Pro-Russian activists guard a barricade at the Ukrainian regional Security Service building in Donetsk. Photo: Getty
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In eastern Ukraine, protestors are chanting “New Russia” – an old term that’s back in fashion

Separatists in Donetsk and elsewhere are harking back to the 18th century territory of Novorossiya, as Moscow seems to be making moves to federalise Ukraine.

This article first appeared on newrepublic.com

Over the weekend, pro-Russian protesters rioted in the eastern Ukrainian cities of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkov. They took over government buildings and arms caches, waving Russian flags and chanting things like “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”). Their aim: to declare independence from Ukraine and, perhaps, become federal provinces (oblasts) of Russia. Early on Monday, separatists in Donetsk declared the creation of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and set a referendum date for 11 May. “If we’re impeded in holding a referendum, we will turn to Russia and ask them to move in their troops,” one separatist said.

The protests are almost certainly Kremlin-backed, part of Russia’s longstanding plan to “federalise” Ukraine, and to reassert control over the territory that used to be called Novorossiya. “The events in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv are coordinated from the same center,” the Kyiv Post reports. Crowds are singing the Russian national anthem in streets of eastern Ukraine; some call themselves the “anti-Maidan,” advocating for the creation of “the spiritually patriotic union“ of Novorossiya. The Twitter account @NOVORUSSIA2014 gained thousands of followers over the weekend, and #RussianSpring and #AntiMaidan are trending.

Novorossiya is the name of the formerly Ottoman territory that Catherine the Great conquered in the Russo-Turkish Wars, which is now much of southern and eastern Ukraine. Led by Prince Grigory Potemkin, Russian forces colonised the land in the late 18th century and established the cities of Sevastopol, Simferopol, Tiraspol, and Odessa.

Catherine the Great conquers Novorossiya in Stefano Torelli's 
The Allegory of Catherine the Great 's Victory over the Turks (1772).
Image: Wikimedia Commons

The area became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the term “Novorossiya” resurfaced after the Soviet Union fell in 1991. In 1994, Transnistria, the breakaway state between Moldova and Ukraine, declared that it was “an inalienable part of the Russian state’s southern region, [which] also includes Crimea, Odessa oblast, and a number of other [Ukrainian] oblasts, [and is] known as Novorossiya.” When it looked like NATO might expand to include Ukraine in 2003, “some not entirely academic quarters in Moscow played with the idea of a major geopolitical redesign of the northern Black Sea area, under which southern Ukraine, from the Crimea to Odessa, would secede from Kiev and form a Moscow-friendly buffer state, ‘Novorossiya’ – New Russia,” writes Dmitry Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre. Now, the swathe of land spanning from Transnistria to Donetsk is increasingly referred to by that name. 

If the Kremlin isn’t after re-establishing Novorossiya, it’s certainly looking to create something like it – and the first step in that direction is federalising Ukraine. In an interview last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that federalisation is the only “absolutely correct way” to proceed, and that it’s “what the eastern and southern regions request.” If the Kremlin has its way, Ukraine might either become a federation of regional governments, each with wide-ranging authority to act virtually autonomously, or the “independent” southern and eastern regions would become Russian oblasts. “Federalisation would give some pro-Russian regions in Ukraine the de facto right to block crucial decisions, including future moves toward integration with the EU. . . Moscow is likely to find it easier to manage Ukraine and to increase Kyiv’s dependency on its eastern neighbor,” Ukraine scholar Wojciech Konończuk writes

The Kremlin has tried to federalise a handful of former Soviet republics. In the early 2000s, Putin proposed that Belarus should become part of Russia in the form of six oblasts (Belarus rejected the offer) and put forward a similar plan for Moldova, Marcel Van Herpen explains in Putin’s WarsIn Ukraine, the prospect of federalisation emerged during the 2004 Orange Revolution when former President Viktor Yanukovych proposed a referendum on the matter. He pursued federalisation again in 2010, but it was tabled again after Yanukovych’s pro-Russia Party of Regions deemed it “too expensive and problematic.” 

Today, only 14 per cent of Ukrainians support federalisation, according to a recent poll. As the Washington Post points out, the idea is more popular in the southern and eastern regions, where 22 per cent and 26 per cent, respectively, support the creation of a federal state, compared to 3 per cent in the west. But if the Kremlin-backed separatists continue this weekend’s provocations, federalisation could actually happen, especially given the extent to which the Ukrainian government was caught off-guard by the Donetsk declaration

“Frankly speaking, we do not see any other ways for sustainable development of the Ukrainian state other than a federal state,” Lavrov said last week. “Maybe, some people know better and some magic formula can be found within a unitarian state. However, when the west, the east and the south celebrate different holidays, honour different heroes, have different economies, speak different languages, think differently and are attracted by the culture of different European civilisations, it is very hard to live in a unitary state in such conditions.”  

This article first appeared on newrepublic.com

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Leader: The unresolved Eurozone crisis

The continent that once aspired to be a rival superpower to the US is now a byword for decline, and ethnic nationalism and right-wing populism are thriving.

The eurozone crisis was never resolved. It was merely conveniently forgotten. The vote for Brexit, the terrible war in Syria and Donald Trump’s election as US president all distracted from the single currency’s woes. Yet its contradictions endure, a permanent threat to continental European stability and the future cohesion of the European Union.

The resignation of the Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi, following defeat in a constitutional referendum on 4 December, was the moment at which some believed that Europe would be overwhelmed. Among the champions of the No campaign were the anti-euro Five Star Movement (which has led in some recent opinion polls) and the separatist Lega Nord. Opponents of the EU, such as Nigel Farage, hailed the result as a rejection of the single currency.

An Italian exit, if not unthinkable, is far from inevitable, however. The No campaign comprised not only Eurosceptics but pro-Europeans such as the former prime minister Mario Monti and members of Mr Renzi’s liberal-centrist Democratic Party. Few voters treated the referendum as a judgement on the monetary union.

To achieve withdrawal from the euro, the populist Five Star Movement would need first to form a government (no easy task under Italy’s complex multiparty system), then amend the constitution to allow a public vote on Italy’s membership of the currency. Opinion polls continue to show a majority opposed to the return of the lira.

But Europe faces far more immediate dangers. Italy’s fragile banking system has been imperilled by the referendum result and the accompanying fall in investor confidence. In the absence of state aid, the Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the world’s oldest bank, could soon face ruin. Italy’s national debt stands at 132 per cent of GDP, severely limiting its firepower, and its financial sector has amassed $360bn of bad loans. The risk is of a new financial crisis that spreads across the eurozone.

EU leaders’ record to date does not encourage optimism. Seven years after the Greek crisis began, the German government is continuing to advocate the failed path of austerity. On 4 December, Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, declared that Greece must choose between unpopular “structural reforms” (a euphemism for austerity) or withdrawal from the euro. He insisted that debt relief “would not help” the immiserated country.

Yet the argument that austerity is unsustainable is now heard far beyond the Syriza government. The International Monetary Fund is among those that have demanded “unconditional” debt relief. Under the current bailout terms, Greece’s interest payments on its debt (roughly €330bn) will continually rise, consuming 60 per cent of its budget by 2060. The IMF has rightly proposed an extended repayment period and a fixed interest rate of 1.5 per cent. Faced with German intransigence, it is refusing to provide further funding.

Ever since the European Central Bank president, Mario Draghi, declared in 2012 that he was prepared to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the single currency, EU member states have relied on monetary policy to contain the crisis. This complacent approach could unravel. From the euro’s inception, economists have warned of the dangers of a monetary union that is unmatched by fiscal and political union. The UK, partly for these reasons, wisely rejected membership, but other states have been condemned to stagnation. As Felix Martin writes on page 15, “Italy today is worse off than it was not just in 2007, but in 1997. National output per head has stagnated for 20 years – an astonishing . . . statistic.”

Germany’s refusal to support demand (having benefited from a fixed exchange rate) undermined the principles of European solidarity and shared prosperity. German unemployment has fallen to 4.1 per cent, the lowest level since 1981, but joblessness is at 23.4 per cent in Greece, 19 per cent in Spain and 11.6 per cent in Italy. The youngest have suffered most. Youth unemployment is 46.5 per cent in Greece, 42.6 per cent in Spain and 36.4 per cent in Italy. No social model should tolerate such waste.

“If the euro fails, then Europe fails,” the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, has often asserted. Yet it does not follow that Europe will succeed if the euro survives. The continent that once aspired to be a rival superpower to the US is now a byword for decline, and ethnic nationalism and right-wing populism are thriving. In these circumstances, the surprise has been not voters’ intemperance, but their patience.

This article first appeared in the 08 December 2016 issue of the New Statesman, Brexit to Trump