Is pay going up or down? Both, or neither, depending on the measure you use. Photo: Getty
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Pay set is to go up, or down, or stay the same – it all depends on how you measure it

We are heading into a so-called “living standards election” – without accurate data on living standards. Different sides will be able to tell whatever story they want.

We can expect to hear an awful lot about the closing gap between pay and inflation over the next few months as, inevitably and thankfully, on some measure we close in on a “cross-over point” where wages overtake price rises.  

But this poses the question: which measure of inflation and, indeed, which measure of pay?

Confusion abounds on this – and this provides the space for different political parties to choose numbers which stand up the story they want to tell about the recovery and living standards. Get ready for a war of competing statistics.

When it comes to pay, average wages (that is, mean pay across the economy or, more accurately, across employees) regularly get reported as if they relate to the experience of a typical worker in the economy. They don’t – they are skewed by whatever is going on at the top of the distribution. For this reason we need to look at median pay – that of the typical worker. While the period since the financial crisis have been marked by relatively even movements in pay across the earnings distribution, the typical experience in recent decades has been for the mean to significantly outpace the median, reflecting growing wage inequality. No one knows for sure how this will pan out during economic recovery, but few would be surprised if the historic relationship resumes.

The trickier issue is the measure of inflation that should be used to deflate trends in wages. And here there is a bit of disarray. This debate may sound nerdy – indeed, it is quite nerdy – but it matters and we are going to hear a lot about all this, so it’s worth reflecting on.

The Retail Price Index (RPI), introduced after WWII,  was traditionally considered the best measure for gauging what was happening to living standards, covering a wider suite of prices (and generally being higher) than the CPI which was introduced in the 1990s to meet the need for international harmonisation. Recently RPI has fallen out of favour. The formula it uses for aggregating prices (the Carli index, if you are into this sort of thing) has been fairly widely criticised and is thought to overstate inflation, leading the ONS to deem that it no longer qualifies as a National Statistic (though that hasn’t stopped the government from continuing to use it in relation to index-linked gilts and bonds).

This has left CPI as the main reported measure for inflation and it is used for uprating benefits, tax credits, pensions and tax thresholds (the government switched from RPI to CPI for uprating benefits from April 2011 and in doing so made a massive saving). But unlike RPI, CPI takes no account of a range of housing costs, such as mortgage interest payments. Arguably, it tells us quite a lot less about living standards.

The controversy about how to measure inflation is such that the UK Statistics Authority has established two reviews including one by the IFS’s Paul Johnson looking specifically at the arguments for using ‘cost of living’ or ‘cost of goods’ concepts in defining inflation. The former concept is likely to have more relevance for households and for the purposes of deflating pay and incomes; the latter is likely to be more useful from a macroeconomic perspective. As things stand, the various measures used in the UK tend to fall somewhere between these two camps.

Just to complicate matters further, two new measures have been already introduced: CPI-H (which adds an owner occupied housing element to CPI) and RPI-J (which maintains the RPI coverage but uses a more reliable formula similar to CPI). But neither of these measures is used by the government in policy formulation so when it comes to official wage projections we are left with the traditional choice between CPI and RPI.

To see how important – and politically relevant – these different measures can be consider this chart.

Source: OBR, Economic and Fiscal Outllook; and Resolution Foundation modelling

The CPI-deflated mean (average) wage projection is taken directly from the OBR’s latest Economic and Fiscal Outlook. It looks pretty rosy in the years ahead – at least compared to the recent past – and has caught the eye of many economic commentators. But it only tells part of the story.

If we want to get a sense of what this might mean for median pay we can adjust the average (assuming, as discussed above, that the relationship between the mean and median over the next few years is the same as that in the decade prior to the financial crisis).

What the chart shows is that if we then adjust this median wage figure for RPI inflation then pay looks set to fall in the years ahead. But if we use CPI it’s set to rise. And if we try and find some middle ground that avoids the narrowness of CPI or the unreliability of RPI, then we could use an imputed projection for RPI-J. (This assumes – imperfectly, but defensibly – that past relationships hold: holding constant the ratio between annual growth in the RPI and RPI-J in the years ahead, reflecting the relative stability of this ratio over the course of the history of the RPI-J). And under this RPI-J measure, pay is set to flat-line. So according to which measure of inflation you use wages are set to rise. Or flat-line. Or fall. Take your pick.

For now, at least, this leaves us in no man’s land. We are heading into a so-called ‘living standards election’ in which different sides will be able to tell whatever story they want about the prospects for wages depending on the measures used (with no official ‘best measure’). Add to this the fact that when it comes to what is happening to household incomes – a far superior measure of living standards – the only accurate data will be more than two years out of date by polling day. Given that some of our key economic measures are misleading and others are out of date, the electorate should stand ready to be bamboozled. Is this really the best we can do?

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Hannan Fodder: This week, Daniel Hannan gets his excuses in early

I didn't do it. 

Since Daniel Hannan, a formerly obscure MEP, has emerged as the anointed intellectual of the Brexit elite, The Staggers is charting his ascendancy...

When I started this column, there were some nay-sayers talking Britain down by doubting that I was seriously going to write about Daniel Hannan every week. Surely no one could be that obsessed with the activities of one obscure MEP? And surely no politician could say enough ludicrous things to be worthy of such an obsession?

They were wrong, on both counts. Daniel and I are as one on this: Leave and Remain, working hand in glove to deliver on our shared national mission. There’s a lesson there for my fellow Remoaners, I’m sure.

Anyway. It’s week three, and just as I was worrying what I might write this week, Dan has ridden to the rescue by writing not one but two columns making the same argument – using, indeed, many of the exact same phrases (“not a club, but a protection racket”). Like all the most effective political campaigns, Dan has a message of the week.

First up, on Monday, there was this headline, in the conservative American journal, the Washington Examiner:

“Why Brexit should work out for everyone”

And yesterday, there was his column on Conservative Home:

“We will get a good deal – because rational self-interest will overcome the Eurocrats’ fury”

The message of the two columns is straightforward: cooler heads will prevail. Britain wants an amicable separation. The EU needs Britain’s military strength and budget contributions, and both sides want to keep the single market intact.

The Con Home piece makes the further argument that it’s only the Eurocrats who want to be hardline about this. National governments – who have to answer to actual electorates – will be more willing to negotiate.

And so, for all the bluster now, Theresa May and Donald Tusk will be skipping through a meadow, arm in arm, before the year is out.

Before we go any further, I have a confession: I found myself nodding along with some of this. Yes, of course it’s in nobody’s interests to create unnecessary enmity between Britain and the continent. Of course no one will want to crash the economy. Of course.

I’ve been told by friends on the centre-right that Hannan has a compelling, faintly hypnotic quality when he speaks and, in retrospect, this brief moment of finding myself half-agreeing with him scares the living shit out of me. So from this point on, I’d like everyone to keep an eye on me in case I start going weird, and to give me a sharp whack round the back of the head if you ever catch me starting a tweet with the word, “Friends-”.

Anyway. Shortly after reading things, reality began to dawn for me in a way it apparently hasn’t for Daniel Hannan, and I began cataloguing the ways in which his argument is stupid.

Problem number one: Remarkably for a man who’s been in the European Parliament for nearly two decades, he’s misunderstood the EU. He notes that “deeper integration can be more like a religious dogma than a political creed”, but entirely misses the reason for this. For many Europeans, especially those from countries which didn’t have as much fun in the Second World War as Britain did, the EU, for all its myriad flaws, is something to which they feel an emotional attachment: not their country, but not something entirely separate from it either.

Consequently, it’s neither a club, nor a “protection racket”: it’s more akin to a family. A rational and sensible Brexit will be difficult for the exact same reasons that so few divorcing couples rationally agree not to bother wasting money on lawyers: because the very act of leaving feels like a betrayal.

Or, to put it more concisely, courtesy of Buzzfeed’s Marie Le Conte:

Problem number two: even if everyone was to negotiate purely in terms of rational interest, our interests are not the same. The over-riding goal of German policy for decades has been to hold the EU together, even if that creates other problems. (Exhibit A: Greece.) So there’s at least a chance that the German leadership will genuinely see deterring more departures as more important than mutual prosperity or a good relationship with Britain.

And France, whose presidential candidates are lining up to give Britain a kicking, is mysteriously not mentioned anywhere in either of Daniel’s columns, presumably because doing so would undermine his argument.

So – the list of priorities Hannan describes may look rational from a British perspective. Unfortunately, though, the people on the other side of the negotiating table won’t have a British perspective.

Problem number three is this line from the Con Home piece:

“Might it truly be more interested in deterring states from leaving than in promoting the welfare of its peoples? If so, there surely can be no further doubt that we were right to opt out.”

If there any rhetorical technique more skin-crawlingly horrible, than, “Your response to my behaviour justifies my behaviour”?

I could go on, about how there’s no reason to think that Daniel’s relatively gentle vision of Brexit is shared by Nigel Farage, UKIP, or a significant number of those who voted Leave. Or about the polls which show that, far from the EU’s response to the referendum pushing more European nations towards the door, support for the union has actually spiked since the referendum – that Britain has become not a beacon of hope but a cautionary tale.

But I’m running out of words, and there’ll be other chances to explore such things. So instead I’m going to end on this:

Hannan’s argument – that only an irrational Europe would not deliver a good Brexit – is remarkably, parodically self-serving. It allows him to believe that, if Brexit goes horribly wrong, well, it must all be the fault of those inflexible Eurocrats, mustn’t it? It can’t possibly be because Brexit was a bad idea in the first place, or because liberal Leavers used nasty, populist ones to achieve their goals.

Read today, there are elements of Hannan’s columns that are compelling, even persuasive. From the perspective of 2020, I fear, they might simply read like one long explanation of why nothing that has happened since will have been his fault.

Jonn Elledge is the editor of the New Statesman's sister site CityMetric. He is on Twitter, far too much, as @JonnElledge.