Is Labour's lead five points or 10? Why ICM and YouGov disagree

It all depends on how you assume those who say "don't know" will vote when the election actually happens.

The latest monthly ICM/Guardian poll, showing that Labour's lead over the Tories has shrunk from eight points to just five, has provoked much comment. How, when most surveys show the party around 11 points ahead, can Labour have sunk so low?

To begin with, it's important to note that ICM's polls have long shown a lower Labour lead than those from other groups such as YouGov and TNS-BRMB. Seven of the last 12 polls by the company have had Labour ahead by five points or less. December's ICM poll, which showed a Labour lead of eight points, was also less flattering than the concurrent YouGov survey, which showed a Labour lead of 10.

Why the discrepancy? The main reason is the difference in how the two pollsters treat the "don't knows". While YouGov simply discounts those voters who say they "don't know" which party they'd vote for, ICM reallocates 50 per cent of them based on the party they voted for at the previous general election. This approach was originally developed to respond to the phenomenon of "shy Tories" - those who intended to vote Conservative but were unwilling to say so. In 1992, this famously meant many polls showed Labour in front when in fact it was the Tories who were heading for victory. After studying the data, ICM found that a disproportionate number of those who said "don't know" to voting intention questions in 1992 had voted for the Conservatives in 1987. The reallocation method was born.

At present, since a significant number of 2010 Liberal Democrat voters are unsure how they'll vote at the next election, while most Labour voters are sure, ICM invariably shows a higher level of support for Clegg's party than YouGov and a lower level of support for Labour. The most recent poll by the latter has Labour on 42 per cent and the Lib Dems on 11 per cent, while the most recent by the former has Labour on 38 per cent and the Lib Dems on a seemingly miraculous 15 per cent. There are good arguments for both YouGov and ICM's approaches but for those sceptical of ICM's method, it's worth pointing out that it was the second most accurate pollster in 2010.

Finally, it's worth imagining how different the political narrative would be if it was ICM, rather than YouGov, that conducted a daily poll. Since the coalition came to power, ICM has never shown a Labour lead larger than 10 points (a figure the party has only attained once, in September 2012) or a Lib Dem vote share lower than 11 per cent (the party averaged 14 per cent in 2012). Conversely, YouGov has had Labour ahead by as much as 14 points and the Lib Dems as low as seven per cent. But fortunately for Ed Miliband and unfortunately for Nick Clegg, politicos pay more far attention to a daily pollster than they do to a monthly one.

Ed Miliband would be under greater pressure if ICM's polling figures received as much attention as YouGov's. Photograph: Getty Images.

George Eaton is political editor of the New Statesman.

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Leader: The unresolved Eurozone crisis

The continent that once aspired to be a rival superpower to the US is now a byword for decline, and ethnic nationalism and right-wing populism are thriving.

The eurozone crisis was never resolved. It was merely conveniently forgotten. The vote for Brexit, the terrible war in Syria and Donald Trump’s election as US president all distracted from the single currency’s woes. Yet its contradictions endure, a permanent threat to continental European stability and the future cohesion of the European Union.

The resignation of the Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi, following defeat in a constitutional referendum on 4 December, was the moment at which some believed that Europe would be overwhelmed. Among the champions of the No campaign were the anti-euro Five Star Movement (which has led in some recent opinion polls) and the separatist Lega Nord. Opponents of the EU, such as Nigel Farage, hailed the result as a rejection of the single currency.

An Italian exit, if not unthinkable, is far from inevitable, however. The No campaign comprised not only Eurosceptics but pro-Europeans such as the former prime minister Mario Monti and members of Mr Renzi’s liberal-centrist Democratic Party. Few voters treated the referendum as a judgement on the monetary union.

To achieve withdrawal from the euro, the populist Five Star Movement would need first to form a government (no easy task under Italy’s complex multiparty system), then amend the constitution to allow a public vote on Italy’s membership of the currency. Opinion polls continue to show a majority opposed to the return of the lira.

But Europe faces far more immediate dangers. Italy’s fragile banking system has been imperilled by the referendum result and the accompanying fall in investor confidence. In the absence of state aid, the Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the world’s oldest bank, could soon face ruin. Italy’s national debt stands at 132 per cent of GDP, severely limiting its firepower, and its financial sector has amassed $360bn of bad loans. The risk is of a new financial crisis that spreads across the eurozone.

EU leaders’ record to date does not encourage optimism. Seven years after the Greek crisis began, the German government is continuing to advocate the failed path of austerity. On 4 December, Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, declared that Greece must choose between unpopular “structural reforms” (a euphemism for austerity) or withdrawal from the euro. He insisted that debt relief “would not help” the immiserated country.

Yet the argument that austerity is unsustainable is now heard far beyond the Syriza government. The International Monetary Fund is among those that have demanded “unconditional” debt relief. Under the current bailout terms, Greece’s interest payments on its debt (roughly €330bn) will continually rise, consuming 60 per cent of its budget by 2060. The IMF has rightly proposed an extended repayment period and a fixed interest rate of 1.5 per cent. Faced with German intransigence, it is refusing to provide further funding.

Ever since the European Central Bank president, Mario Draghi, declared in 2012 that he was prepared to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the single currency, EU member states have relied on monetary policy to contain the crisis. This complacent approach could unravel. From the euro’s inception, economists have warned of the dangers of a monetary union that is unmatched by fiscal and political union. The UK, partly for these reasons, wisely rejected membership, but other states have been condemned to stagnation. As Felix Martin writes on page 15, “Italy today is worse off than it was not just in 2007, but in 1997. National output per head has stagnated for 20 years – an astonishing . . . statistic.”

Germany’s refusal to support demand (having benefited from a fixed exchange rate) undermined the principles of European solidarity and shared prosperity. German unemployment has fallen to 4.1 per cent, the lowest level since 1981, but joblessness is at 23.4 per cent in Greece, 19 per cent in Spain and 11.6 per cent in Italy. The youngest have suffered most. Youth unemployment is 46.5 per cent in Greece, 42.6 per cent in Spain and 36.4 per cent in Italy. No social model should tolerate such waste.

“If the euro fails, then Europe fails,” the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, has often asserted. Yet it does not follow that Europe will succeed if the euro survives. The continent that once aspired to be a rival superpower to the US is now a byword for decline, and ethnic nationalism and right-wing populism are thriving. In these circumstances, the surprise has been not voters’ intemperance, but their patience.

This article first appeared in the 08 December 2016 issue of the New Statesman, Brexit to Trump