An anti-Saudi Arabia protester outside the embassy in Tehran. Photo: Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty
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In Iran today the Great Satan is no longer the United States: it's Saudi Arabia

When I talked to Iranian policymakers last year, they told me US hegemony in the Middle East and global affairs is giving way to a multipolar order - and with it come new enemies.

It is over three decades since Iranian students stormed the US embassy in Tehran crying, “Death to America!” The embassy complex still stands, but it now serves as a training complex for the Revolutionary Guard. Next to memorials to Ayatollah Khomeini and the “martyrs of the revolution” is the “Den of Spies” museum. One highlight on display there is the “glassy room” – a room US diplomats would go to for top-secret conversations. It is a suspended box made of Plexiglas, with transparent walls, floors and ceiling that make it impossible to conceal bugs. The hope of the great powers is that the historic deal struck with Iran on 13 July will make the country’s nuclear programme as transparent and as contained as this.

If the agreement is ratified by the US Congress – given Republican hostility, this cannot be taken for granted – it will, it is hoped, stop Iran from covertly developing nuclear weapons and avert a bombing raid by Washington or Tel Aviv. However, even if the deal is passed, there will be little hope for peace in a region that is already in flames: witness Libya, Syria and Yemen. How will a nuclear deal affect this instability?

The nightmare scenario is one of “Tehran unbound”: a situation where all constraints are lifted and an emboldened Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard are allowed to wreak havoc in the region with impunity. The question is whether the EU and the US – which have successfully negotiated the deal that lifts sanctions on Iran but places strict limits on its nuclear programme – can influence Iran’s regional policies more effectively with engagement than they have done with containment. Or could Iran eventually even play a constructive role in the region?

It is an open question. Visitors to Tehran are always struck by the dizzying complexity of Iranian politics and society. The paradox of 1979’s religious revolution is that it has given birth to the most secular society in the region. More than 70 per cent of Iranians were not even born when the revolution took place, and they are self-consciously more pragmatic, moderate and open to the west than any of their peers in the Middle East. But in terms of its role within the region, Iran is one of the leaders of a violent sectarian conflict; and its leaders are enjoying the new space that has been accorded to them by the toppling of Saddam, the Taliban, and by western mistakes in the region.

George W Bush’s war on terror set off a chain of events that is now putting irresistible pressure on the states created after the First World War. Borders that the US has guaranteed in the post-colonial era are now dissolving and new units – such as Kurdistan and Islamic State – are emerging from the ruins. If you want to find out about the decline of US power in the Middle East, go to Tehran. Few chant “Death to America” these days, and when such chants are heard they come across as more of a nostalgic echo than a rallying cry for Iran’s future.

When I talked to Iranian policymakers last year, they told me US hegemony in the Middle East and global affairs is giving way to a multipolar order. The Great Satan for them is no longer the United States – it is Saudi Arabia. Iranians complain about the Saudis drilling more to reduce oil prices and weaken Tehran; they are concerned about the enhanced military co-operation between members of the Gulf Co-operation Council, oriented against Iran; and about Saudi Arabia challenging them in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria.

In Riyadh I find an exact mirror image of those suspicions. Saudis are obsessed with Iranian activism in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. The geopolitical tussle between these two nations is emblematic of a new Middle East where emancipated local powers are battling it out. Order is no longer defined and defended by Washington. Instead, the US is seen as a resource that Tehran and Riyadh can manipulate in their struggle against one another.

So, what role can the US and EU hope to play in this new Middle East? For the US, the challenge of getting the deal through Congress will demand that Obama go to great lengths to reassure Riyadh and Tel Aviv it is not abandoning them in its links to Tehran or its pivot to Asia. It can continue to co-ordinate its strikes against Isis with Tehran but will be wary about being seen to be getting too cosy with Ayatollah Khamenei.

But Europe, for which the stakes are even higher than for the US, is less constrained in its ability to reach out to different players. As Ellie Geranmayeh argues in an interesting policy paper, Engaging With Iran: a European Agenda, there is a unique chance to construct a regional strategy on the foundations of the Iran nuclear deal.

The EU high representative Federica Mogherini has an opportunity to build on the nuclear talks by quickly opening an EU embassy in Tehran and exploring how economic links could lead to a bilateral détente. More importantly, she should explore whether the “E3+1” grouping – of France, Germany, the UK and the EU – could be reconfigured from having a nuclear focus to one pushing for regional peace. The agenda should be to try, over time, to find ways of reducing tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This could involve confidence-building on Yemen, co-ordination of the anti-Isis campaign in Iraq and Syria, and discussing other thorny issues such as Hezbollah’s role, or even relations with Israel.

There are limits to what can be achieved in the short term. Both Tehran and Riyadh are enjoying their moment in the sun and for both sides the rewards outweigh the risks. However, the successful conclusion of the Iranian nuclear deal showed the power of strategic patience. The challenge now will be to show the same level of diplomatic creativity in a quest for peace. For Europe and the US – as well as for the regional powers locked in a conflict that neither side can win – the hope must be to contain the conflict before the whole region gets sucked into a Thirty Years War.

Mark Leonard is the co-founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations

This article first appeared in the 16 July 2015 issue of the New Statesman, The Motherhood Trap

Photo: Getty Images
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The future of policing is still at risk even after George Osborne's U-Turn

The police have avoided the worst, but crime is changing and they cannot stand still. 

We will have to wait for the unofficial briefings and the ministerial memoirs to understand what role the tragic events in Paris had on the Chancellor’s decision to sustain the police budget in cash terms and increase it overall by the end of the parliament.  Higher projected tax revenues gave the Chancellor a surprising degree of fiscal flexibility, but the atrocities in Paris certainly pushed questions of policing and security to the top of the political agenda. For a police service expecting anything from a 20 to a 30 per cent cut in funding, fears reinforced by the apparent hard line the Chancellor took over the weekend, this reprieve is an almighty relief.  

So, what was announced?  The overall police budget will be protected in real terms (£900 million more in cash terms) up to 2019/20 with the following important caveats.  First, central government grant to forces will be reduced in cash terms by 2019/20, but forces will be able to bid into a new transformation fund designed to finance moves such as greater collaboration between forces.  In other words there is a cash frozen budget (given important assumptions about council tax) eaten away by inflation and therefore requiring further efficiencies and service redesign.

Second, the flat cash budget for forces assumes increases in the police element of the council tax. Here, there is an interesting new flexibility for Police and Crime Commissioners.  One interpretation is that instead of precept increases being capped at 2%, they will be capped at £12 million, although we need further detail to be certain.  This may mean that forces which currently raise relatively small cash amounts from their precept will be able to raise considerably more if Police and Crime Commissioners have the courage to put up taxes.  

With those caveats, however, this is clearly a much better deal for policing than most commentators (myself included) predicted.  There will be less pressure to reduce officer numbers. Neighbourhood policing, previously under real threat, is likely to remain an important component of the policing model in England and Wales.  This is good news.

However, the police service should not use this financial reprieve as an excuse to duck important reforms.  The reforms that the police have already planned should continue, with any savings reinvested in an improved and more effective service.

It would be a retrograde step for candidates in the 2016 PCC elections to start pledging (as I am certain many will) to ‘protect officer numbers’.  We still need to rebalance the police workforce.   We need more staff with the kind of digital skills required to tackle cybercrime.  We need more crime analysts to help deploy police resources more effectively.  Blanket commitments to maintain officer numbers will get in the way of important reforms.

The argument for inter-force collaboration and, indeed, force mergers does not go away. The new top sliced transformation fund is designed in part to facilitate collaboration, but the fact remains that a 43 force structure no longer makes sense in operational or financial terms.

The police still have to adapt to a changing world. Falling levels of traditional crime and the explosion in online crime, particularly fraud and hacking, means we need an entirely different kind of police service.  Many of the pressures the police experience from non-crime demand will not go away. Big cuts to local government funding and the wider criminal justice system mean we need to reorganise the public service frontline to deal with problems such as high reoffending rates, child safeguarding and rising levels of mental illness.

Before yesterday I thought policing faced an existential moment and I stand by that. While the service has now secured significant financial breathing space, it still needs to adapt to an increasingly complex world. 

Rick Muir is director of the Police Foundation