If it is to be a "one nation" party, Labour must support an EU referendum

Miliband is making a strategic mistake by aligning the party with an EU political elite intent on exerting control over all 27 members states, regardless of the wishes of each electorate.

What does the one nation ideal mean for Labour’s approach to an in-out referendum on our EU membership? The term 'one nation' surely implies an end to class war politics and an equal voice in the democratic system for individuals from all sections of society. Rule by elites who act in their own interests at the expense of the rank and file, is the main danger to be avoided. If so, on what principled grounds could a one nation political party oppose an EU referendum?

Well into the 1980s Labour was sceptical about the EU. When I was a member of the party in Newcastle upon Tyne at the time of the 1975 referendum, the overwhelming view of members was that the Common Market (as it was then called) was dominated by the interests of business corporations. Rank and file workers counted for little. This view prevailed into the 1980s and was empirically confirmed by the actions of the Thatcher government in 1986.

The claim that the common market was largely an economic co-prosperity zone had some plausibility at the time of the 1975 referendum. It was possible for a nation to veto decisions that were against the interests of its people. So long as this safeguard remained, the EU might have developed into a mutually beneficial system of international co-operation. But the big countries wanted to be able to impose their wishes on other member states. The turning point came with the Single European Act of 1986, which was actively supported by the Thatcher government. The national veto was replaced by qualified majority voting (QMV) in a dozen key areas, including the single market, monetary co-operation and social policy.

In her book Statecraft, Thatcher explained that she supported the wider use of majority voting because she wished to force the other EU countries to eliminate "non-tariff barriers" to trade, which "operated through different national standards on health and safety, regulations and public procurement policies which discriminated against foreign products, and over-elaborate customs procedures". She wanted the power to outvote other countries, because she thought Britain would gain at the expense of other EU members, especially in providing services. Without the increase in majority voting, she said, "the programme itself could not have been driven through in the face of vested interests in member countries whose governments would have been under immense pressure to use the veto".

Her intention had been to impose de-regulation, but ten years later she admitted that harmful regulation had increased. She acknowledged two mistakes. She had naively believed that powers given to the EU to force through the single market would not be used for other purposes. And she had misunderstood the intentions of other leaders. The single market for them was "a device for centralising more decision-making in the hands of Europe".

In truth, she fell into a trap set up the centralisers. They knew she wanted to deregulate to strengthen the single market, and offered her the chance to coerce other EU members, with the intention of using the self-same powers to force the hand of Thatcher and future British governments. In the end, the Single European Act not only failed to extend the single market, Thatcher concluded that its powers had been "abused in order to push corporatist and collectivist legislation upon Britain by the back door". Her intention had been to impose de-regulation on other countries "by the back door" but they had turned the tables on her. The overall effect had been to "reduce Britain’s ability to compete successfully".

The Conservative Party, which had once prided itself on its patriotism, had under Thatcher been willing to surrender self-government for the paltry gain of a bigger market share for UK service providers in other EU countries. Thatcher at least admitted her mistake and perhaps her admission may serve as a warning to the current government. They could usefully take into account the alternative view that Thatcher advocated in Statecraft. She argued that the strategy of a "level playing field" was not as attractive as it sounded. Harmonisation often entrenched unwise regulation. A better approach would have been to allow different nations to compete to discover the best conditions for enterprise. She quotes J.S. Mill, who had argued that Europe owed its success to the ‘plurality of paths’ followed by different nations.

In saying this, she got close to understanding one of the strongest arguments for democratic self-government, one that was stressed constantly by liberal writers including Hayek, the thinker most admired by Thatcher. Human imperfection was such that we should be wary of giving any agency coercive power. In particular, our institutions should avoid granting exclusive or monopoly power, and instead should allow for reflection, double-checking, and the correction of mistakes in the light of experience. We should aim for an open society in which different ideas can be tried out, and in which creativity and innovation can flourish. Just as a competitive market allows consumers to compare companies, so national independence allows comparison between national systems, including their regulatory regimes. Moreover, democracy depends on nations. They make the ideal of government by consent a realistic hope, and the accountability of leaders a practical possibility.

One country could choose to have greater respect for trade unions and stronger workplace protection and set an example to others of what it believes to be best. Another could have light-touch regulation and offer itself for the critical judgment of other peoples. Over time each can learn from the other.

Until the 1980s it had been the policy of Labour to preserve national independence and Ed Miliband’s use of the term 'one nation' seemed to suggest a renewal of that tradition. But at present, Labour’s leadership is in danger of making a strategic mistake by aligning the party with an EU political elite intent on exerting control over all 27 EU nations, regardless of the wishes of each electorate. The ‘one-nation’ theme of recent speeches surely implies respect for the democratically-expressed views of the people of each nation. Not, it seems, if they want to secure independence from the EU. And yet it was Thatcher who willingly surrendered our powers of self-government. Moreover, David Cameron is no better than Thatcher. Cameron has advanced no principled defence of our independence and tacitly upholds the command-and-control mentality of Europe’s self-chosen elite. Labour is missing a chance to be the voice of the public spirited majority.

David Green is director of Civitas

Workers walk over a giant EU flag in front of the Parliament building in Bucharest, Romania. Photograph: Getty Images.
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"Labour are as pro-Brexit as the Tories": what do Sinn Fein's MPs really want from Westminster?

Its seven MPs are much less sympathetic to Corbyn's party than popularly imagined, and won't ever take their seats.

Should the Conservative minority government fall, what is Jeremy Corbyn’s route to power? The counterfactual as popularly understood goes like this: Corbyn would pick up the phone to his old pal Gerry Adams and convince Sinn Fein’s seven MPs to abandon the habit of a century and take their seats.

There are countless reasons why this would never happen, most of them obvious. One is more surprising. Despite Corbyn’s longstanding links with the republican cause, the Labour party is not all that popular among a new intake, which is preoccupied with one thing above all else: Brexit.

No wonder. Sinn Fein’s long game is an all-Ireland one, and the party believe the UK’s departure from the EU will hasten reunification. In the meantime, however, its priority is a Brexit deal that gives Northern Ireland – where 56 per cent of voters backed remain – designated status within the EU.

Pioneered by the moderate nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party as an antidote to Brexit, designated status would allow the six counties in the North to continue to enjoy the EU’s four freedoms. But the idea is anathema to unionists and the UK government, and Sinn Fein sees little evidence that the Westminster establishment will make it work – not even Labour.

“They are as pro-Brexit as the Conservatives are,” says Mid Ulster MP Francie Molloy. “We’re anti-Brexit. We want to see the right of the people in the North who voted to remain in Europe respected.”

Simmering resentment over what the party perceives to have been broken promises on Tony Blair’s part – especially over legal protection for the Irish language, a key stumbling block obstructing the resumption of power-sharing – makes the already implausible deal even less likely.

“The Irish language act was something that Blair agreed to,” says Molloy. “So when people talk about us taking our seats, they don’t realise we would be backing a Labour government that wouldn’t be living up to its commitments either, and would be just as pro-Brexit as the Conservatives are."

That criticism may well surprise a lay audience whose working assumption is that Adams and Corbyn work hand in glove. But it is perhaps the best illustration of Sinn Fein’s parliamentary priorities: its seven MPs will not in any circumstances take their seats but use their Westminster presence to lobby ministers and MPs of all stripes while running constituency offices at home (they are unsalaried, but claim expenses).

Crucially, its MPs believe abstentionism strengthens, rather than weakens their negotiating hand: by their logic other parties need not and do not fear them given the fact they do not have voting power.

They will use their leverage to agitate for special status above all else. “Special status is the biggest issue that we are lobbying for,” says Molloy. “We feel that is the best way of securing and retaining EU membership. But if we get a referendum on Irish unity and the people vote for that, then the North will automatically join the EU.”

But that wasn’t always the received wisdom. That assurance was in fact secured by Mark Durkan, the former deputy first minister and SDLP MP beaten by Sinn Fein last week, after an exchange with Brexit secretary David Davis at the leaving the EU select committee. The defeat of the three SDLP MPs – two of them by Sinn Fein – means there will be no Irish nationalist voice in the commons while Brexit is negotiated.

Surely that’s bad news for Northern Irish voters? “I don’t think it is,” says Molloy. “The fact we took two seats off the SDLP this time proves abstentionism works. It shows they didn’t deliver by attending. We have a mandate for abstentionism. The people have now rejected attendance at Westminster, and rejected Westminster itself. We’ve never been tempted to take our seats at all. It is very important we live by our mandate.”

If they did, however, they would cut the Conservatives’ and Democratic Unionist Party’s working majority from 13 to a much more precarious six. But Molloy believes any alliance will be a fundamentally weak one and that all his party need do is wait. “I think it’ll be short-lived,” he says. “Every past arrangement between the British government and unionist parties has always ended in tears.”

But if the DUP get its way – the party has signed a confidence and supply deal which delivers extra cash for Northern Ireland – then it need not. Arlene Foster has spoken of her party’s desire to secure a good deal for the entire country. Unsurprisingly, however, Sinn Fein does not buy the conciliatory rhetoric.

“They’ve never really tried to get a good deal for everybody,” says Michelle Gildernew, who won the hyper-marginal of Fermanagh and South Tyrone back from the Ulster Unionists last week. “The assembly and executive [which Sinn Fein and the DUP ran together] weren’t working for a lot of groups – whether that was the LGBT community, the Irish language community, or women...they might say they’re going to work for everybody, but we’ll judge them by their actions, not their words.”

Molloy agrees, and expresses concern that local politicians won’t be able to scrutinise new spending. “The executive needs to be up and running to implement that, and to ensure a fair distribution. If there’s new money coming into the North, we welcome that, but it has to be done through the executive.”

On current evidence, the call for local ministers to scrutinise the Conservatives’ deal with the DUP is wishful thinking – Northern Ireland has been without an executive since February, when the late Martin McGuinness resigned as deputy first minister and triggered a snap election.

The talks since have been defined by intransigence and sluggishness. James Brokenshire, the Northern Ireland secretary, has had to postpone the talks deadline on four separate occasions, and has been criticised by nationalists for his perceived closeness to the DUP.

The final deadline for the restoration of an executive is 29 June 2017. Sinn Fein has called for Brokenshire to recuse himself in favour of a neutral chair. “His hands are tied now, completely,” says Molloy. “The Conservative party were always questionable on where they stood – they’ve always been unionists. The issue now is whether they can act neutrally as a guarantor to the Good Friday Agreement.”

He believes that question is already settled. “Legally, they have to act to ensure that nothing happens to damage that agreement – but we’ve already breached it through Brexit. There was no consultation. The people of the North voted to remain and it hasn’t been recognised. It totally undermines the consent principle.”

Just how they and Brokenshire interpret that principle – the part of the Good Friday Agreement that specifies the constitutional status of the North can only change by consent of its people – will be key to whether they can achieve their ultimate goal: Irish unity.

Molloy and Gildernew say the fact that 11 of Northern Ireland’s 18 constituencies voted to remain in the EU is enough for Brokenshire to call one within the next five years (though polling consistently shows that a clear majority of the province’s electorate, including a substantial minority of nationalists, would vote to stay in the UK). They are confident they can win, though, failing that, Molloy envisages it as the first in several referenda on unification.

But beneath the optimism lies the knowledge that the British government are unlikely to heed their calls. And, willingly absent from the Westminster chamber, they say the UK government’s discussions about Brexit are illegitimate. They see their real powerbase as elsewhere: in Dublin’s Dail Eireann, where Sinn Fein is the third largest party, and the chancelleries of Europe.

“That’s where most of the negotiation will actually happen,” says Molloy. “The EU27 will make the decisions. They won’t be made in Westminster, because the British have already set out what they’re doing: they’re leaving.”

But with seven MPs already lobbying ministers and a united Ireland unlikely to happen in the immediate future, Sinn Fein itself won’t be disappearing anytime soon.

Patrick Maguire writes about politics and is the 2016 winner of the Anthony Howard Award.

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