The bias towards traditional welfare threatens social justice

Rather than defending existing social security entitlements, politicians need to mobilise public support for a new set of social investment priorities.

Reinforced by the wave of austerity following the financial crisis, a new Policy Network/IPPR report shows that social attitudes to welfare are overwhelmingly biased towards a small ‘c’ ‘conservative’ view of the welfare state – implying protecting higher pension payments, social security entitlements, and public expenditure on healthcare. On the other hand, public support for welfare state policies that are geared towards tackling new social risks – relating to structural changes in labour markets and employability, demography, gender equality and family support that traditional protection systems are poorly equipped to provide – is relatively weak. This is the great dilemma at the heart of the politics of the welfare state, which the present debate about welfare reform in the UK scarcely addresses.

In the ongoing discussion about the future role of the state, defending existing social security entitlements, rather than targeting investment at families and children is the public’s preferred option in many European countries, as new comparative polling data from Britain, France and Denmark highlights. Negative sentiment towards growth-oriented, social investment policies in education, active labour markets and family assistance is occurring at a time when slower growth and productivity are increasing the pace of de-industrialisation among developed economies, to the advantage of the emerging powers. The evidence is that shifting expenditure towards these growth-oriented strategies would help to build human capital and increase the capacity for innovation, while supporting the ‘gender revolution’ in paid work and household labour.

Since 2009, every type of welfare regime, including Germany, Sweden and the UK, has chosen a path of budget consolidation that is leading to severe cuts in social investment as a response to the financial crisis. If we consider the survey data on public attitudes towards the welfare state, it is possible to infer that this is merely a rational response by vote-seeking politicians: it is easier to cut back on "family-friendly" service-oriented aspects of welfare rather than healthcare and pension entitlements, as older citizens are more likely to vote.

This preference for the "traditional" welfare state over growth-oriented social investment policies that enhance equity gives serious cause for concern. Growing inequalities in electoral participation might further entrench the welfare status quo, heightening the risk of intergenerational inequality. Given that electoral participation in advanced democracies is falling quickest amongst the young and least affluent, better off and older votes are able to have a greater influence in the political process. For example, spending cuts in the UK have had a disproportionate effect on the young and poor –two groups that tend to have the lowest voter turnout, while universal benefits for the elderly have been largely untouched.

Indeed, support for the ‘traditional’ welfare state is strongest among the more influential cohort of older voters. In Britain, these voters are most likely to support the NHS (51 to 37 per cent), state pensions (44 to 13 per cent) and policing (36 to 18 per cent) as major public expenditure priorities. Conversely, they are less likely to support increased investment in primary and secondary school education by 16 to 32 per cent, and support cutting back maternity and paternity benefit by 37 to 15 per cent compared to younger voters. 78 per cent of Britons and 80 per cent of French voters believe that social protection for families is already more than sufficient. The diverging support for "traditional" welfare provision and a "social investment state" between young and old voters reflects a political context in which the population in many EU member states is getting older, and voters over 50 are most likely to vote.

Worryingly, the financial crisis seems to be consolidating support for ‘old’ welfare state structures at a time when social investment to tackle ‘new’ social risks is of great importance. Europe’s welfare states should be adapting to conquer new structural challenges, which currently pose a major threat to future equity, growth and social sustainability. The biggest threat to social justice in Europe is not institutional change, but the frozen welfare state landscape, perpetuated by the support of major interest groups that are able to control how welfare states operate. Politicians need to show leadership in order to mobilise public support for a transition to a different model of welfare capitalism based on a new set of social investment priorities, looking ahead to the next decade and beyond.

Patrick Diamond is senior research fellow at Policy Network and co-author with Guy Lodge of European Welfare States after the Crisis: changing public attitudes

Students protest against the abolition of the Educational Maintenance Allowance (EMA) outside Downing Street. Photograph: Getty Images.
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We're racing towards another private debt crisis - so why did no one see it coming?

The Office for Budget Responsibility failed to foresee the rise in household debt. 

This is a call for a public inquiry on the current situation regarding private debt.

For almost a decade now, since 2007, we have been living a lie. And that lie is preparing to wreak havoc on our economy. If we do not create some kind of impartial forum to discuss what is actually happening, the results might well prove disastrous. 

The lie I am referring to is the idea that the financial crisis of 2008, and subsequent “Great Recession,” were caused by profligate government spending and subsequent public debt. The exact opposite is in fact the case. The crash happened because of dangerously high levels of private debt (a mortgage crisis specifically). And - this is the part we are not supposed to talk about—there is an inverse relation between public and private debt levels.

If the public sector reduces its debt, overall private sector debt goes up. That's what happened in the years leading up to 2008. Now austerity is making it happening again. And if we don't do something about it, the results will, inevitably, be another catastrophe.

The winners and losers of debt

These graphs show the relationship between public and private debt. They are both forecasts from the Office for Budget Responsibility, produced in 2015 and 2017. 

This is what the OBR was projecting what would happen around now back in 2015:

This year the OBR completely changed its forecast. This is how it now projects things are likely to turn out:

First, notice how both diagrams are symmetrical. What happens on top (that part of the economy that is in surplus) precisely mirrors what happens in the bottom (that part of the economy that is in deficit). This is called an “accounting identity.”

As in any ledger sheet, credits and debits have to match. The easiest way to understand this is to imagine there are just two actors, government, and the private sector. If the government borrows £100, and spends it, then the government has a debt of £100. But by spending, it has injected £100 more pounds into the private economy. In other words, -£100 for the government, +£100 for everyone else in the diagram. 

Similarly, if the government taxes someone for £100 , then the government is £100 richer but there’s £100 subtracted from the private economy (+£100 for government, -£100 for everybody else on the diagram).

So what implications does this kind of bookkeeping have for the overall economy? It means that if the government goes into surplus, then everyone else has to go into debt.

We tend to think of money as if it is a bunch of poker chips already lying around, but that’s not how it really works. Money has to be created. And money is created when banks make loans. Either the government borrows money and injects it into the economy, or private citizens borrow money from banks. Those banks don’t take the money from people’s savings or anywhere else, they just make it up. Anyone can write an IOU. But only banks are allowed to issue IOUs that the government will accept in payment for taxes. (In other words, there actually is a magic money tree. But only banks are allowed to use it.)

There are other factors. The UK has a huge trade deficit (blue), and that means the government (yellow) also has to run a deficit (print money, or more accurately, get banks to do it) to inject into the economy to pay for all those Chinese trainers, American iPads, and German cars. The total amount of money can also fluctuate. But the real point here is, the less the government is in debt, the more everyone else must be. Austerity measures will necessarily lead to rising levels of private debt. And this is exactly what has happened.

Now, if this seems to have very little to do with the way politicians talk about such matters, there's a simple reason: most politicians don’t actually know any of this. A recent survey showed 90 per cent of MPs don't even understand where money comes from (they think it's issued by the Royal Mint). In reality, debt is money. If no one owed anyone anything at all there would be no money and the economy would grind to a halt.

But of course debt has to be owed to someone. These charts show who owes what to whom.

The crisis in private debt

Bearing all this in mind, let's look at those diagrams again - keeping our eye particularly on the dark blue that represents household debt. In the first, 2015 version, the OBR duly noted that there was a substantial build-up of household debt in the years leading up to the crash of 2008. This is significant because it was the first time in British history that total household debts were higher than total household savings, and therefore the household sector itself was in deficit territory. (Corporations, at the same time, were raking in enormous profits.) But it also predicted this wouldn't happen again.

True, the OBR observed, austerity and the reduction of government deficits meant private debt levels would have to go up. However, the OBR economists insisted this wouldn't be a problem because the burden would fall not on households but on corporations. Business-friendly Tory policies would, they insisted, inspire a boom in corporate expansion, which would mean frenzied corporate borrowing (that huge red bulge below the line in the first diagram, which was supposed to eventually replace government deficits entirely). Ordinary households would have little or nothing to worry about.

This was total fantasy. No such frenzied boom took place.

In the second diagram, two years later, the OBR is forced to acknowledge this. Corporations are just raking in the profits and sitting on them. The household sector, on the other hand, is a rolling catastrophe. Austerity has meant falling wages, less government spending on social services (or anything else), and higher de facto taxes. This puts the squeeze on household budgets and people are forced to borrow. As a result, not only are households in overall deficit for the second time in British history, the situation is actually worse than it was in the years leading up to 2008.

And remember: it was a mortgage crisis that set off the 2008 crash, which almost destroyed the world economy and plunged millions into penury. Not a crisis in public debt. A crisis in private debt.

An inquiry

In 2015, around the time the original OBR predictions came out, I wrote an essay in the Guardian predicting that austerity and budget-balancing would create a disastrous crisis in private debt. Now it's so clearly, unmistakably, happening that even the OBR cannot deny it.

I believe the time has come for there be a public investigation - a formal public inquiry, in fact - into how this could be allowed to happen. After the 2008 crash, at least the economists in Treasury and the Bank of England could plausibly claim they hadn't completely understood the relation between private debt and financial instability. Now they simply have no excuse.

What on earth is an institution called the “Office for Budget Responsibility” credulously imagining corporate borrowing binges in order to suggest the government will balance the budget to no ill effects? How responsible is that? Even the second chart is extremely odd. Up to 2017, the top and bottom of the diagram are exact mirrors of one another, as they ought to be. However, in the projected future after 2017, the section below the line is much smaller than the section above, apparently seriously understating the amount both of future government, and future private, debt. In other words, the numbers don't add up.

The OBR told the New Statesman ​that it was not aware of any errors in its 2015 forecast for corporate sector net lending, and that the forecast was based on the available data. It said the forecast for business investment has been revised down because of the uncertainty created by Brexit. 

Still, if the “Office of Budget Responsibility” was true to its name, it should be sounding off the alarm bells right about now. So far all we've got is one mention of private debt and a mild warning about the rise of personal debt from the Bank of England, which did not however connect the problem to austerity, and one fairly strong statement from a maverick columnist in the Daily Mail. Otherwise, silence. 

The only plausible explanation is that institutions like the Treasury, OBR, and to a degree as well the Bank of England can't, by definition, warn against the dangers of austerity, however alarming the situation, because they have been set up the way they have in order to justify austerity. It's important to emphasise that most professional economists have never supported Conservative policies in this regard. The policy was adopted because it was convenient to politicians; institutions were set up in order to support it; economists were hired in order to come up with arguments for austerity, rather than to judge whether it would be a good idea. At present, this situation has led us to the brink of disaster.

The last time there was a financial crash, the Queen famously asked: why was no one able to foresee this? We now have the tools. Perhaps the most important task for a public inquiry will be to finally ask: what is the real purpose of the institutions that are supposed to foresee such matters, to what degree have they been politicised, and what would it take to turn them back into institutions that can at least inform us if we're staring into the lights of an oncoming train?