Generation Yes campaigners leaflet for the Scottish independence referendum on March 29, 2014 in Glasgow. Photograph: Getty Images.
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How close is the Scottish independence race?

The No side's average poll lead has fallen from 24 points in November to eight today. But the odds remain against the SNP. 

For those wanting to gauge the state of the Scottish independence race, today's polls present a particularly murky picture. A new Survation survey in today's Daily Record puts the Yes side 12 points behind (56-44, excluding don't knows), but a Panelbase poll has them trailing by just six (53-47). Even less helpfully, the discrepancy cannot be explained by methodological differences since both companies use weightings based on the 2011 Scottish election, rather than the 2010 general election. 

But despite the gulf in the figures, there are three common trends worth noting. The first is that the race has indisputably narrowed (whatever your pollster of choice). Back in November, the Yes vote stood at an average of 38 per cent, compared to 62 per cent for No. But so far this month, Yes is on 46 per cent with No on 54 per cent. The Unionists' lead has fallen by two-thirds from 24 points to just eight. This is despite the No campaign using what many regarded as its most potent weapon - the pledge to veto a currency union - and José Manuel Barroso's warning that it would be "extremely difficult, if not impossible" for an independent Scotland to join the EU. 

The second is that, for now at least, the Yes side's advance has stalled. The six-point gap shown by Panelbase is identical to that shown four weeks ago and the 12-point gap shown by Survation is a point higher than that in last month's poll. It's too early to say for sure, but the Yes vote may well have hit a ceiling. 

Finally, it's worth making the obvious but significant point that every poll continues to show the No side clearly ahead (as has been the case since the campaign started). While it's not impossible that this will change before 18 September, it is unlikely. A narrow defeat might allow the SNP to press for devo max (and even to revisit the independence question at some point) but a defeat it will be. 

George Eaton is political editor of the New Statesman.

Photo: Getty
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The three avoidable mistakes that Theresa May has made in the Brexit negotiations

She ignored the official Leave campaign, and many Remainers, in pursuing Brexit in the way she has.

We shouldn’t have triggered Article 50 at all before agreeing an exit deal

When John Kerr, the British diplomat who drafted Article 50 wrote it, he believed it would only be used by “a dictatorial regime” that, having had its right to vote on EU decisions suspended “would then, in high dudgeon, want to storm out”.

The process was designed to maximise the leverage of the remaining members of the bloc and disadvantage the departing state. At one stage, it was envisaged that any country not ratifying the Lisbon Treaty would be expelled under the process – Article 50 is not intended to get “the best Brexit deal” or anything like it.

Contrary to Theresa May’s expectation that she would be able to talk to individual member states, Article 50 is designed to ensure that agreement is reached “de vous, chez vous, mais sans vous” – “about you, in your own home, but without you”, as I wrote before the referendum result.

There is absolutely no reason for a departing nation to use Article 50 before agreement has largely been reached. A full member of the European Union obviously has more leverage than one that is two years away from falling out without a deal. There is no reason to trigger Article 50 until you’re good and ready, and the United Kingdom’s negotiating team is clearly very far from either being “good” or “ready”.

As Dominic Cummings, formerly of Vote Leave, said during the campaign: “No one in their right mind would begin a legally defined two-year maximum period to conduct negotiations before they actually knew, roughly speaking, what the process was going to yield…that would be like putting a gun in your mouth and pulling the trigger.”

If we were going to trigger Article 50, we shouldn’t have triggered it when we did

As I wrote before Theresa May triggered Article 50 in March, 2017 is very probably the worst year you could pick to start leaving the European Union. Elections across member states meant the bloc was in a state of flux, and those elections were always going to eat into the time. 

May has got lucky in that the French elections didn’t result in a tricky “co-habitation” between a president of one party and a legislature dominated by another, as Emmanuel Macron won the presidency and a majority for his new party, République en Marche.

It also looks likely that Angela Merkel will clearly win the German elections, meaning that there won’t be a prolonged absence of the German government after the vote in September.

But if the British government was determined to put the gun in its own mouth and pull the trigger, it should have waited until after the German elections to do so.

The government should have made a unilateral offer on the rights of EU citizens living in the United Kingdom right away

The rights of the three million people from the European Union in the United Kingdom were a political sweet spot for Britain. We don’t have the ability to enforce a cut-off date until we leave the European Union, it wouldn’t be right to uproot three million people who have made their lives here, there is no political will to do so – more than 80 per cent of the public and a majority of MPs of all parties want to guarantee the rights of EU citizens – and as a result there is no plausible leverage to be had by suggesting we wouldn’t protect their rights.

If May had, the day she became PM, made a unilateral guarantee and brought forward legislation guaranteeing these rights, it would have bought Britain considerable goodwill – as opposed to the exercise of fictional leverage.

Although Britain’s refusal to accept the EU’s proposal on mutually shared rights has worried many EU citizens, the reality is that, because British public opinion – and the mood among MPs – is so sharply in favour of their right to remain, no one buys that the government won’t do it. So it doesn’t buy any leverage – while an early guarantee in July of last year would have bought Britain credit.

But at least the government hasn’t behaved foolishly about money

Despite the pressure on wages caused by the fall in the value of the pound and the slowdown in growth, the United Kingdom is still a large and growing economy that is perfectly well-placed to buy the access it needs to the single market, provided that it doesn’t throw its toys out of the pram over paying for its pre-agreed liabilities, and continuing to pay for the parts of EU membership Britain wants to retain, such as cross-border policing activity and research.

So there’s that at least.

Stephen Bush is special correspondent at the New Statesman. His daily briefing, Morning Call, provides a quick and essential guide to domestic and global politics.

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