David Cameron and Nick Clegg visit Pentland Brands Global Headquarters on July 25, 2014 in London. Photograph: Getty Images.
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Behind the bluster, the Tories and the Lib Dems are preparing for another coalition

Clegg and others would rather continue to do business with the Tories than with a Labour Party regarded as irredeemably tribal.

War is in the air at Westminster. Battle plans are being finalised, generals recalled and shock troops deployed. In advance of the start of “the long campaign” in January, all parties are transitioning into election mode. Lynton Crosby, the Conservative strategist, has become the pivotal figure at the 4pm Downing Street meeting as David Cameron’s focus shifts from governing to electioneering. Ed Miliband and his office will shortly move from parliament’s Norman Shaw South building to Labour’s Brewer’s Green HQ to merge with the campaign operation. Lib Dem ministers are avoiding the Commons when possible in order to devote their energies to defending their endangered seats.

The Tories and the Lib Dems have spent the period since the Autumn Statement (which Nick Clegg snubbed to campaign in the marginal constituency of St Ives) publicly berating each other. But unlike past ructions over the Alternative Vote campaign, Cameron’s EU “veto”, the constituency boundary changes and childcare ratios, these controlled explosions are designed to benefit both sides politically.

For the Lib Dems, the aim is to demonstrate their independence to the anti-Conservative voters they need to win over to retain the majority of their seats. Of the party’s 56 constituencies, the Tories are in second place in 37. With most of those MPs in Labour-facing areas regarded as “dead men walking”, in the words of one source, it is in these seats that the party’s hopes reside. By talking up the dangers of a future Conservative government, Lib Dems aspire to persuade left-leaning voters that the safest option is to vote for them. For the Tories, the aim is to advertise the defects of another coalition in advance and to convince the electorate that only a majority Cameron administration can be trusted to maintain economic stability, cut taxes, reduce welfare spending and control immigration.

Figures on both sides express the hope that their near-daily disputes will crowd Labour out of the argument, the dynamic that led Alastair Campbell to lament in 2011 that his party was only “the third most interesting”. Although they confront each other as enemies in the marginals of southern England, the Tories acknowledge that they need the Lib Dems to recover if they are to hold off Labour in the battlegrounds of the north and the Midlands.

Some in Miliband’s party see benefits to this new phase of “aggressive differentiation”. By challenging the Tories’ refusal to impose further tax rises on the wealthy and by making the case for borrowing to invest, the Lib Dems lend credibility to policy stances shared by Labour. It is harder for the Conservatives to dismiss Miliband and Ed Balls as deranged Keynesians when their views are echoed by the people they have been in government with for the past four years. The Labour leader’s speech on 11 December, which took aim at the Tories’ own “35 per cent strategy” to shrink the state to its lowest level since the 1930s, demonstrated his confidence in attacking what he regards as a profound strategic error by Cameron and Osborne.

The Lib Dems’ assault on the Tories also exposes them to the charge of inconsistency, a concern articulated by the former minister Jeremy Browne, who urges his party to focus on claiming credit for the coalition’s achievements. When Clegg’s party complains of the “unnecessary pain” planned by the Conservatives, Labour will remind voters that the Lib Dems supported the “bedroom tax”, the tripling of tuition fees and the reorganisation of the NHS. If the Tories are so nasty, why vote for the people who have sat in cabinet with them since 2010?

The greatest irony of the coalition’s internecine warfare is that its members are quietly preparing the ground for a post-election renewal of vows. Both parties are consciously avoiding policy commitments that could prove impossible to maintain in a future negotiation. While railing against the Lib Dems’ proposed “mansion tax”, Osborne has not ruled out introducing a version in the future (having privately supported the option of higher council tax bands in opposition to Cameron). From the other side, Danny Alexander has said of a future VAT rise, “I certainly would not advocate any further increases” – a signal that he fears he may be forced to do so by the Tories. The only official red line drawn by any figure is Cameron’s vow not to lead a government that cannot deliver an in/out EU referendum. While publicly opposed to this policy, Lib Dems privately signal that they would be prepared to accept it in return for concessions such as House of Lords reform and the introduction of proportional representation for local elections.

They also acknowledge that the party’s leadership would rather continue to do business with the Tories than enter government with a Labour Party regarded as irredeemably tribal and impervious to compromise. One MP tells me that the Lib Dems would be prepared to take the path rejected by the Liberal leader Jeremy Thorpe in 1974 and prop up a Conservative government with more votes than Miliband’s party but fewer seats. Cameron – who, as the incumbent, enjoys first preference on any future coalition – can give thanks for that.

No party publicly acknowledges such war-gaming. The Tories and Labour, with good reason, maintain the pretence that they can win majorities even as the polls suggest another hung parliament is likely. No one can be seen to contemplate failure in advance. This stance will be harder to maintain in the heat of a general election campaign when the media and the voters, mindful of the experience of 2010, will demand answers on prospective coalitions. For now, though, the conspiracy of silence endures.

George Eaton is political editor of the New Statesman.

This article first appeared in the 09 December 2014 issue of the New Statesman, How Isis hijacked the revolution

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Hannan Fodder: This week, Daniel Hannan gets his excuses in early

I didn't do it. 

Since Daniel Hannan, a formerly obscure MEP, has emerged as the anointed intellectual of the Brexit elite, The Staggers is charting his ascendancy...

When I started this column, there were some nay-sayers talking Britain down by doubting that I was seriously going to write about Daniel Hannan every week. Surely no one could be that obsessed with the activities of one obscure MEP? And surely no politician could say enough ludicrous things to be worthy of such an obsession?

They were wrong, on both counts. Daniel and I are as one on this: Leave and Remain, working hand in glove to deliver on our shared national mission. There’s a lesson there for my fellow Remoaners, I’m sure.

Anyway. It’s week three, and just as I was worrying what I might write this week, Dan has ridden to the rescue by writing not one but two columns making the same argument – using, indeed, many of the exact same phrases (“not a club, but a protection racket”). Like all the most effective political campaigns, Dan has a message of the week.

First up, on Monday, there was this headline, in the conservative American journal, the Washington Examiner:

“Why Brexit should work out for everyone”

And yesterday, there was his column on Conservative Home:

“We will get a good deal – because rational self-interest will overcome the Eurocrats’ fury”

The message of the two columns is straightforward: cooler heads will prevail. Britain wants an amicable separation. The EU needs Britain’s military strength and budget contributions, and both sides want to keep the single market intact.

The Con Home piece makes the further argument that it’s only the Eurocrats who want to be hardline about this. National governments – who have to answer to actual electorates – will be more willing to negotiate.

And so, for all the bluster now, Theresa May and Donald Tusk will be skipping through a meadow, arm in arm, before the year is out.

Before we go any further, I have a confession: I found myself nodding along with some of this. Yes, of course it’s in nobody’s interests to create unnecessary enmity between Britain and the continent. Of course no one will want to crash the economy. Of course.

I’ve been told by friends on the centre-right that Hannan has a compelling, faintly hypnotic quality when he speaks and, in retrospect, this brief moment of finding myself half-agreeing with him scares the living shit out of me. So from this point on, I’d like everyone to keep an eye on me in case I start going weird, and to give me a sharp whack round the back of the head if you ever catch me starting a tweet with the word, “Friends-”.

Anyway. Shortly after reading things, reality began to dawn for me in a way it apparently hasn’t for Daniel Hannan, and I began cataloguing the ways in which his argument is stupid.

Problem number one: Remarkably for a man who’s been in the European Parliament for nearly two decades, he’s misunderstood the EU. He notes that “deeper integration can be more like a religious dogma than a political creed”, but entirely misses the reason for this. For many Europeans, especially those from countries which didn’t have as much fun in the Second World War as Britain did, the EU, for all its myriad flaws, is something to which they feel an emotional attachment: not their country, but not something entirely separate from it either.

Consequently, it’s neither a club, nor a “protection racket”: it’s more akin to a family. A rational and sensible Brexit will be difficult for the exact same reasons that so few divorcing couples rationally agree not to bother wasting money on lawyers: because the very act of leaving feels like a betrayal.

Or, to put it more concisely, courtesy of Buzzfeed’s Marie Le Conte:

Problem number two: even if everyone was to negotiate purely in terms of rational interest, our interests are not the same. The over-riding goal of German policy for decades has been to hold the EU together, even if that creates other problems. (Exhibit A: Greece.) So there’s at least a chance that the German leadership will genuinely see deterring more departures as more important than mutual prosperity or a good relationship with Britain.

And France, whose presidential candidates are lining up to give Britain a kicking, is mysteriously not mentioned anywhere in either of Daniel’s columns, presumably because doing so would undermine his argument.

So – the list of priorities Hannan describes may look rational from a British perspective. Unfortunately, though, the people on the other side of the negotiating table won’t have a British perspective.

Problem number three is this line from the Con Home piece:

“Might it truly be more interested in deterring states from leaving than in promoting the welfare of its peoples? If so, there surely can be no further doubt that we were right to opt out.”

If there any rhetorical technique more skin-crawlingly horrible, than, “Your response to my behaviour justifies my behaviour”?

I could go on, about how there’s no reason to think that Daniel’s relatively gentle vision of Brexit is shared by Nigel Farage, UKIP, or a significant number of those who voted Leave. Or about the polls which show that, far from the EU’s response to the referendum pushing more European nations towards the door, support for the union has actually spiked since the referendum – that Britain has become not a beacon of hope but a cautionary tale.

But I’m running out of words, and there’ll be other chances to explore such things. So instead I’m going to end on this:

Hannan’s argument – that only an irrational Europe would not deliver a good Brexit – is remarkably, parodically self-serving. It allows him to believe that, if Brexit goes horribly wrong, well, it must all be the fault of those inflexible Eurocrats, mustn’t it? It can’t possibly be because Brexit was a bad idea in the first place, or because liberal Leavers used nasty, populist ones to achieve their goals.

Read today, there are elements of Hannan’s columns that are compelling, even persuasive. From the perspective of 2020, I fear, they might simply read like one long explanation of why nothing that has happened since will have been his fault.

Jonn Elledge is the editor of the New Statesman's sister site CityMetric. He is on Twitter, far too much, as @JonnElledge.