All white on the right
Jon Cruddas reviews Daniel Trilling's book on Nick Griffin and the BNP, Bloody Nasty People.
By Jon Cruddas Published 13 September 2012
Bloody Nasty People: the Rise of Britain’s Far Right
Daniel Trilling
Verso, 240pp, £14.99
Why bother with the BNP? It’s heading into oblivion through factionalism, financial disintegration and assorted membership problems. Sure, the EDL (English Defence League) has its militia-style street politics but why write a new text on the growth of the far right? Isn’t it in free fall? Maybe the New Statesman’s Daniel Trilling should have not bothered and just kept busy at the day job.
In the warm afterglow of Olympic triumph, we’ve been pretty busy congratulating ourselves on the nature of modern Britain. Team GB’s successful multiculturalism defines a positive national story, in strict contrast to one anchored in loss, anomie and far-right extremism. That is all to the good. Why, then, a new history of the BNP and assorted far-right crews?
There is a central pivot to this book that alone is worth the asking price. Hit the rewind button and think of another Olympic year – the late summer and early autumn of 2000, following the Sydney Games – and one of the great missed opportunities of the last government. Twelve years before the London Games of Danny Boyle, Jessica Ennis and Mo Farah, there was an opportunity to forge a new, confident national story. Trilling’s book hinges on this often forgotten moment and the damage that political indecision inflicted on the character of the country.
In 2000, the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain signalled that Britain faced a fork in the road. Would the country push forward and define itself as a “community of communities . . . at ease with its place in the world and with its own internal differences” or would it squander this opportunity and accept emerging resentments? Fearful that this opportunity might be missed as a result of the toxic climate around race and asylum, the commission implored the then Labour government to make a formal declaration that Britain was a multicultural, multi-faith society.
Following leaks in the Daily Telegraph, the government swerved around the question of modern national identity and triangulated instead between the nationalist right and the liberal left. What followed over the next decade were successive attempts at a much vaguer, defensive notion of Britishness. In short, the Labour government lost a decade in this debate, much to the dismay of Bhikhu Parekh, the commission’s chairman. Trilling’s book joins the dots and works through the fallout.
In August 2000, Nick Griffin’s leadership of the BNP was in crisis: the Conservatives under William Hague were making the running on asylum and immigration. Yet within a year of Labour’s body swerve on the commission’s report, the BNP was on the move and a decadelong battle was taking shape.
By the spring and summer of 2001, communities off the radar of the middle-England focused political calculus – Bradford, Oldham and Burnley – were rioting. Griffin learned from Bruno Mégret, the principal strategist of the French Front National, that the party founded by John Tyndall had to forge a new identity politics; that the old left/right fault line was withering away and the real conflicts were “between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, between identity and internationalism”. The attacks of 11 September 2001 soon followed and the climate of fear and suspicion intensified, playing into the hands of the BNP and its new emphasis on “freedom, security, democracy and identity”.
Bloody Nasty People walks us through the various sites of contest across England. It offers sharp portraits while also keeping an eye on the increasingly harsh tone of political language driven by fear, polling and press dynamics. However, the book is by no means all one-way traffic. While all the political parties are criticized for pandering – for example, at different times, each of them deployed ruthless “sons and daughters” populism on housing issues – light is also shone on successful mobilization and forms of political resistance (though this is a long and painful war of position that has left plenty of wreckage by the roadside).
One might take issue with some of Trilling’s conclusions or with the slightly reductive class component to his analysis, and more discussion of the various strategies, as well as the tensions, inside the anti-fascist movement would have been desirable. But these are second-order points. This is a cracking book that respectfully weaves together testimonies and stories – of people and places – with national political formations, examining them alongside the deeper economic and cultural questions posed by globalisation. Especially strong is the analysis of the cross-currents at play in the 1993 Isle of Dogs council by-election victory of Derek Beackon.
Despite our post-Olympic glow, Trilling’s book is a useful reminder of our Balkanised political landscape. It places him alongside other young, left-wing writers such as Owen Jones in the front line of political and cultural debate, to which I don’t see a downside. I just keep thinking back to 2000 – to the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain and what might have been.
Jon Cruddas is MP (Labour) for Dagenham and Rainham.
Latest tweets
More from New Statesman
- Online writers:
- Steven Baxter
- Rowenna Davis
- David Allen Green
- Mehdi Hasan
- Nelson Jones
- Gavin Kelly
- Helen Lewis
- Laurie Penny
- The V Spot
- Alex Hern
- Martha Gill
- Alan White
- Samira Shackle
- Alex Andreou
- Nicky Woolf in America
- Bim Adewunmi
- Glosswitch
- Kate Mossman on pop
- Ryan Gilbey on Film
- Martin Robbins
- Rafael Behr
- Eleanor Margolis
- Tools and services:
- Polls
- Predictions
- Archive
- Magazine
- PDF edition
- RSS feeds
- Advertising
- Subscribe
- Special supplements
- Stockists


39 comments
A Cole is right. Of course working-class is difficult to define, but it's clear that big business benefits from mass immigration, whilst the least well-off suffer. Immigration depresses wages and puts pressure on public services and housing- I'm not sure how anyone can dispute that. Very few in the Labour party and on the Left have understood this though, Jon Cruddas being one exception, and have instead focused on woolly arguments about multiculturalism. Since Labour became a better branded Tory party, who represents what remains of the white, working-class who lose out from immigration? Nobody, so it's understandable that far-right extremism and populism becomes appealing. Wish we could have a sensible debate about immigration based on economic analysis, rather than both the Left and Right faffing about discussing culture.
"A Cole is right."
now there's a statement you won't read very often...
"Of course working-class is difficult to define"
which was the whole point of me asking him to define his terms. problem for Cole and you is that 'working class' used to be a doddle to explain, but that was in the 'good old days'. not so today. people i know who call themselves working class do so based on their familial roots, so purely by association. it's an almost meaningless term, unless you provide the definition and the data showing how many people are working class. care to have a go?
"Wish we could have a sensible debate about immigration based on economic analysis"
sounds good, so what do you have?
"Wish we could have a sensible debate about immigration based on economic analysis"
Because all immigrants are is a financial vehicle and all British people care about is money?
I wish we could have a sensible debate about immigration based on culture, values, wishes, desires, the environment, ethics, sustainability, quality of life. You know, a human debate, not a computerised one.
Aha fair enough. People care about job security, having a decent living wage, and access to good public services, and economic analysis can help work out the how immigration impacts on these. That's surely a more human debate than an abstract discussions about culture and values.
"People care about job security, having a decent living wage, and access to good public services"
Yes, but that's not *all* they care about. They also care about their traditions, their history, their legacy, their sense of pride, their loyalties, their bonds, their self-respect, their commonalities, their family and friends, their architecture, their music, their food, their religions, their law, their language, their countryside, their transport, their health care, their crime levels, their feeling of security and familiarity, their sense of continuity, their feeling at home. They care about their grannies not feeling isolated with nobody who understands them in nursing homes, they care about going to work and having pigeon English superficial conversations. They care about having to censor or explain themselves because others don't get their cultural tics and nuances. They care about it being taken for granted that men and women should be treated equally.
And all we ever talk about is housing and jobs? Really? Is it because it's less embarrassing for the British to talk about money than emotions?
Completely agree, but it doesn't mean that a hard-headed economic analysis of how immigration affects unemployment, housing, transport, health care, job security etc. isn't useful too.
Well a useful method for looking at the effects of immigration would be to look at people in unskilled jobs, of which there are about 3.5million in the UK, or around 15% of the employed, plus the unskilled unemployed (can't find statistics for that, but a conservative estimate would be 0.5million). I agree it's probably not that useful to use the term 'working-class' nowadays, but I think examining the effects of immigration on that 15% is useful.
And the start of the sensible debate was: high unskilled immigration (or skilled immigrants willing to take unskilled jobs) depresses wages, increases unskilled unemployment, leads to worse working conditions through agency work/zero-hour contracts, and puts pressure on public services and housing.
as no doubt we both agree this is one enormous complex issue, with many factors at play. but let's try and unpack some of your starting points;
"high unskilled immigration (or skilled immigrants willing to take unskilled jobs) depresses wages"
since we have a minimum wage i can't see how immigrants would automatically depress wages? since wages are identical for english and immigrant worker the employer will pick the more able candidate. so it boils down to the qualities of the individual.
"leads to worse working conditions through agency work/zero-hour contracts"
i also despise the increased use of agency staff. for a fact it costs employers more per hour (the crappy hourly wage plus commission) and yet the temps have no benefits. money that could go to benefit the employee is skimmed off by the agency as commission. it adds no value, and only allows the employer more flexibility to quickly down size staff numbers. but here again i can't see an advantage for an agency to prefer immigrants, there are lots of Visa and permit hassles. if anything the indigenous worker should have the advantage.
"puts pressure on public services and housing."
since their wages are subject to taxation public services should be able to manage, unless of course this system is already broken. i do however see the housing problem as an area where immigration has an undeniable negative effect.
quick question for you; do you think there are any benefits whatsoever for england in having net positive immigration?
The minimum wage complicates it, but mass unskilled immigration depresses wages down to the minimum wage (which is not an adequate living wage), and once wages cannot go any lower it causes higher unemployment.
And agency work is part of a broader trend that I also despise, though I accept it isn't predominantly the fault of immigration. But I do think having an influx of immigrants sometimes more willing to accept bad working conditions and exploitative contracts certainly makes it easier for employers to get away with it.
In the long-term, I agree taxation will pay for public services, but because immigration tends to be concentrated in specific areas, in the short-term it puts pressure on service until investment kicks in to adjust, which takes years. It shouldn't be a problem if immigration is well-managed, but it's a disaster when it's not, such as housing.
Yes, I do think there are some benefits to net positive immigration. The benefits of skilled immigrants are undeniable: the NHS would collapse without immigrant labour. There are also some benefits of unskilled immigration, for example the many cases when immigrants do jobs that Britons just won't do, such as seasonal strawberry-picking. But I do think it needs to be managed and controlled better, not for right-wing/nationalist reasons, but for the left-wing reason that mass immigration benefits capital at the expense of labour. So the effects are complex, but I think we probably agree on most things!
indeed we are in broad agreement.
where we may differ is on the cause of a low minimum wage, i don't see it too closely related to immigration. (btw i do see your argument when applied to driving down higher than minimum wages). but on the minimum wage, i fear it is down to the lack of political will, and us as the electorate not forcing politicians to push it up. we both know that a fair wage is historically a focal point for party politics, where no-one seems able to link wages to the cost of living in a meaningful manner.
employers clearly have no genuine interest in providing the best working wage & benefits since it eats into their profits and shareholder value. they have powerful lobbying skills, which are entirely absent for the low waged. so perhaps we can agree that the minimum wage is more the predictable result of aggressive Capitalism than immigration?