Health secretary Jeremy Hunt. Photo: Getty
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Diagnosing cancer: why shaming and blaming GPs isn’t about improving patient safety

Cancer very often presents in ways we don’t expect. Creating a culture of fear around diagnosis isn’t a good thing.

“What do you think this is, doc?”

Mike opened his mouth as wide as possible and pointed to his right tonsil.

It was about the size of a conker and grey. I’d never seen anything like it.

“I’ve never seen anything like it” I said. “But I really don’t like the look of it.”

“So what could it be?” he asked.

“Mike, I’ve never seen tonsil cancer before, but I really think we should find out what that is as soon as possible.”

“Thanks doc, what do we do now?”

I referred him to the local ENT specialist and 2 weeks later he was diagnosed with cancer of his tonsil.


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“Could you sign my insurance form please?”

Aimee had been seeing a private physiotherapist for her back pain which started a month ago while she was gardening.

“Is the physio helping?” I asked. Aimee was a fit-looking 32 year old who worked for a city bank.

“Not much yet,” she said. “I’m still taking pain-killers and doing the exercises though.”

I’m not sure I examined her, she was in a rush, I was running late and she looked well.

Three months later I discovered that she had metastatic breast cancer. The back pain started when one of the vertebrae (bones) in her back fractured because the cancer had metastasised (spread) there. She saw three other doctors before one of them arranged for blood tests which showed signs of inflammation, then a bone-scan showed the metastatic spread and further tests revealed the breast cancer.

Both Mike and Aimee died last year.

I see about 2-3 new cases of cancer a year. Some are like Mike, some are like Aimee.

The secretary of state for health, Jeremy Hunt has announced, to cheering headlines from the Mail and the Mirror, that GPs who are slower than average to diagnose cancer will be “named and shamed”. If I have two patients like Mike I’ll be fine, two like Aimee and I’ll be named and shamed. One year green for good, the next year red for dangerous. If you want to wait until I’ve seen enough patients with cancer to be statistically significant, you might have to wait another 20 years.

Another problem is about which of the three GPs, one A&E doctor and two physiotherapists is responsible. I only saw her once. Guidelines recommend that we start investigating when a new episode of back pain hasn’t resolved by six weeks, but she had only had it for a month when she saw me.

After Aimee’s diagnosis our practice arranged a meeting with all the doctors and trainees to discuss how we could have helped her sooner. I reviewed all the literature I could find on back pain and breast cancer and presented a summary to the other doctors. We read the hospital reports and discussed Aimees concerns and opinions. We instituted a policy of every patient having a usual doctor, because one factor in the delay was seeing different doctors who were more likely to watch and wait than a doctor who had already made their own assessment and done that once. We also made a decision to discuss every patient who was diagnosed with cancer, whether or not their diagnosis is delayed, like Joan who didn’t see a GP until her breast was covered with a giant cancerous ulcer.

I don’t know if it has made a difference, because as a practice of 12,000 patients we only see about 20 new cases of cancer a year. But we haven’t had any significant delays in cancer diagnoses since then and all of us really appreciate learning from the cases. Cancer very often presents in ways we don’t expect.
 

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Shame is never useful. The natural response to shame is to hide, oneself or one’s actions or both. Another response might be to refer every patient who might possibly have cancer so that someone else, anyone else is responsible, but not you. That would be a disaster. Shame and blame are the last things you want if you’re looking for a culture of openness and safe patient care. The Francis and Berwick reports after Mid Staffs, both pointed to the dangers of a culture of fear,

Honest failure is something that needs to be protected otherwise people will continue to live in fear. (Francis)

Abandon blame as a tool and trust the goodwill and good intentions of NHS staff.  (Berwick)

According to airline and patient safety expert Sidney Dekker,

Accountability is the willingness to share accounts.

Fear is a grave risk to patient safety.

Shame as a policy satisfies our desire for a simple explanation, a bad doctor for example. This is an ancient myth we tell our children and ourselves; if we can identify the bogeymen, in this case the bad doctors, then we’ll be safe. Shame is also the product of a desire for retribution. Behind policies designed to shame people are not simply newspaper editors looking for headlines, or politicians looking for simple answers to complex problems, but aggrieved relatives, policy-makers or journalists trying to cope with a delayed diagnosis or a medical error.

Their concerns deserve to be taken seriously, very seriously indeed.

But if shame continues to shape policy, it will be a disaster for patient safety.

Of course, this policy may have nothing whatsoever to do with patient safety. It has always been a fantasy of Tim Kelsey (who Paul Nuki from NHS Choices said might be behind this idea) and other policy makers that patients should act more like consumers. In order to do that, the bond between patients and their GPs who they know and trust (but may be a little slower than average in diagnosing cancer) needs to be broken. One might even wonder if the constant denigration of GPs is part of this project. Then with alarming headlines and league tables patients will be scared (enabled) to choose another GP…. (thanks to Richardblogger for pointing this out here).

Further reading/watching:

Patient safety and quality: An evidence-based handbook for nurses. Chapter 35 Error reporting and disclosure.

Patient safety depends on NHS staff feeling valued, respected, engaged and supported: Culture and behaviour in the English NHS. Mary Dixon-Woods

Referring patients. Doctors’ anxiety has a lot to do with it.

Narrative, listening and forgiveness.  How the process of grieving can lead to forgiveness

Shame – and how it presents in clinical encounters.

The emotional labour of care. Health care is emotional labour.

 

Sidney Dekker – airline and patient safety expert and brilliant speaker. Lecture on Just Culture, short version:

Full version:

 

This article first appeared on abetternhs.wordpress.com and is crossposted here with permission.

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We're racing towards another private debt crisis - so why did no one see it coming?

The Office for Budget Responsibility failed to foresee the rise in household debt. 

This is a call for a public inquiry on the current situation regarding private debt.

For almost a decade now, since 2007, we have been living a lie. And that lie is preparing to wreak havoc on our economy. If we do not create some kind of impartial forum to discuss what is actually happening, the results might well prove disastrous. 

The lie I am referring to is the idea that the financial crisis of 2008, and subsequent “Great Recession,” were caused by profligate government spending and subsequent public debt. The exact opposite is in fact the case. The crash happened because of dangerously high levels of private debt (a mortgage crisis specifically). And - this is the part we are not supposed to talk about—there is an inverse relation between public and private debt levels.

If the public sector reduces its debt, overall private sector debt goes up. That's what happened in the years leading up to 2008. Now austerity is making it happening again. And if we don't do something about it, the results will, inevitably, be another catastrophe.

The winners and losers of debt

These graphs show the relationship between public and private debt. They are both forecasts from the Office for Budget Responsibility, produced in 2015 and 2017. 

This is what the OBR was projecting what would happen around now back in 2015:

This year the OBR completely changed its forecast. This is how it now projects things are likely to turn out:

First, notice how both diagrams are symmetrical. What happens on top (that part of the economy that is in surplus) precisely mirrors what happens in the bottom (that part of the economy that is in deficit). This is called an “accounting identity.”

As in any ledger sheet, credits and debits have to match. The easiest way to understand this is to imagine there are just two actors, government, and the private sector. If the government borrows £100, and spends it, then the government has a debt of £100. But by spending, it has injected £100 more pounds into the private economy. In other words, -£100 for the government, +£100 for everyone else in the diagram. 

Similarly, if the government taxes someone for £100 , then the government is £100 richer but there’s £100 subtracted from the private economy (+£100 for government, -£100 for everybody else on the diagram).

So what implications does this kind of bookkeeping have for the overall economy? It means that if the government goes into surplus, then everyone else has to go into debt.

We tend to think of money as if it is a bunch of poker chips already lying around, but that’s not how it really works. Money has to be created. And money is created when banks make loans. Either the government borrows money and injects it into the economy, or private citizens borrow money from banks. Those banks don’t take the money from people’s savings or anywhere else, they just make it up. Anyone can write an IOU. But only banks are allowed to issue IOUs that the government will accept in payment for taxes. (In other words, there actually is a magic money tree. But only banks are allowed to use it.)

There are other factors. The UK has a huge trade deficit (blue), and that means the government (yellow) also has to run a deficit (print money, or more accurately, get banks to do it) to inject into the economy to pay for all those Chinese trainers, American iPads, and German cars. The total amount of money can also fluctuate. But the real point here is, the less the government is in debt, the more everyone else must be. Austerity measures will necessarily lead to rising levels of private debt. And this is exactly what has happened.

Now, if this seems to have very little to do with the way politicians talk about such matters, there's a simple reason: most politicians don’t actually know any of this. A recent survey showed 90 per cent of MPs don't even understand where money comes from (they think it's issued by the Royal Mint). In reality, debt is money. If no one owed anyone anything at all there would be no money and the economy would grind to a halt.

But of course debt has to be owed to someone. These charts show who owes what to whom.

The crisis in private debt

Bearing all this in mind, let's look at those diagrams again - keeping our eye particularly on the dark blue that represents household debt. In the first, 2015 version, the OBR duly noted that there was a substantial build-up of household debt in the years leading up to the crash of 2008. This is significant because it was the first time in British history that total household debts were higher than total household savings, and therefore the household sector itself was in deficit territory. (Corporations, at the same time, were raking in enormous profits.) But it also predicted this wouldn't happen again.

True, the OBR observed, austerity and the reduction of government deficits meant private debt levels would have to go up. However, the OBR economists insisted this wouldn't be a problem because the burden would fall not on households but on corporations. Business-friendly Tory policies would, they insisted, inspire a boom in corporate expansion, which would mean frenzied corporate borrowing (that huge red bulge below the line in the first diagram, which was supposed to eventually replace government deficits entirely). Ordinary households would have little or nothing to worry about.

This was total fantasy. No such frenzied boom took place.

In the second diagram, two years later, the OBR is forced to acknowledge this. Corporations are just raking in the profits and sitting on them. The household sector, on the other hand, is a rolling catastrophe. Austerity has meant falling wages, less government spending on social services (or anything else), and higher de facto taxes. This puts the squeeze on household budgets and people are forced to borrow. As a result, not only are households in overall deficit for the second time in British history, the situation is actually worse than it was in the years leading up to 2008.

And remember: it was a mortgage crisis that set off the 2008 crash, which almost destroyed the world economy and plunged millions into penury. Not a crisis in public debt. A crisis in private debt.

An inquiry

In 2015, around the time the original OBR predictions came out, I wrote an essay in the Guardian predicting that austerity and budget-balancing would create a disastrous crisis in private debt. Now it's so clearly, unmistakably, happening that even the OBR cannot deny it.

I believe the time has come for there be a public investigation - a formal public inquiry, in fact - into how this could be allowed to happen. After the 2008 crash, at least the economists in Treasury and the Bank of England could plausibly claim they hadn't completely understood the relation between private debt and financial instability. Now they simply have no excuse.

What on earth is an institution called the “Office for Budget Responsibility” credulously imagining corporate borrowing binges in order to suggest the government will balance the budget to no ill effects? How responsible is that? Even the second chart is extremely odd. Up to 2017, the top and bottom of the diagram are exact mirrors of one another, as they ought to be. However, in the projected future after 2017, the section below the line is much smaller than the section above, apparently seriously understating the amount both of future government, and future private, debt. In other words, the numbers don't add up.

The OBR told the New Statesman ​that it was not aware of any errors in its 2015 forecast for corporate sector net lending, and that the forecast was based on the available data. It said the forecast for business investment has been revised down because of the uncertainty created by Brexit. 

Still, if the “Office of Budget Responsibility” was true to its name, it should be sounding off the alarm bells right about now. So far all we've got is one mention of private debt and a mild warning about the rise of personal debt from the Bank of England, which did not however connect the problem to austerity, and one fairly strong statement from a maverick columnist in the Daily Mail. Otherwise, silence. 

The only plausible explanation is that institutions like the Treasury, OBR, and to a degree as well the Bank of England can't, by definition, warn against the dangers of austerity, however alarming the situation, because they have been set up the way they have in order to justify austerity. It's important to emphasise that most professional economists have never supported Conservative policies in this regard. The policy was adopted because it was convenient to politicians; institutions were set up in order to support it; economists were hired in order to come up with arguments for austerity, rather than to judge whether it would be a good idea. At present, this situation has led us to the brink of disaster.

The last time there was a financial crash, the Queen famously asked: why was no one able to foresee this? We now have the tools. Perhaps the most important task for a public inquiry will be to finally ask: what is the real purpose of the institutions that are supposed to foresee such matters, to what degree have they been politicised, and what would it take to turn them back into institutions that can at least inform us if we're staring into the lights of an oncoming train?