The coalition's support for fracking is based on ideology, not evidence

The government's dash for gas will increase energy bills, not reduce them.

Today the temporary moratorium on fracking in Lancashire was lifted, completing a journey to redemption for the UK shale gas industry since Cuadrilla caused two small tremors in Blackpool last year. Fracking has been given a green light.

It’s the latest pro-shale move from a coalition government gone fracking crazy. The first two weeks of this month alone have seen George Osborne announce tax breaks for the shale gas industry, Boris Johnson compose a paean to fracking in his Telegraph column and David Cameron tell the House of Commons Liaison Committee that Britain must be part of a "shale gas revolution".

The enthusiasm for shale gas among many in the Conservative Party, and beyond, is partly based on the notion that it will bring down energy bills for consumers. In his Autumn Statement, Osborne justified his fracking tax break by arguing that: "we don't want British families and businesses to be left behind as gas prices tumble on the other side of the Atlantic”.

Fracking indeed caused gas prices to fall in the U.S (although they’ve since rebounded somewhat). And the hope of a similar nosedive has led to the Chancellor staking the future of the UK’s energy system, and the size of our energy bills, on natural gas.

So how likely is it that we’ll enjoy a US style fracking revolution here? Not very, say experts. Analysts at Deutsche Bank, the International Energy Agency (IEA), Ofgem, the European Commission, Chatham House and others, have all concluded that the fall in gas prices seen in the U.S. will not be replicated in Europe. Deutsche Bank, for example, concluded that “those waiting for a shale gas ‘revolution’ outside the US will likely be disappointed, in terms of both price and the speed at which high-volume production can be achieved”. While the IEA have outlined how European shale gas will be 50 per cent more expensive to extract.

Yet Osborne is betting the farm, and the UK’s energy future, on fracking bringing costs down enough to make it economic to run almost half our power supply off gas. At his behest, the Department for Energy and Climate Change last week published its Gas Generation Strategy, which aims to incentivise the construction of up to 40 new gas-fired power stations. Given that the UK already relies on gas for most of its heating and much of its electricity, this move to increase our reliance on an increasingly expensive fuel represents a considerable gamble with consumers’ money. It comes as government advisers, the committee on climate change, today warned that Osborne’s ‘dash for gas’ could increase our energy bills by £600 over the coming decades. The committee cast the low carbon route, which would see bills rise by only £100 by 2020, as an insurance policy against rising gas prices.

There is also the small matter of local opposition to fracking. One Conservative MP has described opposition to windfarms as being a "walk in the park" compared to shale gas. While recent analysis by Greenpeace found that over 60 per cent of England is currently under ‘license block’ consideration for the development of shale gas. Much of this gas is hidden under the Home Counties and, as the residents of Balcombe in West Sussex have demonstrated, fracking is not welcome in these parts.

Earlier this week, leading energy expert, Professor Paul Stevens of Chatham House, went as far as to describe George Osborne’s plan for a dash for gas as "misleading and dangerous" Misleading because it is based on the mirage of lower gas prices resulting from fracking; dangerous because the dash for gas threatens to pull much needed resources away from clean energy and thus poses a significant threat to our efforts to tackle climate change.

In fact, Osborne’s plans to incentivise the construction of 40 new gas power stations are predicated on dismantling key climate laws. Last month, a Greenpeace investigation revealed Osborne’s plans to unpick the Climate Change Act. These plans took a step forward with the publication of the Gas Generation Strategy, which outlines how “gas could play a more extensive role, with higher load factors, should the 4th Carbon Budget be revised upwards.” 

Precisely why Osborne has chosen to ignore the facts in order to pursue his dash for gas is for others to speculate. But for consumers up and down the UK, not to mention our attempts to tackle the urgent threat of climate change, it would be infinitely more reassuring if our energy policy was based on evidence rather than ideology.

Demonstrators protest against hydraulic fracturing for shale gas outside parliament in London on December 1, 2012. Photograph: Getty Images.

Lawrence Carter is a climate campaigner at Greenpeace

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Brexit has opened up big rifts among the remaining EU countries

Other non-Euro countries will miss Britain's lobbying - and Germany and France won't be too keen to make up for our lost budget contributions.

Untangling 40 years of Britain at the core of the EU has been compared to putting scrambled eggs back into their shells. On the UK side, political, legal, economic, and, not least, administrative difficulties are piling up, ranging from the Great Repeal Bill to how to process lorries at customs. But what is less appreciated is that Brexit has opened some big rifts in the EU.

This is most visible in relations between euro and non-euro countries. The UK is the EU’s second biggest economy, and after its exit the combined GDP of the non-euro member states falls from 38% of the eurozone GDP to barely 16%, or 11% of EU’s total. Unsurprisingly then, non-euro countries in Eastern Europe are worried that future integration might focus exclusively on the "euro core", leaving others in a loose periphery. This is at the core of recent discussions about a multi-speed Europe.

Previously, Britain has been central to the balance between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, often leading opposition to centralising eurozone impulses. Most recently, this was demonstrated by David Cameron’s renegotiation, in which he secured provisional guarantees for non-euro countries. British concerns were also among the reasons why the design of the European Banking Union was calibrated with the interests of the ‘outs’ in mind. Finally, the UK insisted that the euro crisis must not detract from the development of the Single Market through initiatives such as the capital markets union. With Britain gone, this relationship becomes increasingly lop-sided.

Another context in which Brexit opens a can of worms is discussions over the EU budget. For 2015, the UK’s net contribution to the EU budget, after its rebate and EU investments, accounted for about 10% of the total. Filling in this gap will require either higher contributions by other major states or cutting the benefits of recipient states. In the former scenario, this means increasing German and French contributions by roughly 2.8 and 2 billion euros respectively. In the latter, it means lower payments to net beneficiaries of EU cohesion funds - a country like Bulgaria, for example, might take a hit of up to 0.8% of GDP.

Beyond the financial impact, Brexit poses awkward questions about the strategy for EU spending in the future. The Union’s budgets are planned over seven-year timeframes, with the next cycle due to begin in 2020. This means discussions about how to compensate for the hole left by Britain will coincide with the initial discussions on the future budget framework that will start in 2018. Once again, this is particularly worrying for those receiving EU funds, which are now likely to either be cut or made conditional on what are likely to be more political requirements.

Brexit also upends the delicate institutional balance within EU structures. A lot of the most important EU decisions are taken by qualified majority voting, even if in practice unanimity is sought most of the time. Since November 2014, this has meant the support of 55% of member states representing at least 65% of the population is required to pass decisions in the Council of the EU. Britain’s exit will destroy the blocking minority of a northern liberal German-led coalition of states, and increase the potential for blocking minorities of southern Mediterranean countries. There is also the question of what to do with the 73 British MEP mandates, which currently form almost 10% of all European Parliament seats.

Finally, there is the ‘small’ matter of foreign and defence policy. Perhaps here there are more grounds for continuity given the history of ‘outsourcing’ key decisions to NATO, whose membership remains unchanged. Furthermore, Theresa May appears to have realised that turning defence cooperation into a bargaining chip to attract Eastern European countries would backfire. Yet, with Britain gone, the EU is currently abuzz with discussions about greater military cooperation, particularly in procurement and research, suggesting that Brexit can also offer opportunities for the EU.

So, whether it is the balance between euro ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, multi-speed Europe, the EU budget, voting blocs or foreign policy, Brexit is forcing EU leaders into a load of discussions that many of them would rather avoid. This helps explain why there is clear regret among countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, at seeing such a key partner leave. It also explains why the EU has turned inwards to deal with the consequences of Brexit and why, although they need to be managed, the actual negotiations with London rank fairly low on the list of priorities in Brussels. British politicians, negotiators, and the general public would do well to take note of this.

Ivaylo Iaydjiev is a former adviser to the Bulgarian government. He is currently a DPhil student at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford

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