Bad politics, baffling diplomacy - Osborne's stance on bank bonuses

The government's posturing is about little more than saying enough to keep the eurosceptics quiet.

Of all the unpopular causes to take up, defending bank bonuses must rank pretty high up the list. That still applies even if it is the EU, rather than the House of Commons, doing the legislating.

But that doesn't seem to have deterred David Cameron. Yesterday George Osborne stood alone in opposition to a deal that could make the European banking sector safer and more transparent and which contains a number of major reforms actively pushed by the UK.
First, a disclaimer. The Capital Requirements legislation is not really about bonuses or bankers' pay. Instead, it focuses on increasing the amount of core capital banks must hold on their balance sheet. A lack of sufficient good quality capital combined with a liquidity crisis when the money markets seized up, were the two main causes of the 2007-9 banking crisis. More than five years on, the European and US economies are still yet to recover.
Increasing the minimum levels of capital to be held on their balance sheets and establishing rules to control leverage ratios will bring more safety to the banking sector. Moreover, the introduction of country-by-country reporting, which will require European banks to disclose how much tax they pay is another welcome breakthrough that will increase transparency and rebuild public trust in the banking sector. Like the country-by-country reporting, new rules on bank pay were among the baubles added to the tree.
The provisions on bonus payments are among the most complicated parts of an already highly technical piece of law. This strict 1:1 cap will be the norm but banks will be able to pay bonuses worth double salary on a majority vote among shareholders. Meanwhile, with up to 25 per cent of the bonus able to be made in deferred bonds or securities there is scope to spread out payments or make them dependent on long-term performance.
What I suspect is that the government's posturing is about little more than saying enough to keep the eurosceptics quiet. Boris Johnson, who has been consistent and vocal in his opposition to the regulation, quickly denounced the agreement as "self-defeating" and "deluded". The Prime Minister, correctly guessing that Thursday's by-election might lead to more questions about his leadership and the threat from UKIP, chose to add his two penn'orth.
But it is difficult to take the government's opposition at face value. First of all, this is not a case of Britain vs Europe. There have been a glut of EU laws regulating different parts of the financial sector since the financial crisis - short selling, the derivatives market, hedge funds and insurance just to name a few. Guess how many times Britain has been outvoted in the Council of Ministers by those perfidious foreigners? Zero, nada, zilch - it hasn't happened since the last European elections in 2009.
For all the hyperbole likely to dominate the pages of Conservative Home and the right-wing press, the British government has not been marginalised in the negotiations on CRD IV. On the contrary, it has led them and, indeed, wanted to go further than the European Commission on the level of core capital that banks should be required to hold. While it is true that the British government had expressed reservations about the bonus cap, a government official I spoke with described CRD IV as "a crucially important piece of legislation".
The same is true in the European Parliament. Liberal Democrat MEP Sharon Bowles and Conservative Vicky Ford, who were part of the Parliament's six-member negotiating team, both spoke favourably of the agreement at a press conference on Thursday last week. One of the Parliament's most vocal critics of the City, Green MEP Philippe Lamberts, another member of the Parliament's negotiating team, said that he had "felt like a Briton" on "most topics" covered by the legislation.
Ford went further, saying that the public "need to know how much banks are paying in tax". Referring to the exemption allowing bonuses to be paid in long-dated bonds or securities, she added that "the long-dated pay element should be examined before they (bankers) start screaming".
Besides, rules on bank pay should hardly be controversial at a time when pay levels in both the public and private sector are being tightly controlled. The Independent was among those arguing last week that politicians should not legislate on private sector pay. This might hold water if the banking sector had shown an iota of willingness to self-regulate to curb excessive pay. They have not, and too many top banking executives are still receiving multi-million pound rewards for presiding over multi-million or billion pound losses.
There is precious little the government can do to block a cap and they know it. The Irish government, which currently holds the six month rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers, would not have offered the compromise unless it was confident that all governments would sign up to it. For its part, the Parliament, which has given up tighter rules on bank leverage ratios in exchange for the bonus cap, will not want to unpick a painstakingly reached agreement and wants the symbolic victory of the bonus cap. Although other countries are anxious for Britain to vote in favour, the bill will be adopted by a qualified majority by ministers and the European Parliament, so there is no scope for a veto.
By promising to hold an 'in/out' referendum early in the next Parliament, Cameron is already running a high risk strategy on Europe. If he wants other countries to look kindly on the prospect of giving more opt-outs and exemptions to Britain then he needs allies and he needs to pick his battles wisely. Holding up vitally important legislation on bank capital for the sake of a losing battle on behalf of a few thousand multi-millionaires in the Square Mile is not just bad politics, but bad economics too.
Ben Fox is a reporter for EU Observer. He writes in a personal capacity
Chancellor George Osborne is pictured prior to an Economic and Financial Affairs Council on March 5, 2013 at the EU headquarters in Brussels. Photograph: Getty Images.
Photo: Getty Images
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Cameron needs to decide what he thinks about Russia

David Cameron's words suggest one thing, his actions quite another.

David Cameron needs to decide whether he takes Russia seriously.

He certainly talks a good game, calling Vladimir Putin to account for crimes against Ukrainian sovereignty and for supporting the wrong side in Syria, claiming credit for bolstering the post-Crimea sanctions regime, and demanding that Moscow’s behaviour change. And the new Strategic Defence & Security Review, published last week, puts Russia front and centre among the threats Britain faces.

The problem is, his government’s foreign policy seems calculated to make no one happier than Putin himself.

At fault is not a failure of analysis. It has taken Whitehall 19 months since Moscow annexed Crimea to develop a new Russia policy, replacing the old aspirations of “strategic partnership based on common values”, but the conviction that Russia be treated as a significant threat to the U.K.’s security and prosperity is solid.

Five years ago, when the coalition government published the last Strategic Defence & Security Review, Russia was mentioned once, in the context of rising global powers with whom London could partner to help solve planetary problems, from nuclear proliferation to climate change. The new SDSR tells a very different story. Russia gets 28 mentions this time around, characterised as a “state threat” that “may feel tempted to act aggressively against NATO allies.” Russia’s annexation of Crimea and instigation of a separatist civil war in eastern Ukraine are mentioned in the same sentence with Assad’s chemical weapons attacks on Syrian civilians and the rise of the Islamic State as key examples of how the world is becoming a more dangerous place.

How that threat will be countered, however, is not a question Whitehall can answer: it is a question for Westminster, and it gets to the heart of where this government sees its place in the world, and in Europe in particular. What Whitehall cannot say – but what the politicians must recognise – is this: the best bulwark against the Kremlin is a strengthened European Union, with more integrated markets and the force to push a concerted foreign policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood. And that recognition requires Cameron to decide whether Putin poses a greater challenge than Nigel Farage.

The SDSR is right to note that the danger of a military confrontation with Russia is remote. Just in case, the Government has committed to bolstering aerial defences, contributing to NATO’s rapid reaction capabilities and maintaining the sanctions regime until a full settlement is reached that restores Ukrainian sovereignty. These are all reasonable measures, which will go some distance to ensuring that Moscow understands the risks of further escalation in the near term. But they do nothing to address the longer term problem.

From a hard-security perspective, Russia is a nuisance. The real danger is in the threat Moscow poses to what the SDSR calls the “rules-based order” – that system of institutions, agreements and understandings that underpin stability and prosperity on the European continent. That order is about more than respecting national borders, important as that is. It is also about accepting that markets are impartially regulated, that monopolies are disallowed and political and economic power reside in institutions, rather than in individuals. It is, in other words, about accepting rules that are almost the polar opposite of the system that Russia has built over the past 25 years, an order based on rents, clientelism and protected competitive positions.

Russia, after all, went to war over a trade treaty. It invaded Ukraine and annexed part of its territory to prevent the full implementation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement that was designed to make Ukraine function more like Europe and less like Russia. From Moscow’s point of view, the European project is a very real geopolitical threat, one that promises to reduce the territory in which Russia can compete and, eventually, to increase the pressure on Russia itself to change. In somewhat less pernicious ways Moscow is seeking similarly to derail Moldova’s and Georgia’s European integration, while working hard to keep Belarus and Armenia from straying.

This is not a problem of vision or diplomacy, a failure to convince Putin of the value of the European way of doing things. For Putin and those on whose behalf he governs, the European way of doing things carries negative value. And unless the basic structure of politics and economics in Russia shifts, that calculation won’t change when Putin himself leaves the Kremlin. For the foreseeable future, Russia’s rulers will be willing to go to extraordinary lengths to prevent the widening of Europe, at the cost of instability and dysfunction in the region.

European willingness is another question. A chorus of euro=sceptics both left and right have demanded that Europe stop provoking the Russian bear, leaving the Eastern Neighbourhood countries to fend for themselves – sacrificing Kiev’s sovereignty to Moscow in order to bolster their own sovereignty from Brussels. Cracks, too, are emerging in the centre of the political spectrum: as French President Francois Hollande pledged to work with Moscow to fight ISIS in Syria, Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared that such an alliance would necessitate the lifting of sanctions on Russia, thus trading stability in Syria for instability in Ukraine.

As a member of the EU, London has a role to play. Together with Berlin, London could exert pressure on Paris and keep the margins of the political spectrum marginal. London could through its weight behind a common energy market, forcing Gazprom to play by EU competition rules. London could bolster anti-corruption systems and ensure that ill-gotten gains have no safe haven in Europe. London could insist on the legitimacy of the European project from one end of the continent to the other.

Instead, London is threatening Brexit, relinquishing any leverage over its European allies, and seeking EU reforms that would eviscerate the common energy market, common financial regulation, the common foreign and security policy and other key tools in the relationship with Russia.

In their February 2015 report on EU-Russian relations, the House of Lords raised the question of “whether Europe can be secure and prosperous if Russia continues to be governed as it is today.” To be sure, Europe can’t change Russia’s government and shouldn’t try. But by insisting on its own rules – both in how it governs its internal markets and in how it pursues its foreign policy – Europe can change the incentives Russia’s government faces.

The question, then, to Cameron is this: Whose rules would Westminster rather see prevail in the Eastern Neighbourhood, Europe’s or Russia’s?

Samuel A. Greene is Director of the King’s Russia Institute, King’s College London.