The Supreme Court ruling which could break, or save, the internet

Do you "copy" a website just by reading it?

Last August, I wrote about the High Court ruling which could break the internet. The Newspaper Licensing Agency, which exists to grant licenses to organisations — mainly media monitors — which need to make copies of newspapers, had taken a PR company called Meltwater to court. Meltwater's crime was realising that, rather than photocopying papers and sending them to clients (which undoubtedly requires a license), they could just send them links instead.

Clearly that breaks the NLA's business model, and the agency took Meltwater to court, arguing that even the link-sharing model was a breach of copyright. Astonishingly, they won, with two arguments which betrayed a complete lack of understanding about how the internet works, and which, if they become an accepted part of UK case law, threaten the backbone of social interaction online.

The first argument the NLA made was that the act of sharing a link with a headline was itself potentially infringing on copyright. The judge concurred, arguing that crafting a newspaper headline takes skill and that this headline must be a protected work in its own right.

Traditionally, titles of creative works aren't copyrightable (although they may be trademarkable) which is why, for instance, there are multiple films called the Last Stand and multiple songs called the Look of Love. The ruling effectively makes newspaper headlines into very short poems — which may be true for some, but is unlikely to be the case for most.

The second argument was that, since the act of viewing a webpage involves creating a copy of it on your computer, Meltwater and their clients had infringed the implied license granted by the newspapers, and had to pay for an explicit right to read the content.

Quite apart from the fact that that argument is on shaky legal ground — European case law calls for a temporary copy exemption which covers precisely that type of use — it is also entirely at odds with how the internet works. It is akin to saying that, because you have to make a copy of a book on your retinas to read it, you could be sued for copyright infringement if you breach the "implicit license" that it's not to be read on holiday.

The rulings were appealed once, to the High Court, where both were upheld, and Meltwater — which has been joined by the PR industry's trade body, the PRCA — are now appealing to the Supreme Court. Sadly, they have dropped their objection to the first point of law, which means that newspaper headlines remain copyrighted and that, theoretically, you could be sued for tweeting a link to a piece with its headline if you don't have a license.

On the second point, however, the PRCA is appealing, and argues (correctly) that:

A temporary copy created on the screen of a computer simply as a technical necessity to allow the user to read the article should be considered to be within the temporary copying exception from copyright law. Reading a work should not be considered unlawful simply because one reads the work on a computer or other device as opposed to in print.

The NLA argues that the ruling is unlikely to affect anyone outside their business, but the language of the High Court's judgement is too open for that to be the case. Hopefully the Supreme Court will see sense, and dial back the power it has given copyright holders in favour of internet users nationwide. The case begins on Monday.

A sad mac. Photograph: Etsy/pixelparty

Alex Hern is a technology reporter for the Guardian. He was formerly staff writer at the New Statesman. You should follow Alex on Twitter.

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7 problems with the Snooper’s Charter, according to the experts

In short: it was written by people who "do not know how the internet works".

A group of representatives from the UK Internet Service Provider’s Association (ISPA) headed to the Home Office on Tuesday to point out a long list of problems they had with the proposed Investigatory Powers Bill (that’s Snooper’s Charter to you and me). Below are simplified summaries of their main points, taken from the written evidence submitted by Adrian Kennard, of Andrews and Arnold, a small ISP, to the department after the meeting. 

The crucial thing to note is that these people know what they're talking about - the run the providers which would need to completely change their practices to comply with the bill if it passed into law. And their objections aren't based on cost or fiddliness - they're about how unworkable many of the bill's stipulations actually are. 

1. The types of records the government wants collected aren’t that useful

The IP Bill places a lot of emphasis on “Internet Connection Records”; i.e. a list of domains you’ve visited, but not the specific pages visited or messages sent.

But in an age of apps and social media, where we view vast amounts of information through single domains like Twitter or Facebook, this information might not even help investigators much, as connections can last for days, or even months. Kennard gives the example of a missing girl, used as a hypothetical case by the security services to argue for greater powers:

 "If the mobile provider was even able to tell that she had used twitter at all (which is not as easy as it sounds), it would show that the phone had been connected to twitter 24 hours a day, and probably Facebook as well… this emotive example is seriously flawed”

And these connection records are only going to get less relevant over time - an increasing number of websites including Facebook and Google encrypt their website under "https", which would make finding the name of the website visited far more difficult.

2. …but they’re still a massive invasion of privacy

Even though these records may be useless when someone needs to be found or monitored, the retention of Internet Connection Records (ICRs) is still very invasive – and can actually yield more information than call records, which Theresa May has repeatedly claimed are their non-digital equivalent.

Kennard notes: “[These records] can be used to profile [individuals] and identify preferences, political views, sexual orientation, spending habits and much more. It is useful to criminals as it would easily confirm the bank used, and the time people leave the house, and so on”. 

This information might not help find a missing girl, but could build a profile of her which could be used by criminals, or for over-invasive state surveillance. 

3. "Internet Connection Records" aren’t actually a thing

The concept of a list of domain names visited by a user referred to in the bill is actually a new term, derived from the “Call Data Records" collected by hone companies. Compiling them is possible, but won't be an easy or automatic process.

Again, this strongly implies that those writing the bill are using their knowledge of telecommunications surveillance, not internet era-appropriate information. Kennard calls for the term to be removed form the bill. or at least its “vague and nondescript nature” made clear.

4. The surveillance won’t be consistent and could be easy to dodge

In its meeting with the ISPA, the Home Office implied that smaller Internet service providers won't be forced to collect these ICR records, as it's a costly process. But this means those seeking to avoid surveillance could simply move over to a smaller provider. Bit of a loophole there. 

5. Conservative spin is dictating the way we view the bill 

May and the Home Office are keen for us to see the surveillance in the bill as passive: internet service providers must simply log the domains we visit, which will be looked at in the event that we are the subject of an investigation. But as Kennard notes, “I am quite sure the same argument would not work if, for example, the law required a camera in every room in your house”. This is a vast new power the government is asking for – we shouldn’t allow politicians to play it down.

6. The bill would allow our devices to be bugged

Or, in the jargon, used in the draft bill, subjected to “equipment interference”. This could include surveillance of all use of a phone or laptop, or even the ability to turn on its camera or webcam to watch someone. The bill actually calls for “bulk equipment interference” – when surely, as Kennard notes, “this power…should only be targeted at the most serious of criminal suspects" at most.

7. The ability to bug devices would make them less secure

Devices can only be subject to “equipment interference”, or bugging, if they have existing vulnerabilities, which could also be exploited by criminals and hackers. If security services know about these vulnerabilities, they should tell the manufacturer about them. As Kennard writes, allowing equipment interference "encourages the intelligence services to keep vulnerabilities secret” so they don't lose their own access to our devices. Meanwhile, though, they're laying the population open to hacks from cyber criminals. 


So there you have it  – a compelling soup of misused and made up terms, and ethically concerning new powers. 

Barbara Speed is a technology and digital culture writer at the New Statesman and a staff writer at CityMetric.