Anti-government protestors in Ukraine. (Photo:Getty)
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Western weakness and indecision has fanned the flames in Ukraine

The West's politicians have emboldened Vladimir Putin with their mistakes and indecision. They need to send a signal he can't ignore.

Western leaders are trying their best to sound tough as they wait to find out if Russia sticks to the Minsk agreement and halts its land grab in eastern Ukraine. President Obama has threatened a “strong reaction” if the ceasefire is breached. Chancellor Merkel says Europe is ready to impose new sanctions. The debate about arming Ukraine rumbles on in Washington. Yet this hardly amounts to a turning point. We have already been through 12 months of ‘red line’ ultimatums, incremental sanctions and penny-packet support for Ukraine. The West is no closer to forcing Vladimir Putin to think again than it was a year ago when he seized Crimea.


This makes a nonsense of the idea, skilfully encouraged by the Kremlin, that its intervention was provoked by Western efforts to lure Ukraine into its camp. The real story of EU and US policy towards Ukraine over the last decade has been one of lethargy and indifference. The much-cited 2008 NATO declaration that Ukraine “will join” was a sop designed to make up for the fact that it had just been denied a Membership Action Plan. The EU Association Agreement that Putin induced President Yanukovych to abandon, triggering the Ukrainian leader’s downfall, was offered as an alternative to membership because the EU had become too weary and self-absorbed to contemplate further enlargement.


A West that really wanted to integrate Ukraine would have seized the opportunity offered by the 2004 Orange Revolution to embrace its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and help it to complete its democratic transition. Instead its leaders were told to go away and turn their country into a fully-fledged democracy without the political guidance and financial support given to other former communist countries as part of the EU accession process. Their failure is widely lamented. But the bigger failure – of Western responsibility – is barely acknowledged.


Western disinterest consigned Ukraine to a state of geopolitical limbo, encouraging Putin to believe that he could claw it back into Russia’s sphere of influence by force. The full implications of this only became apparent after the shooting started and policy makers in Europe and America suddenly realised the scale of his irredentist ambitions. They may not have been willing to say yes to Ukraine’s desire to join Western institutions, but they couldn’t acquiesce in the armed partition of Europe and the return of empire without abandoning the principles on which the post-Cold War security order had been built. This was a war about something far bigger than the future of Ukraine.


Every time the West has fluffed its policy towards Ukraine with half-measures and empty words, the bill for repairing the damage has risen.

The cost of failing to support democratic change with the incentive of EU accession was to drive despairing Ukrainians back into the arms of Viktor Yanukovych. The unwillingness of the EU to match its proposed Association Agreement with a package of financial support for Ukraine allowed Putin to scupper it with a $15bn bribe. Now the West is forced to provide £40bn in loans and guarantees to rescue Ukraine’s economy from the resulting chaos.


The bill will go on rising as long as the West prevaricates, and with potentially more serious consequences. Some see the conflict as a vindication of NATO’s decision to keep Ukraine at arms length; imagine if we had accepted a treaty commitment to defend its border with Russia. Well, we may not have to imagine much longer if success in Ukraine emboldens Putin to try something similar in the Baltic States where we do have a NATO commitment. To behave as if our own security in not at stake in Donetsk and Luhansk is recklessly complacent.


The West should be doing far more to support Ukraine, if for no other reason than self-interest. The immediate priority should be to help its economy. If Russian guns have fallen silent for now, it is partly because Putin’s goal of destabilising Ukraine is currently being achieved by economic means. Some financial aid has already been provided, but there is a risk that Western strategy is repeating the mistakes of the EU’s efforts to deal with the Eurozone crisis of always being a day late and a dollar short. The latest IMF package is already being overtaken as the economic outlook continues to worsen, and Ukraine has seen little enough of the money that has been promised as it is. George Soros is right to argue that a willingness to support Ukraine financially is a key test of Western resolve. Sufficient funds should be provided to get Ukraine’s economy off life support and into recovery.


Another crucial area is energy where Russian leverage has frequently been used to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty. The government in Kiev has set a target of becoming independent of Russian gas supply by 2017, a goal that could be achieved this year if the EU enforced its own competition rules and forced Gazprom to release unused pipeline capacity in Slovakia to facilitate the reverse flow of gas to Ukraine. Instead, the European Commission brokered a deal last October that forced Ukraine to buy overpriced Russian gas and pay $3bn of disputed debt. This has rewarded Russia and pushed Ukraine to the edge of bankruptcy, increasing the cost of the Western bailout. EU policy should be changed to one of supporting Ukraine’s energy independence in the shortest achievable timescale.


It is also time that the West resolved to bolster Ukraine’s defence with modern military equipment. The UK, along with the US and Russia, gave a solemn commitment to support Ukraine’s territorial integrity when the country gave up its stockpile of Soviet nuclear missiles in 1994. If we are not prepared to make good that commitment with our own forces, the very least we should be prepared to do is to help the Ukrainian armed forces to do it for themselves. The current policy of allowing aggression to succeed in the name of peace is as dishonourable now as it was in the Balkans twenty years ago.


In the face of criticism that his Ukraine policy is failing, President Obama insists that he is playing the long game. But what he likes to call “strategic patience” looks to Putin much more like strategic indecision. He draws even more strength from the EU’s weak and hesitant approach. Western policy will keep failing and the cost will keep rising until European and American leaders send a signal of intent that Russia can’t ignore.

 

David Clark was Robin Cook’s special adviser at the Foreign Office 1997-2001.

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The public like radical policies, but they aren't so keen on radical politicians

Around the world, support for genuinely revolutionary ideas is strong, but in the UK at least, there's less enthusiasm for the people promising them.

You’re probably a getting a little bored of the litany of talking head statistics: trust in elected officials, parliament, the justice system and even democracy itself has been falling steadily for years and is at record lows. Maybe you’ve seen that graph that shows how people born after 1980 are significantly less likely than those born in 1960 to think that living in a democracy is ‘essential’. You’ve possibly heard of the ‘Pasokification’ of the centre-left, so-named the collapse of the once dominant Greek social democratic party Pasok, a technique being aggressively pursued by other centre-left parties in Europe to great effect.    

And so, goes the logic, there is a great appetite for something different, something new. It’s true! The space into which Trump et al barged leaves plenty of room for others: Beppe Grillo in Italy, Spanish Podemos, Bernie Sanders, Jean Luc Melanchon, and many more to come.

In my new book Radicals I followed movements and ideas that in many cases make someone like Jeremy Corbyn seem positively pedestrian: people who want to dismantle the nation state entirely, use technology to live forever, go off grid. All these ideas are finding fertile ground with the frustrated, disillusioned, and idealistic. The challenges of coming down the line – forces of climate change, technological change, fiscal crunch, mass movements of people – will demand new types of political ideas. Radical, outsider thinking is back, and this does, in theory at least, offer a chink of light for Corbyn’s Labour.

Polling last week found pretty surprising levels of support for many of his ideas. A big tax on high earners, nationalising the railways, banning zero hours contracts and upping the minimum wage are all popular. Support for renewable energy is at an all-time high. According to a recent YouGov poll, Brits actually prefer socialism to capitalism, a sentiment most strongly held among younger people.

There are others ideas too, which Corbyn is probably less likely to go for. Stopping benefits entirely for people who refuse to accept an offer of employment is hugely popular, and in one recent poll over half of respondents would be happy with a total ban on all immigration for the next two years. Around half the public now consistently want marijuana legalised, a number that will surely swell as US states with licenced pot vendors start showing off their dazzling tax returns.

The BNP effect used to refer to the problem the far-right had with selling their ideas. Some of their policies were extremely popular with the public, until associated with the BNP. It seems as though the same problem is now afflicting the Labour brand. It’s not the radical ideas – there is now a genuine appetite for those who think differently – that’s the problem, it’s the person who’s tasked with delivering them, and not enough people think Corbyn can or should. The ideal politician for the UK today is quite possibly someone who is bold enough to have genuinely radical proposals and ideas, and yet appears extremely moderate, sensible and centrist in character and temperament. Perhaps some blend of Blair and Corbyn. Sounds like an oxymoron doesn’t it? But this is politics, 2017. Anything is possible.

Jamie Bartlett is the head of the Violence and Extremism Programme and the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media at Demos.

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