reduces the likelihood of enforced withdrawal leading to a liquidity crisis.

The impact of the Asian crisis lives long in the memory of Asian corporates. The days of rapid expansion and growth for the sake of growth have gone and been replaced by conservatism and a focus on cash flow and profitability. Corporate debt levels are at all-time lows while cashflow compares favourably to any other region of the world. Interestingly it is developed economies that are now showing the stresses Asia encountered and recovered from 20 years ago; Asia in comparison looks favourable.

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