Rich people are not over-taxed - they just have all the money

The tax burden on high-earning individuals has gone up not because politicians have been taking them for all that they’ve got, but because they’re the ones earning all the money in the first place.

I think I've identified a new logical fallacy. It's quite a specific fallacy, admittedly, so best I can tell no one’s bothered to give it a name – but it's popping up with infuriating frequency nonetheless.

You can spot this fallacy in action whenever the thorny topic of rich people and their taxes rears its head. This piece of obvious trolling, for example, comes from the beloved mayor of London who is, as ever, concerned for the welfare of the forgotten and disenfranchised:

The top 1% of earners now pay 29.8% of all the income tax and National Insurance received by the Treasury. In 1979 – when Labour had a top marginal rate of 83% tax after Denis Healey had earlier vowed to squeeze the rich until the pips squeaked – the top 1% paid only 11% of income tax. Now, the top 0.1% – about 29,000 people – pay an amazing 14.1% of all taxes.

In other words, even though tax rates have fallen, the tax burden borne by the rich has grown. Ergo, we should stop being so beastly to the poor lambs.

Can you spot the hole in the logic there? I don't think it's particularly subtle, but it seems to have evaded Boris "he was an Eton scholar, you know" Johnson.

Tell you what, here's another example of Elledge's Fallacy at work. (Hmmm. The name needs some work.) This time it's from the Mail's This Is Money website, and dates from February 2012, but the quote concerns a similar set of numbers to those outlined by Boris:

Michael Spencer, chief executive of the City broker Icap and former treasurer of the Conservative party, said: “The debate about tax in this country has sadly become more and more about politics and less and less about what is good for the economy and for growth. All we hear about is ‘the rich must pay more; soak the rich’. Well the facts are clear; the rich are paying much more."

Actually, the facts are not clear. The facts are very, very unclear.

That’s because there are two numbers that could explain the rise in the share of income tax paid by the ultra-rich. One is the tax rate they pay; the other is their taxable income. Their share of the tax burden has gone up not because those latter day sans-culottes Gordon Brown or George Osborne have been taking them for all that they’ve got, but because they’re the ones earning all the money in the first place.

All those figures quoted by Johnson and Spencer show is that inequality has gone through the roof. According to the Resolution Foundation, the share of national income going to the top 1 per cent of earners has, over the last 30 years, risen by a half (from 2 per cent in the late 1970s to around 3.1 per cent in 2010). Over the same time period, the share going to the bottom 50 per cent shrank by a quarter, from 16 per cent down to 12 per cent. Include bonus payments, which are mostly earned by those at the top, and the share of income going to the bottom half of the UK workforce stood at just 10 per cent.

Let me say that again: half of British workers, put together, take home just one pound in every ten earned in Britain.

Now there are all sorts of reasons for this (lower top tax rates, the rise of the City, globalisation, spiraling executive pay). Some of these are down to government action; some of them aren’t.

But the ultimate result is the same. Britain could have been paying flat taxes for the last 30 years, and the share of tax paid by the rich would still appear to have soared. That's because – I can't believe it's even necessary to spell this out, but there it is – they're the ones with all the money.

The upshot of all this is that figures showing the total share of income tax paid by the rich tell us nothing about whether they’re over-taxed or not. There may be good reasons to lower taxes on the rich – to stop the City decamping en masse to Zurich, say, or to prop up Britain's all-important luxury yacht business. (I doubt it, but what do I know.) But there is nothing in the figures quoted by Boris and his ilk to back up this point.

All those figures tell us is that the biggest earners are taking home the biggest chunk of the money. That, oddly enough, we already knew.


The City of London. Photo: Getty

Jonn Elledge is the editor of the New Statesman's sister site CityMetric. He is on Twitter, far too much, as @JonnElledge.

Photo: Getty
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The three big mistakes the government has made in its Brexit talks

Nicola Sturgeon fears that the UK has no negotiating position at all. It's worse than she thinks. 

It’s fair to say that the first meeting of the government’s Brexit ministers and the leaders of the devolved legislatures did not go well.

Scotland’s Nicola Sturgeon told reporters outside that it had all been “deeply frustrating”, and that it was impossible for her to undermine the United Kingdom’s negotiating position as “I can’t undermine something that doesn’t exist, and at the moment it doesn’t seem to me like there is a UK negotiating strategy”.

To which cynical observers might say: she would, wouldn’t she? It’s in Sturgeon’s interest to paint the Westminster government as clueless and operating in a way that puts Scotland’s interests at risk. Maybe so, but Carwyn Jones, her Welsh opposite number, tends to strike a more conciliatory figure at these events – he’s praised both George Osborne and David Cameron in the past.

So it’s hard not to be alarmed at his statement to the press that there is still “huge uncertainty” about what the British government’s negotiating position. Even Arlene Foster, the first minister in Northern Ireland, whose party, the DUP, is seen as an increasingly reliable ally for the Conservative government, could only really volunteer that “we’re in a negotiation and we will be in a negotiation and it will be complex”.

All of which makes Jeremy Corbyn’s one-liner in the Commons today that the government is pursuing neither hard Brexit nor soft Brexit but “chaotic Brexit” ring true.

It all adds to a growing suspicion that the government’s negotiating strategy might be, as Jacqui Smith once quipped of Ed Miliband’s policy review, something of “a pregnant panda – it's been a very long time in the making and no one's quite sure if there's anything in there anyway”.

That’s not the case – but the reality is not much more comforting. The government has long believed, as Philip Hammond put when being grilled by the House of Lords on the issue:

"There's an intrinsic tension here between democratic accountability of the government and effective negotiation with a third party. Our paramount objective must be to get a good deal for Britain. I am afraid will not be achieved by spelling out our negotiating strategy."

That was echoed by Theresa May in response to Corbyn’s claim that the government has no plan for Brexit:

 “We have a plan, which is not to give out details of the negotiation as they are being negotiated”

Are Hammond and May right? Well, sort of. There is an innate tension between democratic accountability and a good deal, of course. The more is known about what the government’s red lines in negotiations, the higher the price they will have to pay to protect. That’s why, sensibly, Hammond, both as Foreign Secretary during the dying days of David Cameron’s government, and now as Chancellor, has attempted to head off public commitments about the shape of the Brexit deal.

But – and it’s a big but – the government has already shown a great deal of its hand. May made three big reveals about the government’s Brexit strategy it in her conference speech: firstly, she started the clock ticking on when Britain will definitely leave the European Union, by saying she will activate Article 50 no later than 31 March 2017. Secondly, she said that Brexit meant that Britain would control its own borders. And thirdly, she said that Brexit meant that Britain would no longer be subject to the judgements of the European Court of Justice.

The first reveal means that there is no chance that any of 27 remaining nations of the European Union will break ranks and begin informal talks before Article 50 is triggered.

The second reveal makes it clear that Britain will leave the single market, because none of the four freedoms – of goods, services, capital or people – can be negotiated away, not least because of the fear of political contagion within the EU27, as an exit deal which allowed the United Kingdom to maintain the three other freedoms while giving up the fourth would cause increased pressure from Eurosceptics in western Europe.

And the third reveal makes it equally clear that Britain will leave the customs union as there is no way you can be part of a union if you do not wish to accept its legal arbiter.

So the government has already revealed its big priorities and has therefore jacked up the price, meaning that the arguments about not revealing the government’s hand is not as strong as it ideally would be.

The other problem, though, is this: Theresa May’s Brexit objectives cannot be met without a hard Brexit, with the only question the scale of the initial shock. As I’ve written before, there is a sense that the government might be able to “pay to play”, ie, in exchange for continuing to send money to Brussels and to member states, the United Kingdom could maintain a decent standard of access to the single market.

My impression is that the mood in Brussels now makes this very tricky. The tone coming out of Conservative party conference has left goodwill in short supply, meaning that a “pay to play” deal is unlikely. But the other problem is that, by leaving so much of its objectives in the dark, Theresa May is not really laying the groundwork for a situation where she can return to Britain with an exit deal where Britain pays large sums to the European Union for a worse deal than the one it has now. (By the way, that is very much the best case scenario for what she might come back with.) Silence may make for good negotiations in Brussels – but in terms of the negotiation that may follow swiftly after in Westminster, it has entirely the opposite effect. 

Stephen Bush is special correspondent at the New Statesman. His daily briefing, Morning Call, provides a quick and essential guide to British politics.