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Syria gets a taste for protest

After events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain, Syrian citizens have finally found a voice agains

There are small numbers of tourists in the old city of Damascus and the many foreign students who come to Syria to study Arabic haven't left. May Mamarbachi, a tourism and travel operator, is running her business as usual - more or less. She has just sent some clients to Palmyra, and confirms that Bosra, with its Roman amphitheatre, is safe. "We are only avoiding Latakia," she says briskly.

As well they should. Latakia, Syria's principal port city and seaside resort, located north-west of Damascus, has joined Deraa as the latest hot spot. Clashes between protesters and military police there have led to beatings, arrests and 12 deaths in the past week. The military are still on the streets. The relative calm in Damascus belies a situation that is constantly changing and the mood is tense. The government is on the defensive; careless talk could lead to trouble.

Bashar bashing

There has been much commentary in the international media about which way President Bashar al-Assad will go: whether he will continue the crackdown or manage to persuade protesters that his proposed reforms are convincing and will happen. On 24 March, a state spokeswoman announced that there would be extensive concessions, including the release of political prisoners and a "study" into the possibility of ending emergency laws that have been in place since 1963. However, the next day security forces reacted violently to the protests in Deraa, Latakia and elsewhere.

The moves exposed a government unwilling - perhaps unable - to keep its promises, amid disagreement within the security forces, intelligence services (the notorious mukhabarat) and Assad's inner circle. The cabinet resigned on 29 March in an attempt to allay the protests. At the time of going to press on 30 March, the president was due to address his people and announce details of the reforms.

Unrest began in early March in the south in Deraa, where teenagers were arrested for scrawling subversive graffiti on walls. The ensuing protests there and in other cities were put down by security forces on 18 March. Government officials blamed foreigners, infiltrators or armed gangs for the chaos. The trouble has continued for many days now, and at least 60 people have been killed there alone. The city is surrounded and besieged, and electricity and telephone networks have been cut intermittently. Armed forces entered the city, dispersing crowds with tear gas. There was a report that agents confiscated wheat supplies from bakeries just before the siege to squeeze the rebellious population.

That the unrest has reached Latakia is an important development, because the city is religiously mixed. Mostly Sunni, it is, however, a heartland of the Alawites, the minority Shia sect to which the Assads belong, and also home to many Christians. This means that sectarianism and Sunni resentment against the ruling Alawites cannot be blamed for the uprisings.

While the situations in Deraa and Latakia are the most severe, there have been protests all over the country. On Friday 25 March, which activists called the Day of Dignity, there were demonstrations in central and suburban Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Idlib, Tafas and other towns. Some were small and ended without trouble. Larger protests were aggressively dispersed by the military police.

Hama brings particularly emotive memories for Syrians, who recall how President Hafez al-Assad, Bashar's father, massacred tens of thousands of residents in 1982 after a revolt led by the Muslim Brotherhood resulted in the city being besieged by special forces units and soldiers. Hama had been the organisational centre of Islamist guerrilla attacks against the Ba'athist regime. The brutal suppression was a decisive blow against Islamism in Syria.

Pro-government demonstrators, too, have been out on the streets in Damascus, in particularly large numbers on 29 March. Ausama Monajed, an activist and Syrian exile who runs a media information network for the revolution, is not surprised by their appearance. He says pro-government supporters "are mostly employees of companies owned by the political-business elite" - for example, the mobile-phone companies MTN and Syriatel. The latter, whose offices in Deraa were burned by protesters, is owned by the president's cousin Rami Makhlouf. People were encouraged to attend the pro-Assad rallies: schools were closed for the day and civil servants given time off. But Monajed believes that most were forced.

The net effect

While people in the capital remain mostly silent, they keep a keen - and discreet - eye on events by watching al-Jazeera and foreign news channels. State television is notoriously unreliable. They are also using the internet, where mobile uploads of demonstrations in many parts of the country are posted. As in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, these are effective at spreading news and rallying support.

Facebook is buzzing with images of people in Deraa dismantling the statue of Hafez al-Assad, of crowds shouting for freedom and, in some cases, of protesters being sprayed with tear gas or bullets.

Assad is said to have the support of the prosperous middle classes and religious minorities, which he protects; some believe he is a moderate surrounded by the severe state security apparatus established by his father. Activists dismiss such arguments as excuses. Instead, to counter misinformation that the protests are sectarian, they are organising nationwide rallies to be held on 1 April, the "Day of Unity". At first serenely unaffected by the flames that have set the Middle East alight, Syria is now unmistakably feeling the heat, and much depends on the reaction to the president's speech.

This article first appeared in the 04 April 2011 issue of the New Statesman, Who are the English?

Jeremy Corbyn. Photo: Getty
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Lexit: the EU is a neoliberal project, so let's do something different when we leave it

Brexit affords the British left a historic opportunity for a decisive break with EU market liberalism.

The Brexit vote to leave the European Union has many parents, but "Lexit" – the argument for exiting the EU from the left – remains an orphan. A third of Labour voters backed Leave, but they did so without any significant leadership from the Labour Party. Left-of-centre votes proved decisive in determining the outcome of a referendum that was otherwise framed, shaped, and presented almost exclusively by the right. A proper left discussion of the issues has been, if not entirely absent, then decidedly marginal – part of a more general malaise when it comes to developing left alternatives that has begun to be corrected only recently, under Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell.

Ceding Brexit to the right was very nearly the most serious strategic mistake by the British left since the ‘70s. Under successive leaders Labour became so incorporated into the ideology of Europeanism as to preclude any clear-eyed critical analysis of the actually existing EU as a regulatory and trade regime pursuing deep economic integration. The same political journey that carried Labour into its technocratic embrace of the EU also resulted in the abandonment of any form of distinctive economics separate from the orthodoxies of market liberalism.

It’s been astounding to witness so many left-wingers, in meltdown over Brexit, resort to parroting liberal economics. Thus we hear that factor mobility isn’t about labour arbitrage, that public services aren’t under pressure, that we must prioritise foreign direct investment and trade. It’s little wonder Labour became so detached from its base. Such claims do not match the lived experience of ordinary people in regions of the country devastated by deindustrialisation and disinvestment.

Nor should concerns about wage stagnation and bargaining power be met with finger-wagging accusations of racism, as if the manner in which capitalism pits workers against each other hasn’t long been understood. Instead, we should be offering real solutions – including a willingness to rethink capital mobility and trade. This places us in direct conflict with the constitutionalised neoliberalism of the EU.

Only the political savvy of the leadership has enabled Labour to recover from its disastrous positioning post-referendum. Incredibly, what seemed an unbeatable electoral bloc around Theresa May has been deftly prized apart in the course of an extraordinary General Election campaign. To consolidate the political project they have initiated, Corbyn and McDonnell must now follow through with a truly radical economic programme. The place to look for inspiration is precisely the range of instruments and policy options discouraged or outright forbidden by the EU.

A neoliberal project

The fact that right-wing arguments for Leave predominated during the referendum says far more about today’s left than it does about the European Union. There has been a great deal of myth-making concerning the latter –much of it funded, directly or indirectly, by the EU itself.

From its inception, the EU has been a top-down project driven by political and administrative elites, "a protected sphere", in the judgment of the late Peter Mair, "in which policy-making can evade the constraints imposed by representative democracy". To complain about the EU’s "democratic deficit" is to have misunderstood its purpose. The main thrust of European economic policy has been to extend and deepen the market through liberalisation, privatisation, and flexiblisation, subordinating employment and social protection to goals of low inflation, debt reduction, and increased competitiveness.

Prospects for Keynesian reflationary policies, or even for pan-European economic planning – never great – soon gave way to more Hayekian conceptions. Hayek’s original insight, in The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, was that free movement of capital, goods, and labour – a "single market" – among a federation of nations would severely and necessarily restrict the economic policy space available to individual members. Pro-European socialists, whose aim had been to acquire new supranational options for the regulation of capital, found themselves surrendering the tools they already possessed at home. The national road to socialism, or even to social democracy, was closed.

The direction of travel has been singular and unrelenting. To take one example, workers’ rights – a supposed EU strength – are steadily being eroded, as can be seen in landmark judgments by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Viking and Laval cases, among others. In both instances, workers attempting to strike in protest at plans to replace workers from one EU country with lower-wage workers from another, were told their right to strike could not infringe upon the "four freedoms" – free movement of capital, labour, goods, and services – established by the treaties.

More broadly, on trade, financial regulation, state aid, government purchasing, public service delivery, and more, any attempt to create a different kind of economy from inside the EU has largely been forestalled by competition policy or single market regulation.

A new political economy

Given that the UK will soon be escaping the EU, what opportunities might this afford? Three policy directions immediately stand out: public ownership, industrial strategy, and procurement. In each case, EU regulation previously stood in the way of promising left strategies. In each case, the political and economic returns from bold departures from neoliberal orthodoxy after Brexit could be substantial.

While not banned outright by EU law, public ownership is severely discouraged and disadvantaged by it. ECJ interpretation of Article 106 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has steadily eroded public ownership options. "The ECJ", argues law professor Danny Nicol, "appears to have constructed a one-way street in favour of private-sector provision: nationalised services are prima facie suspect and must be analysed for their necessity". Sure enough, the EU has been a significant driver of privatisation, functioning like a ratchet. It’s much easier for a member state to pursue the liberalisation of sectors than to secure their (re)nationalisation. Article 59 (TFEU) specifically allows the European Council and Parliament to liberalise services. Since the ‘80s, there have been single market programmes in energy, transport, postal services, telecommunications, education, and health.

Britain has long been an extreme outlier on privatisation, responsible for 40 per cent of the total assets privatised across the OECD between 1980 and 1996. Today, however, increasing inequality, poverty, environmental degradation and the general sense of an impoverished public sphere are leading to growing calls for renewed public ownership (albeit in new, more democratic forms). Soon to be free of EU constraints, it’s time to explore an expanded and fundamentally reimagined UK public sector.

Next, Britain’s industrial production has been virtually flat since the late 1990s, with a yawning trade deficit in industrial goods. Any serious industrial strategy to address the structural weaknesses of UK manufacturing will rely on "state aid" – the nurturing of a next generation of companies through grants, interest and tax relief, guarantees, government holdings, and the provision of goods and services on a preferential basis.

Article 107 TFEU allows for state aid only if it is compatible with the internal market and does not distort competition, laying out the specific circumstances in which it could be lawful. Whether or not state aid meets these criteria is at the sole discretion of the Commission – and courts in member states are obligated to enforce the commission’s decisions. The Commission has adopted an approach that considers, among other things, the existence of market failure, the effectiveness of other options, and the impact on the market and competition, thereby allowing state aid only in exceptional circumstances.

For many parts of the UK, the challenges of industrial decline remain starkly present – entire communities are thrown on the scrap heap, with all the associated capital and carbon costs and wasted lives. It’s high time the left returned to the possibilities inherent in a proactive industrial strategy. A true community-sustaining industrial strategy would consist of the deliberate direction of capital to sectors, localities, and regions, so as to balance out market trends and prevent communities from falling into decay, while also ensuring the investment in research and development necessary to maintain a highly productive economy. Policy, in this vision, would function to re-deploy infrastructure, production facilities, and workers left unemployed because of a shutdown or increased automation.

In some cases, this might mean assistance to workers or localities to buy up facilities and keep them running under worker or community ownership. In other cases it might involve re-training workers for new skills and re-fitting facilities. A regional approach might help launch new enterprises that would eventually be spun off as worker or local community-owned firms, supporting the development of strong and vibrant network economies, perhaps on the basis of a Green New Deal. All of this will be possible post-Brexit, under a Corbyn government.

Lastly, there is procurement. Under EU law, explicitly linking public procurement to local entities or social needs is difficult. The ECJ has ruled that, even if there is no specific legislation, procurement activity must "comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaty, in particular the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality". This means that all procurement contracts must be open to all bidders across the EU, and public authorities must advertise contracts widely in other EU countries. In 2004, the European Parliament and Council issued two directives establishing the criteria governing such contracts: "lowest price only" and "most economically advantageous tender".

Unleashed from EU constraints, there are major opportunities for targeting large-scale public procurement to rebuild and transform communities, cities, and regions. The vision behind the celebrated Preston Model of community wealth building – inspired by the work of our own organisation, The Democracy Collaborative, in Cleveland, Ohio – leverages public procurement and the stabilising power of place-based anchor institutions (governments, hospitals, universities) to support rooted, participatory, democratic local economies built around multipliers. In this way, public funds can be made to do "double duty"; anchoring jobs and building community wealth, reversing long-term economic decline. This suggests the viability of a very different economic approach and potential for a winning political coalition, building support for a new socialist economics from the ground up.

With the prospect of a Corbyn government now tantalisingly close, it’s imperative that Labour reconciles its policy objectives in the Brexit negotiations with its plans for a radical economic transformation and redistribution of power and wealth. Only by pursuing strategies capable of re-establishing broad control over the national economy can Labour hope to manage the coming period of pain and dislocation following Brexit. Based on new institutions and approaches and the centrality of ownership and control, democracy, and participation, we should be busy assembling the tools and strategies that will allow departure from the EU to open up new political-economic horizons in Britain and bring about the profound transformation the country so desperately wants and needs.

Joe Guinan is executive director of the Next System Project at The Democracy Collaborative. Thomas M. Hanna is research director at The Democracy Collaborative.

This is an extract from a longer essay which appears in the inaugural edition of the IPPR Progressive Review.

 

 

This article first appeared in the 04 April 2011 issue of the New Statesman, Who are the English?