The rise of the shadow state: What can we do about it?

If the money doesn't go to giants like Serco and G4S, where can it go? Alan White explores the ability of social enterprises to commission services instead.

Yesterday I catalogued the problems with the way Government outsourcing is conducted: the placing of profits before people, the siphoning away of money intended for communities that need it, the unaccountability; the rewards for failure.

Peter Holbrook, CEO of Social Enterprise UK says: “The Government has to act as more than a legislator. It can shape markets and it doesn’t do so. These markets have to be part of the solution. It’s not left wing to call for more transparency and accountability. There seems to be a contradiction - everyone knows localism makes sense, but as soon as various parts of local and national Government are given the chance to commission, they buy in bulk.”

The question is what we’re going to do about it. And the first question is obvious - if we don’t give the money to the giants like Serco and G4S, to whom can it go?

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The Paddington Development Trust (PDT) is what’s known as a social enterprise. What’s a social enterprise? There’s no legal basis for such a thing, so it can take many forms: it could be a charity, or a limited or commercial company, for example. This masks the fact the central idea is quite simple: the profits do not go to shareholders, instead being reinvested in the “social mission” the company is carrying out. A PLC is legally required to maximise shareholder value, while a social enterprise, of which there are 68,000, acts like a company but instead tries to maximise its social value. Well-known examples are things like the Big Issue and Jamie Oliver’s Fifteen.

The PDT was founded in 1997, one of the first community-owned social enterprises in the country. On paper, its goals perhaps sound wishy-washy and vague: to “increase social, cultural and economic opportunities by forming strong partnerships across the community and public sectors.” The projects it has delivered have been anything but.

The money the PDT receives is focussed on a specific local area: north Westminster - and is then broken down between even smaller areas. I first came across it in the process of researching a local housing estate. The community forum whose incredible actions ended up forming the core of the resulting long form piece I wrote is a PDT offshoot.

Its chief executive, the admirably straight-talking Neil Johnston, tells me more: “When the residents set up the PDT, the area of north Westminster was a colossal failure. You could see it through so many indices: housing, unemployment, mortality rates.” In 1998, the PDT won £13.5m of funding, through the government's Single Regeneration Budget programme, which ran from 1994 to 2001.

Johnston says: “The money went to other organisations in order to deliver services. We formed an interface between the public and the private sector – since then we’ve distributed £40m over fifteen years and have been influential in the spending of another £120m. The money’s come from various sources - the Great and Good, local government authorities, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), and others.”

The PDT now runs youth services, health centres, academies, has refurbished community centres, and has been involved in many more projects, most of which are designed to create employment and business opportunities for residents. One of the PDT’s most successful enterprises was Westbourne Studios, into which it invested £500,000 - it didn’t own the building, but paid a peppercorn rent to guarantee the assets were distributed through the local economy. Today it’s one of Britain's most imaginative office and studio complexes, home to over 100 small businesses. On top of that, the PDT even has a small grant through which it can fund start-ups.

 

One thing that struck me about the people I wrote about was how happy they were in their work. Despite the fact that pay for its staff has gone down in recent years, the PDT has a remarkably low rate of employee turnover, which in turn saves money and helps it pay acceptable wages.

Social enterprises are often limited in size, partly because their purpose is often built around the needs of a particular area, and partly because they don’t have the same will to grow as a purely profit-driven operation. It means they’re finding themselves squeezed in a market that increasingly favours the largest contract-size.

“Interestingly, we have been commissioned by the DWP for the Work Programme,” says Johnston. “We’re a small partner with Maximus, which is a huge company. Fortunately, Maximus are a commercial business, but they know what they’re doing - their vice president came over to visit, for a start. We actually lost money through doing it, but managed to supplement it through doing other projects.”

A belief has grown that commissioners can’t afford to outsource differently. In fact, the opposite might be true: they can’t afford not to. As Johnston says:  “The question for Government is - do you let the money out through companies, or inject it into local organisations? There seems to be a belief that you can economise through upscaling and contracting to the big organisations. But Maximus know what they’re doing on that side too - they won’t give away any more profit than they have to. The Government’s either aware of that, or it doesn’t understand profit in business.”

The way the Work Programme works is that once people have been unemployed for six months, their details are fed into a big databases. ”Prime” contractors then spit out names to the smaller charities. Johnston wasn’t surprised when the initial figures showed it to be a failure.

 

He says: “Prior to the Work Programme, we managed to get 500 people in work over the course of two years. But it was bloody hard work. We had to work in partnership with a lot of community enterprises. We had neighbourhood-based advisors, who were going around knocking on doors. With the Work Programme there’s a disconnect - I recently heard a story about one women being interviewed and asked why she hadn’t found a job sooner, even though she was blind.”

One could say that the very fact something like the PDT exists demonstrates the fact that it’s needed. Johnston says: “You have Whitehall, you have local authorities - and they’re always fighting a war over budgets and power - then you have nothing official, but there’s a whole plethora of stuff going on. If communities weren’t crying out for power, they wouldn’t set up things like the PDT. So the challenge for the Government - and it’s something all governments want to do, is how far they can drive down the democratisation of budgets.”

I point out to him that during the riots London called out for the return of Boris Johnson and David Cameron from their holidays. If that highlighted anything, it was a distinct lack of local leadership. He replies: “In New York you can see the leadership flowing down from the Mayor, the key officers - and that socioeconomic strategy makes the city sing. In our major cities the leadership appears to be less accountable than rhetorical.”
 

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Despite the gloomy history of commissioning described thus far, the future for social enterprises is looking up. In January 2013 the Public Services (Social Value) Act becomes law. It’ll require all public bodies in England and Wales to consider the wider social or economic benefit to an area of any contract they award, over the value of £113,000 for central government and £173,000 for other bodies. According to Social Enterprise UK’s report: “Commissioners have told us that the Act finally gives them the justification to commission in ways that they have previously wanted to, but could not.” The organisation has made a number of recommendations with regard to the law, including an independent body to scrutinise contracting, and previous performance being weighed up as part of the process.

There’s evidence of a growing appetite for more thoughtful commissioning. In October 2012 the Cabinet Office awarded contracts for the National Citizen Service. Management fees were capped at 5 per cent and payment was made in advance, so that smaller charities and community groups without large capital reserves could afford to bid. Ninety per cent of organisations involved were locally based.

There are small steps being made at a local level too: in Lambeth, the commissioning process is being stripped down to its first principles. This doesn’t necessarily mean that global companies are excluded, but the locally devised solutions are unlikely to include too many. Moreover, by the beginning of November 2012, 93 organisations, including nine local authorities, had become accredited Living Wage Employers.

Nick Hurd MP is quoted in Social Enterprise UK’s report: “You could do really smart stuff. In my area, Hillingdon Council, BlueSky do the landscaping. Their motto is, ‘we’re the only company in the country where you have to have a criminal record to work’. It’s the first chance to prove yourself, to prove that you can be trusted. From Hillingdon’s perspective, they get a good service at a good price. But they also reduce reoffending. For me, that’s smart commissioning.”

And as Neil Johnston tells me: “Part of the reason for the upscaling has been the assumption among commissioners that everyone will try to rip you off. But we’ve seen things like A4E recently - you will always get people who cheat, but is it the prevalent part of the community?”

Charities and social enterprises delivering public services was a much-repeated promise in the argument for the big society vision: the title may have fallen by the wayside, but is the idea dead?  As Social Enterprise UK’s report concludes: “Public debate in the wake of the financial crisis has centred on whether public spending cuts must be made or avoided. But who benefits and who loses because of the way that public spending is done, is a much bigger question.”

The huge Aylesbury council estate in Southwark, home to 7,500 people. Photograph: Getty Images

Alan White's work has appeared in the Observer, Times, Private Eye, The National and the TLS. As John Heale, he is the author of One Blood: Inside Britain's Gang Culture.

ELLIE FOREMAN-PECK FOR NEW STATESMAN
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Craig Oliver, Cameron's attack dog, finally bites

A new book reveals the spiteful after life of Downing Street's unlikely spin doctor.

It must be hard being a spin doctor: always in the shadows but always on-message. The murky control that the role requires might explain why David Cameron’s former director of communications Craig Oliver has rushed out his political memoirs so soon after his boss left Downing Street. Now that he has been freed from the shackles of power, Oliver has chosen to expose the bitterness that lingers among those on the losing side in the EU referendum.

The book, which is aptly titled Unleashing Demons, made headlines with its revelation that Cameron felt “badly let down” by Theresa May during the campaign, and that some in the Remain camp regarded the then home secretary as an “enemy agent”. It makes for gripping reading – yet seems uncharacteristically provocative in style for a man who eschewed the sweary spin doctor stereotype, instead advising Cameron to “be Zen” while Tory civil war raged during the Brexit campaign.

It may be not only politicians who find the book a tough read. Oliver’s visceral account of his side’s defeat on 24 June includes a description of how he staggered in a daze down Whitehall until he retched “harder than I have done in my life. Nothing comes up. I retch again – so hard, it feels as if I’ll turn inside out.”

It’s easy to see why losing hit Oliver – who was knighted in Cameron’s resignation honours list – so hard. Arguably, this was the first time the 47-year-old father-of-three had ever failed at anything. The son of a former police chief constable, he grew up in Scotland, went to a state school and studied English at St Andrews University. He then became a broadcast journalist, holding senior posts at the BBC, ITV and Channel 4.

When the former News of the World editor Andy Coulson resigned as No 10’s communications director in January 2011 because of unceasing references in the press to his alleged involvement in the phone-hacking scandal, Oliver was not the obvious replacement. But he was seen as a scandal-free BBC pen-pusher who exuded calm authority, and that won him the job. The Cameron administration, tainted by its association with the Murdoch media empire, needed somebody uncontroversial who could blend into the background.

It wasn’t just Oliver’s relative blandness that recommended him. At the BBC, he had made his name revamping the corporation’s flagship News at Ten by identifying the news angles that would resonate with Middle England. The Conservatives then put this skill to very good use during their 2015 election campaign. His broadcast expertise also qualified him to sharpen up the then prime minister’s image.

Oliver’s own sense of style, however, was widely ridiculed when he showed up for his first week at Downing Street looking every inch the metropolitan media male with a trendy man bag and expensive Beats by Dre headphones, iPad in hand.

His apparent lack of political affiliation caused a stir at Westminster. Political hacks were perplexed by his anti-spin attitude. His style was the antithesis of the attack-dog mode popularised by Alastair Campbell and Damian McBride in the New Labour years. As Robert Peston told the Daily Mail: “Despite working closely with Oliver for three years, I had no clue about his politics or that he was interested in politics.” Five years on, critics still cast aspersions and question his commitment to the Conservative cause.

Oliver survived despite early wobbles. The most sinister of these was the allegation that in 2012 he tried to prevent the Daily Telegraph publishing a story about expenses claimed by the then culture secretary, Maria Miller, using her links to the Leveson inquiry as leverage – an accusation that Downing Street denied. Nevertheless, he became indispensable to Cameron, one of a handful of trusted advisers always at the prime minister’s side.

Newspapers grumbled about Oliver’s preference for broadcast and social media over print. “He’s made it clear he [Oliver] doesn’t give a s*** about us, so I don’t really give a s*** about him,” a veteran correspondent from a national newspaper told Politico.

Yet that approach was why he was hired. There was the occasional gaffe, including the clumsy shot of a stern-looking Cameron, apparently on the phone to President Obama discussing Putin’s incursion into Ukraine, which was widely mocked on Twitter. But overall, reducing Downing Street’s dependence on print media worked: Scotland voted against independence in 2014 and the Tories won a majority in the 2015 general election.

Then came Brexit, a blow to the whole Cameroon inner circle. In his rush to set the record straight and defend Cameron’s legacy – as well as his own – Oliver has finally broken free of the toned-down, straight-guy persona he perfected in power. His memoir is spiteful and melodramatic, like something straight from the mouth of Malcolm Tucker in The Thick of It. Perhaps, with this vengeful encore to his mild political career, the unlikely spin doctor has finally fulfilled his potential. 

This article first appeared in the 29 September 2016 issue of the New Statesman, May’s new Tories