Adonis's review should galvanise the North East and its neighbours

While the coalition dithers on its growth strategy, the Labour peer has set out precisely the rebalancing the nation needs to recover from the crash.

The launch of the North East Independent Economic Review, chaired by Andrew Adonis, provides further evidence that while the government dithers on economic growth strategy, others are prepared to set out their stalls. First Heseltine, then the Northern Economic Futures Commission and now Adonis all point to the importance of local and regional economies in returning the nation to prosperity.

Adonis sets out a North East vision comprised of "making, trading and exporting" – precisely the rebalancing the nation needs to recover from an economic shock which started in the financial sector but which has had its greatest impact in the north. It calls for the creation of 60,000 private sector jobs and makes clear that the north east has some key competitive advantages to enable that rebalancing and job creation to happen if only opportunities can be unlocked.

The review makes proposals to boost exports and supply chains and co-ordinate inward investment activities through the formation of North East International, it calls for a North East Innovation Board to oversee the development of key innovation centres in life sciences, automotive manufacture and offshore engineering, and it makes the case for a regional business bank and a successor body for the NE JEREMIE, European and social enterprise funds overseen by a NE Investment and Finance Board. In many ways this puts back together again some of the functions that were once carried out by the regional development agency but with a fresh purpose and momentum.

Skills, widely accepted to be critical to driving growth in regions like the North East, also have a key role in the plan with proposals for a North East Schools Challenge, a doubling of the numbers of youth apprenticeships, increasing number of young people in higher education by 1 per cent per annum and a payment-by-results component for local training providers. It also calls for a strategic plan for transport and a NE Infrastructure Fund to fund a series of key priorities including smartcard ticketing, the A1 Western Bypass and A19 developments, and a series of rail improvements including to maximise freight potential. These should be led by a new body: Transport North East.

All of the proposals are sensible and progressive and emphasise what the North East can do for itself if it can now get its act together, establish the Combined Authority it has recently announced, and come up with a delivery plan that turns aspiration into action. Three questions, though, remain.

First, there is the matter of scale. While many measures make sense at the North East level and require the kind of co-ordination that Adonis has proposed, there are a few where the North East will have to work more collaboratively beyond its borders to maximise its potential. On inward investment, innovation and transport in particular, North Eastern activities need to be quickly integrated with activity taking place in Tees Valley but perhaps, more importantly, with other Northern LEPs. For example, Transport North East will only be able to achieve its objectives of faster journey times between key cities if it quickly gets behind plans to decentralise the Northern Rail and Transpennine franchises being organised by the emergent 'Transport for the North' collaboration.

Second, there is central government. Adonis is right not to be too demanding and let Heseltine do the heavy-lifting in this regard, but in most aspects of the review, some central government leniency will be required to allow proposals the freedom – and investment – to really take off. Changes to the national FDI system, University Technical Colleges, locating the British Investment bank in the North East would all be cases in point but long term fiscal autonomy and much greater economic decentralisation must be the wider goals for all Northern LEPs and these will only be achieved with a wider Northern voice.

Finally, there is the question of time. With the Financial Times reporting that places such as Sunderland will be £618 per person worse off than before as a result of welfare changes, one wonders whether any plan of this nature can offset such a hit to the local economy. Clearly there is a very real sense that things can only get worse before they get better, but Adonis and his review team have put together a coherent plan and for now it’s the only game in town.

Ed Cox is director of IPPR North


Labour peer and former transport secretary Andrew Adonis.

Ed Cox is Director at IPPR North. He tweets @edcox_ippr.

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I'm far from convinced by Cameron's plans for Syria

The Prime Minister has a plan for when the bombs drop. But what about after?

In the House of Commons today, the Prime Minister set out a powerful case for Britain to join air strikes against Isil in Syria.  Isil, he argued, poses a direct threat to Britain and its people, and Britain should not be in the business of “outsourcing our security to our allies”. And while he conceded that further airstrikes alone would not be sufficient to beat Isil, he made the case for an “Isil first” strategy – attacking Isil now, while continuing to do what we can diplomatically to help secure a lasting settlement for Syria in which Assad (eventually) plays no part.

I agreed with much of David Cameron’s analysis. And no-one should doubt either the murderous barbarism of Isil in the region, or the barbarism they foment and inspire in others across the world.  But at the end of his lengthy Q&A session with MPs, I remained unconvinced that UK involvement in airstrikes in Syria was the right option. Because the case for action has to be a case for action that has a chance of succeeding.  And David Cameron’s case contained neither a plan for winning the war, nor a plan for winning the peace.

The Prime Minister, along with military experts and analysts across the world, concedes that air strikes alone will not defeat Isil, and that (as in Iraq) ground forces are essential if we want to rid Syria of Isil. But what is the plan to assemble these ground forces so necessary for a successful mission?  David Cameron’s answer today was more a hope than a plan. He referred to “70,000 Syrian opposition fighters - principally the Free Syrian Army (FSA) – with whom we can co-ordinate attacks on Isil”.

But it is an illusion to think that these fighters can provide the ground forces needed to complement aerial bombardment of Isil.  Many commentators have begun to doubt whether the FSA continues to exist as a coherent operational entity over the past few months. Coralling the myriad rebel groups into a disciplined force capable of fighting and occupying Isil territory is a heroic ambition, not a plan. And previous efforts to mobilize the rebels against Isil have been utter failures. Last month the Americans abandoned a $500m programme to train and turn 5,400 rebel fighters into a disciplined force to fight Isil. They succeeded in training just 60 fighters. And there have been incidents of American-trained fighters giving some of their US-provided equipment to the Nusra Front, an affiliate of Al Qaeda.

Why has it proven so hard to co-opt rebel forces in the fight against Isil? Because most of the various rebel groups are fighting a war against Assad, not against Isil.  Syria’s civil war is gruesome and complex, but it is fundamentally a Civil War between Assad’s forces and a variety of opponents of Assad’s regime. It would be a mistake for Britain to base a case for military action against Isil on the hope that thousands of disparate rebel forces can be persuaded to change their enemy – especially when the evidence so far is that they won’t.

This is a plan for military action that, at present, looks highly unlikely to succeed.  But what of the plan for peace? David Cameron today argued for the separation of the immediate task at hand - to strike against Isil in Syria – from the longer-term ambition of achieving a settlement in Syria and removing Assad.  But for Isil to be beaten, the two cannot be separated. Because it is only by making progress in developing a credible and internationally-backed plan for a post-Assad Syria that we will persuade Syrian Sunnis that fighting Isil will not end up helping Assad win the Civil War.  If we want not only to rely on rebel Sunnis to provide ground troops against Isil, but also provide stable governance in Isil-occupied areas when the bombing stops, progress on a settlement to Syria’s Civil War is more not less urgent.  Without it, the reluctance of Syrian Sunnis to think that our fight is their fight will undermine the chances of military efforts to beat Isil and bring basic order to the regions they control. 

This points us towards doubling down on the progress that has already been made in Vienna: working with the USA, France, Syria’s neighbours and the Gulf states, as well as Russia and Iran. We need not just a combined approach to ending the conflict, but the prospect of a post-war Syria that offers a place for those whose cooperation we seek to defeat Isil. No doubt this will strike some as insufficient in the face of the horrors perpetrated by Isil. But I fear that if we want not just to take action against Isil but to defeat them and prevent their return, it offers a better chance of succeeding than David Cameron’s proposal today. 

Stewart Wood is a former Shadow Cabinet minister and adviser to Ed Miliband. He tweets as @StewartWood.