Remembrance of times past: RFA Fort George, one of the last of its class built at the Swan Hunter yard, launched in 1991 and was decommissioned last year. Photograph: John Kippin.
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All agog on the Tyne

Edward Platt returns to the north-east, where he lived as a boy. In Newcastle, he discovers brave ne

An enduring affection for English Journey – a book that its author, J B Priestley, described as a “rambling but truthful account of what one man saw and heard and felt and thought during a journey through England during the autumn of the year 1933” – was one of the reasons I set out last summer to revisit the parts of the country where I have lived, and when I arrived in Newcastle on a cold January morning, the back-handed tribute he had paid to the nature of life in the north-east was in my mind. “There is, you see, something bracing about the Tyne,” he wrote. “After you have seen it, you realise that it is not for the likes of us to be sorry for ourselves.”

My memories of Northumberland are predominantly of its empty moors and long, windswept beaches, rather than the pits and slums Priestley found so oppressive, yet I was expecting to discover that his observation remained as appropriate as ever. After all, the past half-century has not been easy for the north-east. When Priestley said that the inhabitants of Gateshead lived “in a workshop that has no work for them”, the region’s old industries were in severe yet temporary decline.

Today they have disappeared altogether and the north-east is attempting to forge a new identity in the middle of one of the most severe recessions since the slump that coincided with Priestley’s visit.

The three years that my family spent in Northumberland came between those two lows, and before an equally savage period of retrenchment in the 1980s. I had spent the first two years of my life in Essex, where I was born, but in 1970 my father got a job in Southampton working for a company called the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation or ICFC, which was a kind of national investment fund, set up by the clearing banks and the Bank of England at the end of the Second World War. In 1972 he was appointed to run the Newcastle office. ICFC’s aim was to provide long-term loans and “risk capital” to small- and medium-sized businesses that had no access to capital funding, and it placed great emphasis on its network of regional offices. In 1974, it ran a national advertising campaign with the strapline “A Man in the Field Is Worth Two in the City”, and in Newcastle it illustrated the ad with a photograph of my father standing in front of one of the city’s best-known landmarks.

Grey’s Monument stands in the middle of Grainger Town, the elegant city centre designed by a speculative builder in the 1830s as Newcastle entered its period of greatest prosperity. In 1722, Daniel Defoe had anticipated Priestley’s lament for the lost souls of the north-east when he bemoaned Newcastle’s “prodigious number” of poor people, but by the end of the 18th century the city had begun to change. The Literary and Philosophical Society, the city’s celebrated library, was founded in 1793 and moved into a listed building in 1825. In 1830 a local aristocrat named Earl Grey became prime minister. During his four years in office, he oversaw the abolition of slavery in the British empire and implemented the Great Reform Act, which scrapped the “rotten boroughs” and ensured parliamentary representation for the rapidly expanding cities of industrialised Britain. According to the inscription on the pedestal of his statue, Earl Grey “was the constant advocate of peace, and the fearless and consistent champion of civil and religious liberty”. The advert no doubt was intended to evoke favourable comparisons between the noble lord and the lean, dark-suited young man with the fashionably florid sideburns staring down into the camera.

I didn’t remember Grey’s Monument, but I knew it second-hand from the photograph that had found its way into a family album, and it seemed an obvious starting point for my attempt to explore a city I hardly knew. As I made my way down Grainger Street from Central Station, I passed Bigg Market, centre of the nightlife for which Newcastle has become so popular, and reached a plaque that offered a more sober appraisal of the city’s nature. I couldn’t unravel the logic of the legend in the central panel inlaid in the pavement – “The Past Is My Present To Your Future”, it said – but
I recognised the aptness of the two-word prose poems in the squares placed around it: “Of Now”, “Of Then”, “Of Women”, “Of Men”, “Of Stone”, “Of Steel”.

Until New Year, the protesters of the Occupy Newcastle movement had been encamped beneath Grey’s Monument, but the tents had gone and the square was empty apart from a scattering of weekday shoppers. The street that curled downhill towards the river was also named after Earl Grey, and it is often described as one of England’s finest. “As for the curve of Grey Street, I shall never forget seeing it to perfection, traffic-less on a misty Sunday morning,” John Betjeman said. “Not even Regent Street, even old Regent Street London, can compare with that descending subtle curve.” Priestley had been less impressed; he conceded that the centre of Newcastle had “a certain sombre dignity”, but it was “chiefly built of a stone that has turned almost a dead black”, and on a wet November evening in 1933, “the whole city seemed a black steaming mass”.

Evidently it had been cleaned since then. The stone of Grainger Town was a soft, pale gold in the morning sunlight, though its elegant streets and buildings sit within a city shaped by robust and unsentimental planning. In the 19th century, a railway viaduct was driven through the middle of the medieval castle that gave the city its name, leaving the remnants divided by the tracks, and recently motorways have been pushed through the centre. The bridges and viaducts that brace the city against the slope as it falls away towards the Tyne were another reminder that Newcastle is both the workshop and the showroom of the Industrial Revolution. Robert Stephenson built the early steam engine known as the Rocket in a factory in Forth Street, and he also built the bridge that provides a dramatic entrance to those arriving from the south. Earlier in the day, I had been sitting on the train, listening to a trio of Christian missionaries discussing a project in Malawi as Durham flickered past. Neither the sudden apparition of The Angel of the North nor the sight of a scrapyard stacked with cars and lorries had alerted me to our imminent arrival in the north-east’s pre-eminent city, and I was surprised when the train emerged from a cutting and I found myself looking down on the grey waters of the Tyne.

Priestley was particularly dismissive of Gates­head, Newcastle’s sister city, which lies on the south bank of the Tyne: he claimed that it had “fewer public buildings of any importance than any town of its size in the country”, but that changed after Lottery funds became available at the end of the 20th century. As we crossed the High Level Bridge, I caught a glimpse of the three landmark structures that have opened on the south bank of the Tyne in the past ten years, and when I reached the bottom of the hill on foot and passed beneath the huge stone ramparts of the Tyne Bridge I saw them from the level of the river. The linked chain of steel and glass mounds that make up Norman Foster’s Sage centre for the arts was directly opposite, and the Baltic Centre for Contemporary Art occupied a converted grain warehouse further downstream. The final part of Gateshead’s trio of grands projets was supplied by the tilted hemispheres of the Millennium Bridge, which provide a pedestrian link between Newcastle and Gateshead and complete a renovated riverscape to match the splendour of Grainger Town.

The development of the Quayside on the Newcastle bank was less dramatic, though the man who had overseen it maintained it was no less  complete. Alastair Balls is a quietly spoken 68-year-old Scotsman who began his career in Whitehall and rose to the post of senior economic adviser to the Treasury. While he was in London, he had met a delegation of miners who came south with “flat caps and begging bowls” in the late 1970s, and he remembered attending a funeral of an uncle at a Methodist chapel in south Tyneside where the women sat on one side and the men on the other.

Yet even though the north-east seemed a “cultural throwback” that did not put him off, after 15 years in London he decided he wanted to live somewhere “a bit grittier”, and he moved to Newcastle in 1983 to become northern regional director of the Transport and Environment departments.
Shortly afterwards, Margaret Thatcher visited a shipyard in the north-east and the workers turned their backs on her. “They still believed that they could build the best ships in the world,” Balls said, when I met him in the pub beside the Millennium Bridge on the Quayside. “They said they needed subsidy – but they could still build them. Unfortunately, it wasn’t true. No one wanted to buy them.”

Balls believes that two events galvanised the region: the opening of the Metrocentre in Gateshead, which is usually said to be Europe's largest shopping centre, and Nissan’s decision to build a car plant in Sunderland. The car plant may be located on Wearside but Geordies claim a stake in it as well, and it “acted as an enormous hike”. Production started in 1986 – the same year that the first phases of the Metrocentre opened – and a year later, Balls became director of the newly created Tyne and Wear Development Corporation. The regeneration of the Quayside was his main task. The wooden staves of the jetty were rotten and the adjacent warehouses had been used to store asbestos. Treacherous underfoot, stacked with carcinogenic debris and unused by shipping, it had fallen into “total dereliction”. It is now a kind of “urban park” and an integral part of the city, yet some say that the cultural and residential regeneration of the Tyne will not count for much unless its industrial sites are also revived.

After I left the Quayside, I travelled a mile downriver to the offices of a company called Shepherd Offshore in the old naval yard in the Walker area of the city. The naval yard once belonged to Armstrong Whitworth, and it was one of the most significant warship manufacturers in the world. “Armstrong brought the world vessels, and then artillery, and then put the two together,” Andy Williamson, Shepherd Offshore’s director of business development, told me as we sat in the boardroom looking out across the dock to the slow-moving water of the Tyne. “Basically, you had ships and guns and then guns on ships.”

Williamson used to work for the regional development agency, where he campaigned to keep the yards downriver zoned for industrial use, and his commitment to the task has continued since he joined Shepherd Offshore. The company is owned and run by two brothers called Bruce and Freddy Shepherd, who are part of an entrepreneurial working-class clan from the East End of Newcastle. Their father, who was a lorry driver, set up a transport business and acquired the family’s first riverside property. When the North Sea oil and gas industry developed in the 1970s, the Shepherds established a base for manufacturing and servicing offshore platforms, and as shipbuilding declined, they bought up more and more vacant land on the north bank of the Tyne.

Some people regard the Shepherds with unconcealed distaste, not least because of their tenure of Newcastle United Football Club. They owned the club in conjunction with the family of Sir John Hall, the property developer who built the Metrocentre, and had a plan to unite the local football, rugby, basketball and ice hockey teams in an entity that would exemplify the spirit of the “Geordie nation”. Yet Hall’s grandiloquent vision for the Newcastle Sporting Group did not catch the local imagination, and when he failed to get permission for an all-purpose stadium, he began to dispose of the parts of his sporting franchise. The Hall family retained a stake in the football club, but in 1997 Freddy Shepherd became chairman and John Hall passed on his shares to his son, Douglas. A year later, Freddy Shepherd and Douglas Hall suffered the embarrassment of being caught on a tape in a Spanish brothel by the News of the World’s “fake sheikh”, Mazher Mahmood, describing Newcastle women as “dogs” and mocking the club’s supporters for overpaying for its merchandise. The Shepherds have also been accused of mismanaging the club and plundering it for profit. After the businessman Mike Ashley bought Newcastle United from the Halls and the Shepherds in 2007, newspapers reported that the families had made £95.7m and £50.1m respectively on their investments, partly by virtue of being in charge when football clubs of Newcastle’s profile changed from local concerns to publicly listed companies.

Yet there is no shortage of people prepared to speak up for the Halls and Shepherds. One local businessman told me that John Hall’s initiative had inspired a new breed of entrepreneurs in the north-east, and Andy Williamson was naturally inclined to defend his employers, insisting that they are “local boys done good” who have reinvested heavily in their community. He said the Shepherds were the first to recognise the potential of the old shipyards on the Tyne. They bought the naval yard in 1986 and have since turned it into an industrial estate called the Offshore Technology Park, with tenants involved in oil and gas and deep-sea exploration, such as Wellstream and Duco. They have also bought up other sites downstream.

Williamson maintained that Shepherd Offshore and its “anchor tenants” have invested £120m in manufacturing capacity and new infrastructure on the north bank of the Tyne in the past 12 months alone – a figure that allows it to claim it is performing the “pump-priming role” usually taken by central governments.

He said he would let me see for myself, and we climbed into a Land Rover and set off past a ship loading up on the dock, where 250-tonne reels of coloured cable were stacked like giant spools of thread. The first sites we passed were still derelict, but work has begun on the Neptune shipyard downriver, which Shepherd Offshore bought in 2008. So far, it has invested £38m on renovating it, and two partially completed warehouses lie beyond its gates. The first is leased to an American company that had intended to use it as a turbine blade manufacturing plant until new owners put the plan on hold, and the second to a British firm called Bridon International, which is establishing a plant manufacturing steel and wire rope.

We passed another ship moored beside a new concrete “load-out pad” and stopped beside the dry dock where the Mauretania, which once held the record for the fastest Atlantic crossing, had been built; it was 217 metres long, 35 metres wide and 11 metres deep and it looked like an immense, drained swimming pool.

Further down the dock, a bumpy, mud-strewn path wound between the mountains of earth that have been collected for the task of filling in the other three dry docks in the Neptune yard. When the work is completed and Neptune’s 800-metre dock is added to the 900 metres of the Offshore Technology Park, the Shepherds’ holdings on the north bank of the Tyne will constitute what Williamson calls a major UK manufacturing supply base. “You’ve got a working river again – and if you look at where it was in the 1980s . . .”

The Tyne’s best-known shipyard, which lay at the end of the Shepherds’ holdings, was a reminder of the fate that had been averted. My father went to a ship launch at the Swan Hunter yard soon after he arrived in Newcastle but it was coming to the end of its productive life. After it was privatised in 1987, it was used as a base for offshore oil and gas platforms, but it couldn’t beat the competition from the Far East, and in April 2007 its cranes and floating docks were sold to one of India’s largest private-sector shipbuilders. The buildings and equipment beyond the fence that ringed the yard adjoining the eastern edge of Shepherd Offshore’s holding were demolished and the land was bought by the local council. All that is left of Swan Hunter today is a small company that provides engineering and design services from an office on the site.

The rows of terraced housing that abutted the retaining walls on the edge of the docks were a reminder of the intimate relationship that used to exist between local people and the shipyards, but Williamson saw no reason to despair. “We go to crisis meetings about the region losing its identity, but in the meantime we plough on and we manage to get quite a lot done,” he told me. He believes that the Tyne might one day generate work for 10,000 people – a fraction of the number it once employed, but nonetheless a “rising from the ashes” that has no parallel in the industrial heartlands of the Midlands where he was born. Yet its success is far from guaranteed: offshore wind could be the “biggest game-changer” that UK manufacturing has experienced in the past 50 years, but it will require central intervention, and since the coalition government announced in 2010 that it was scrapping the regional development agencies there has been little indication of a co-ordinated plan. “There is cause for concern, but we put our best foot forward,” Williamson said. “Build it and they will come. It’s been said before.”

The Shepherds’ acquisitions are not limited to properties on the Tyne. In 1993, they bought Mitford Hall, the 5,000-acre estate near the county town of Morpeth that had belonged to the Mitford family since the 11th century. In 2009, they confirmed their place among the city’s new aristocracy
by acquiring La Sagesse, a site in the Newcastle suburb of Jesmond that includes the listed home of Charles Mitchell, who began shipbuilding at the naval yard in Walker in 1852.

Yet the influence of Northumberland’s old families has not entirely faded, as the event that marked the beginning of the financial crisis made plain. It used to be said that most of Northumberland was owned by the Forestry Commission, the Duke of Northumberland and a handful of aristocratic families, including the Ridleys. Matthew White Ridley, the 4th Viscount Ridley, who died last month, was the elder brother of the late Conservative cabinet minister Nicholas Ridley. The 4th Viscount Ridley was chairman of Northumberland County Council between 1967 and 1979 and subsequently served as Lord Steward of the Household – an important role in the royal family.

His son, the science writer Matt Ridley, who is now the 5th Viscount Ridley, inherited the title and the family estate, Blagdon Hall, which lies ten miles north of Newcastle. By a less direct mechanism, he also inherited some of his father’s responsibilities for local concerns. The 4th Viscount was chairman of the Newcastle-based bank Northern Rock between 1988 and 1993 and his son was its non-executive chairman from 2004 to 2007, a time when it was pursuing what a Treasury select committee described as a “high-risk” business model that depended on raising funds from wholesale markets – essentially, large-scale interbank transactions. When the markets froze in 2007, it could not raise the money it needed to meet its short-term obligations and depositors rushed to withdraw their funds, making Northern Rock the first UK financial house in 150 years to suffer a “bank run”.

Nicholas Ridley was an outspoken advocate of the free market and Matt Ridley has always been equally sceptical of the value of regu­lation: he has said that “government is the problem not the solution” and described it as “a self-seeking flea on the backs of the more productive people of this world”. Yet, under his chairmanship, Northern Rock was forced to ask the Treasury for emergency credit. It was subsequently nationalised and split in two. The Treasury has kept control of the so-called bad bank, but in November last year it sold the “good bank” to Virgin Money for £747m – a loss to the taxpayer of at least £400m.

Matt Ridley declined to speak to me and Virgin Money would not talk about Northern Rock’s recent past. Alastair Balls, who is chairman of Northern Rock Foundation, the bank’s charitable arm, which had a great deal of money to dispense in the boom years, said they were right not to drag it up again, though others told me he was overestimating the blow to local pride constituted by its demise. Balls said that Northern Rock’s collapse had played out like “a Shakespearean tragedy”, and called it a “great enterprise which had got into difficulties, partly through reasons of its own making and partly for reasons beyond its control”, which seemed a generous interpretation.

A select committee report criticised Matt Ridley for failing “to act as an effective restraining force on the strategy of the executive members”, and he resigned from Northern Rock in October 2007. Yet his family’s wealth and connections ensure that he remains a powerful figure in Northumberland. Blagdon Hall, which has been in the White Ridley family since 1698, includes tenanted farms, residential and commercial properties and two coal mines, one of which figures in a new scheme intended to carry the process of “cultural regeneration” that began in Gateshead further north.

The architect Charles Jencks is using the spoil from the Shotton surface mine to create a “recumbent female figure” 34 metres high and 400 metres long. It will be the “world’s largest human form carved into the landscape”, and it will form the centrepiece of a 19-hectare “landform public park”, called Northumberlandia, that will bridge the division between “the rolling countryside of mid-Northumberland and the urban areas of south-east Northumberland and Newcastle”.

Northumberland’s premier aristocrats have produced a piece of landscape architecture of their own. The Alnwick Garden is a complex of formal gardens built around a water cascade on a 17-hectare site next to Alnwick Castle, ancestral home of the Duke of Northumberland. That Alnwick Castle is now best known as the stand-in for Hogwarts in the Harry Potter films is testament to the faintly fantastical nature of life in rural Northumberland. Another of the family’s properties is Syon Park, near Kew, the last privately owned stately home in London.

The Alnwick Garden has been called “the Versailles of the north” and it is said to be the largest and most expensive garden created in Britain since the Second World War. I walked round it with my wife and son two years ago when we were driving from Edinburgh to London, and I didn’t go back during this trip north. Instead, I caught the train to Morpeth, where I lived as a child.

The county town of Northumberland lies 21 miles north of Newcastle, halfway between Alnwick Castle and Blagdon Hall and two miles east of Mitford Hall. We moved there at short notice, and for a year we lived in a house on a 1950s estate near the station. A board on the far side of the road listed the exotic trees that had been planted in the adjoining arboretum and another listed the names of the streets beyond the entrance to the estate, but the difference between the worlds they represented was not as extreme as it initially seemed. The tarmac streets that wound past the houses on the estate seemed to follow the contours of the land as naturally as a trodden path winding through a wood.

We left the house when I was six and I had been back only once but, to my surprise, I found it without hesitation. The house was bigger than I remembered: it had two sitting rooms facing the unfenced front garden, and the woman who answered the door said they had turned the garage into an extra flat for her parents.

An elderly Indian man leaning on a stick and smoking a cigarette emerged from the house next door as I crossed the footbridge above the stream at the bottom of the road. It was market day and there were roadworks in the high street; a single lane of traffic was filtering past a small collection of stalls set up in a square. A woman selling home-made fudge told me that she remembered the market when it filled two car parks by the river, but “the lamb man” on the stall opposite had a longer perspective. Jimmy Bell’s family had been bringing sheep into Morpeth from their farm in East Wingate, ten miles to the north-west, for the past 400 years, and he saw no reason to bemoan a temporary dip in fortunes. Twelve years ago he began butchering his lambs and selling the meat directly to the public, but otherwise little had changed.

Our second house in Morpeth stood in a sloping garden halfway up a street called Kings Avenue, five minutes’ walk beyond the market. It was bigger and older than the other house, a large, square Victorian building three storeys high. An unframed canvas was propped on an easel in the sitting room and there were flowerpots in the conservatory facing the garden where I remember playing as a child. The solidity of its pale sandstone walls reminded me of the manor houses and farmhouses that some of my family’s friends used to rent on the rural estates around Morpeth and, indirectly, of the moors and beaches that many people still regard as Northumberland’s greatest prize.

On my way back to the station, I stopped on the lichen-encrusted bridge above the River Wansbeck, which burst its banks in 2008 and flooded the town. The water was low enough to show the footpaths on either side, but the branches pinned against the piers of the bridge testified to the force of a current that seemed to grow stronger as it swept past my first primary school, Goose Hill, which lay beyond a patch of empty land on the far bank. There was a solicitors’ firm at the end of the bridge called Wholley Goodings and a Union Jack was flying from one of the houses upstream.

My father would have stayed longer in Newcastle, but in 1975 he was persuaded to accept a job running a bigger office in Liverpool, and 25 years later ICFC – or 3i, as it had become – left as well. It had floated on the stock market in 1994, and once it began pursuing the quicker, larger returns its institutional shareholders required, it dismantled its network of regional offices. In effect, it had quit the field for the City, and my father was not alone in regretting the way it had abandoned its original remit. Lucy Armstrong, who went to work for 3i in Newcastle when she left university in 1989, said that its departure was seen as a bad sign at the time and is still regretted now. “People still talk about it – they say we want the old 3i back, or something like it,” she said. “That’s something you’ll hear a lot in this town.”

Armstrong left 3i in 1995, coincidentally the year my father retired, but she still lives in Newcastle, where she is chief executive of the Alchemists, a kind of consultancy that provides advice and support for “fast-growing, entrepreneurial companies that have reached a critical point in their development”. She is also director of the Confederation of British Industry’s council on small- and medium-sized enterprises – or private and family-owned businesses, as she prefers to call them. She believes that SMEs will play a vital role in driving the UK out of recession. “Crudely put, the government’s bust, the consumer’s bust, and only about 30 per cent of the FTSE-100 companies’ turnover is in the UK, so they’re not really British businesses,” she says. “So it has to be private and family businesses.”

This is one area where the north-east has an advantage: because there are now few public limited companies that maintain headquarters outside the south-east, the region is dominated by SMEs. That many of these are manufacturing and hi-tech engineering firms also counts in the north-east’s favour. Domestic demand is so weak that growth will be export-led; and it is not only thanks to Nissan that the north-east is the only region of the UK to boast a positive trade balance.

Others believe that the future will depend on kibs – knowledge-intensive businesses – in the “creative-media” field. Charlie Hoult, scion of a family that for four generations has run a business from a ten-acre complex of warehouses in Ouseburn called Hoults Yard, believes that Newcastle embodies the modish concept of “Ideopolis”, a city that requires no more than an airport, a university and good broadband connections to prosper. Hoults Yard is a case in point. Charlie was running a public relations business in London when he got “spat out by the financial crisis” of 2008, and came home to take on the family firm. Hoults Yard has been in the family since 1917. It was originally the base for a removals company and a pottery business set up by Charlie Hoult’s great-grandfather, but the pottery shut down in 1963 and 20 years later Pickfords absorbed the removals firm. It was Charlie’s father who had to find a use for “a large draughty space in a dodgy part of town”. He started letting units to photographers who placed more emphasis on heat than light and appreciated the site’s industrial character. When Charlie took over in 2009, he continued the process of converting the site’s warehouses into offices and studios, though he says he has been more forceful about presenting Hoults Yard as a “creative village” rather than a business park.

Alastair Balls has similar ambitions for his adopted town. When he arrived in Newcastle “people were still talking about the grand old days when there were ships floating down the Tyne and everyone turned out for the football match”. He believed that a “cultural transformation” was required. He was particularly concerned that Newcastle’s universities – an essential component of the Ideopolis – were “punching below their weight”, so he helped set up an educational and scientific charity, the Centre for Life, which now occupies a campus near the railway station designed by the ubiquitous Terry Farrell. Matt Ridley, who knows a great deal more about life sciences than he does about finance, was the founding chairman. The Centre for Life is a “centre of excellence” in the fields of genetics and stem-cell science. Its success is consistent with Newcastle’s determination to promote itself as a student town. In term time, students account for 5 per cent of the local population, and it is acknowledged that Newcastle must do more to retain graduates who are educated in the city.

It also has to provide more opportunities for its indigenous population. One recent growth area has exploited the distinctive Geordie accent. Priestley called it a “most barbarous, monotonous and irritating twang”, but it seems that I am far from alone in finding it easy on the ear, if the preponderance of call centres is any guide. Today, an estimated 60,000 people are employed in call centres in the north-east, or one in 20 of the local workforce. And yet few will be surprised by the conclusion of a report, published last year by Durham University, that such work is perceived as a “stopgap” at best, poorly paid and with little chance of advancement. However, even jobs like these are under threat.

In the past year, unemployment in the north-east has risen by 25 per cent, outstripping not only the relatively modest increases in London and the south-east but those in other parts of the north as well. House prices – that indispensable guide to the nation’s emotional and financial health, at least in the middle-class mind – confirm the north-east’s predicament. According to the Land Registry, house prices rose by 2.8 per cent in London in 2011 but in the north-east they fell by 7.1 per cent, making it the only region in the country where the average house costs less than £100,000. There is worse still to come for a region that is heavily dependent on public-sector employment: 94 per cent of the departmental spending cuts and 88 per cent of benefit reductions the government has announced have not yet been implemented, but already people are saying that things are worse than they have ever known them.

Ken Milor, who lives on the landmark Byker estate in the deprived East End of Newcastle from which the Shepherds originally came, has been unemployed for three years and he has had only one job interview in that time. Milor grew up in the old back-to-back houses that were demolished in the 1970s to make way for the estate, designed by the Swedish architect Ralph Erskine, and he still lives close to his old home. He began his career with a three-year apprenticeship at Swan Hunter, but since injuring his back at the age of 25 while working as a gardener, he has had paid work intermittently. In 1999, he launched the Millennium Jobs Scheme with the former footballer Peter Beardsley. The aim was to get 2,000 people into work, and he was the last to get a job. He worked as an events organiser for a year, and in 2001 he began volunteering for a project helping asylum-seekers.

The wider north-east has a relatively small black and ethnic-minority population compared to the rest of England, but Newcastle conforms with national trends: its population is 87.8 per cent white, on a par with the national average of 87.5 cent. A local councillor told me that the children at Byker Primary School speak 35 different languages. Nonetheless, Milor said that the East End did not have a “particularly diverse community” ten years ago and, given the way that asylum-seekers and refugees were characterised in the press, he had wanted to do his bit to ensure that the north-east’s reputation for hospitality was preserved.

Over the next eight years, he graduated to the role of principal project worker. “I was really proud of what I achieved,” he said when I met him in the church hall that houses the Byker Community Association. “I was just a lad from Byker. I didn’t have any qualifications, but I had a passion for helping, and I worked my way up.” In 2009, he was promised a three-year contract to continue his work but the funds ran out. He is still bitter about the way he was treated: “That was it – here’s the door, turn the light off on your way out. It wasn’t good.”

With his long record of voluntary work, however, Milor soon found himself running the Byker Community Association. “This is Cameron’s idea of the big society, and we’ve been doing it for years. The country couldn’t exist without it. I do 11-hour shifts here – I’ve got voluntary work coming out of my ears – but I can’t find paid work to save my life. I despise Thatcherism and its legacy, but this is worse. It’s reminiscent of the 1920s. It’s quite shocking.

The division between rich and poor is so extreme, and they pick on the weakest first. We’ve always prided ourselves on giving, and our government prides itself on taking from the most vulnerable. That’s Cameron’s Britain. I hope he can sleep at night. Because I can’t.”

I wanted to see the neighbourhood where he had spent his life, so we left the community centre and walked down the hill to the “Byker Wall” – the unbroken line of flats that forms the northern edge of the estate. Because it was designed partly to shield the interior from the noise and fumes from the traffic on the A193, its façade is pierced by only a few windows, but on the inside it is broken up by balconies and by the red, green and blue wooden cladding that colour-codes the estate, softening the assemblage of brick walls and concrete walkways. Byker was one of the products of T Dan Smith’s vision of turning Newcastle into the “Brasilia of the north”. Smith was the Labour leader of Newcastle City Council who went to prison in 1974 for corruption. One of the legacies of his rule was the enduring distrust of politicians and political structures that prompted the people of the north-east to reject John Prescott’s plan for a regional assembly in such convincing numbers in 2004. Yet Smith’s desire to clear the city’s slums and replace them with something better resulted in the striking architecture of places such as Byker, which was granted Grade II listed status in 2007.

Milor was pleased that Byker’s merits have been recognised, though he was dismissive of the “Perrier and croissant” lifestyle of the architect who proposed the listing and lived briefly in a flat in the Byker Wall. His attitude to the estate as a whole was no less ambivalent. He regretted the loss of the neighbourhood that he knew as a child and disliked the high-handed way the changes had been made, but welcomed the improvements in heating and sanitation, and recognised the wisdom of replacing the old back-to-back houses, which ran up and down the hill, with flats that run across the slope and command wide views of the city and the Tyne below. The taxi driver who took me to Byker said the houses on St Michael’s Mount were in the best location in the city, and the renovated garden of the church below the community centre enjoys the same commanding views. A circular timeline engraved on a sundial on the terrace identified landmarks in the city and the year in which they entered its history, but my eye was drawn inexorably to the shimmering trail of the Tyne and the interlocking loops, curves and ruled lines of the bridges that tie the cities of Newcastle and Gateshead together.

Milor said the view gave him goosebumps and that it was the Tyne Bridge that meant the most to him, as an old-school Geordie. Its semi-circular form and the phantom shapes of the great ships that had slipped into the water beneath it are an uncompromising demonstration of the engineering prowess that made Newcastle rich. By comparison, the newer structures seem fragile and meretricious, for they were generated during the debt-fuelled boom of the first part of the millenium, and are devoted to culture and leisure. But there is no doubt that Newcastle has undergone a transformation. The difficulties that lie ahead are as great as any it has faced, and yet the city I found seemed a brighter and stronger place than the one my father would have known, let alone the one that J B Priestley discovered.

Edward Platt is a contributing writer for the New Statesman. “City of Abraham”, his book about Hebron, will be published by Picador in September

This article first appeared in the 09 April 2012 issue of the New Statesman, Spring Double Issue

Andre Carrilho
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Putin's revenge

Twenty-five years after the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia is consumed by an insatiable desire for recognition as the equal of the USA.

President Trump meets President Putin. It’s the most eagerly awaited encounter in world politics. Will The Donald thaw the New Cold War? Or will he be trumped by “Vlad” – selling out the West, not to mention Ukraine and Syria?

The Donald v Vlad face-off comes at a sensitive moment for the Kremlin, 25 years after the demise of the USSR on Christmas Day 1991 and just before the centenary of the Russian Revolution. Were the heady hopes at the end of the Cold War about a new world order mere illusions? Was Mikhail Gorbachev an aberration? Or is Putin rowing against the tide of post-Cold War history? How did we end up in the mess we’re in today?

These are some of the questions that should be explored in Trump’s briefing book. He needs to get to grips with not only Putin, but also Russia.

 

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Today President George H W Bush’s slogan “new world order” sounds utopian; even more so the pundit Francis Fukuyama’s catchphrase “the end of history”. But we need to remember just how remarkable that moment in world affairs was. The big issues of the Cold War had been negotiated peacefully between international leaders. First, the reduction of superpower nuclear arsenals, agreed in the Washington treaty of 1987: this defused Cold War tensions and the fears of a possible third world war. Then the 1989 revolutions across eastern Europe, which had to be managed especially when national boundaries were at stake. Here the German case was acutely sensitive because the Iron Curtain had split the nation into two rival states. By the time Germany unified in October 1990, the map of Europe had been fundamentally redrawn.

All this was accomplished in a spirit of co-operation – very different from other big shifts in European history such as 1815, 1871, 1918 and 1945, when great change had come about through great wars. Amid such excitement, it wasn’t surprising that people spoke of a new dawn. This was exemplified by the unprecedented working partnership between the US and the USSR during the First Gulf War in the winter of 1990-91 to reverse Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Bush and Gorbachev agreed that they shared a set of “democratic” and “universal” values, rooted in international law and in co-operation within the United Nations.

The new order of course assumed the continued existence of the Soviet Union. Despite the USSR’s growing economic and political problems, no one anticipated its free fall in the second half of 1991. First came the August coup, an attempt by a group of anti-Gorbachev communist hardliners to take control of the Union. Their failed putsch fatally undermined Gorbachev’s authority as Soviet leader and built up Boris Yeltsin as the democratic president of a Russian republic that was now bankrolling the USSR. Then followed the independence declarations of the Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – and crucially Ukraine, which precipitated the complete unravelling of the Union. And so, on Christmas Day 1991, Gorbachev became history, and with him the whole Soviet era. It seemed like the final curtain on a drama that had opened in Petrograd in 1917. A grandiose project of forced modernisation and empire-building pursued at huge human and economic cost had imploded. The satellites in eastern Europe had gone their own way and so had the rimlands of historic Russia, from central Asia through Ukraine to the Baltic Sea. What remained was a rump state, the Russian Federation.

Despite all the rhetoric about a new world order, no new structures were created for Europe itself. Instead, over the next 15 years, the old Western institutions from the Cold War (the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union) were enlarged to embrace eastern Europe. By 2004, with the inclusion of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Nato and the EU reached the borders of Russia, less than 100 miles from St Petersburg.

Initially the West’s eastward expansion wasn’t a big problem. The Kremlin did not feel threatened by the EU because that was seen as a political-economic project. Nato had been repackaged in 1990 as a more political organisation. Indeed, four years later, Russia joined the alliance’s “Partnership for Peace”. And in 1997, when Nato announced its first enlargement to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Russia was invited to join the alliance’s new Permanent Joint Council. That same year, Russia became a member of the G8. In short, during the 1990s the consensual atmosphere of 1989-91 seemed to be maintained.

But Yeltsin failed to create a new Russia from the ruins of Soviet communism. Between 1989 and 1992, as the command economy disintegrated, inflation soared and national income fell by one-third – a crash as spectacular as those America and Germany had suffered in the early 1930s. The largest and fastest privatisation that the world had seen created a cohort of super-rich oligarchs. Crime and corruption became rampant, while millions of Russians were condemned to penury. “Everything was in a terrible, unbelievable mess,” Yeltsin’s adviser Yegor Gaidar later admitted. “It was like travelling in a jet and you go into the cockpit and you discover that there’s no one at the controls.”

Meanwhile, the proliferation of political parties resulted in chaos. Yeltsin managed to hang on, thanks to increasingly autocratic rule. In October 1993, after several months of wrangling over the balance of power between executive and legislature, he used army tanks to shell the parliament building in Moscow and imposed a new constitution built around a strong presidency. This and a succession of contrived referendums kept him in power for the rest of the decade. Finally, on New Year’s Eve 1999, an ill and exhausted Yeltsin orchestrated his own departure. Declaring that he would hand over to “a new generation” that “can do more and do it better” at the start of a new millennium, he said that he was conveying his powers to an acting president.

His designated successor was an apparently unassuming little man called Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.

***

Who was Putin? Where had he come from? Most immediately he had been prime minister since August 1999 – the sixth man to serve as Yeltsin’s premier. Yet he had made his career as a discreet outsider, often underestimated by those around him. In fact, he was a long-serving KGB officer: he joined in 1975, at the age of 23, entering a culture that would define his persona and outlook.

Crucially, the Gorbachev era was almost a closed book to Putin: he never experienced the intoxicating passions of reform politics within the USSR – perestroika, glasnost and demokratizatsiya – because he spent 1985 to 1990 as a case officer in Dresden in East Germany. To him, Gorbachev’s reforms signified destruction: an empire discarded and a country ruined. During the 1990s, as Putin rose through the ranks of the city administration of his home town St Petersburg and was then moved to Moscow, he witnessed the disastrous effects of chaotic privatisation, the erosion of Russia as a great power and the collapse of the national economy.

Out of the traumatic 1990s came Putin’s passion for a strong state. He spelled this out in a 5,000-word document entitled Russia on the Threshold of the New Millennium, published on the Soviet government website on 29 December 1999. In it, he stated bluntly that the Bolshevik experiment had totally failed. “Communism and the power of the Soviets did not make Russia into a prosperous country,” he wrote. It had been “a road to a blind alley which is far away from the mainstream of civilisation”.

Putin welcomed recent “positive changes”, especially the Russian people’s embrace of “supranational universal values” such as freedom of expression and travel, as well as “fundamental human rights and political liberties”. But he also highlighted traditional “Russian values”, especially patriotism – pride in “a nation capable of great achievements” – and “social solidarity”, which, he asserted, had “always prevailed over individualism”. He did not believe that Russia would become “a second edition of, say, the US or Britain, in which liberal values have deep historic traditions”. What he presented as “the new Russian idea” would be “an alloy or organic unification of universal general values with traditional Russian values which had stood the test of the times, including the test of the turbulent 20th century”.

Woven into Putin’s manifesto was a distinctive conception of his place in politics. He envisaged himself as a “statesman” in the Russian sense – meaning a builder and servant of the state, in a country where the state has always been seen as superior to society and the individual. He considered the true leader to be above mere electoral politics, occupying a more permanent position as the guardian of state interests. He looked back admiringly to the autocratic reformers of the late tsarist era – men such as Nicholas II’s prime minister Pyotr Stolypin – and had no time for Gorbachev and Yeltsin, who had both been submerged by democracy and had undermined the state.

Above all, he believed that Russia had to resume its rightful historic place as a “great power”. He considered the vicissitudes of the 1990s an aberration that had to be overcome. Adapting one of Stolypin’s celebrated phrases, he liked to say that the people did not need “great upheavals”. They needed “a great Russia” – with a “strong state” as the “guarantor of order” and the “main driving force” of any durable change.

The “acting president” was elected in his own right in March 2000 and won re-election in 2004 for another four years. During the 2000s Putin concentrated on kick-starting the economy, bringing the oligarchs of the Yeltsin era under firm control and building monetary reserves, aided by rising prices for Russia’s oil and gas. This enabled the country to survive the financial crisis of 2008 and stood in marked contrast to a decade earlier, when the Asian crash of 1997-98 led Russia to default on its foreign debt and devalue the rouble. In rebuilding prosperity and pride, Putin earned the gratitude of millions of Russians, scarred by the poverty and humiliations of the Yeltsin era.

Showing himself off as a military strongman, he targeted Chechnya, which had claimed independence in 1991. Yeltsin had failed to tame the anarchic north Caucasus republic in the Chechen War of 1994-96; Putin imposed direct Russian rule brutally in the first year of his presidency, reducing the Chechen capital, Grozny, to rubble in 2000.

Increasingly secure at home, he began to reassert Russian power in the international arena. Initially, this did not involve confrontation with the West. He co-operated with the US in the post-9/11 “war on terror”, though he didn’t support the toppling of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, abstaining from the Bush-Blair mission of forceful regime change. In 2003-2004 he protested but ultimately accepted the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the accession of the Baltic states into Nato and the EU – even if the Kremlin regarded them as part of Russia’s “near abroad”. In 2007, however, Washington’s plans for a Nato missile defence “shield” in eastern Europe (deploying interceptor missiles and radar tracking systems), officially justified as protection against “rogue states” such as Iran, prompted Russia to withdraw from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. This was part of the fabric of co-operation woven in 1990-91. Nevertheless, foreign policy wasn’t Putin’s priority in his first stint as president.

***


In 2008, after two terms in office, Putin was obliged under the constitution to step down from the presidency. Under a notorious job swap, however, he was elected as prime minister to the new (nominal) president, Dmitry Medvedev, who within months pushed through a law extending the term for future presidents from four to six years. Then, in September 2011, Putin announced that he would run for the presidency again.

For millions of Russians, this second job swap seemed a cynical power play. Putin won the election of March 2012, naturally – the Kremlin machine ensured that. Yet he gained only 64 per cent of the vote despite having no serious opposition. Rural areas run by local clans tied to him were easily manipulated, but in many big cities, including Moscow, he polled less than 50 per cent.

The 2012 election campaign was the moment when Putin’s conception of the statesman-strongman collided with the democratic expectations of Russia’s perestroika generation, now coming of age. It marked a crunch point in the history of post-Soviet Russia – a clash between different models of the country and its future. Ranged against Putin were those whom the opposition leader Vladimir Ryzhkov, of the liberal People’s Freedom Party, called the new “mass middle class”, formed over the previous two decades. Taking to the streets in protest against the Putin-Medvedev “tandem” were managers, engineers, journalists, lawyers, IT specialists and the like. For these people, Putin had passed his sell-by date. After his announcement that he wanted another term in the Kremlin, images circulated on the internet of an aged Putin dissolving into the geriatric visage of Leonid Brezhnev – whose near-two decades in office symbolised the “era of stagnation” that Mikhail Gorbachev had swept aside.

Social media was transforming urban Russia. Between 2008 and 2012 internet penetration among the over-16s doubled from 25 per cent to 50 per cent. Russia had its own version of Facebook: VKontakte. The Kremlin’s alarm at the upsurge of virtual opposition and street protest was intensified by the Arab spring in 2011. Much international comment highlighted the role of a young “Facebook Generation” in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, fostering a “digital democracy” that toppled long-standing autocrats – supposedly financed and supported by Washington. Putin liked to claim that the protests in Russia had also been stirred up and/or funded by the then US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton. Little wonder that one of his priority projects after winning the 2012 election was refining a sophisticated system of internet surveillance known as Sorm, run from part of the old secret-police headquarters of Lenin’s Cheka and Stalin’s KGB in Lubyanka Square, Moscow. With that in mind, the oppositionist Ryzhkov declared that even though Russian society was now very mature and “European”, the regime was “still Chekist-Soviet”. This, he said, was the “main contradiction” in contemporary Russia.

The domestic protests and the Arab spring threatened Putin’s determination to rebuild Russia’s position in the world and consolidate its sphere of influence in the “near abroad”. He focused on a “Eurasian Union”, an idea first touted in the 1990s by some central Asian states, notably Kazakhstan, but picked up in earnest by Putin after 2011. Yet, for him, the crux of a viable Eurasian bloc lay in the west, not the east: in Ukraine, with 45 million people, a strong industrial base, and its critical geopolitical position. Putin didn’t just see Ukraine as Russia’s historic “borderland”. Celebrating Kievan Rus – the original east Slavic state of the 9th to 13th centuries – he insisted that Kyiv was “the mother of Russian cities”. Keeping Ukraine within Moscow’s sphere of influence was a red-line issue for the Kremlin.

That line was crossed in February 2014. For a decade Ukraine – an ethnically fractured country (78 per cent Ukrainian; 17 per cent Russian) – had hovered between Russia and the West, depending on the latest change of leaders in this corruption-riddled state. In November 2013 the Russia-leaning Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, stalled Ukraine’s long-discussed “association” agreement with the European Union. Thousands of pro-EU protesters surged into Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv.

In the face of repressive police measures, the mass demonstrations continued for three months and spread across the country, including the Crimea, where Russians were the majority, bringing Ukraine to the brink of civil war. Yanukovych fled Kyiv for Russia on 21 February 2014. The next day Putin began a campaign of retaliation, culminating in the forcible annexation of the Crimea, rubber-stamped by a referendum in which (officially) 96.77 per cent of the Crimean electorate voted to join Russia.

For the West, Putin had finally overstepped the mark, because the Crimea had been part of Ukraine since 1954. Putin claimed that the Russian inhabitants of the region were invoking the right to “self-determination”, just like the Germans during unification in 1990, or the Albanians in Kosovo in 1999 when seceding from Yugoslavia. But in the West, Russia’s military intervention in an independent state was condemned as a flagrant breach of international law. The US and the EU imposed political and economic sanctions against Russia, precipitating a financial crisis and a collapse of the stock market. By the spring of 2016 the rouble had fallen 50 per cent in two years. This was coupled with a halving of the price of oil, on which Russia’s economy depends. The country slid into recession, reversing the economic success of the president’s first stint in power.

Yet the slump does not appear to have damaged his domestic popularity severely. The state-controlled media whipped up patriotic fervour: Russia v the West. And Putin – the “History Man”, as Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy dub him in their book Mr Putin – has deliberately constructed his own version of the recent past to justify his actions. Playing on the trauma and humiliation of the Soviet break-up, he appealed to national pride, touching the emotions of millions of Russians.

Putin has presented his intervention in the Crimea (and subsequently eastern Ukraine) as an assertion of Russia’s right as “an independent, active participant in international affairs”. In a major policy statement on 18 March 2014, he harked back to the era of “bipolarity” as a source of “stability”, arguing that America’s arrogant attempts after 1991 to create a “unipolar” world, exacerbated by Nato’s progressive enlargement, had pushed his country into a corner.

It was not just that Kyiv’s turn towards the EU threatened to detach Ukraine from Russia and its “Eurasian” sphere; talk about actually joining Nato raised the spectre of the Western military alliance being “right in our backyard” and on “our historic territory”. Putin conjured up the prospect of Nato warships entering the Black Sea and docking in Sevastopol, that “city of Russia’s military glory” – a “real threat to the whole of southern Russia”. Enough was enough, he declared: “If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard.”

***

 

To Western eyes the story looked very different. The enlargement of the EU and Nato was driven less from Brussels and Washington than by the desire of eastern European countries to escape from the clutches of “the Bear”. Putin had tolerated the loss from Russia’s “near abroad” of Warsaw Pact states from Poland to Bulgaria, but the Baltic states (former Russian imperial territory) were a very different matter. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had won their independence from the tsarist empire after the First World War, only to be absorbed into the Soviet Union after the Second World War. For the Balts, 1991 therefore represented the rebirth of freedom and statehood; they saw membership of the institutional West – the European Union and Nato – as an essential guarantee of national security.

Nato has become a “four-letter word” for Russia and one can argue that, ideally, the “new world order” should have been based on new institutions. But in 1989-90 the persistence of Nato was essential to allay European fears, not least in the USSR, about a unified Germany at the heart of the continent. There was no discussion at this moment about Nato’s further extension beyond Germany, let alone a firm pledge that it would not. Contrary to Putin’s assertions, an expansionary blueprint did not exist.

Whatever the arguments about ­history, however, relations between Russia and the West are deadlocked. So are we in a “New Cold War”, as touted by the Russian government since Dmitry Medvedev’s speech to the Munich Security Conference in February 2016? In fundamental ways: no. Russia and America are not engaged in an all-encompassing global power struggle, military, political, economic, cultural, ideological. The new Russia is essentially capitalist and fully integrated into the world economy, with a multitude of trade and financial links with the West.

Despite bellicose rhetoric at the top, Russian and US diplomats talk and work together behind the scenes, not least in the recent selection of a new UN secretary general, António Guterres. Above all, the language of “unipolarity” and “bipolarity” no longer reflects the reality of international affairs: a “multipolarity” of world powers, a profusion of “non-state actors” capable of terrorism and warfare, and potent transnational forces, notably mass migration – all of which are deeply destabilising. This is very different from the Cold War.

Amid this new world disorder, today’s Russian-American stand-off revolves around differing approaches to international relations. Putin’s policy is rooted in traditions of great-power politics: the control of territory and the assertion of state sovereignty, especially within what Russia regards as its historic sphere. By contrast, the United States, albeit erratically, has promoted humanitarian interventionism, pursued regime change and indulged in the rhetoric of global democracy, especially since the 9/11 attacks.

So, why the divergence? One can say that the West has failed to pay consistent attention to Russia’s sensitivities about its post-Soviet decline. Nor has it given due recognition to the reality of Russia as a great Eurasian power. On the other side, Putin has increasingly pulled his country out of the network of co-operative political forums and agreements forged with the West in the aftermath of the Cold War. He has also challenged the independence of small states on Russia’s periphery. Today, abandoning any vestiges of entente with America, Putin seems to believe that Russia can regain its great-power status only by distancing itself from the West and by overtly challenging the US in hot spots around the world. This is very different from the world imagined by Bush and Gorbachev and pursued to some degree by Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin. Putin is undoing what he sees as a “democratic” peace, made to Russia’s geopolitical disadvantage in 1989-91.

Take Syria: Putin knew that Barack Obama had no stomach for wholesale military intervention on such a fragmented battleground, where few direct US interests are at stake. As an appalling human tragedy has unfolded, especially in Aleppo, Putin has exploited his free hand by despatching Russia’s sole (Brezhnev-era) aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, to Syrian waters and building a Russian airbase near the key port of Latakia. US passivity has allowed him to establish a novel, if tenuous, military presence in the eastern Mediterranean and thereby to strengthen his position in the Middle East as a whole.

On the Baltics, Washington drew a firm line last summer: Nato’s Warsaw summit in July 2016 committed Alliance troops and aircraft to each of these states by way of a token but unequivocal act of deterrence. Putin responded by further beefing up the Russian short-range nuclear arsenal in Kaliningrad. This tit-for-tat in the Baltic Sea area is likely to spiral.

In the standoff over Ukraine – where Russia has done nothing to end the fighting – the Americans have been content to let Angela Merkel take the lead in trying to broker a peace deal. While playing tough in the Baltic, she has kept open channels of communication with Putin over Ukraine. Significantly, the president has not spurned her offer to talk. The two can converse without interpreters, in German and in Russian; Merkel seems to be one of the few foreign leaders for whom Putin entertains a certain respect, if only because she recognises Russia’s need to be taken seriously.

Nevertheless, all these various power plays reflect essentially conventional ways by which Putin seeks to unpick 1989-91. More significant is the Kremlin’s increasingly aggressive avant-garde methods of combating the Western “bloc” of liberal democracies – by manipulating transnational financial and commercial ties, spinning the global media and steering policy discourse in target states. Russia can leverage its relative weakness if it cleverly exploits its post-Cold War immersion within the global capitalist system and Western popular culture as a kind of “Trojan Horse” .This is what Putin’s personal adviser Vladislav Surkov has termed “non-linear war”.

It is no secret that, in this vein, Moscow used cyber-power in an attempt to mould American opinion during the 2016 presidential election campaign. For all the media hype about hacked computer systems and leaked emails, the Kremlin’s information warfare is not that innovative. After all, the underlying concepts and most of the techniques were developed by the USSR (and equally by the United States) to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs during the Cold War. Let’s not forget that the young Mr Putin was schooled in KGB Dresden.

So, although we may not be back in the era of bipolarity, some of the new ways are also old ways. Under Putin, Russia seems to have resumed its historic quest for position against the West and its insatiable desire for recognition as America’s equal. Will it ever be possible to forge a stable “alloy” blending “universal” and “Russian” values? That would truly be a Russian revolution. l

Kristina Spohr (London School of Economics) and David Reynolds (Cambridge) are the co-editors of “Transcending the Cold War” (Oxford University Press)

This article first appeared in the 12 January 2017 issue of the New Statesman, Putin's revenge