Thatcher and North Sea oil – a failure to invest in Britain’s future

Had Thatcher been a truly visionary politician, she would have established a wealth fund for the oil windfall, not squandered it on tax cuts and current spending.

Margaret Thatcher was undoubtedly a transformative prime minister. The only peacetime premiers who might be said to have had a similar lasting impact on British politics are the Victorian titans Gladstone and Disraeli, and Attlee, who led the great post-war Labour government

But whatever else might be said of Thatcher’s record one thing seems undeniable. She was not an investment prime minister. She may be credited by David Cameron for having made Britain great again following the malaise of the 1970s but she failed – and spectacularly so – to invest in Britain’s post-Thatcherite future. As capital spending plummeted, our national infrastructure was left to rot. Public services in particular were starved of resources. Most seriously her governments did little to help find future employment for those industries deemed beyond the pale of the Thatcher revolution. 

But nothing better illustrates her failure to invest in Britain’s long term future than her mishandling of the giant windfall she was gifted on entering Number 10 from booming North Sea oil revenues.

There is no doub that oil played a big part in bankrolling Thatcher’s agenda and in allowing Britain to address a chronic balance of payments problem that had besieged post-war government (Tony Blair said in 1987 that North Sea oil was "utterly essential to Mrs Thatcher’s electoral success"). But history should also record that Thatcher missed a trick in not diverting some of the proceeds of oil revenue into an oil fund, like Norway and others did. Instead she used the lot to support current spending, including covering the costs of large-scale industrial restructuring and funding expensive tax cuts to woo middle England.

And what a lot it was. The table below shows government tax receipts from the UK Continental Shelf since 1980 where the numbers have been rebased to show receipts in real terms, expressed in 2011 pounds. In the years between 1980-81 and 1989-90, the Thatcher governments received a staggering windfall of £166bn. 

Total North Sea Revenue: UK 1980-81 to 2010-11 in real terms (£2011)

 

Source: Scotland's Choices McLean, Gallagher and Lodge 2013

Oil revenues were significant in the 1980s for two reasons. One was that the price of oil was at a real-terms historic high, after two political shocks in 1973-4 (caused by the Arab-Israeli war) and 1978-9 (caused by the Iranian revolution). In 1979 the marker oil price reached a peak of US $93 per barrel at today’s prices. This price has only been exceeded twice in history: once at the dawn of extraction in the 1860s, and once in 2007. The other was that North Sea production came on stream rapidly, with the easiest fields, of course, being exploited first.

Now, no one is suggesting that all oil revenue should have been put away for a rainy day just that some of it should have. To think through what might have been, the Scottish government published a report in 2009 which considered "how much a hypothetical UK Oil Fund would have been worth had the UK Government invested a proportion of oil tax revenue over the past three decades". The answers, on three different assumptions about the annual investment, and three different assumptions about the nominal rate of return, are shown below:

Value of a hypothetical Oil Fund for UK (2008-09), on assumption that given percentages of North Sea revenues had been allocated to it since 1980.

Building up an endowment is something politicians would often agree is a good idea. But they almost never do it (we don’t for instance have a real National Insurance fund but rather a pay-as-you-go system). The reason is very simple. A politician in a democracy must be re-elected in, at latest, five years’ time. An endowment must be built up, unspent, for much longer than that if it is to yield anything worth having.

Undoubtedly there would have been fiscal consequences had Thatcher opted for an oil fund: after all, you can’t spend and save at the same time. Nevertheless, as these figures show, if just 10 per cent of UK tax receipts from the North Sea had been put into an oil fund starting in 1980 and continuing until 2008, and if the nominal return had been 3 per cent, the value of the fund would be £24bn per annum. Twenty per cent of oil revenues on a return of 5 per cent would have created a pot of £66bn per annum. The failure to create such a fund is brought home when you consider what it could have been spent on. To give one example, hundreds of thousands of new houses could be built to replace the housing stock Thatcher ran down through her iconic policy of selling council houses. We might not face the housing shortage crisis we do today.

The decision to treat tax receipts as a windfall to set against current expenditure was a major policy mistake. Oil and gas in the North Sea are part of the nation’s capital stock. To tax this stock and spend the money in a flow of current expenditure is to deplete the stock. The lesson from history is that tax proceeds on capital receipts should be reserved in some form for major investment projects, something that might be borne in mind should shale gas generate significant revenues.

Had Thatcher been a truly visionary politician, she would have done more to use the the riches from North Sea oil to not only rescue Britain from her troubled past, but also help her be great in the future too. 

Guy Lodge is associate director at IPPR. He is co-author with Iain McLean and Jim Gallagher of Scotland's Choices: the referendum and what happens afterwards published on April 18th by Edinburgh University Press.

 

A picture taken on 11 June 1984 shows a tanker taking on oil from a loading bay at the Statfjord A-platform in the North Sea. Photograph: Getty Images.

Guy Lodge is associate director at IPPR. He is co-author with Iain McLean and Jim Gallagher of Scotland’s Choices: the referendum and what happens afterwards and with Anthony Seldon of Brown at Ten.

Photo: Getty
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The Prevent strategy needs a rethink, not a rebrand

A bad policy by any other name is still a bad policy.

Yesterday the Home Affairs Select Committee published its report on radicalization in the UK. While the focus of the coverage has been on its claim that social media companies like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are “consciously failing” to combat the promotion of terrorism and extremism, it also reported on Prevent. The report rightly engages with criticism of Prevent, acknowledging how it has affected the Muslim community and calling for it to become more transparent:

“The concerns about Prevent amongst the communities most affected by it must be addressed. Otherwise it will continue to be viewed with suspicion by many, and by some as “toxic”… The government must be more transparent about what it is doing on the Prevent strategy, including by publicising its engagement activities, and providing updates on outcomes, through an easily accessible online portal.”

While this acknowledgement is good news, it is hard to see how real change will occur. As I have written previously, as Prevent has become more entrenched in British society, it has also become more secretive. For example, in August 2013, I lodged FOI requests to designated Prevent priority areas, asking for the most up-to-date Prevent funding information, including what projects received funding and details of any project engaging specifically with far-right extremism. I lodged almost identical requests between 2008 and 2009, all of which were successful. All but one of the 2013 requests were denied.

This denial is significant. Before the 2011 review, the Prevent strategy distributed money to help local authorities fight violent extremism and in doing so identified priority areas based solely on demographics. Any local authority with a Muslim population of at least five per cent was automatically given Prevent funding. The 2011 review pledged to end this. It further promised to expand Prevent to include far-right extremism and stop its use in community cohesion projects. Through these FOI requests I was trying to find out whether or not the 2011 pledges had been met. But with the blanket denial of information, I was left in the dark.

It is telling that the report’s concerns with Prevent are not new and have in fact been highlighted in several reports by the same Home Affairs Select Committee, as well as numerous reports by NGOs. But nothing has changed. In fact, the only change proposed by the report is to give Prevent a new name: Engage. But the problem was never the name. Prevent relies on the premise that terrorism and extremism are inherently connected with Islam, and until this is changed, it will continue to be at best counter-productive, and at worst, deeply discriminatory.

In his evidence to the committee, David Anderson, the independent ombudsman of terrorism legislation, has called for an independent review of the Prevent strategy. This would be a start. However, more is required. What is needed is a radical new approach to counter-terrorism and counter-extremism, one that targets all forms of extremism and that does not stigmatise or stereotype those affected.

Such an approach has been pioneered in the Danish town of Aarhus. Faced with increased numbers of youngsters leaving Aarhus for Syria, police officers made it clear that those who had travelled to Syria were welcome to come home, where they would receive help with going back to school, finding a place to live and whatever else was necessary for them to find their way back to Danish society.  Known as the ‘Aarhus model’, this approach focuses on inclusion, mentorship and non-criminalisation. It is the opposite of Prevent, which has from its very start framed British Muslims as a particularly deviant suspect community.

We need to change the narrative of counter-terrorism in the UK, but a narrative is not changed by a new title. Just as a rose by any other name would smell as sweet, a bad policy by any other name is still a bad policy. While the Home Affairs Select Committee concern about Prevent is welcomed, real action is needed. This will involve actually engaging with the Muslim community, listening to their concerns and not dismissing them as misunderstandings. It will require serious investigation of the damages caused by new Prevent statutory duty, something which the report does acknowledge as a concern.  Finally, real action on Prevent in particular, but extremism in general, will require developing a wide-ranging counter-extremism strategy that directly engages with far-right extremism. This has been notably absent from today’s report, even though far-right extremism is on the rise. After all, far-right extremists make up half of all counter-radicalization referrals in Yorkshire, and 30 per cent of the caseload in the east Midlands.

It will also require changing the way we think about those who are radicalized. The Aarhus model proves that such a change is possible. Radicalization is indeed a real problem, one imagines it will be even more so considering the country’s flagship counter-radicalization strategy remains problematic and ineffective. In the end, Prevent may be renamed a thousand times, but unless real effort is put in actually changing the strategy, it will remain toxic. 

Dr Maria Norris works at London School of Economics and Political Science. She tweets as @MariaWNorris.