The bias towards traditional welfare threatens social justice

Rather than defending existing social security entitlements, politicians need to mobilise public support for a new set of social investment priorities.

Reinforced by the wave of austerity following the financial crisis, a new Policy Network/IPPR report shows that social attitudes to welfare are overwhelmingly biased towards a small ‘c’ ‘conservative’ view of the welfare state – implying protecting higher pension payments, social security entitlements, and public expenditure on healthcare. On the other hand, public support for welfare state policies that are geared towards tackling new social risks – relating to structural changes in labour markets and employability, demography, gender equality and family support that traditional protection systems are poorly equipped to provide – is relatively weak. This is the great dilemma at the heart of the politics of the welfare state, which the present debate about welfare reform in the UK scarcely addresses.

In the ongoing discussion about the future role of the state, defending existing social security entitlements, rather than targeting investment at families and children is the public’s preferred option in many European countries, as new comparative polling data from Britain, France and Denmark highlights. Negative sentiment towards growth-oriented, social investment policies in education, active labour markets and family assistance is occurring at a time when slower growth and productivity are increasing the pace of de-industrialisation among developed economies, to the advantage of the emerging powers. The evidence is that shifting expenditure towards these growth-oriented strategies would help to build human capital and increase the capacity for innovation, while supporting the ‘gender revolution’ in paid work and household labour.

Since 2009, every type of welfare regime, including Germany, Sweden and the UK, has chosen a path of budget consolidation that is leading to severe cuts in social investment as a response to the financial crisis. If we consider the survey data on public attitudes towards the welfare state, it is possible to infer that this is merely a rational response by vote-seeking politicians: it is easier to cut back on "family-friendly" service-oriented aspects of welfare rather than healthcare and pension entitlements, as older citizens are more likely to vote.

This preference for the "traditional" welfare state over growth-oriented social investment policies that enhance equity gives serious cause for concern. Growing inequalities in electoral participation might further entrench the welfare status quo, heightening the risk of intergenerational inequality. Given that electoral participation in advanced democracies is falling quickest amongst the young and least affluent, better off and older votes are able to have a greater influence in the political process. For example, spending cuts in the UK have had a disproportionate effect on the young and poor –two groups that tend to have the lowest voter turnout, while universal benefits for the elderly have been largely untouched.

Indeed, support for the ‘traditional’ welfare state is strongest among the more influential cohort of older voters. In Britain, these voters are most likely to support the NHS (51 to 37 per cent), state pensions (44 to 13 per cent) and policing (36 to 18 per cent) as major public expenditure priorities. Conversely, they are less likely to support increased investment in primary and secondary school education by 16 to 32 per cent, and support cutting back maternity and paternity benefit by 37 to 15 per cent compared to younger voters. 78 per cent of Britons and 80 per cent of French voters believe that social protection for families is already more than sufficient. The diverging support for "traditional" welfare provision and a "social investment state" between young and old voters reflects a political context in which the population in many EU member states is getting older, and voters over 50 are most likely to vote.

Worryingly, the financial crisis seems to be consolidating support for ‘old’ welfare state structures at a time when social investment to tackle ‘new’ social risks is of great importance. Europe’s welfare states should be adapting to conquer new structural challenges, which currently pose a major threat to future equity, growth and social sustainability. The biggest threat to social justice in Europe is not institutional change, but the frozen welfare state landscape, perpetuated by the support of major interest groups that are able to control how welfare states operate. Politicians need to show leadership in order to mobilise public support for a transition to a different model of welfare capitalism based on a new set of social investment priorities, looking ahead to the next decade and beyond.

Patrick Diamond is senior research fellow at Policy Network and co-author with Guy Lodge of European Welfare States after the Crisis: changing public attitudes

Students protest against the abolition of the Educational Maintenance Allowance (EMA) outside Downing Street. Photograph: Getty Images.
Getty
Show Hide image

Why the Liberal Democrats by-election surge is not all it seems

The Lib Dems chalked up impressive results in Stoke and Copeland. But just how much of a fight back is it?

By the now conventional post-Brexit logic, Stoke and Copeland ought to have been uniquely inhospitable for the Lib Dems. 

The party lost its deposit in both seats in 2015, and has no representation on either council. So too were the referendum odds stacked against it: in Stoke, the so-called Brexit capital of Britain, 70 per cent of voters backed Leave last June, as did 62 per cent in Copeland. And, as Stephen has written before, the Lib Dems’ mini-revival has so far been most pronounced in affluent, Conservative-leaning areas which swung for remain. 

So what explains the modest – but impressive – surges in their vote share in yesterday’s contests? In Stoke, where they finished fifth in 2015, the party won 9.8 per cent of the vote, up 5.7 percentage points. They also more than doubled their vote share in Copeland, where they beat Ukip for third with 7.3 per cent share of the vote.

The Brexit explanation is a tempting and not entirely invalid one. Each seat’s not insignificant pro-EU minority was more or less ignored by most of the national media, for whom the existence of remainers in what we’re now obliged to call “left-behind Britain” is often a nuance too far. With the Prime Minister Theresa May pushing for a hard Brexit and Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn waving it through, Lib Dem leader Tim Farron has made the pro-EU narrative his own. As was the case for Charles Kennedy in the Iraq War years, this confers upon the Lib Dems a status and platform they were denied as the junior partners in coalition. 

While their stance on Europe is slowly but surely helping the Lib Dems rebuild their pre-2015 demographic core - students, graduates and middle-class professionals employed in the public sector – last night’s results, particularly in Stoke, also give them reason for mild disappointment. 

In Stoke, campaign staffers privately predicted they might manage to beat Ukip for second or third place. The party ran a full campaign for the first time in several years, and canvassing returns suggested significant numbers of Labour voters, mainly public sector workers disenchanted with Corbyn’s stance on Europe, were set to vote Lib Dem. Nor were they intimidated by the Brexit factor: recent council by-elections in Sunderland and Rotheram, which both voted decisively to leave, saw the Lib Dems win seats for the first time on massive swings. 

So it could well be argued that their candidate, local cardiologist Zulfiqar Ali, ought to have done better. Staffordshire University’s campus, which Tim Farron visited as part of a voter registration drive, falls within the seat’s boundaries. Ali, unlike his Labour competitor Gareth Snell and Ukip leader Paul Nuttall, didn’t have his campaign derailed or disrupted by negative media attention. Unlike the Tory candidate Jack Brereton, he had the benefit of being older than 25. And, like 15 per cent of the electorate, he is of Kashmiri origin.  

In public and in private, Lib Dems say the fact that Stoke was a two-horse race between Labour and Ukip ultimately worked to their disadvantage. The prospect of Nuttall as their MP may well have been enough to convince a good number of the Labour waverers mentioned earlier to back Snell. 

With his party hovering at around 10 per cent in national polls, last night’s results give Farron cause for optimism – especially after their near-wipeout in 2015. But it’s easy to forget the bigger picture in all of this. The party have chalked up a string of impressive parliamentary by-election results – second in Witney, a spectacular win in Richmond Park, third in Sleaford and Copeland, and a strong fourth in Stoke. 

However, most of these results represent a reversion to, or indeed an underperformance compared to, the party’s pre-2015 norm. With the notable exception of Richmond’s Sarah Olney, who only joined the Lib Dems after the last general election, these candidates haven’t - or the Lib Dem vote - come from nowhere. Zulfiqar Ali previously sat on the council in Stoke and had fought the seat before, and Witney’s Liz Leffman and Sleaford’s Ross Pepper are both popular local councillors. And for all the excited commentary about Richmond, it was, of course, held by the Lib Dems for 13 years before Zac Goldsmith won it for the Tories in 2010. 

The EU referendum may have given the Lib Dems a new lease of life, but, as their #LibDemFightback trope suggests, they’re best understood as a revanchist, and not insurgent, force. Much has been said about Brexit realigning our politics, but, for now at least, the party’s new normal is looking quite a lot like the old one.