Anti-government protestors in Ukraine. (Photo:Getty)
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Western weakness and indecision has fanned the flames in Ukraine

The West's politicians have emboldened Vladimir Putin with their mistakes and indecision. They need to send a signal he can't ignore.

Western leaders are trying their best to sound tough as they wait to find out if Russia sticks to the Minsk agreement and halts its land grab in eastern Ukraine. President Obama has threatened a “strong reaction” if the ceasefire is breached. Chancellor Merkel says Europe is ready to impose new sanctions. The debate about arming Ukraine rumbles on in Washington. Yet this hardly amounts to a turning point. We have already been through 12 months of ‘red line’ ultimatums, incremental sanctions and penny-packet support for Ukraine. The West is no closer to forcing Vladimir Putin to think again than it was a year ago when he seized Crimea.


This makes a nonsense of the idea, skilfully encouraged by the Kremlin, that its intervention was provoked by Western efforts to lure Ukraine into its camp. The real story of EU and US policy towards Ukraine over the last decade has been one of lethargy and indifference. The much-cited 2008 NATO declaration that Ukraine “will join” was a sop designed to make up for the fact that it had just been denied a Membership Action Plan. The EU Association Agreement that Putin induced President Yanukovych to abandon, triggering the Ukrainian leader’s downfall, was offered as an alternative to membership because the EU had become too weary and self-absorbed to contemplate further enlargement.


A West that really wanted to integrate Ukraine would have seized the opportunity offered by the 2004 Orange Revolution to embrace its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and help it to complete its democratic transition. Instead its leaders were told to go away and turn their country into a fully-fledged democracy without the political guidance and financial support given to other former communist countries as part of the EU accession process. Their failure is widely lamented. But the bigger failure – of Western responsibility – is barely acknowledged.


Western disinterest consigned Ukraine to a state of geopolitical limbo, encouraging Putin to believe that he could claw it back into Russia’s sphere of influence by force. The full implications of this only became apparent after the shooting started and policy makers in Europe and America suddenly realised the scale of his irredentist ambitions. They may not have been willing to say yes to Ukraine’s desire to join Western institutions, but they couldn’t acquiesce in the armed partition of Europe and the return of empire without abandoning the principles on which the post-Cold War security order had been built. This was a war about something far bigger than the future of Ukraine.


Every time the West has fluffed its policy towards Ukraine with half-measures and empty words, the bill for repairing the damage has risen.

The cost of failing to support democratic change with the incentive of EU accession was to drive despairing Ukrainians back into the arms of Viktor Yanukovych. The unwillingness of the EU to match its proposed Association Agreement with a package of financial support for Ukraine allowed Putin to scupper it with a $15bn bribe. Now the West is forced to provide £40bn in loans and guarantees to rescue Ukraine’s economy from the resulting chaos.


The bill will go on rising as long as the West prevaricates, and with potentially more serious consequences. Some see the conflict as a vindication of NATO’s decision to keep Ukraine at arms length; imagine if we had accepted a treaty commitment to defend its border with Russia. Well, we may not have to imagine much longer if success in Ukraine emboldens Putin to try something similar in the Baltic States where we do have a NATO commitment. To behave as if our own security in not at stake in Donetsk and Luhansk is recklessly complacent.


The West should be doing far more to support Ukraine, if for no other reason than self-interest. The immediate priority should be to help its economy. If Russian guns have fallen silent for now, it is partly because Putin’s goal of destabilising Ukraine is currently being achieved by economic means. Some financial aid has already been provided, but there is a risk that Western strategy is repeating the mistakes of the EU’s efforts to deal with the Eurozone crisis of always being a day late and a dollar short. The latest IMF package is already being overtaken as the economic outlook continues to worsen, and Ukraine has seen little enough of the money that has been promised as it is. George Soros is right to argue that a willingness to support Ukraine financially is a key test of Western resolve. Sufficient funds should be provided to get Ukraine’s economy off life support and into recovery.


Another crucial area is energy where Russian leverage has frequently been used to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty. The government in Kiev has set a target of becoming independent of Russian gas supply by 2017, a goal that could be achieved this year if the EU enforced its own competition rules and forced Gazprom to release unused pipeline capacity in Slovakia to facilitate the reverse flow of gas to Ukraine. Instead, the European Commission brokered a deal last October that forced Ukraine to buy overpriced Russian gas and pay $3bn of disputed debt. This has rewarded Russia and pushed Ukraine to the edge of bankruptcy, increasing the cost of the Western bailout. EU policy should be changed to one of supporting Ukraine’s energy independence in the shortest achievable timescale.


It is also time that the West resolved to bolster Ukraine’s defence with modern military equipment. The UK, along with the US and Russia, gave a solemn commitment to support Ukraine’s territorial integrity when the country gave up its stockpile of Soviet nuclear missiles in 1994. If we are not prepared to make good that commitment with our own forces, the very least we should be prepared to do is to help the Ukrainian armed forces to do it for themselves. The current policy of allowing aggression to succeed in the name of peace is as dishonourable now as it was in the Balkans twenty years ago.


In the face of criticism that his Ukraine policy is failing, President Obama insists that he is playing the long game. But what he likes to call “strategic patience” looks to Putin much more like strategic indecision. He draws even more strength from the EU’s weak and hesitant approach. Western policy will keep failing and the cost will keep rising until European and American leaders send a signal of intent that Russia can’t ignore.

 

David Clark was Robin Cook’s special adviser at the Foreign Office 1997-2001.

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The real question about George Osborne and the Evening Standard? Why he'd even want the job

The week in the media, from Osborne’s irrelevant editorship to the unrepentant McGuinness and Vera Lynn’s stirring ballads.

The big puzzle about George Osborne’s appointment as the editor of the London Evening Standard is why he wanted the job. The Standard is now just a local freesheet, a pale shadow of its old self. In Tube carriages, discarded copies far exceed those being read. Its columnists are lightweight [Ed: as an occasional columnist myself, thanks, Peter] and its news stale, mostly written the previous day. Critics of Osborne’s appointment describe the Standard as “a major newspaper”. It is no such thing. The idea that the editorship will allow the former chancellor to propel himself towards the London mayoralty is laughable. In last year’s election for mayor, the Standard, according to University of London research, ran twice as many positive headlines about the Tories’ Zac Goldsmith as it did about Labour’s Sadiq Khan. The latter won comfortably. The paper was so supportive of Khan’s predecessor, Boris Johnson, that it became known as “the Daily Boris”. But Johnson, with a high profile from television, hardly needed its backing to beat a tired and largely discredited Ken Livingstone.

If Osborne believes that the Standard offers him a significant political platform, it is just further proof that he belongs to an ignorant elite.

 

Violent legacy

More than anyone else, Martin McGuinness, who has died aged 66, represented how the IRA-Sinn Fein combined uncompromising violence with negotiating charm to achieve its aims. Unlike Gerry Adams, McGuinness admitted openly and proudly that he was a senior IRA commander. In Londonderry on Bloody Sunday in 1972 he carried a sub-machine gun, but apparently without using it. Later that year, he was among a delegation that held secret talks with British ministers and officials. The following year, he was arrested near a car containing prodigious quantities of explosives and ammunition.

Like many who recall the IRA’s campaign in mainland Britain – three huge bombs detonated less than half a mile from me – I could never quite accept McGuinness as a government minister and man of peace. Whatever he said, he did not renounce ­violence. He just had no further use for it, a decision that was reversible.

 

A peace of sorts

When I hear politicians saying they could never contemplate talks with al-Qaeda, I smile. They said the same about the IRA. The idea of negotiation, John Major said, “turns my stomach”. A month later, news leaked of secret talks that would lead to a ceasefire. You can call it hypocrisy but politicians have no practical alternative. Significant terrorist campaigns rarely end without deals of some sort. Even then, dishonesty is necessary. The parties to the Good Friday Agreement with Sinn Fein in 1998 never admitted the true terms, perhaps even to themselves. In return for a role in government, the IRA ceased attacks on the British mainland, army, governing classes and commercial interests. It remained in control of working-class Catholic enclaves in Northern Ireland, where it continued to murder, inflict punishment beatings and run protection rackets. Not a pretty bargain, but it brought peace of a sort.

 

Real war anthems

“We’ll Meet Again” and “The White Cliffs of Dover”, sung by Dame Vera Lynn, who has just celebrated her 100th birthday, are the songs most closely associated with the Second World War. This, when you think about it, is peculiar. Most wars are associated with stirring, patriotic anthems, not sentimental ballads. Even the First World War’s “Keep the Home Fires Burning”, before it mentions hearts yearning for home, stresses the noble, manly instincts that drove soldiers to fight: “They were summoned from the hillside/They were called in from the glen,/And the country found them ready/At the stirring call for men.” Lynn’s songs had only the wistful sadnesses of parting and reassurances that nothing would change.

Their “slushy” tone troubled the BBC. It feared they would weaken the troops’ fighting spirit. Despite Lynn’s high ratings among listeners at home and service personnel overseas, her radio series was dropped in favour of more virile programmes featuring marching songs. Unable to sing to her forces fans over the airwaves, Lynn bravely travelled to the army camps in Burma. A BBC centenary tribute showed veterans of the war against Japan weeping as her songs were played back.

The wartime role of this unassuming plumber’s daughter makes me – and, I suspect, millions of others – feel prouder to be British than any military anthem could.

 

Ham-fisted attempt

After his failed attempt to increase National Insurance contributions for the self-employed, Philip Hammond, it is said, will have a £2bn hole in his budget. It will be more than that. Thanks to the publicity, tens of thousands more workers in regular employment will be aware of the tax advantages of self-employed status and hasten to rearrange their affairs. Likewise, newspaper accountants of old, after circulating memos imploring journalists to reduce lavish claims for “subsistence” while covering stories away from the office, would find a sharp rise in claims from hacks previously unaware that such a perk existed.

 

Battle of Hastings

My fellow journalist Max Hastings, attending a West End play, was once dragged on stage by the comedian James Corden, told to help move a heavy trunk and slapped on the bottom. Ever since, I have approached plays starring comedians warily. I dropped my guard, however, when I bought tickets for a contemporary adaptation of Molière’s The Miser starring Griff Rhys Jones, and found myself drenched when Jones spilled (deliberately) what purported to be fine wine. It was of course only water and, unlike
Hastings, I shall not demand a refund.

Peter Wilby was editor of the Independent on Sunday from 1995 to 1996 and of the New Statesman from 1998 to 2005. He writes the weekly First Thoughts column for the NS.

This article first appeared in the 23 March 2017 issue of the New Statesman, Trump's permanent revolution