“Teaching the British reduces the killing”

"I never tell people about my work. A lot of people have been killed for working with the British or

From the beginning of the war, the Ministry of Defence ran programmes to prepare British soldiers for the challenges of peacekeeping. Servicemen and women of all ranks were put through crash courses - usually of about two weeks - in the language and culture of Iraq.

Najma, aged 24, who moved to London in 2001, is one of a number of British Iraqis working with the army on such programmes. She and colleagues role-play as Iraqi civilians; though London-based, their work is not without dangers. Like her compatriots in southern Iraq who work with the British, Najma finds that her involvement risks her being labelled a traitor.

"I never tell people about my work," she says, puffing on a cigarette. "A lot of people have been killed for working with the British or Americans, especially in Iraq. One of my close friends went back as an interpreter in 2004. He was shot dead in less than two weeks."

A particular concern is the safety of her mother, who still lives in Iraq.

"Last year someone wrote an article on the internet saying that we're betraying our country and helping the enemy for the sake of money. They didn't mention names but they listed some people's initials. I got really scared. At the end of the day I have a family in Iraq. Even if I am safe here, they are definitely not safe there."

Najma insisted on meeting at a cafe in an area where no one would know her. She says she has been working for the army since early 2005, in bases around the British Isles and in Germany. I ask her if she had had doubts about helping people who had killed her countrymen.

"The first thought that came into my mind was: 'They are in my country; you can't change that,'" she says. "The only thing you can do is to try to help the situation. I thought if I could teach them a little bit about how Iraqi people operate, it could reduce the killing."

But she has had doubts. "Every time the situation changes, my opinion changes. Sometimes I think I'm doing the right thing. Then when I watch the news and see soldiers mistreating Iraqi people, killing people, it makes me wonder why I am working with them. I don't feel guilty, because if I did I would stop, but it hurts to see them doing these things."

She has always been different, she says. When she was growing up in west Baghdad, her male relatives gave her a boy's nickname, because she would run ahead in the street instead of walking behind them as they thought she should. She later determined on a career in the theatre despite the strenuous objections of her family.

Iraqis recruited by the army have to be fluent in English and must have recent experience of their homeland. They are paid £100 per day.

"It is hard work," Najma says, and it can be overwhelming. "Sometimes the Iraqis forget they are acting and get upset. They start to think that it's real. I once saw a girl doing an exercise lose it completely. She started crying and just couldn't stop. She was thinking about Iraq and everything that has happened there.

"My opinion of the British army hasn't changed from doing this work. They are trying to learn the culture and they're trying to understand the way we react to what they do there. I've heard colleagues say that they wouldn't work for the Americans who haven't bothered to learn simple things, and their way of treating people is appalling. For example, they don't knock on the door, they just break in. That is the Iraqi opinion of American people."

Najma won't be put off working for the army, and is determined to continue trying to increase understanding. The child who took the nickname of a boy in the streets of Baghdad still refuses to fall in line.

Days of war

29 January 2002: Bush names Iraq as part of the "axis of evil"

3 February 2003: Publication of "dodgy dossier"

14 February 2003: Hans Blix tells UN Security Council that Iraq is co-operating more

15 February 2003: In London, over a million march against war

17 March 2003: Bush gives Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq; Robin Cook resigns from cabinet

18 March 2003: Commons votes for war; 139 Labour MPs rebel

20 March 2003: Invasion begins (far left)

9 April 2003: Statue of Saddam toppled (left)

1 May 2003: Bush announces victory

12 May 2003: Clare Short resigns from cabinet

18 July 2003: Dr David Kelly found dead after being named as source that war dossier had been "sexed up"

13 December 2003: Saddam captured

April 2004: Reports surface of torture, rape and murder at Abu Ghraib Prison in Baghdad (right)

28 June 2004: US hands sovereignty to interim government under PM Iyad Allawi

19 October 2005: Saddam goes on trial accused of crimes against humanity

19 November 2005: US marines massacre 24 civilians in Haditha

20 January 2006: Shia alliance emerges as winner of first parliamentary elections

21 August 2006: Bush acknowledges Iraq had "nothing" to do with 9/11

25 December 2006: After Christmas Day car bomb attack, US military death toll surpasses that of 9/11

30 December 2006: Saddam executed

10 January 2007: Bush announces "surge", proposing 21,500 extra troops and $1.2bn more funds

1 May 2007: Reports of death of Abu Ayyub al-Masri, Iraqi leader of al-Qaeda

1 August 2007: Main Sunni political group in Iraq withdraws from cabinet, plunging central government into crisis

16 September 2007: British hand over control of Basra to Iraq

Research by Edmund Gordon

This article first appeared in the 17 March 2008 issue of the New Statesman, Iraq: the war that changed us

Jeremy Corbyn. Photo: Getty
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Lexit: the EU is a neoliberal project, so let's do something different when we leave it

Brexit affords the British left a historic opportunity for a decisive break with EU market liberalism.

The Brexit vote to leave the European Union has many parents, but "Lexit" – the argument for exiting the EU from the left – remains an orphan. A third of Labour voters backed Leave, but they did so without any significant leadership from the Labour Party. Left-of-centre votes proved decisive in determining the outcome of a referendum that was otherwise framed, shaped, and presented almost exclusively by the right. A proper left discussion of the issues has been, if not entirely absent, then decidedly marginal – part of a more general malaise when it comes to developing left alternatives that has begun to be corrected only recently, under Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell.

Ceding Brexit to the right was very nearly the most serious strategic mistake by the British left since the ‘70s. Under successive leaders Labour became so incorporated into the ideology of Europeanism as to preclude any clear-eyed critical analysis of the actually existing EU as a regulatory and trade regime pursuing deep economic integration. The same political journey that carried Labour into its technocratic embrace of the EU also resulted in the abandonment of any form of distinctive economics separate from the orthodoxies of market liberalism.

It’s been astounding to witness so many left-wingers, in meltdown over Brexit, resort to parroting liberal economics. Thus we hear that factor mobility isn’t about labour arbitrage, that public services aren’t under pressure, that we must prioritise foreign direct investment and trade. It’s little wonder Labour became so detached from its base. Such claims do not match the lived experience of ordinary people in regions of the country devastated by deindustrialisation and disinvestment.

Nor should concerns about wage stagnation and bargaining power be met with finger-wagging accusations of racism, as if the manner in which capitalism pits workers against each other hasn’t long been understood. Instead, we should be offering real solutions – including a willingness to rethink capital mobility and trade. This places us in direct conflict with the constitutionalised neoliberalism of the EU.

Only the political savvy of the leadership has enabled Labour to recover from its disastrous positioning post-referendum. Incredibly, what seemed an unbeatable electoral bloc around Theresa May has been deftly prized apart in the course of an extraordinary General Election campaign. To consolidate the political project they have initiated, Corbyn and McDonnell must now follow through with a truly radical economic programme. The place to look for inspiration is precisely the range of instruments and policy options discouraged or outright forbidden by the EU.

A neoliberal project

The fact that right-wing arguments for Leave predominated during the referendum says far more about today’s left than it does about the European Union. There has been a great deal of myth-making concerning the latter –much of it funded, directly or indirectly, by the EU itself.

From its inception, the EU has been a top-down project driven by political and administrative elites, "a protected sphere", in the judgment of the late Peter Mair, "in which policy-making can evade the constraints imposed by representative democracy". To complain about the EU’s "democratic deficit" is to have misunderstood its purpose. The main thrust of European economic policy has been to extend and deepen the market through liberalisation, privatisation, and flexiblisation, subordinating employment and social protection to goals of low inflation, debt reduction, and increased competitiveness.

Prospects for Keynesian reflationary policies, or even for pan-European economic planning – never great – soon gave way to more Hayekian conceptions. Hayek’s original insight, in The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, was that free movement of capital, goods, and labour – a "single market" – among a federation of nations would severely and necessarily restrict the economic policy space available to individual members. Pro-European socialists, whose aim had been to acquire new supranational options for the regulation of capital, found themselves surrendering the tools they already possessed at home. The national road to socialism, or even to social democracy, was closed.

The direction of travel has been singular and unrelenting. To take one example, workers’ rights – a supposed EU strength – are steadily being eroded, as can be seen in landmark judgments by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Viking and Laval cases, among others. In both instances, workers attempting to strike in protest at plans to replace workers from one EU country with lower-wage workers from another, were told their right to strike could not infringe upon the "four freedoms" – free movement of capital, labour, goods, and services – established by the treaties.

More broadly, on trade, financial regulation, state aid, government purchasing, public service delivery, and more, any attempt to create a different kind of economy from inside the EU has largely been forestalled by competition policy or single market regulation.

A new political economy

Given that the UK will soon be escaping the EU, what opportunities might this afford? Three policy directions immediately stand out: public ownership, industrial strategy, and procurement. In each case, EU regulation previously stood in the way of promising left strategies. In each case, the political and economic returns from bold departures from neoliberal orthodoxy after Brexit could be substantial.

While not banned outright by EU law, public ownership is severely discouraged and disadvantaged by it. ECJ interpretation of Article 106 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has steadily eroded public ownership options. "The ECJ", argues law professor Danny Nicol, "appears to have constructed a one-way street in favour of private-sector provision: nationalised services are prima facie suspect and must be analysed for their necessity". Sure enough, the EU has been a significant driver of privatisation, functioning like a ratchet. It’s much easier for a member state to pursue the liberalisation of sectors than to secure their (re)nationalisation. Article 59 (TFEU) specifically allows the European Council and Parliament to liberalise services. Since the ‘80s, there have been single market programmes in energy, transport, postal services, telecommunications, education, and health.

Britain has long been an extreme outlier on privatisation, responsible for 40 per cent of the total assets privatised across the OECD between 1980 and 1996. Today, however, increasing inequality, poverty, environmental degradation and the general sense of an impoverished public sphere are leading to growing calls for renewed public ownership (albeit in new, more democratic forms). Soon to be free of EU constraints, it’s time to explore an expanded and fundamentally reimagined UK public sector.

Next, Britain’s industrial production has been virtually flat since the late 1990s, with a yawning trade deficit in industrial goods. Any serious industrial strategy to address the structural weaknesses of UK manufacturing will rely on "state aid" – the nurturing of a next generation of companies through grants, interest and tax relief, guarantees, government holdings, and the provision of goods and services on a preferential basis.

Article 107 TFEU allows for state aid only if it is compatible with the internal market and does not distort competition, laying out the specific circumstances in which it could be lawful. Whether or not state aid meets these criteria is at the sole discretion of the Commission – and courts in member states are obligated to enforce the commission’s decisions. The Commission has adopted an approach that considers, among other things, the existence of market failure, the effectiveness of other options, and the impact on the market and competition, thereby allowing state aid only in exceptional circumstances.

For many parts of the UK, the challenges of industrial decline remain starkly present – entire communities are thrown on the scrap heap, with all the associated capital and carbon costs and wasted lives. It’s high time the left returned to the possibilities inherent in a proactive industrial strategy. A true community-sustaining industrial strategy would consist of the deliberate direction of capital to sectors, localities, and regions, so as to balance out market trends and prevent communities from falling into decay, while also ensuring the investment in research and development necessary to maintain a highly productive economy. Policy, in this vision, would function to re-deploy infrastructure, production facilities, and workers left unemployed because of a shutdown or increased automation.

In some cases, this might mean assistance to workers or localities to buy up facilities and keep them running under worker or community ownership. In other cases it might involve re-training workers for new skills and re-fitting facilities. A regional approach might help launch new enterprises that would eventually be spun off as worker or local community-owned firms, supporting the development of strong and vibrant network economies, perhaps on the basis of a Green New Deal. All of this will be possible post-Brexit, under a Corbyn government.

Lastly, there is procurement. Under EU law, explicitly linking public procurement to local entities or social needs is difficult. The ECJ has ruled that, even if there is no specific legislation, procurement activity must "comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaty, in particular the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality". This means that all procurement contracts must be open to all bidders across the EU, and public authorities must advertise contracts widely in other EU countries. In 2004, the European Parliament and Council issued two directives establishing the criteria governing such contracts: "lowest price only" and "most economically advantageous tender".

Unleashed from EU constraints, there are major opportunities for targeting large-scale public procurement to rebuild and transform communities, cities, and regions. The vision behind the celebrated Preston Model of community wealth building – inspired by the work of our own organisation, The Democracy Collaborative, in Cleveland, Ohio – leverages public procurement and the stabilising power of place-based anchor institutions (governments, hospitals, universities) to support rooted, participatory, democratic local economies built around multipliers. In this way, public funds can be made to do "double duty"; anchoring jobs and building community wealth, reversing long-term economic decline. This suggests the viability of a very different economic approach and potential for a winning political coalition, building support for a new socialist economics from the ground up.

With the prospect of a Corbyn government now tantalisingly close, it’s imperative that Labour reconciles its policy objectives in the Brexit negotiations with its plans for a radical economic transformation and redistribution of power and wealth. Only by pursuing strategies capable of re-establishing broad control over the national economy can Labour hope to manage the coming period of pain and dislocation following Brexit. Based on new institutions and approaches and the centrality of ownership and control, democracy, and participation, we should be busy assembling the tools and strategies that will allow departure from the EU to open up new political-economic horizons in Britain and bring about the profound transformation the country so desperately wants and needs.

Joe Guinan is executive director of the Next System Project at The Democracy Collaborative. Thomas M. Hanna is research director at The Democracy Collaborative.

This is an extract from a longer essay which appears in the inaugural edition of the IPPR Progressive Review.

 

 

This article first appeared in the 17 March 2008 issue of the New Statesman, Iraq: the war that changed us