What happens if England votes no and Scotland votes yes to the EU?

If England pulls Scotland out of the EU against its will, the independence cause could be re-energised.

In the next five years, Scotland could be holding two referenda on its relationship within two unions. First, the Scottish people will determine their fate within the United Kingdom when they vote on independence in 2014. If they vote to remain within the UK then they could possibly be voting in a second referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU. Polling trends indicate that Scotland will choose to stay within the UK. Polls on Britain staying within the EU, however, are showing mixed results. A more in-depth look shows Scotland and England are much divided on continuing EU membership. If a referendum is held a possible scenario could see England pull an unwilling Scotland out of Europe.  If this does happen could it be the catalyst for a second wave of Scottish nationalism?

Last weekend, polling commissioned by the FT showed that convincing the British public to support EU membership could be an uphill struggle. Were an in-out referendum held tomorrow, 50 per cent would vote to leave, with only 33 per cent opting to stay in. Meanwhile, ahead of the independence referendum, Alex Salmond has placed much emphasis on an independent Scotland joining the EU. It seems rather unusual that a politician in Britain is using Europe in an attempt to attract voters. The issue of European membership, however, isn’t as toxic in Scotland as it is in England. A second poll conducted at a similar time by Ipsos-Mori on Scottish attitudes towards an EU referendum shows that, while not overly enthusiastic about Europe, the Scottish seem to be less eurosceptic than the rest of Britain. Roughly 50 per cent of those polled said they’d vote to remain within the EU, while 34 per cent would vote to leave – the inverse of the FT’s poll of the entire British public. Given such evidence it isn’t inconceivable to think that if an EU in-out referendum does happen, Scotland could vote to stay in, while the rest of Britain votes to leave. But even if the Scottish become less enthusiastic about continuing EU membership, how easily could the English – along with Wales and Northern Ireland – pull Scotland out of Europe?

Using the 2011 AV referendum turnout figures as a proxy for a potential EU membership referendum, we can see that the Scottish only make up about 1 in 10 voters in the British electorate. The English, with their overwhelming voter power, won’t have to disagree to a large extent with Scotland to force a "Brexit". Below are a few hypothetical results showing that England can easily take Scotland out of the EU, despite a large Scottish vote in favour of staying in.  

The numbers show that unless the margin of difference between in-out votes in England, Wales and Northern Ireland is exceptionally close (between 1-2 per cent ) it looks likely that Scotland’s EU fate is entirely out of its own hands. The number of votes needed from Scotland to stay in increases dramatically as the in-out margin becomes wider in the rest of Britain. Even if Scotland votes in favour of staying in by two to one, 52 per cent of the rest of the British electorate is all that’s needed to force an EU exit. In fact, even if every voter in Scotland chose to continue EU membership, it would only take about 56 per cent of the rest of Britain to vote for withdrawal to take Scotland with them.

Anyone with a bit of arithmetic can easily point out this balance of voting power. This possible scenario, however, shows that Britain could be voting on more than just EU membership. England pulling a pro-European Scotland out of the EU could have immense political consequences  for years to come. For Scotland to vote to stay within the UK, only to have England take it out of the EU against its will, could re-energise Scottish nationalism.

This might be exactly what Alex Salmond needs to keep his dream of independence alive for future generations. Any Westminster government would be unlikely to allow an immediate second referendum but nationalism can have persistence. In Canada, the Québécois overwhelmingly voted against independence in 1980. But by remaining determined they were able to achieve a second referendum 15 years later. In 1995, independence was extremely close with 49.42 per cent voting 'yes'. If Scottish nationalism is strengthened by England pulling Scotland out of the EU, when most Scots would rather stay in, we shouldn’t necesarily expect the uncertainty over Scotland’s future to end in 2014.

Glenn Gottfried is research fellow at IPPR

David Cameron and Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond attend the Drumhead Service on June 25, 2011 in Edinburgh. Photograph: Getty Images.

 

Glenn Gottfried is research fellow at IPPR

Show Hide image

France’s burkini ban could not come at a worse time

Yet more legislation against veiled women can only further divide an already divided nation.

Since mayor of Cannes David Lisnard banned the full-body burkini from his town’s beaches, as many as 15 French resorts have followed suit. Arguments defending the bans fall into three main categories. First, it is about defending the French state’s secularism (laïcité). Second, that the costume represents a misogynistic doctrine that sees female bodies as shameful. And finally, that the burkini is cited as a threat to public order.

None of these arguments satisfactorily refute the claims of civil rights activists that the bans are fundamentally Islamophobic.

The niceties of laïcité

The Cannes decree explicitly invokes secular values. It prohibits anyone “not dressed in a fashion respectful of laïcité” from accessing public beaches. However, the French state has only banned “ostentatious” religious symbols in schools and for government employees as part of laïcité (the strict separation between the state and religious society). And in public spaces, laïcité claims to respect religious plurality. Indeed, the Laïcité Commission has tweeted that the ban, therefore, “cannot be based upon the principle of laïcité”.

While veils covering the entire face such as the burqa or niqab are illegal, this is not to protect laïcité; it is a security matter. The legal justification is that these clothes make it impossible to identify the person underneath – which is not the case for the burkini.

 

By falling back on laïcité to police Muslim women in this way, the Cannes authorities are fuelling the argument that “fundamentalist secularism” has become a means of excluding Muslims from French society.

Colonial attitudes

Others, such as Laurence Rossignol, the minister for women’s rights, hold that the burkini represents a “profoundly archaic view of a woman’s place in society”, disregarding Muslim women who claim to wear their burkini voluntarily.

This typifies an enduring colonial attitude among many non-Muslim French politicians, who feel entitled to dictate to Muslim women what is in their best interests. Rossignol has in the past compared women who wear headscarves through choice to American “negroes” who supported slavery.

Far from supporting women’s rights, banning the burkini will only leave the women who wear it feeling persecuted. Even those with no choice in the matter are not helped by the ban. This legal measure does nothing to challenge patriarchal authority over female bodies in the home. Instead, it further restricts the lives of veiled women by replacing it with state authority in public.

Open Islamophobia

Supporters of the ban have also claimed that, with racial tensions high after recent terrorist attacks, it is provocative to wear this form of Muslim clothing. Such an argument was made by Pierre-Ange Vivoni, mayor of Sisco in Corsica, when he banned the burkini in his commune. Early reports suggested a violent clash between local residents and non-locals of Moroccan origin was triggered when strangers photographed a burkini-wearing woman in the latter group, which angered her male companions. Vivoni claimed that banning the costume protected the security of local people, including those of North African descent.

Those reports have transpired to be false: none of the women in question were even wearing a burkini at the time of the incident. Nonetheless, the ban has stood in Sisco and elsewhere.

To be “provoked” by the burkini is to be provoked by the visibility of Muslims. Banning it on this basis punishes Muslim women for other people’s prejudice. It also disregards the burkini’s potential to promote social cohesion by giving veiled women access to the same spaces as their non-Muslim compatriots.

Appeals to public order have, occasionally, been openly Islamophobic. Thierry Migoule, head of municipal services in Cannes, claimed that the burkini “refers to an allegiance to terrorist movements”, conveniently ignoring the Muslim victims of recent attacks. Barely a month after Muslims paying their respects to friends and family killed in Nice were racially abused, such comments are both distasteful and irresponsible.

Increased divisions

Feiza Ben Mohammed, spokesperson for the Federation of Southern Muslims, fears that stigmatising Muslims in this way will play into the hands of IS recruiters. That fear seems well-founded: researchers cite a sense of exclusion as a factor behind the radicalisation of a minority of French Muslims. Measures like this can only exacerbate that problem. Indeed, provoking repressive measures against European Muslims to cultivate such a sentiment is part of the IS strategy.

Meanwhile, the day after the incident in Sisco, riot police were needed in nearby Bastia to prevent a 200-strong crowd chanting “this is our home” from entering a neighbourhood with many residents of North African descent. Given the recent warning from France’s head of internal security of the risk of a confrontation between “the extreme right and the Muslim world”, such scenes are equally concerning.

Now more than ever, France needs unity. Yet more legislation against veiled women can only further divide an already divided nation.

The Conversation

Fraser McQueen, PhD Candidate, University of Stirling

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.