The economy: hurting, yes. Working, maybe - but for whom?

Growth that doesn't fix the squeeze on living standards poses a challenge to all parties.

Ken Clarke, the cabinet minister with responsibility for giving mildly revealing interviews, has given a mildly revealing interview to the Daily Telegraph. The item that has grabbed most headlines is the acknowledgement that the government is unlikely to legislate to create a tax break for married couples this parliament. That is disappointing to the Conservative right but not entirely surprising. Tax cuts are a very precious political commodity; the Lib Dems are opposed to this particular one and would demand something juicy in return. The Tory leadership is happy to do those sorts of deals in theory but is not wedded enough [sorry, no pun intended] to the idea of a marriage allowance to squander coalition negotiating capital on it.

Also interesting is Clarke’s line on the economy:

If we are back to strong growth by the next election, we probably won’t need to campaign. If at the next election, the economy is in strong normal growth, George Osborne will be given the Companion of Honour or something and we will all get safe back.

Clarke adds, of course, that such a scenario is supremely unlikely and that a more plausible campaign for the Tories in 2015 is one that advertises them as having a “safe hand on the tiller.” That, along with dark warnings against prematurely handing responsibility for the economy back to Labour – and especially Ed Balls - is bound to be the outline of the Conservative pitch at the next election.  

The news last Thursday that the economy has formally exited recession has opened up a whole new school of political speculation – how does the return of growth change things? This is peculiar in a way because no-one expected the economy to shrink forever. Some recovery was always in prospect. What matters in economic terms is how robust it is. Some pessimists are forecasting a slump back into negative territory – a “triple dip” – most analysts expect weak growth whose benefits will not be widely felt.

Yet politically, Thursday’s positive number has made a difference. There are two reasons for that.

First, Labour MPs and shadow ministers – as I noted in my column last week – were already fretting about their apparent lack of a “fair weather” strategy. The previous week’s relatively buoyant employment figures provoked an attack of nerves, with some anxious consideration of the prospect that the Tory plan might really be working – or be superficially yet plausibly presentable as working. That is really a subset of anxiety about Ed Balls’s handling of the role of shadow chancellor. Broadly speaking he has called the macro-economics of the past two years right. For that he gets a lot of credit in Labour ranks – and among some non-partisan economists. He forecast a double dip and there was one.

But politically he has failed to stick the blame for that recession firmly on the coalition. Opinion polls show a gradual shift on the question of who is more trusted to run the economy – away from the Tories and towards Labour. But given the predictable mid-term dip experienced by any administration and the empirical fact that George Osborne inherited a growing economy and promptly shrank it, the Conservative ratings on the economy are – from Labour’s point of view – shockingly, depressingly good.

The whispering against Balls in the Labour ranks is that he has gambled too much on being vindicated by economics and has misplayed the politics. No-one wants the opposition to be ghoulishly willing the economy to fail. And if, come 2015, it is growing, no-one will be much impressed by a retrospective and unprovable claim that it might have grown sooner and better had the Tories not cut too far too fast in the early stages of the parliament.

That leads to the second obstacle facing Labour, which is psychological as much as political. It is the problem of cognitive dissonance. This is the phenomenon that leads people to unconsciously ignore or reject evidence that challenges a prejudice, because doing so is less painful than recognising and owning up to a fault. In this case, the Liberal Democrats, the Tory-inclined media and quite a few people who voted Conservative all have a profound emotional investment in Ed Balls having been wrong all along. That need will, in most cases, far outweigh the reasonable argument that – in a purely dispassionate account of the economic evidence – he was right. More generally, swing voters who backed coalition parties will be marginally predisposed to give Osborne some economic benefit of the doubt because they don’t want to think – or be told – that ejecting  Labour was an error and that the problems we now face are, to some extent, their own fault.

All of that means that Labour needs to be relentlessly focused on the future. To be fair, Ed Miliband seems to understand this. A crucial point – and an area of great danger for the Tories – is that a return to growth will not end the squeeze on living standards for people in middle of the income scale and below. This recovery will be unlike the bounce back from past recessions. Real wages and the purchasing power of many voters will still feel as if they are shrinking.

Later this week, the Resolution Foundation - the politically neutral think tank that has done more than any institution in Britain to define and highlight the “squeezed middle”  phenomenon – publishes the final report of its Commission on Living Standards. This is an epic piece of work that has drawn testimony and data from a wider range of expert individuals and institutions over the past 18 months. The report will look at various scenarios that might evolve over the next few years and the policy priorities implied by those outcomes. It will be a big mid-week story and makes, from what I have heard, uncomfortable reading in various ways for all political parties.

One thing we already know from past analysis by Resolution and others, such as the IFS, is that many people who consider themselves middle class and who generally expect a growing economy to make them feel more prosperous will reach the next election feeling discernibly poorer than they were in 2010. The political hazard for the Tories is that, even if they try to avoid triumphalism, they will be addressing the electorate with a message that says, in essence, “it hurt but it’s working” and the public will respond by saying “you say it, but it sure as hell doesn’t feel that way to us.” Or, worse, they will think “working for whom, exactly? You and your rich mates, perhaps, but not for us.”

Understanding that feeling and turning it into support for a different, fairer account of the future under Labour is Ed Miliband’s goal. The question for him and his shadow chancellor is whether or not the pursuit of that target means moving on from the big macro-economic argument of the past two years. It is a painful proposition, especially for Ed Balls. Perhaps he was right all along; perhaps no-one cares.

Good economic news puts the Labour under pressure. Source: Getty

Rafael Behr is political columnist at the Guardian and former political editor of the New Statesman

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Stop saying identity politics caused Trump

It's a wildly unsophisticated analysis that ignores the fact that all politics is inflected by identity.

Look, I don't mean to be funny, but is there something in the water supply? When Mark Lilla wrote his jeremiad against "identity liberalism" in the New York Times, it was comprehensively picked over and rebutted. But this zombie take has risen again. In the last 24 hours, all these tweets have drifted across my timeline:

And then this (now deleted, I think, probably because I was mean about it on Twitter).

And finally, for the hat-trick . . .

Isn't it beautiful to see a Blairite, a Liberal Leaver and a Corbynite come together like this? Maybe there is a future for cross-spectrum, consensual politics in this country.

These are all versions of a criticism which has swilled around since Bernie Sanders entered the US presidential race, and ran on a platform of economic populism. They have been turbocharged by Sanders' criticisms since the result, where he blamed Clinton's loss on her attempt to carve up the electorate into narrow groups. And they are now repeated ad nauseam by anyone wanting to sound profound: what if, like, Black Lives Matter are the real racists, yeah? Because they talk about race all the time.

This glib analysis has the logical endpoint that if only people didn't point out racism or sexism or homophobia, those things would be less of a problem. Talking about them is counterproductive, because it puts people's backs up (for a given definition of "people"). She who smelt it, dealt it.

Now, I have strong criticisms of what I would call Pure Identity Politics, unmoored from economics or structural concerns. I have trouble with the idea of Caitlyn Jenner as an "LGBT icon", given her longstanding opposition to gay marriage and her support for an administration whose vice-president appears to think you can electrocute the gay out of people. I celebrate female leaders even if I don't agree with their politics, because there shouldn't be an additional Goodness Test which women have to pass to be deemed worthy of the same opportunities as men. But I don't think feminism's job is done when there are simply a few more female CEOs or political leaders, particularly if (as is now the case) those women are more likely than their male peers to be childless. Role models only get you so far. Structures are important too.

I also think there are fair criticisms to be made of the Clinton campaign, which was brave - or foolish, depending on your taste - to associate her so explicitly with progressive causes. Stephen Bush and I have talked on the podcast about how hard Barack Obama worked to reassure White America that he wasn't threatening, earning himself the ire of the likes of Cornel West. Hillary Clinton was less mindful of the feelings of both White America and Male America, running an advert explicitly addressed to African-Americans, and using (as James Morris pointed out to me on Twitter) the slogan "I'm With Her". 

Watching back old Barack Obama clips (look, everyone needs a hobby), it's notable how many times he stressed the "united" in "united states of America". It felt as though he was trying to usher in a post-racial age by the sheer force of his rhetoric. 

As Obama told Ta-Nehisi Coates during his last days in office, he thought deeply about how to appeal to all races: 

"How do I pull all these different strains together: Kenya and Hawaii and Kansas, and white and black and Asian—how does that fit? And through action, through work, I suddenly see myself as part of the bigger process for, yes, delivering justice for the [African American community] and specifically the South Side community, the low-income people—justice on behalf of the African American community. But also thereby promoting my ideas of justice and equality and empathy that my mother taught me were universal. So I’m in a position to understand those essential parts of me not as separate and apart from any particular community but connected to every community."

Clinton's mistake was perhaps that she thought this caution was no longer needed.

So there are criticisms of "identity politics" that I accept, even as I wearily feel that - like "neoliberalism" - it has become a bogeyman, a dumpster for anything that people don't like but don't care to articulate more fully.

But there are caveats, and very good reasons why anyone pretending to a sophisticated analysis of politics shouldn't say that "identity politics caused Trump".

The first is that if you have an identity that any way marks you out from the norm, you can't change that. Hillary Clinton couldn't not be the first woman candidate from a major party running for the US presidency. She either had to embrace it, or downplay it. Donald Trump faced no such decision. 

The second is that, actually, Clinton didn't run an explicitly identity-focused campaign on the ground, at least not in terms of her being a woman. Through the prism of the press, and because of the rubbernecker's dream that is misogyny on social media, her gender inevitably loomed large. But as Rebecca Solnit wrote in the LRB:

"The Vox journalist David Roberts did a word-frequency analysis on Clinton’s campaign speeches and concluded that she mostly talked about workers, jobs, education and the economy, exactly the things she was berated for neglecting. She mentioned jobs almost 600 times, racism, women’s rights and abortion a few dozen times each. But she was assumed to be talking about her gender all the time, though it was everyone else who couldn’t shut up about it."

My final problem with the "identity politics caused Trump" argument is that it assumes that explicit appeals to whiteness and masculinity are not identity politics. That calling Mexicans "rapists" and promising to build a wall to keep them out is not identity politics. That promising to "make America great again" at the expense of the Chinese or other trading partners is not identity politics. That selling a candidate as an unreconstructed alpha male is not identity politics. When you put it that way, I do accept that identity politics caused Trump. But I'm guessing that's not what people mean when they criticise identity politics. 

Let's be clear: America is a country built on identity politics. The "all men" who were created equal notably excluded a huge number of Americans. Jim Crow laws were nothing if not identity politics. The electoral college was instituted to benefit southern slave-owners. This year's voting restrictions disproportionately affected populations which lean Democrat. There is no way to fight this without prompting a backlash: that's what happens when you demand that the privileged give up some of their perks. 

I don't know what the "identity politics caused Trump" guys want gay rights campaigners, anti-racism activists or feminists to do. Those on the left, like Richard Burgon, seem to want a "no war but the class war" approach, which would be all very well if race and gender didn't intersect with economics (the majority of unpaid care falls squarely on women; in the US, black households have far fewer assets than white ones.)

Those on the right, like Daniel Hannan, seem to just want people banging on about racism and homophobia to shut up because he, personally, finds it boring. Perhaps they don't know any old English poetry with which to delight their followers instead. (Actually, I think Hannan might have hit on an important psychological factor in some of these critiques: when conversations centre on anti-racism, feminism and other identity movements, white men don't benefit from their usual unearned assumption of expertise in the subject at hand. No wonder they find discussion of them boring.)

Both of these criticisms end up in the same place. Pipe down, ladies. By complaining, you're only making it worse. Hush now, Black Lives Matter: white people find your message alienating. We'll sort out police racism... well, eventually. Probably. Just hold tight and see how it goes. Look, gay people, could you be a trifle... less gay? It's distracting.

I'm here all day for a discussion about the best tactics for progressive campaigners to use. I'm sympathetic to the argument that furious tweets, and even marches, have limited effect compared with other types of resistance.

But I can't stand by while a candidate wins on an identity-based platform, in a political system shaped by identity, and it's apparently the fault of the other side for talking too much about identity.

Helen Lewis is deputy editor of the New Statesman. She has presented BBC Radio 4’s Week in Westminster and is a regular panellist on BBC1’s Sunday Politics.