Mourners carry the body of a father killed by a drone strike in Gaza. Photograph: Getty Images
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Drone attacks go against every human rights principle in the book

There is a sense that international law has failed.

It has for centuries been lawful to kill enemy commanders, on the principle that “a man who is dead renews no war”, a thought that comforted Cromwell as he viewed the body of Charles I. The outcry in the 1970s over comical CIA plots to murder Fidel Castro by sending him exploding cigars and poison pens led Congress to ban political assassinations under Executive Order 12333: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.” This comports with the Fifth Amendment to the US constitution, which protects “any person” (not just US citizens) from being “deprived of life . . . without due process of law”.

Until 9/11, the legal position was clear: in war, active combatants could kill and be killed, subject to rules governing surrender, use of banned weapons, etc. But “war law” applied only to conflicts between armed forces of opposing states, invoking the right of self-defence. Confrontations with insurgents, rioters and terrorists were governed by human rights law, which requires state use of force against serious criminals to be reasonable in the circumstances. This is more restrictive – after three IRA bombers were shot dead on Gibraltar in 1988, the European Court held that the UK had denied them the right to life because MI5 had jumped to mistaken conclusions. In the case of known members of terrorist organisations, the “reasonable force” requirement exercises a necessary and humane restraint over the trigger-happiness of “special forces” and drone targeters. This is why the US, Russia and Israel pretend they are bound only by the law of war, which allows suspects to be killed without much compunction.

The states that deploy drones argue that they are operating under war law, where human rights are less relevant. As Harold Koh, legal adviser to the US state department, puts it: “The US is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda . . . and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defence . . . including by targeting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning to attack us.” This bald statement prompts many questions. How can you have “an armed conflict” without an enemy state? What criteria are used for putting names on the secret death list: is it enough to be sympathetic to terrorism, married to a terrorist, or anti-American? To provide shelter or give funds to terrorist groups? What is the required degree of proof? There are no accountability mechanisms – no inquests, sometimes not even a casualty list (although the US usually announces and celebrates when it hits a “high-value target”).

In drone warfare, there is no fairness or due process to enable the potential victim, his relatives or any outside body to challenge the accuracy of the information on which the targeting decision has been made. The Senate foreign relations committee reported in 2009 that the Pentagon’s approved list of “prioritised targets” contained 367 names and had been expanded to include 50 Afghan drug lords suspected of donating money to the Taliban. Suppose the suspicion was unreasonable, or the donation had been at gunpoint, or of a negligible amount? What the Pentagon is doing is secretly sentencing people to death for an unproven crime.

The Israeli Supreme Court is the only tribunal to have confronted the legality of targeted kill­ing, at a time (2008) when 234 victims had been members of Hamas and a further 153 had been civilians who got in the way. The court contented itself with comments about limiting the targets to dangerous terrorists and issued Polonius-like precautionary precepts: “well-based information is needed”; “innocent civilians are not to be harmed”; “careful verification is needed before an attack is made”. In reality, innocent civilians very often are killed, and “verification” always seems careful to the minds of the targeters.

Israeli officials seem morally content to risk civilian lives: after a one-tonne bomb was dropped on Gaza City in 2002, killing many civilians in order to assassinate the Hamas military leader Salah Shehadeh, an inquiry merely noted “shortcomings” in evaluation of information. This was a case of manslaughter by gross negligence. The CIA’s anxiety to kill the al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri led to a drone attack in 2006 on a village in Pakistan where he was mistakenly thought to be hiding, and 18 civ­ilians were killed. There was no explanation, no accountability and no compensation for what the CIA calls a “decapitation strike”.

Koh says that drone strikes are an exercise in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. But Article 51 applies only to attacks (or imminent attacks) by other states, not by terrorist groups. Nobody has yet noticed the irony of squeezing terrorism into this war-law paradigm. Because the Geneva Conventions and customary rights must apply to terrorist and law enfor­cer alike, if it is lawful to kill Osama Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and Hamas commanders, then it must be lawful for them to kill their opposite numbers – Barack Obama and Binyamin Netan­yahu, generals, allies. (Even the Queen, as head of a co-belligerent state, may qualify.) Those who take the lives of innocent civilians in order to spread terror deserve to be treated like dangerous criminals and shot down when necessity requires, not dignified in law as if they were warriors matched in combat with great states.
What is the position under human rights law? It would obviously be a breach of the right to life if terrorist sympathisers were targeted to deter others, or killed in circumstances where it was possible to arrest them. It would be reasonable to kill terrorists on missions to blow up civilians, or engaged in conspiracies to kill them. But the record of drone attacks demonstrates that often individuals are targeted when they constitute no clear or present danger.

Drone killings in tribal areas of Pakistan and in Yemen have taken the lives of targets who are armed and in conspiratorial meetings, but others have merely been attending weddings or funerals or emerging from hospitals or mosques. In Pakistan, there have been cases where pro-government leaders, their families and even army soldiers have been killed by mistake in drone attacks that have severely damaged US relations with a politically tense, nuclear-armed nation that is not at war with the US.

There was little protest in the US until last year, when a drone strike in Yemen targeted a US citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, rumoured to be al-Qaeda’s leader in that area. The rockets were fired at his pick-up truck, in which he might have been picked up rather than bombed. Obama’s lawyers said that the Fifth Amendment could not avail a US citizen who joined an enemy force. This is correct as far as it goes, but the Fifth Amendment must entitle a citizen or his family to know whether he is on a death list and to apply to have himself taken off it. When al-Awlaki’s father sought judicial review, the judge told him he did not have standing. If a father does not have standing to challenge a targeted killing, who does?

The Obama administration seems to have given the CIA carte blanche to choose targets, subject to the approval of Koh, a law professor, now an executioner. Those who press the Hellfire buttons in Nevada do not pause to consider whether their targets are engaged in combatant missions or not. But there is no point speculating about the criteria for listing or executing: these are secret CIA prerogatives, beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

The battlefield utility of drone technology is such that it will be used widely in future conflicts, and by states much less scrupulous than the US and Israel (Syria and Iran, for example). Drones will become more compact, and more difficult to detect or shoot down – already there are plans for bird- and even insect-sized drones, capable of crawling inside homes or squatting on window ledges to listen and send “kill” messages to their bigger brethren without any “pilot” in Nevada pressing a button.

There is an urgent need for the US to make its drone operations more principled, first, by moving responsibility from the CIA to the department of defence, which is more accountable and bound by the Geneva Conventions. Second, there must be transparency in respect of both the target list and criteria for listing, and an opportunity for those listed to surrender or seek judicial review of whether the evidence against them proves they are an active combatant. Third, rules of engagement must exclude any killing if civilians are likely to be present, and finally, rules must prevent killing of a target who can be captured or arrested.

There is a sense that international law has failed: the UN Charter, the conventions and the norms of the courts have not provided satisfactory guidance for waging asymmetric warfare. Hence the silence of states and the recent earnest request, by the UN’s human rights commissioner, for urgent clarification of the law. The way forward may be to find a way back, to reasonable force and proportionality. At present, many drone killings can only be described as summary executions – the punishment of the Red Queen (“sentence first, trial later”), which denies the right to life, the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial.

Geoffrey Robertson QC’s full legal analysis of drone warfare is in his fourth edition of “Crimes Against Humanity” (Penguin, September 2012). Also in the New Statesman's Drones issue: Chris Woods on the legality of drones, Jemima Khan's interview with former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf and Michael Brooks on the science that makes drones work

This article first appeared in the 18 June 2012 issue of the New Statesman, Drones: video game warfare

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An English hero for the ages: Ian Botham at 60

Botham blends his sportsmanship and deep-seated passion for cricket with a lust for life.

Begging W H Auden’s pardon, it is possible both to honour and to value the vertical man, and in the case of Ian Botham, who turned 60 on 24 November, it is our bounden duty. No sportsman has given Britons so much to enjoy in the past half-century and no sportsman is loved more. Two decades after he retired from first-class cricket, his reputation as one of life’s champions remains unassailable.

No mere cricketer is he, either. Botham is a philanthropist, having raised more than £12m for various charities, notably Leukaemia and Lymphoma Research. In December, 30 years after his first walk from John o’Groats to Land’s End, he will set off again, in South Africa, where England are on tour. And he really does walk, too, not amble. As somebody who accompanied him on one of his dozen walks said: “You can’t keep up with him. The man is a phenomenon.”

Of all postwar sportsmen, only Bobby Charlton and, at a pinch, Henry Cooper come close to matching Botham’s enduring popularity. But Charlton, a shy man who was scarred by the Munich plane crash of 1958 (and may never have recovered from its emotional effects), has never comfortably occupied a public stage; and Cooper, being a boxer, had a solitary role. Botham, by contrast, spoke for England. Whenever he picked up his bat, or had a ball in his hand, he left spectators in no doubt.

Others have also spoken for England. Bobby Moore and Martin Johnson, captains respectively of England’s World Cup-winning football and rugby teams, were great players but did not reach out to people as naturally as Botham. Nick Faldo, Lester Piggott, Sebastian Coe and, to bring us up to date, Lewis Hamilton have beaten the best in the world, but they lacked those qualities that Botham displayed so freely. That is not to mark them down. They were, and are, champions. But Botham was born under a different star.

It was John Arlott, the great cricket commentator, who first spotted his uniqueness. Covering a match at Taunton in 1974, he asked the young colt to carry his bags up the rickety staircase to the press box, where Arlott, wearing his oenophile’s hat, pulled out a bottle of red wine and invited Botham to drink. Forty years later Botham is a discriminating wine drinker – and maker. Along with his friend and fellow England great Bob Willis, and their Australian wine­making pal Geoff Merrill, he has put his name to a notable Shiraz, “BMW”.

Arlott, with his nose for talent and good company, saw something in the young Botham that Brian Close, his captain at Somerset, was beginning to bring out. Later, Mike Brearley, as England captain, drew out something even more remarkable. As Rodgers and Hammerstein wrote, you’ve got to be carefully taught. And Botham, a fine team man as well as a supreme individual performer, has never withheld praise from those who enabled him to find his voice.

If sport reveals character, then cricket is the game that reveals it most clearly. In no other sport is the individual performance rooted so firmly in a team context. Every over brings a contest of skill and intelligence between batsman and bowler but only a team can win the match. “A cricketer,” as Arlott said, “is showing you something of himself all the time.”

Cricket also reveals national character more than any other sport. Football may be the most popular game in the world but cricket, and cricketers, tell us far more about England and Englishness. It is instructive, in this regard, to hear what Philippe Auclair, a French journalist and author long resident in London, has to say about Botham: “He is essentially an 18th-century Englishman.” In one! It’s not difficult to sense a kinship with Tom Jones, Fielding’s embodiment of 18th-century life, who began his journey, as readers may recall, in Somerset.

A country boy who played for Worcestershire after leaving Somerset, and who lives by choice in North Yorkshire, Botham is an old-fashioned Englishman. Although nobody has yet found him listening to the parson’s sermon, he is conservative with a small and upper-case C, a robust monarchist, handy with rod and gun, and happiest with a beaker in front of him. He represents (though he would never claim to be a representative) all those people who understand instinctively what England means, not in a narrow way, but through something that is in the blood.

Above all, he will be remembered for ever as the hero of 1981. Even now it takes some believing that Botham bowled and batted with such striking success that the Australians, who were one up after two Tests, were crushed. Some of us who were actually at Headingley for the famous third Test – thousands who claim to have been there were not – recall the odds of 500-1 on an England victory going up on the electronic scoreboard that Saturday evening.

Botham made 149 not out as England, following on, beat the Aussies by 18 runs. For three hours the country seemed to stop. In the next Test, at Edgbaston, Botham took five wickets for one run as Australia fell under his spell. Then, at Old Trafford, on a dank Saturday afternoon, he played the most memorable innings of his life and one of the greatest innings ever played by an Englishman: 118 magnificent, joyful runs. Joy: that’s the word. Botham brought joy into people’s lives.

Yet it was the final Test at the Oval, which ended in a draw, that brought from him a performance no less remarkable than those from before. He bowled 89 overs in that match, flat out, continuing to run in when others withdrew with injury. That was the team man coming to the fore. Little wonder his comrades thought the world of him.

Modest, loyal, respectful to opponents, grateful to all who have lent him a hand, and supported throughout a turbulent life by Kath, his rock of a wife, and their three children, this is a cricketing hero to rank with W G Grace, Jack Hobbs, Wally Hammond and Fred Trueman. A feature in the lives of all who saw him, and a very English hero. 

This article first appeared in the 26 November 2015 issue of the New Statesman, Terror vs the State