The dangers of payment-by-results in probation

Grayling's reforms show the coalition hasn't learned from the failure of the Work Programme.

Today the Justice Secretary, Chris Grayling, set out the coalition’s latest payment-by-results (PBR) scheme. Originally developed as a way of contracting out back-to-work employment services, this public services version of ‘no win, no fee’ is going to be extended to the probation service in an attempt to bring down reoffending.

The idea is simple – services once delivered by the state are contracted out to private and voluntary sector providers, but a big chunk of these providers’ fees are only paid if they achieve certain outcomes. So in the Work Programme around 80 per cent of the fee is paid only once an unemployed person has been supported into a sustainable job. In the probation service, the measure of success will be reoffending rates. The state only shells out if private companies do what they promise. What could possibly go wrong?

The answer is, unfortunately, quite a lot, as the Work Programme has shown a couple of years into the original contracts. And none of the lessons it’s thrown up seem to have been taken on board.

First, PBR is essentially a way of the state contracting out risk and uncertainty. In order to come up with the right price tag, the state needs to be able to price that risk. The problem comes when public commissioners have no idea about levels of risk involved in what they’re commissioning – and when contractors themselves have no control over some of the biggest risks like the state of the economy in the Work Programme. This is one reason why Work Programme contractors are likely to find themselves in difficulties – the original contracts built in overly optimistic assumptions about the labour market. So the contracts are too stretching and if they are stuck to, the government in effect will be underpaying for services given the economic backdrop.

Does it really matter? Surely underpayment is no skin off the state’s nose. But this is far too simplistic. There’s too much at stake with unemployment – the Work Programme providers really are too big to fail, which some of them may do if they fail to meet outcomes set out in their contracts. That’s arguably even more true in the case of probation services, where public safety is at stake. This implicit guarantee at least partially erodes the point of PBR as a risk transfer mechanism. And it muddies accountability. If the economy’s doing worse than expected – which affects reoffending as well as unemployment – who’s responsible for contractors not meeting their outcomes?

Second is the impact of payment-by-results on the voluntary sector. These PBR contracts couldn’t be more distant from the notions of "big society" or devolution – the proposals for the probation scheme are for just a handful of contracts covering huge swathes of the country. Only large private companies are able to absorb the risks involved in going for a contract of this size, which is why it is the Sercos and A4Es of this world delivering the Work Programme rather than even the largest charities involved in welfare to work. The idea is that these big contractors subcontract to the voluntary sector. Yet the Work Programme contracts have been structured in such a way that private providers can cream off the ‘safe’ payment not linked to outcomes and pass on more – not less – risk to the small voluntary organisations with whom they subcontract. The result is that far from building up voluntary sector capacity, PBR risks squeezing it at the expense of big companies. No wonder the sector is outraged.

The third fundamental problem with PBR is that it discourages knowledge-sharing of what works – whether that’s getting people back into work, improving kids’ reading or reducing reoffending. Initial data on the Work Programme shows there is big variance in the performance of different companies. What are some doing that’s more effective than others? This is a question of huge public interest. Yet PBR means that companies – far from sharing best practice across the public sector – have a commercial interest in protecting their recipes for success. This is one example of where there is a real tension between the profit motive and public interest, and it needs to be managed.

None of this to suggest that there is anything inherently wrong with private sector delivery of public services. Of course the public sector could stand to gain from intelligently incorporating some learning from the private sector if it’s done in the right way. But it’s just as ridiculous to say the private sector is always better at delivering public services than it is to say it’s always worse.

Unfortunately, the state has a history of making some pretty bad deals with the private sector – from PFI deals gone wrong to the public-private venture capital funds that lost huge amounts of money in the 1990s and 2000s. All of these examples highlight the importance of getting the relationship - and, crucially, the contract that structures that relationship – between the public and private sector right. But unfortunately for those who adopt a ‘private sector good, public sector bad’ mantra, that’s probably trickier to do than delivering efficient services in the first place. It’s a great shame the coalition shows no indication of learning the lessons from the Work Programme – and it means there’s a real risk PBR ends up being the PFI story of the 2010s.

Justice Secretary Chris Grayling speaks at last year's Conservative conference in Birmingham. Photograph: Getty Images.

Sonia Sodha is head of policy and strategy at the Social Research Unit and a former senior policy adviser to Ed Miliband. She tweets @soniasodha.

Photo: Getty
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Leader: History is not written in stone

Statues have not been politicised by protest; they were always political.

When a mishmash of neo-Nazis, white supremacists, Trump supporters and private militias gathered in Charlottesville, Virginia on 12 August – a rally that ended in the death of a counter-protester – the ostensible reason was the city’s proposal to remove a statue of a man named Robert E Lee.

Lee was a Confederate general who surrendered to Ulysses S Grant at the Appomattox Court House in 1865, in one of the last battles of the American Civil War – a war fought to ensure that Southern whites could continue to benefit from the forced, unpaid labour of black bodies. He died five years later. It might therefore seem surprising that the contested statue of him in Virginia was not commissioned until 1917.

That knowledge, however, is vital to understanding the current debate over such statues. When the “alt-right” – many of whom have been revealed as merely old-fashioned white supremacists – talk about rewriting history, they speak as if history were an objective record arising from an organic process. However, as the American journalist Vann R Newkirk II wrote on 22 August, “obelisks don’t grow from the soil, and stone men and iron horses are never built without purpose”. The Southern Poverty Law Center found that few Confederate statues were commissioned immediately after the end of the war; instead, they arose in reaction to advances such as the foundation of the NAACP in 1909 and the desegregation of schools in the 1950s and 1960s. These monuments represent not history but backlash.

That means these statues have not been politicised by protest; they were always political. They were designed to promote the “Lost Cause” version of the Civil War, in which the conflict was driven by states’ rights rather than slavery. A similar rhetorical sleight of hand can be seen in the modern desire to keep them in place. The alt-right is unwilling to say that it wishes to retain monuments to white supremacy; instead, it claims to object to “history being rewritten”.

It seems trite to say: that is inevitable. Our understanding of the past is perpetually evolving and the hero of one era becomes a pariah in the next. Feminism, anti-colonialism, “people’s history” – all of these movements have questioned who we celebrate and whose stories we tell.

Across the world, statues have become the focus for this debate because they are visible, accessible and shape our experience of public space. There are currently 11 statues in Parliament Square – all of them male. (The suffragist Millicent Fawcett will join them soon, after a campaign led by Caroline Criado-Perez.) When a carving of a disabled artist, Alison Lapper, appeared on the fourth plinth in Trafalgar Square, its sculptor, Marc Quinn, acknowledged its significance. “This square celebrates the courage of men in battle,” he said. “Alison’s life is a struggle to overcome much greater difficulties than many of the men we celebrate and commemorate here.”

There are valid reasons to keep statues to figures we would now rather forget. But we should acknowledge this is not a neutral choice. Tearing down our history, looking it in the face, trying to ignore it or render it unexceptional – all of these are political acts. 

The Brexit delusion

After the UK triggered Article 50 in March, the Brexiteers liked to boast that leaving the European Union would prove a simple task. The International Trade Secretary, Liam Fox, claimed that a new trade deal with the EU would be “one of the easiest in human history” to negotiate and could be agreed before the UK’s scheduled departure on 29 March 2019.

However, after the opening of the negotiations, and the loss of the Conservatives’ parliamentary majority, reality has reasserted itself. All cabinet ministers, including Mr Fox, now acknowledge that it will be impossible to achieve a new trade deal before Brexit. As such, we are told that a “transitional period” is essential.

Yet the government has merely replaced one delusion with another. As its recent position papers show, it hopes to leave institutions such as the customs union in 2019 but to preserve their benefits. An increasingly exasperated EU, unsurprisingly, retorts that is not an option. For Britain, “taking back control” will come at a cost. Only when the Brexiteers acknowledge this truth will the UK have the debate it so desperately needs. 

This article first appeared in the 24 August 2017 issue of the New Statesman, Sunni vs Shia