Golden Brown

The next Labour leader should learn the lessons of 1992, says Steve Richards.

Even at the end of a long leadership campaign, there is no clear sense that any of the candidates fully understands why Tony Blair and Gordon Brown won three elections, and there has been only a vague attempt to explain what went wrong. Yet until lessons are learned, positive and negative, Labour will struggle to win again. A key to Labour's victories after its calamitous defeat in 1992 was Brown's determined, ruthlessly disciplined development of an economic policy. It commanded wide support (for a time) and gave him space to increase public spending while redistributing fairly extensively.

As shadow chancellor in the early 1990s, Brown faced a nightmarish dilemma: voters did not want Labour to spend any more of their money and yet the decrepit public services were in need of huge investment. It has become fashionable to attack Brown for having been too dependent on tax receipts from the financial services industry to fund the increases in spending. But politicians, especially Labour ones, function in tiny amounts of space most of the time, and if anyone cares to look back at the public and media mood in the mid-1990s, few would argue that there was an alternative route. Nonetheless, by 2002, Brown was in a strong enough position to propose openly a tax rise to pay for big increases in spending on the National Health Service. This formed the centrepiece of the most popular Budget since polling began, even winning the backing of a majority of Conservative voters.

Brown's career peaked before his overwhelming desire to replace Blair led him to make some terrible misjudgements. But, for ten years, from 1992 to 2002, he was the biggest figure in British politics.

It is strange, therefore, that in the retelling of New Labour history, only passing reference is made to economic policy, and this is invariably done out of context. So Blair's memoirs refer fleetingly to the increased investment in public services as if it were a policy as peripheral as opening a new chip shop in Southend. In Peter Mandelson's account, the economy barely features until he gets to the dramas of the financial crisis of 2008-2009.

Labour ministers came and went, more interested in pouring poison into the ears of influential columnists about "reform", and the importance of remaining New Labour, than they were in advancing economic policy. (What was a Blairite economic policy? Actually, Blair answered that question in the postscript to his memoirs. It is the same as George Osborne's, which does not get the new Labour leader very far.)

Contrary to current mythology, Brown was more ambitious than Blair in what he sought to achieve in policy. And he shared with Blair an instinct that Britain was a centre-right country, but had a unique way of coping with it. His public narrative was apolitical. He spoke of Britishness, prudence, purpose, fairness and consensus - who could possibly be against any of this? Behind the narrative, he was taxing stealthily, targeting help on poorer areas and over time vastly increasing public spending. Only after the policies were implemented did he put the case for them; look in vain for arguments about increases in spending in 1997.

By 2005, Brown was retrospectively hailing increases that he did not argue for in advance. Working on the assumption that the British media would not report such arguments fairly, he adopted words and phrases that the Tory-supporting newspapers could not oppose. Crucially, he did not put the case for the 2002 tax increases during the 2001 election. It is true that he refused to rule out National Insurance increases - resisting pressure from some timid Blairites to do so - but that was as far as he went. Similarly, the decision to increase taxes on high earners was made only after the 2005 election. During that campaign, which culminated in Labour's third victory, he pledged not to increase income-tax rates.

The tax factor

The new Labour leader and shadow chancellor will face challenges similar to those that Brown confronted in 1992, and while it has become orthodox to cast the former PM as a disaster, the next Labour generation can learn much from him - especially his days in opposition. Consider that, for newspaper support, Labour can rely only on the Daily Mirror: hostility towards the party is similar to that of the early 1990s. Consider, too, the media consensus that any move to the left of David Cameron is a lurch back to the vote-losing ways of the 1980s. The papers are not as influential as they were, but their power to shape opinion remains significant.

Meanwhile, the new leader will face a coalition that has a political strategy as much as an economic one. Cameron and Osborne hope to propose tax cuts at the next election. They note that Margaret Thatcher won landslides, with little over 40 per cent of the vote, using a tax-cutting strategy. They might not be in a position to make such a move, but what if they are?

During the contest, most of the leadership candidates put the argument for higher taxes rather than spending cuts. There is a strong case for such a balance. But can Labour win an election on such a basis, and without the support of most newspapers? The question that Brown had no choice but to address in 1992 is back.

Steve Richards's book "Whatever It Takes" is published by Fourth Estate (£14.99). His series "The Brown Years" is running for another two Tuesdays at 9am on BBC Radio 4

This article first appeared in the 27 September 2010 issue of the New Statesman, The 50 people who matter

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The spread of Wahhabism, and the West’s responsibility to the world

In 2013, the European Union declared Wahhabism the main source of global terrorism. But it's not just a “Middle East problem”; it is our problem, too.

François Hollande’s declaration of war against Isis (also known as Islamic State) was, perhaps, a natural reaction to the carnage in Paris but the situation is now so grave that we cannot merely react; we also need sustained, informed and objective reflection. The French president has unwittingly played into the hands of Isis leaders, who have long claimed to be at war with the West and can now present themselves as noble ­resistance fighters. Instead of bombing Isis targets and, in the process, killing hapless civilians, western forces could more profitably strengthen the Turkish borders with Syria, since Turkey has become by far the most important strategic base of Isis jihadis.

We cannot afford to allow our grief and outrage to segue into self-righteousness. This is not just the “Middle East problem”; it is our problem, too. Our colonial arrangements, the inherent instability of the states we created and our support of authoritarian leaders have all contributed to the terrifying disintegration of social order in the region today. Many of the western leaders (including our own Prime Minister) who marched for liberté in Paris after the Charlie Hebdo massacre were heads of countries that, for decades, have backed regimes in Muslim-majority countries that denied their subjects any freedom of expression – often with disastrous results.

One of these regimes is Saudi Arabia. Despite its dismal human rights record, the kingdom has been central to western foreign policy in the Middle East since the 1970s and western governments have therefore tacitly condoned its “Wahhabisation” of the Muslim world. Wahhabism originated in the Arabian peninsula during the 18th century as an attempt to return to the pristine Islam of the Prophet Muhammad. Hence, Wahhabis came to denounce all later developments – such as Sufism and Shia Islam – as heretical innovations.

Yet this represented a radical departure from the Quran, which insists emphatically that there must be “no coercion in matters of faith” (2:256) and that religious pluralism is God’s will (5:48). After the Iranian Revolution, the Saudis used their immense wealth to counter the power of Shia Islam by funding the building of mosques with Wahhabi preachers and establishing madrasas that provided free education to the poor. Thus, to the intense dismay of many in the Muslim world, an entire generation has grown up with this maverick form of Islam – in Europe and the US, as well as in Pakistan, Jordan and Malaysia.

In 2013, the European Union declared that Wahhabism was the main source of global terrorism. It is probably more accurate, however, to say that the narrowness of the Wahhabi vision is a fertile soil in which extremism can flourish. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Wahhabi chieftains did indeed conduct violent military expeditions against the Shia but, during the 1930s, the Saudi kingdom abandoned military jihad and Wahhabism became a religiously conservative movement. Today, some members of the Saudi ruling class support Isis but the Grand Mufti has condemned it in the strongest terms. Like Osama Bin Laden, Isis leaders aim to overthrow the Saudi regime and see their movement as a rebellion against modern Wahhabism.

Military action in Syria will not extirpate Islamist extremism elsewhere. In order to be fully successful, President Hollande’s campaign must also include a review of domestic policy. France has signally failed to integrate its Muslim population. Most of the terrorists responsible for the atrocities of 13 November appear to have been disaffected French nationals. So, too, were the Kouachi brothers, who committed the Charlie Hebdo massacre, and Amedy Coulibaly, who hijacked the Jewish supermarket in January. All three lived in notoriously deprived suburbs of Paris and – evoking France’s colonial past – were of Algerian and Malian descent. Psychiatrists who have investigated people involved in the 9/11 plot and in subsequent attacks have found that these terrorists were not chiefly motivated by religion. Far more pressing has been the desire to escape a ­stifling sense of insignificance. Powerless at home, many of them alienated by the host culture, young Muslim men in the West are attracted by the strong masculine figure of the jihadi and the prospect of living in a like-minded community, convinced that a heroic death will give their lives meaning. 

As they debate the feasibility of British air strikes in Syria, some MPs have insisted that they must be accompanied by negotiation and diplomacy. Again, these cannot be conducted in a spirit of superior righteousness. There must be a recognition that the West is not the only victim of Muslim extremism. We seem curiously blind to this. Far more Muslims than non-Muslims have been killed by Isis, yet this is rarely mentioned. Two weeks before the Charlie Hebdo atrocities in January, the Taliban murdered 145 Pakistanis, most of them children; two days after it, Boko Haram slaughtered as many as 2,000 villagers in Nigeria. Yet, compared with the Paris attack, the media coverage in the West was perfunctory. There has been little acknowledgment that the refugees whom many would seek to exclude from Europe have experienced the horrors we saw in Paris on a regular basis in Syria or Iraq. Already we seem to have forgotten that more than 40 people in Beirut were killed by two Isis suicide bombers on 12 November.

This heedlessness – a form, perhaps, of denial – does not go unnoticed in the Muslim world. The Iraq War showed that a military campaign cannot succeed if it fails to respect the sensibilities of the local people. Western governments must understand that their ­nations bear considerable responsibility for the present crisis – Isis is, after all, the product of the ill-considered Iraq War. And, as long as we mourn only our own dead, we cannot escape the accusation – frequently heard in the developing world – that the West has created a global hierarchy in which some lives are more valuable than others.

Karen Armstrong is the author of “Fields of Blood: Religion and the History of Violence” (Vintage)

This article first appeared in the 26 November 2015 issue of the New Statesman, Terror vs the State