Migrants check a truck heading to England in the port of Calais, 24 September. Photo: Getty
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Leader: Labour and the truth about immigration

Politicians should listen to the public mood but not be constrained by it. It should not be irreconcilable to address immigration’s problems while making a positive case for it.

In 2007, Gordon Brown, shortly after becoming prime minister, used his leader’s speech at the Labour party conference in Bournemouth to pledge the creation of “British jobs for British workers”. The absurd remark was emblematic of Labour’s confused approach to immigration, which continues into the present.

The tensions in the party remain unresolved: one reason why Ed Miliband was so negligent in failing to mention immigration, as well as the deficit, in his conference speech in Manchester. After Labour came close to losing to the UK Independence Party in the Heywood and Middleton by-election, Jack Straw, Simon Danczuk and John Mann, three respected party figures, were among those to articulate concerns about Labour’s approach to immigration. The subtext was that the party was too soft on the issue and did not understand the anxieties fuelling the Ukip insurgency.

It would be foolish to deny that immigration from within the European Union and outside it brings pressures on housing, schools, maternity units and other public services. It presents challenges to social cohesion and fuels people’s insecurities. It would be foolish, too, to deny that there are abuses of the immigration system. One problem concerns the government’s use of companies such as Serco, the security firm contracted to manage and house asylum seekers in parts of the country with low housing costs, creating conflict in struggling communities.

Politicians should listen to the public mood but not be constrained by it. It should not be irreconcilable to address immigration’s problems while making a positive case for it. Immigration has, on the whole, been a force for good. Studies have repeatedly shown that immigrants bring in more than they take out, as well as contributing to the vibrancy, diversity and cultural richness of Britain, the demographic composition of which reflects our astonishing imperial history.

The problem with the UK not imposing the so-called transition controls on new EU members in 2004 was not with those who migrated from Poland and elsewhere but with the absence of planning for it. Labour had estimated that 13,000 would arrive in Britain from Poland; in the event, more than a million arrived. On this, Labour was culpable of spectacular bureaucratic incompetence for which, among other failures, it was punished in the 2010 general election.

Mr Miliband understands this. Under his leadership, Labour has evolved a more nuanced immigration policy. It has pledged to scrap the Conservatives’ net migration target that has so angered business and the universities. It has pledged tougher regulation of the labour market, to raise and enforce the minimum wage and so prevent foreign workers from illegally undercutting British workers. Recruitment agencies would be banned from advertising only for foreign workers. Accompanying this would be a reassertion of the contributory principle in welfare and a requirement for migrants to learn English.

Yet if Mr Miliband has such an admirable vision, it is one that has too seldom been articulated. The substance of policies matters little while Labour is failing to challenge myths about immigration. An Ipsos MORI poll last year found that the public believes that immigrants account for 31 per cent of the population; the actual figure is 13 per cent.

The notion that Britain can “clamp down” on immigration is a fallacy. Labour should level with the voters. Open borders are a consequence of our membership not just of the EU but of the modern economy. Retaining complete control of Britain’s borders is impossible without leaving the EU, as Ukip and many Conservative MPs would wish. Pretending otherwise is more than just disingenuous. It is exactly the kind of claim that has contributed to the collapse of trust in the Westminster elite.

Ultimately there are sound political reasons for Labour to make the humane, pro-immigration case, as Tony Blair used to do. The party will never be believed – nor should it be – if it attempts to mimic Farageist populism. Posturing such as this serves only to shift the debate on immigration to the right, further legitimising Ukip, the voice of dismal, small-minded English reaction. 

This article first appeared in the 15 October 2014 issue of the New Statesman, Isis can be beaten

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Leader: The unresolved Eurozone crisis

The continent that once aspired to be a rival superpower to the US is now a byword for decline, and ethnic nationalism and right-wing populism are thriving.

The eurozone crisis was never resolved. It was merely conveniently forgotten. The vote for Brexit, the terrible war in Syria and Donald Trump’s election as US president all distracted from the single currency’s woes. Yet its contradictions endure, a permanent threat to continental European stability and the future cohesion of the European Union.

The resignation of the Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi, following defeat in a constitutional referendum on 4 December, was the moment at which some believed that Europe would be overwhelmed. Among the champions of the No campaign were the anti-euro Five Star Movement (which has led in some recent opinion polls) and the separatist Lega Nord. Opponents of the EU, such as Nigel Farage, hailed the result as a rejection of the single currency.

An Italian exit, if not unthinkable, is far from inevitable, however. The No campaign comprised not only Eurosceptics but pro-Europeans such as the former prime minister Mario Monti and members of Mr Renzi’s liberal-centrist Democratic Party. Few voters treated the referendum as a judgement on the monetary union.

To achieve withdrawal from the euro, the populist Five Star Movement would need first to form a government (no easy task under Italy’s complex multiparty system), then amend the constitution to allow a public vote on Italy’s membership of the currency. Opinion polls continue to show a majority opposed to the return of the lira.

But Europe faces far more immediate dangers. Italy’s fragile banking system has been imperilled by the referendum result and the accompanying fall in investor confidence. In the absence of state aid, the Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the world’s oldest bank, could soon face ruin. Italy’s national debt stands at 132 per cent of GDP, severely limiting its firepower, and its financial sector has amassed $360bn of bad loans. The risk is of a new financial crisis that spreads across the eurozone.

EU leaders’ record to date does not encourage optimism. Seven years after the Greek crisis began, the German government is continuing to advocate the failed path of austerity. On 4 December, Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, declared that Greece must choose between unpopular “structural reforms” (a euphemism for austerity) or withdrawal from the euro. He insisted that debt relief “would not help” the immiserated country.

Yet the argument that austerity is unsustainable is now heard far beyond the Syriza government. The International Monetary Fund is among those that have demanded “unconditional” debt relief. Under the current bailout terms, Greece’s interest payments on its debt (roughly €330bn) will continually rise, consuming 60 per cent of its budget by 2060. The IMF has rightly proposed an extended repayment period and a fixed interest rate of 1.5 per cent. Faced with German intransigence, it is refusing to provide further funding.

Ever since the European Central Bank president, Mario Draghi, declared in 2012 that he was prepared to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the single currency, EU member states have relied on monetary policy to contain the crisis. This complacent approach could unravel. From the euro’s inception, economists have warned of the dangers of a monetary union that is unmatched by fiscal and political union. The UK, partly for these reasons, wisely rejected membership, but other states have been condemned to stagnation. As Felix Martin writes on page 15, “Italy today is worse off than it was not just in 2007, but in 1997. National output per head has stagnated for 20 years – an astonishing . . . statistic.”

Germany’s refusal to support demand (having benefited from a fixed exchange rate) undermined the principles of European solidarity and shared prosperity. German unemployment has fallen to 4.1 per cent, the lowest level since 1981, but joblessness is at 23.4 per cent in Greece, 19 per cent in Spain and 11.6 per cent in Italy. The youngest have suffered most. Youth unemployment is 46.5 per cent in Greece, 42.6 per cent in Spain and 36.4 per cent in Italy. No social model should tolerate such waste.

“If the euro fails, then Europe fails,” the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, has often asserted. Yet it does not follow that Europe will succeed if the euro survives. The continent that once aspired to be a rival superpower to the US is now a byword for decline, and ethnic nationalism and right-wing populism are thriving. In these circumstances, the surprise has been not voters’ intemperance, but their patience.

This article first appeared in the 08 December 2016 issue of the New Statesman, Brexit to Trump