A poster encouraging a Yes vote in the coming referendum. Photo:Getty Images
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It's apathy, not shy No voters, that may sink the Republic of Ireland's equal marriage referendum

The Republic of Ireland is on the brink of making history this week. But a low turnout could still sink the Yes side.

On Friday, Ireland will become the first country to hold a referendum on whether to legalise same sex marriage. Polling shows the Yes campaign to be garnering massive support. Not only is Ireland likely to introduce same sex marriage but it will do so with the mass backing of its people. All the major political parties are backing same sex marriage. Now they just need to get over the last hurdles to make it a reality and insert same sex marriage into the Irish constitution.

Numerous commentators have raised the possibility of inaccurate polling, comparing the polling on the referendum to the polling on the recent UK general election. While it is doubtless that there are shy no voters, just as there were shy Tories, it is likely that there is not enough of them to sway the vote significantly. The polls surrounding the UK election where somewhat different. Rather than showing a significant lead for one side, as the Irish marriage referendum polls do, they showed both sides at around the same levels of support. Support for same sex marriage in Ireland on the other hand is polling at 70 per cent compared to 30 per cent against, once the undecided have been removed. Only 13 per cent are claiming to be undecided, an insignificant number that is not going to cause a massive upset although may cause the gap between yes and no to narrow. Another major poll shows support at 69 per cent when the undecided are included and 73 per cent when they’re excluded.  

The so called ‘shy no voter’ is inevitable in a referendum on something like this. It’s a topic that is highly charged and passionately argued about, it’s inevitable that some no voters would rather keep their vote to themselves. Some of the major parties have been lobbying their members who may be against or undecided on Friday. Those affiliated to Fianna Fáil are most likely to vote no, polling figures range from 42 per cent to 47 per cent voting against. However Fianna Fáil has attempted to garner support among its members. Yesterday evening they sent out an email to members explaining clearly and simply what the referendum was about, why it was important and addressing common concerns about the same sex marriage such as the issue of surrogacy and adoption. Fianna Fáil’s leader Micheál Martin has also advocated the Yes vote relentlessly during the campaign. During a recent interview with Vincent Browne he dismissed the issues surrounding the referendum, arguing that ‘The question is simple: who may marry and who may not marry – nothing more’. The shy no voter is not likely to be the Yes campaigns biggest challenge, the undecided aren’t a significant number and parties are attempting to address fears as well as they can. 

The biggest challenges for the Yes campaign will be getting out the Yes vote on the day. If they are to realise anywhere near their polling figures, it is vital that people are not apathetic about the referendum and don’t assume that polling figures means that the referendum will pass with ease and they don’t need to vote. This has previously been a problem in Irish referendums. The initial Nice Treaty referendum suffered from an extremely low turnout, only 34 per cent, and the no vote triumphed. However a referendum on the same Treaty, with some further assurances from Europe on issues such as military neutrality, saw turnout at almost 50 per cent and passed, the no vote stagnating but the yes vote grew substantially with almost twice the number of people voting for the Nice Treaty. This suggests that turnout was a major factor in the Nice Treaty referendum rather than a serious objection to the content.  Polling data suggests that getting out the vote will be particularly important as voter turnout is usually higher among older age groups and those in the 65 and older category are most likely to vote against same sex marriage. 18 to 24 year olds are the most likely to vote Yes however they are also less likely to vote. In the last push before voting opens, these are the voters that must be inspired and convinced that their vote matters.

The possibility of Ireland being the first country to legalise same sex marriage by popular vote is something for Ireland to be very proud of. Once same sex marriage is a part of the constitution it is protected from easy changes and can only be altered by another referendum. The biggest hurdle now will be to get out the vote, particularly those who may not normally vote but feel strongly about same sex marriage. This is far more important than worrying about shy no voters or the possible inaccuracies of opinion polls. History has shown that low turnout can sway referendums in ways that the majority of the population didn’t necessarily want such as with the Nice Treaty. If people vote and don’t take the Yes vote support for granted, then Friday will be a historic moment for Irish politics. 

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Brexit has opened up big rifts among the remaining EU countries

Other non-Euro countries will miss Britain's lobbying - and Germany and France won't be too keen to make up for our lost budget contributions.

Untangling 40 years of Britain at the core of the EU has been compared to putting scrambled eggs back into their shells. On the UK side, political, legal, economic, and, not least, administrative difficulties are piling up, ranging from the Great Repeal Bill to how to process lorries at customs. But what is less appreciated is that Brexit has opened some big rifts in the EU.

This is most visible in relations between euro and non-euro countries. The UK is the EU’s second biggest economy, and after its exit the combined GDP of the non-euro member states falls from 38% of the eurozone GDP to barely 16%, or 11% of EU’s total. Unsurprisingly then, non-euro countries in Eastern Europe are worried that future integration might focus exclusively on the "euro core", leaving others in a loose periphery. This is at the core of recent discussions about a multi-speed Europe.

Previously, Britain has been central to the balance between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, often leading opposition to centralising eurozone impulses. Most recently, this was demonstrated by David Cameron’s renegotiation, in which he secured provisional guarantees for non-euro countries. British concerns were also among the reasons why the design of the European Banking Union was calibrated with the interests of the ‘outs’ in mind. Finally, the UK insisted that the euro crisis must not detract from the development of the Single Market through initiatives such as the capital markets union. With Britain gone, this relationship becomes increasingly lop-sided.

Another context in which Brexit opens a can of worms is discussions over the EU budget. For 2015, the UK’s net contribution to the EU budget, after its rebate and EU investments, accounted for about 10% of the total. Filling in this gap will require either higher contributions by other major states or cutting the benefits of recipient states. In the former scenario, this means increasing German and French contributions by roughly 2.8 and 2 billion euros respectively. In the latter, it means lower payments to net beneficiaries of EU cohesion funds - a country like Bulgaria, for example, might take a hit of up to 0.8% of GDP.

Beyond the financial impact, Brexit poses awkward questions about the strategy for EU spending in the future. The Union’s budgets are planned over seven-year timeframes, with the next cycle due to begin in 2020. This means discussions about how to compensate for the hole left by Britain will coincide with the initial discussions on the future budget framework that will start in 2018. Once again, this is particularly worrying for those receiving EU funds, which are now likely to either be cut or made conditional on what are likely to be more political requirements.

Brexit also upends the delicate institutional balance within EU structures. A lot of the most important EU decisions are taken by qualified majority voting, even if in practice unanimity is sought most of the time. Since November 2014, this has meant the support of 55% of member states representing at least 65% of the population is required to pass decisions in the Council of the EU. Britain’s exit will destroy the blocking minority of a northern liberal German-led coalition of states, and increase the potential for blocking minorities of southern Mediterranean countries. There is also the question of what to do with the 73 British MEP mandates, which currently form almost 10% of all European Parliament seats.

Finally, there is the ‘small’ matter of foreign and defence policy. Perhaps here there are more grounds for continuity given the history of ‘outsourcing’ key decisions to NATO, whose membership remains unchanged. Furthermore, Theresa May appears to have realised that turning defence cooperation into a bargaining chip to attract Eastern European countries would backfire. Yet, with Britain gone, the EU is currently abuzz with discussions about greater military cooperation, particularly in procurement and research, suggesting that Brexit can also offer opportunities for the EU.

So, whether it is the balance between euro ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, multi-speed Europe, the EU budget, voting blocs or foreign policy, Brexit is forcing EU leaders into a load of discussions that many of them would rather avoid. This helps explain why there is clear regret among countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, at seeing such a key partner leave. It also explains why the EU has turned inwards to deal with the consequences of Brexit and why, although they need to be managed, the actual negotiations with London rank fairly low on the list of priorities in Brussels. British politicians, negotiators, and the general public would do well to take note of this.

Ivaylo Iaydjiev is a former adviser to the Bulgarian government. He is currently a DPhil student at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford

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