Why is tax avoidance a reason for letting people off tax?

Tax dodging, the Laffer curve, and the 50p rate

The reason given for cutting the 50p rate of tax to 45p was avoidance. It wasn't clearly phrased as such – most of the talk was about how it had raised less money than expected, or had changed behaviour in ways that harmed growth – but that is what it was nonetheless. To many, this will seem strange. "You avoided tax, so we will make you pay less". But it is an integral part of the line of thought that lies behind the cut.

Art Laffer first made the argument that cutting tax rates could boost revenue. The reasoning is broadly that, when the marginal tax rate (the amount you pay on each extra pound earned) gets too high, people start doing things to reduce their taxable income.

The palatable version is that they work less, because an extra hour of work no longer pays as well as it did, and this is probably true; there are certainly anecdotal tales of highly paid consultants turning down work later on in the year to spend more time at home.

The less palatable version is that they avoid more tax, because spending the money and effort required to set up a limited company, be paid "overseas", or funnel your income through a Swiss bank account in the name of your dog becomes more worthwhile the more it saves you.

Both of these "behavioural changes" are factored in to the Laffer curve, the rough prediction of how much revenue will be gained at various marginal tax rates. HMRC produced three such curves, each based around a different "taxable income elasticity" (TIE), a measure of how much an individual's behaviour changes given the tax rate:

They based their analysis around a TIE of 0.45 (a figure basically plucked from thin air – HMRC admit the evidence to choose is "extremely limited", and the studies they cite range from -0.6 to 2.75), which showed a peak of revenue at around 48 per cent. Quite why this then led the Chancellor to cut the rate to three per cent below that is unclear. If he wanted to raise revenue, his own analysis is showing that he's done it wrong.

The problem is, one thing which affects the TIE is the ease with which one can avoid tax. Make tax avoidance harder, TIE goes up, and the peak revenue rate increases. In fact, given the anti-avoidance measures announced at the budget yesterday, TIE will already be higher than it was at the time of the analysis, boosting the argument for keeping the 50p rate.

There is one massive category of avoidance which can't be cited as a reason for cutting the rate, however. The HMRC's stats show that £6.6bn less income was declared in 2010-11 due to it being "forestalled" – paid the year before, so as to take advantage of the lower rate. This is avoidance on a massive scale (Richard Murphy points out that it is £1.6bn more than the estimation for all tax avoidance in 2011), yet, contra Tim Worstall, it has no bearing on the decision on whether or not to cut the rate, because it can only ever be done once. 

By cutting the tax so early in its life, Osborne has ensured that we make the decision unable to know the full effect of cutting it. We can guess at how much will have been raised for the 2011-12 tax year, when forestalling was harder (although not impossible, and HMRC warn that it "continues to reduce revenues in 2011-12 and beyond"), but by the time we know for sure, it will be too late. The 45p tax will be in, and there won't be a "normal" year of the 50p rate to compare it to.

Tax dodging is an emotive issue. Credit: Getty

Alex Hern is a technology reporter for the Guardian. He was formerly staff writer at the New Statesman. You should follow Alex on Twitter.

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Britain has built a national myth on winning the Second World War, but it’s distorting our politics

The impending humiliation of Brexit is going to have a lot more in common with Suez.

The Crown, Peter Morgan’s epic drama covering the reign of Elizabeth II, ended its first series with a nemesis waiting just off-stage to shake up its court politics. In the final episode, Egyptian president Gamal Nasser gives a rip-roaringly anti-imperialist – and anti-British – speech. The scene is set for the Suez Crisis to be a big plot point in Season 2.

Suez has gone down in history as the great foreign policy debacle of postwar Britain. The 1956 crisis – which saw Israel, France and Britain jointly invade Egypt to take control of the Suez Canal, only to slink off again, nine days later, once it became clear the US wasn’t having any of it – is seen as the point at which it became clear that even the bigger states of Europe were no longer great powers in the world. “President Eisenhower’s humiliation of Britain,” Jack Straw wrote in his 2012 memoir, “had been total.”

This was, though, a fairly limited sort of humiliation. Britain was not invaded or occupied; there was no sudden collapse in living standards, let alone a significant body count. Our greatest national debacle is nothing more than the realisation that Britain could no longer do whatever it wanted without fear of reprisal. As humiliations go, this one’s up there with the loss of status men have faced from the rise of feminism: suddenly, Britain could do what it wanted a mere 80 per cent of the time.

The Crown begins in 1947, when Prince Philip gives up his Greek and Danish royal titles and becomes a British subject, so that he can marry Princess Elizabeth. That year saw another British foreign policy debacle, one on which the show remains oddly silent. In the partition which followed India’s independence from the British Empire, 70 years ago this week, upwards of a million people died; in the decades since, the borders drawn up at that time have been the site of numerous wars, and Kashmir remains a flashpoint.

All this, one might think, might count as a far bigger regret than Suez – yet it doesn’t feature in the national narrative in the same way. Perhaps because partition was about the withdrawal of British forces, rather than their deployment; perhaps it’s simply that it all happened a very long way away. Or perhaps we just care less about a body count than we do about looking bad in front of the Americans.

I think, though, there’s another reason we don’t talk about this stuff: the end of empire is hidden behind a much bigger part of our national myth. In the Second World War, Britain is undeniably one of the good guys; for 12 months, indeed, Britain was the only good guy. Never mind that it still had the largest empire the world had ever seen to fall back on: Britain stood alone.

The centrality of the Second World War to the national myth warps our view of history and our place in the world in all sorts of ways. For starters, it means we’ve never had to take an honest account of the consequences of empire. In a tale about British heroes defeating Nazi villains, British mistakes or British atrocities just don’t fit. (Winston Churchill’s role in the 1943 Bengal famine – death toll: three million – by ordering the export of Indian grain to Britain rarely comes up in biopics.) In this dominant version of the national story, the end of empire is just the price we pay to defeat fascism.

More than that, our obsession with the Second World War creates the bizarre impression that failure is not just heroic, but a necessary precursor to success. Two of the most discussed elements of Britain’s war – the evacuation of Dunkirk, and the Blitz – are not about victory at all, but about survival against the odds. The lesson we take is that, with a touch of British grit and an ability to improvise, we can accomplish anything. It’s hard not to see this reflected in Brexit secretary David Davis’s lack of notes, but it’s nonsense: had the Russians and Americans not arrived to bail us out, Britain would have been stuffed.

Most obviously, being one of the winners of the Second World War infects our attitude to Europe. It’s probably not a coincidence that Britain has always been both one of the most eurosceptic EU countries, and one of the tiny number not to have been trampled by a foreign army at some point in recent history: we don’t instinctively grasp why European unity matters.

Once again, Suez is instructive. The lesson postwar France took from the discovery that the imperial age was over was that it should lead a strong and unified Europe. The lesson Britain took was that, so long as we cosied up to the US – Athens to their Rome, to quote Harold Macmillan – we could still bask in reflected superpower.

Until recently, Britain’s Second World War obsession and national ignorance about empire didn’t really seem to affect contemporary politics. They were embarrassing; but they were also irrelevant, so we could cope. Brexit, though, means that hubris is about to run headlong into nemesis, and the widespread assumption that Britain is a rich, powerful and much-loved country is unlikely to survive contact with reality. India will not offer a trade deal for sentimental reasons; Ireland is not a junior partner that will meekly follow us out of the door or police its borders on our behalf. The discovery that Britain is now a mid-ranking power that – excepting the over-heated south-east of England – isn’t even that rich is likely to mean a loss of status to rival Suez.

Morgan says he has planned six seasons of The Crown. (This looks entertainingly like a bet the Queen will be dead by 2021; if not, like Game of Thrones before it, he might well run out of text to adapt.) It’ll be interesting to see how the show handles Brexit. It began with the royal family facing up to a vertiginous decline in British power. As things stand, it may have to end the same way. 

Jonn Elledge edits the New Statesman's sister site CityMetric, and writes for the NS about subjects including politics, history and Brexit. You can find him on Twitter or Facebook.

This article first appeared in the 17 August 2017 issue of the New Statesman, Trump goes nuclear