The black marks on the government's inequality record

Half way through the parliamentary term, how is the government doing? Not too well, writes One Society's Larissa Hansford.

At the half way point of the Coalition Government's term, debate rages over top pay, low pay and the persistently vast gulf between the two.

The trend to an expanding pay gulf is one that right and left alike have denounced. Front page headlines express outrage over the £1.32m payout to theformer director-general of the BBC, influential multinational board members call for a pay cap on corporate bonuses, and studies show that pay for top bosses rose an average of 10 per cent in 2011. Meanwhile £5m people are living at below living wage pay, with both Boris Johnson and Ed Milliband, backing an expansion of the scheme.

In the midst of so many calls for a reduction in the UK pay gulf, how have the Government performed on these issues? A new report by One Society, The Coalition Government and Income Inequality: The half term report, indicates that their record is wanting. It finds not only that inequality has not been reduced, but concludes that Coalition polices are actually likely to produce an increasing gap between the richest and the rest, at the same time as average incomes fail to keep up with the rising cost of living.

A One Society report on fair pay in Local Authorities showed how much progress has been made in the public sector over the last few years in addressing its inequalities. However, the private sector points out the report, where pay ratios are much more extreme, has largely escaped notice. The much reported "shareholder spring" led to just six substantial protest votes over extortionate pay at the top. BIS (The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills) proposals to increase shareholder power have failed to incorporate important stakeholders such as company employees. Proposals on binding pay votes have been watered down and there has been no significant action on issues such cash bonuses and simplification of pay packages.

At the lower end of the payscale, the two year public sector pay freeze and the upcoming two year below-inflation pay rise have put pressure on already low public sector salaries. Not only does this have a direct impact on inequality, but along with increasing costs of living, has serious implications for living standards. Increased costs of childcare, transport and cuts to tax credits have all played their part in this.

When they stood in the general election, inequality was a major concern for both coalition parties. The Conservative manifesto called for a society in which “wealth and opportunity must be more fairly distributed”. The Liberal Democrats meanwhile decried the fact that “Britain [is] one of the most unequal societies in the developed world, where ordinary people struggle to make ends meet.”

With 74 per cent of people believing that income inequality is too high and even CEOs beginning to recognise they are probably overpaid, it is clearly still a highly relevant issue to the electorate. On top of this, No. 10's favourite think tank recently warned that the Conservative Party are still seen as the party of the rich.

"Excessive" levels of income inequality are not only unpopular, but, as the One Society's report sets out, they are also inefficient. Growing evidence shows that large pay differentials stunt economic growth and cause instability. It also highlights the harmful effect that inequality has on our communities, our health and our environment.

For all these reasons, argues the report, political parties who want to be taken seriously in the next general election will have to outline a plan of action to tackle the UK's unacceptable levels of income inequality. Left and right alike must sit up and take notice of the harmful effect of extreme wealth disparities, and the significant impact that government policy could have in addressing them.

Marking the scorecard. Photograph: Getty Images

Larissa Hansford is a Campaign Assistant at One Society.

Photo: Getty
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The future of the left: The path ahead is full of challenges

Be in no doubt: the left faces a struggle for survival.

There are plenty of grounds for pessimism about the left’s prospects and they are well rehearsed.  Across Europe, social democrats are out of power and when they do manage to enter government, it is under the skirts of dominant centre-right parties or at the helm of fragile coalitions. Ageing western societies have become more conservative, immigration has driven a cultural wedge into the cross-class coalitions that once undergirded centre-left voting blocs, and austerity has ushered in a politics of security, not reform. Only those who have borne the brunt of the financial crisis and its aftermath, like the unemployed youth and evicted homeowners of Southern Europe, have swung decisively to the left, joined by relatively protected but angry older middle class liberals of Northern Europe. Even in Latin America, where the left swept the board at the turn of the century, politics is shifting to the right. Bright spots, such as municipal experimentalism in Spanish cities, or energetic liberalism in Canada and Italy, illuminate the gloom. But mostly, darkness is visible.

Is this condition terminal? Inequality, stagnant living standards and the turbulence of global capitalism generate profound political discontent. They give oxygen to progressive protest movements as well as populist reactionaries, as the convulsions in US politics show. But only a facile determinism reads off political progress from economic crisis. There is nothing to guarantee that revulsion at political and economic elites will give birth to a new egalitarianism. The left needs a clearer headed view of the political terrain that it will face in the 2020s.

Demographic change is a given. Advanced democracies like Britain will get older and the weight of older voters in elections will increase, not diminish. The gap in turnout rates between young and old is unlikely to close, tilting politics even further towards the cultural concerns and economic interests of the over fifties. Leadership credentials and economic competence matter for these voters more than abstract appeals to equality. But a generation of young people will also enter middle age in the 2020s having endured the worst of the age of austerity, with lower wages, stymied home ownership aspirations and stunted career progression to show for it. So just as 20th century catch-all parties built cross-class electoral alliances, successful political movements in the coming decades will need to secure inter-generational voting blocs. Stitching these together will foreground the politics of family and focus policy attention on transfers of wealth and opportunity across multiple generations. 

Ageing will also ratchet up fiscal pressures on the state, as costs mount for the NHS, care of the elderly and pensions. But Britain’s tax base has been weakened by low productivity, corporate tax avoidance and expensive personal allowance giveaways. In the 2020s, this crunch will loom large over fiscal policy and force hard choices over priorities. Just as in the 1990s, we can expect public disquiet at the run-down of investment in public services to mount, but this time there won’t be the same spending headroom to respond to it. The political debate currently underway in Scotland about raising income tax is therefore a harbinger of the future for the rest of the UK.

Fiscal constraints will also force the left to take seriously the agenda of economic reform opened up under the ungainly title of “pre-distribution”. Without an account of how to generate and share prosperity more equitably within the market economy, social democracy is purposeless. But it will need a far more robust and plausible political strategy for achieving these ambitions than anything that has been on offer hitherto. Technological change will not usher in a new economy of its own accord, and without the solid base of an organised working class to ground its politics, the left needs to be open to a wide set of alliances with businesses, big and small. Combining economic radicalism with credibility and popular appeal, particularly to voters who still blame it for the financial crisis, is the hardest challenge the left faces, but there is no getting away from it.

On a note of optimism, the left is currently strong in cities, from which it can build out. Diversity is a strength in major urban centres, not a weakness, and powerful city leaders endow progressive politics with governing authority. Cities are the places where new social movements are most active and much of the energy of contemporary politics can be found, even if elections are fought on wider terrain. The task is to combine a propensity to decentralise and devolve with clear national political direction. The same holds with party reform: the mass political parties of the 20th century are dead, but networks can’t fight elections, so combining openness and democratic engagement, with discipline and national purpose, is vital. 

Nick Pearce is the director of the Institute for Public Policy Research.