The lost lion of Kabul

In 2000, after the flight of the mullahs, one Pashtun warlord offered a viable way of uniting the factions in Afghanistan and finishing off the Taliban. His name was Abdul Haq. First, the CIA supported him — then it stabbed him in the back.

By Lucy Morgan Edwards Published 10 November 2011

A decade after the fall of Kabul to western-backed forces, the war in Afghanistan remains intractable. On 29 October, 13 Americans were killed in a single suicide attack in that city, and the country's government is becoming more, not less, dysfunctional: President Hamid Karzai now openly suggests that he would side with Pakistan in a fight against the west.

But what if the US had been able to topple the Taliban without the need for external military intervention, coming up with an Afghan-led consensus to govern? What if I told you that our leaders and western intelligence agencies - the CIA, followed slavishly by MI6 - not only ignored this option in the weeks after 9/11, but did everything they were asked not to do by those undertaking the alternative plan, preparing the ground for the present disastrous situation? You might think I was joking. I am not. This is the story of the man who could have stopped a war. His name is Abdul Haq.

Hollywood Haq

Among the Afghans, Abdul Haq's nickname was the "Lion of Kabul", because he was the only significant commander of the anti-Soviet guerrilla war of the 1980s to take the fight to the capital and the heart of the communist regime. Born in 1958, he was one of eight brothers known as "resistance royalty" for their charisma and effectiveness as commanders.

The extended family was the chief clan of the Ghilzai Pashtun, from Jalalabad in the south-east; the clan has a long historical relationship with the tribes of Afghanistan's four eastern provinces. And even among his brothers, Haq stood out. In 1986, he blew up a seven-storey Soviet underground munitions dump, an act which turned that war in the west's favour, and his clever asymmetric operations caused him to be feted by both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.

He walked with a distinctive gait, having lost a foot to a Soviet landmine while conducting an operation - and yet CIA officers who lingered in the comfort of Islamabad, as the war took place across the border in Afghanistan in the 1980s, referred to him snidely as "Hollywood Haq". This was an attempt to diminish him, because he spoke out to journalists against the folly of the CIA's policy of channelling its Afghan war chest through the Pakistani secret service, the ISI. As a veteran journalist later told me: "The cure was so simple: do not rely on single-source intelligence. But the US did; they relied on ISI, fundamentalists with political agendas."

In the years following the 1989 Soviet pullout, the mujahedin commanders turned on one another as they struggled for dominance. Haq did not join in - he had not fought the Russians only to kill Afghans, he said - and left for Dubai. When the Taliban came to power in the 1990s, he returned to the region, working from an office in Peshawar, Pakistan, to provide an alternative to a regime run by religious zealots. In 1998, his wife and four-year-old son were killed at the family's villa; it was widely believed to be the work of the ISI.

If the intention was to deter Haq, it did not work. He began to rally support around the former king Zahir Shah, a unifying figure for disparate groups. Haq managed to build consensus among Afghans, including those who were part of, but fed up with, the regime, as well as tribal leaders waiting it out in their regions and men he had commanded during the jihad in the 1980s. Because of his history, he was respected and trusted by many. And although he was part of an Islamist political party, he was considered to be a moderate, one who believed in education (he sent his children to school in the US).

Abdul Haq's plan was significant because he understood that the Taliban contained only a slim majority of Arabists and hardliners, the rest being decent Afghan nationalists who wanted peace after the mayhem of the early 1990s. Haq was a patriot, but not a Pashtun nationalist eager to take on Pakistan over its problematic western border with the Afghans, the Durand Line. His efforts were supported by two independent groups of well-connected westerners. The first was led by two American brothers, James and Joe Ritchie, who had made money on the Chicago options market and now wanted to do something for the country where they had lived as children when their father was an engineer in Kandahar.

Impressed by Haq and his option for an alternative to the Taliban, they were happy to back him, providing money for satellite phones and vehicles to distribute to field commanders. They also financed meetings between him and those Afghans willing to coalesce around the ex-king in Istanbul and Bonn, a plan known as the "Rome process".

Across the Atlantic, the other group trying to get Haq taken seriously was comprised of a former head of the British Special Boat Service, "Ram" Seeger; an ex-marine named Ken Guest; and a former Rhodesian army officer, John Gunston. All three had spent a lot of time "inside" Afghanistan during the jihad, travelling with various mujahedin leaders.

But then, just as it seemed there was a chance that the Taliban could be deposed without western intervention, the 11 September 2001 attacks happened.

That is when my story intersects with Haq's. I first heard about him in the weeks after the terrorist attacks when he called on the west not to bomb Afghanistan. By that time, I had already worked in Kandahar for several months for the UN, a posting abruptly curtailed by the al-Qaeda bombing of the USS Cole in 2000. I would return again soon, in October 2001, to begin five years there as an election monitor, journalist and political adviser.

Through September of 2001, Haq tried to salvage his plan to remove the Taliban and instal the former king as an interim ruler in the face of a growing US political consensus that an invasion was inevitable. Gunston travelled to meet Haq and his commanders in Rome that month, and later told me he was astonished by the alliance of Afghans Haq had managed to build. "It's crazy you have this today," he said, "yet in Rome there were Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara leaders. They were all ready to buy in to the process. . . to work under the king's banner for an ethnically balanced Afghanistan."

Gunston decided to visit Haq in Peshawar and was with him in his office as Taliban defectors and commanders came clandestinely to meet the Lion of Kabul. They included the commander of the Taliban regime's eastern corps, nicknamed Rocketti for his skill with rocket-propelled grenades.

“Rocketti had been one of Abdul's commanders during the jihad," Gunston told me. "Yes, he'd had a chequered past, but now he was earnest in what he wanted. Like [the] other Pashtuns, there was concern, after September 11, about the return of Jamiat." Jamiat was the Tajik faction, based in the north-east of the country, and led by Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud - the grouping to which the west has essentially given the lion's share of power since 2001.

“These guys took Kabul to the cleaners," Gunston said, talking of the previous time Jamiat had overrun Kabul, in 1992, leading to civil
war. "With that memory in mind, not just the Taliban but decent Pashtuns wanted a Pashtun who'd bring peace."

It wasn't only Rocketti who swore allegiance to Haq. Three division commanders in Kabul did the same, as well as the Taliban divisional commanders in the cities of Hezarac, Gardez and Ghazni. Some visited Haq in Peshawar; others sent word that they would turn their men over to him at the designated time. "He'd broken the back of the Taliban," Gunston said. "Just look at the map."

But Haq's plan relied on one critical factor: that there would be no western bombing campaign. He had warned western journalists from his office in Peshawar in September 2001 that a bombing campaign would change the politics of balance of power in Afghanistan overnight.

Haq told reporters he wanted Tony Blair to "put the hand of restraint on America". Of the commanders outwardly loyal to the Taliban, he told Newsweek: "They will be with us, if they don't have to worry about their own survival and security." He planned to move in with his own commanders, Taliban defectors and tribal representatives. "We'll just take down the Taliban flag and put up our own flag."

It is sobering to think that, a decade on, the Taliban strongholds that would have fallen to Haq - lying in an arc through southern and eastern Afghanistan - are now the locus of Nato's most insoluble difficulties. This is the heartland of the cross-border Haqqani network, an insurgent group that is widely thought to receive operational support from Pakistan's ISI. With the Haqqanis, too, Haq would have had influence - he had been trained in guerrilla warfare in the early 1980s by Jalaluddin Haqqani himself. Though Haq was not an extremist like his mentor, it is likely that the Haqqanis, whose tribe, the Zadran, was known as much for its support of the monarchy as for its resistance to foreign interference, would have bought in to Haq's process with the former king as a transitional figurehead.

In the meantime, Ram Seeger, Ken Guest and John Gunston had been continuing their quest in London for Haq and his plan to be taken seriously. It was futile. The former Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown told them: "You must accept there has to first be a fireworks display, a significant fireworks display. The Americans are demanding it, and not until after the fireworks display can we continue the debate." Ashdown was right. The west began bombing Afghanistan on 7 October 2001.

On 24 October, Haq went into Afghanistan with his small group of followers. He was concerned that without a Pashtun rebellion from the east, the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance strongmen would take Kabul alone, leading to a repeat of the chaos of the early 1990s. He ignored the warnings from those who said such a move would be suicidal, believing as he did that it was important to get "the right structure" in place.

Death in the mountains

“Alhamdullilah!" the shout went up. "We've caught the American and British agents!"

From the darkness, the Taliban commanders emerged. Abdul Haq knew the situation was hopeless. Earlier in the day, he and his men had left their weapons at a village where they had been eating with the elders, and now they were defenceless. It was 25 October. Haq had been in Afghanistan for little more than 24 hours and already the Taliban had trapped him in the hills of Tera Mangal. The steepness of the terrain was such that he had been forced to dismount from his pony, slowing him further. He decided to give himself up in the hope that the Arab Taliban forces would not find his men.

“Move, go!" one man screamed as Haq stepped forward, still holding the pony by its bridle. "I can't walk without the prosthesis," Haq said. The Talibs weren't listening; they led him away. Aga Jan, who was with him on this last mission, told me he heard several shots being fired. However, it seems Haq was not killed there and then, but was taken to Kabul and executed the following day by the Taliban interior minister Abdur Razzaq, who shot him with a pistol borrowed from his bodyguard.

The US could have saved Haq but did not attempt to do so; as a CIA agent told a well-connected journalist at the time: "Let the one-legged bastard walk out of Afghanistan." Even after his death, the cities along the Taliban backbone of the country, lying in an arc from the south to the east, fell swiftly to his men. Yet just as Haq had foreseen, the Allied bombing of the country enabled the Tajiks to take Kabul and gain control of most of the power ministries and security infrastructure. They argued against including moderate Taliban in the government from the outset.

Over the coming days, the small window of opportunity that had existed to achieve a more ethnically balanced post-Taliban political settlement between the September 2001 attacks and the fall of Kabul closed. The former king was swiftly sidelined and humiliated, while the CIA - already distributing sacks of cash to commanders on the ground - was able, with Haq out of the way, to do things its way. The Americans in effect "bought" the short-term goodwill of strongmen.

In 2004, I asked the Taliban deputy interior minister Mullah Khaksar why they had killed Haq so quickly after his capture. He said the Taliban hardliners could not afford to leave such a popular leader alive; in prison, he would have offered a rallying point for people "pushing for a revolution". Khaksar was assassinated in 2006.

Afghan solution

After ten years of a failed policy in Afghanistan, the west desperately wants to leave. The narrative is that Nato will simply "hand over" to Afghan security forces by 2014. But once the west is gone, Hamid Karzai's government will struggle to hold its ground and the country seems certain to return to prolonged civil war.

Despite the vast sums the west has spent on its military campaign in Afghanistan (as much as $500bn from the US alone), it has succeeded only in destabilising the region further, leaving most Afghans as poor as they were when the west intervened in 2001. The 2011 UN Human Development Index still shows Afghanistan at the bottom. It is a sad irony that a Pashtun commander who remains a national hero to many Afghans offered a viable "Afghan solution", yet is hardly known in the west.

A decade after the fall of Kabul and having its "fireworks display", the west accepts that, to extricate itself from Afghanistan, it needs to foster internal leadership, negotiate with the Taliban (and the Haqqani network) and wise up to Pakistan's duplicitous game of taking money from the Americans while giving covert support to insurgents. Much of this is unlikely today but, tragically, Abdul Haq was well on the way to achieving it when the west dropped its first bombs in October 2001.

Lucy Morgan Edwards is the author of "The Afghan Solution: the Inside Story of Abdul Haq, the CIA and How Western Hubris Lost Afghanistan" (Pluto, £20). To order the book for £14.99, including UK post and packaging, visit: bit.ly/afghansolution

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Tags: Afghanistan

13 comments

Tue, 2012-04-24 05:45 — FranklinBonner

In April 1992, the Afghan political parties in the Peshawar Accords agreed to create an interim government and form the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Jamiat's Ahmad Shah Massoud was officially appointed as the defense minister by all the major Afghan parties - except for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i Islami. The Pashtun Hekmatyar, who had been offered the position of prime minister, opposed the peace and power sharing agreement (Peshawar Accords) and then rained Pakistan-supplied rockets on Kabul in 1992 destroying many parts of the city and starting a terrible war. Then president Sighbatullah Mojadeddi (a Pashtun, not from Jamiat) then asked the defense minister Massoud to defend Kabul against "the aggressor" Hekmatyar. http://www.online-legal-info.com/

Sun, 2011-11-13 12:01 — Najib-Kabul (not verified)

What a not-so-fact based written article. Maybe a little deep research was needed before putting your cursor down writing all this bluff.

Fri, 2011-11-11 11:23 — Roran (not verified)

“These guys took Kabul to the cleaners," Gunston said, talking of the previous time Jamiat had overrun Kabul, in 1992, leading to civil war. "With that memory in mind, not just the Taliban but decent Pashtuns wanted a Pashtun who'd bring peace."

---

Eh? Please, take a history lesson before writing such things.

After the communist defeat, the "Lion of Panjshir", resistance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud (Jamiat), who had stopped his troops at the gates of Kabul, repeatedly tried to convince other military leaders not to enter Kabul and to do the same as he did. He wanted to have a political agreement in place so that no fighting would break out between the factions. But Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hezb-i Islami), a Pashtun, wanted to take power for only himself and didn't listen to Massoud. The conversation between Massoud and Hekmatyar was recorded and is publicly available, so there are clear evidence for that.

MASSOUD: The Kabul regime is ready to surrender peacefully, so instead of the fighting we should gather ... The leaders are meeting in Peshawar. ... The troops should not enter Kabul, they should enter later as part of the government.

HEKMATYAR: We will march into Kabul with our naked sword ... Why should we meet the leaders?

So, please, get your facts straight. Thank you.

BTW, Abdul Haq and Abdul Qadir (his brother) followed Ahmad Shah Massoud "Lion of Panjshir" in his resistance against the Taliban. It was Massoud who led that resistance and Haq and Qadir were his Pashtun allies.

Sun, 2011-11-13 13:04 — K. Jabbarkhail (not verified)

I have lately noticed that mentioning and acknowledging Abdul Haq's sacrifices and contributions for his country and people have provoked and incited the fans of Ahmad Shah Masoud. Abdul Haq and Ahmad Shah Masoud both have fought bravely against the Soviets like millions of other unknown Afghan Patriots. Abdul Haq, Ahmad Shah Masoud and some others became the symbols of Afghan resistance to the Soviets and their areas of operation were very clear during Soviet-Afghan war.Denying any of these individuals accomplishments during Soviet-Afghan war would be very unethical but there is a clear distinction between the deeds of the two in the post Soviet or post communist Afghan era. Abdul Haq was able to keep his integerity intact by not indulging in the infamous civil where as Ahmad Shah Masoud couldn't end the continuation of the hatrid and differences that existed between him and Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar and Masoud's hatrid have a long history and their men have slaughtered each other even during Afghan-Soviet war so therefore their differences didn't started with that conversion through walkie-talkie at the gate of Kabul. Both claimed Kabul on the bases of their Jehadi credentials and their stabborness, uncompromising moods, and inflexibility resulted in the killings of thousands of innocent civilians and destruction of most of the Kabul. Shifting alliances among major warring factions with their foreign backers and patrons pro-longed the sufferings of the diverse Afghan population. Gen.Dostam and Mazari and some others along with some Parchamis communists were first part of Ahmad Shah Masoud's coalition against the Hekmatyar and his Khalqi-Tania alliance but later Gen. Dostam and Mazari joined Hekmatyar against Masoud. The massacre of Hazaras in Kabul by Masoud and his allied Sayyaf militias are not hidden from anyone and the youtube videos of victims and their relatives clearly pinpoint fingers towards Masoud and Sayyaf's men. Their men have literally skinned off people and chopped off the heads from the bodies of some innocent Afghan Hazaras.The infighting which resulted in mass violations of human rights and other atrocities have evaporated whatever respect remained for the Mujahideen. In reality the infighting no matter who started it first was a betrayal towards the sacrifices of the millions of Mujahideen because people started questioning and doubted the whole Jehad era. There could be no justification what so ever for indulging in a meaningless war through the support of external regional patrons against one or the other. Abdul Haq was not part of that infamous civil war era and he always tried to convince others too avoid such meaningless infighting and never claimed any position on the bases of his jehadi credentials, achievements and contributions. This is what distinguishes him and sit him apart from others atleast for me because he didn't compromised and smear the image of the sacrifices of our martyred fathers by not indulging in the baseless and useless civil war. He preserved the honor and integerity of all the true fallen Patriots of Afghan Jehad by not participating in that infamous murderous civil war. This is the listen that some of my Afghan brothers forget due to their tremendous love for Ahmad Shah Masoud which blinded them and they think it Ahmad Shah Masoud that liberated whole of Afghanistan during Afghan-Soviet war and if there was no other hero besides him. I would say yes Masoud played a major role against the Soviets and some times allowed the caravans and conveys of Scuds to pass Salang and be used in other parts of Afghanistan but he deemed it necessary as a strategic step for his front in Panjsher but not realizing it how disastrous it was for the rest of the country. During that time it seemed that for him just Pansher and its survival was much more important and he didn't regarded himself as a national figure and should have looked into the broader implication of his decision for the rest of Afghanistan. So, there were many other lions and it was not just the lion of Panjsher with all due respect to all his fans because it was a united efforts of most of the Afghans made it possible to get rid of the Soviet Occupiers and Panjsher was very important but one of the over 300 districts of Afghanistan.

Sun, 2011-11-13 13:35 — Ahmad Jan (not verified)

Thank you Lucy for bringing the story of Abdul Haq a real Afghan hero and Patriot. Please stay strong because now it seems that its not just the emotional Masoud fan club but other intel communities that you exposed will try to marginaliz and discredit you. Mr. Jabbarkhail I totally agree with you. Here is the link for tubetube video for the atrocities of civil war and the victims are Hazara Afghans and they clearly named the perpetrators of the crimes. This is what distinguished Afghan Patriot Abdul Haq from others.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxYuBfSI_8E&feature=related

Sun, 2011-11-13 16:23 — Roran (not verified)

Dear Mr. Jabbarkhail (ISI),

very wrong, so very wrong what you wrote. History has given enough evidence to show who was who. Either you buy Pakistani propaganda or you sell it.

Ahmad Shah Massoud was the anti-Taliban resistance commander without whom anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan would not have survived. Abdul Haq resided in Pakistan during the resistance. Massoud always stayed inside Afghanistan personally visiting the front lines, personally training the resistance, personally sleeping on stones in the mountains like his fighters. Ahmad Shah Massoud even let refugees camp in the garden outside his home. It was Ahmad Shah Massoud who was invited to and spoke in front of the European Parliament in early 2001 as the anti-Taliban leader. It was Massoud to ask the international community to provide humanitarian support to the Afghan people and who warned of an imminent terrorist attack against the US.

Considering the "civil war" time, everyone knows the clear distinction between Massoud and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar "proxy of Pakistan".

As was written before. The following conversation between Massoud and Hekmatyar is well recorded:

MASSOUD: The [communist] Kabul regime is ready to surrender peacefully, so instead of the fighting we should gather ... The leaders are meeting in Peshawar. ... The troops should not enter Kabul, they should enter later as part of the government.

HEKMATYAR: We will march into Kabul with our naked sword ... Why should we meet the leaders?

As was written before:
ALL the Afghan parties INCLUDING ABDUL HAQ - except for Pakistani proxy Gulbuddin Hekmatyar - accepted the peace and power-sharing agreement "Peshawar Accords" in April 1992. Ahmad Shah Massoud was officially appointed DEFENSE MINISTER. Abdul Haq was appointed INTERIOR MINISTER. Mojaddedi (Pashtun) was appointed PRESIDENT. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was offered the position of prime minister but refused. The goal of the Peshawar Accords were democratic elections to be held after a transitional period. But Gulbuddin Hekmatyar with Pakistani backing started to bomb Kabul because he wanted undisputed power and did not want to make compromises.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH writes: "The sovereignty of Afghanistan was vested formally in the Islamic State of Afghanistan, an entity created in April 1992, after the fall of the Soviet-backed Najibullah government. ... With the exception of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, all of the parties ... were ostensibly unified under this government in April 1992. ... Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, for its part, refused to recognize the government for most of the period discussed in this report and launched attacks against government forces and Kabul generally."

Now, Ahmad Shah Massoud (internationally recognized defense minister of Afghanistan) and Abdul Haq (interior minister) took different decisions. Ahmad Shah Massoud decided to fulfill his obligations as defense minister and to defend Kabul against the attacks of a militia leader and Pakistani proxy Hekmatyar who was bombing the capital and tried to render irrelevant the peace and power-sharing agreement between the different factions. Abdul Haq decided to leave Afghanistan for Dubai. In Dubai Abdul Haq entered the oil business and would not return to Afghanistan until after September 2001.

Meanwhile, Ahmad Shah Massoud fought to uphold the Peshawar Accord. Meanwhile, Massoud tried to mediate between other factions to prevent further escalation. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH writes:

"Rare ceasefires, usually negotiated by representatives of Ahmad Shah Massoud, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi or Burhanuddin Rabbani [the interim government], or officials from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), commonly collapsed within days."

Massoud never fought for his own power. Although there were criminals inside his faction like in all the factions, Massoud remained the only humane commander in Afghanistan. You know full well that the Afshar operation - which was originally a military operation to stop the bombardment of northern Kabul by the Hazara Wahdat faction (which also put nails into the heads of their enemies) and Hekmatyar - was escalated by the Wahhabi Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Ittihad not by Massoud. AFGHANISTAN JUSTICE PROJECT writes:

"[T]here is no indication that senior Shura-e Nazar leaders [including Massoud] ordered abuses."

But the dilemma for Massoud was the following as reported by Human Rights Watch source and AP journalist John Jennings:

A journalist from the Associated Press and the Economist who was present in Kabul and Afshar during that time reports:

"When Iran-backed [Wahdat] Hazara militiamen who had also been involved in ethnic cleansing and were allied to Hekmatyar began shelling Kabul's northwestern neighborhoods, Massoud worried aloud to his aides that driving them from their positions would risk allowing some of his allies' camp followers [notably those of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf] to commit atrocities against Hazara captives. On the other hand, he noted, the alternative was to allow Hazara militiamen to continue shelling much more heavily populated araeas, and killing many more noncombatants,on the other side of the town."

As Sayyaf's Sunni Wahhabi forces escalated the operation against the Shia Hazaras, Massoud convened a meeting where he ordered an immediate halt to the killings and withdrew most of his own offensive troops (as reported by the Afghanistan Justice Project). Massoud also appointed a Shia commander of his forces to care for the security of Shia civilians. Massoud and Sayyaf did not like each other. And it was Sayyaf who eventually was part of the assassination plot against Massoud in September 2001.

In 1993, Hekmatyar made the resignation of Massoud a condition for the end of the war. Now, you say they were both stubborn and the same. Wrong, very wrong. Massoud officially resigned as defense minister in exchange for peace. Hekmatyar took the role of prime minister ... for one cabinet meeting. Roy Gutman (United States Institute of Peace) writes:

"After chairing one cabinet meeting, Hekmatyar never returned to the capital, fearing, perhaps, a lynching by Kabulis infuriated over his role in destroying their city. Even his close aides were embarrassed. Hekmatyar spokesman Qutbuddin Helal was still setting up shop in the prime minister's palace when the city came under Hezb[-i Islami] rocket fire late that month."

After several failed attempts by others to coordinate the government's defense lines, Massoud was re-appointed to lead the ministry of defense. In late 1994 Massoud finally stopped the state's enemies' bombardment and restored calm to Kabul - which lasted only a short time - as the Taliban were approaching from the south. Interestingly, Hekmatyar fled the Taliban and gave himself into the hands of Massoud. Now, if what you wrote was true and Hekmatyar and Massoud were alike and both cruel warmongers, what would Massoud have done to Hekmatyar? Hekmatyar certainly would have killed Massoud immediately. But Ahmad Shah Massoud gave safe conduct for Hekmatyar to leave Afghanistan for Iran. The same way Massoud never harmed former communist president Najibullah who remained in Kabul.When the Taliban took Kabul in September 1996, they tortured Najibullah to death. The Taliban started a two year bombardment campaign against Kabul in early 1995 with the support of Pakistan (who had abandoned unsuccessful Hekmatyar), Saudi Arabia and Bin Laden. Massoud was left alone to stand against them. And - he had no outside support while in Kabul.

On September 26, 1996, the Islamic State retreated from Kabul, on September 27, 1996, the Taliban entered Kabul and established the Islamic Emirate. Massoud organized resistance against the Taliban from the north and as of 1998 (defeat of Dostum by the Taliban) remained the only major anti-Taliban leader (except for Abdul Qadir) inside Afghanistan. The Hazaras (AMONG OTHERS) fled to the protection of Massoud because the Taliban conducted massacre campaigns against them. Up to one million people fled to the protection of Massoud. It was Massoud and no other who provided that protection.

Sun, 2011-11-13 18:48 — Roran (not verified)

During the anti-Taliban resistance there are no reported human rights abuses by the troops under the direct control of Massoud. Instead, Massoud became known for defending human rights personally. He ordered the abolishment of the Afghan custom to give girls or women as a kind of payment (blood money) to an opposed party in cases of dispute, he intervened in cases of forced marriage, he fought corruption, etc.

Concerning the Soviet period, yes, Panjshir was just one district among many. But, the leader of Panjshir, Ahmad Shah Massoud was the one who united over 130 commanders from 12 Afghan provinces in his alliance to fight against the Soviets. This well-cordinated alliance was, beside the Stinger, one of the main reasons the Soviets were defeated. It is not without a reason Ahmad Shah Massoud was called "the Afghan who won the Cold War" by the renowned Wall Street Journal.

On another point you made: Yes, Hekmatyar attacked Massoud before 1992, but no, Massoud did not attack Hekmatyar. As the Soviets were being defeated in 1989, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar ambushed a meeting of Massoud and his main commanders, hoping to behead Massoud's organization. He managed to kill many of Massoud's top commanders and friends. Did Massoud respond with revenge killings? No. He captured the perpetrators of this crime and sent them to the courts of the united mujahideen parties in Peshawar where they were given a trial and sentenced. This are all well-recorded historical facts.

Sun, 2011-11-13 19:36 — K. Jabbarkhail (not verified)

Dear Roran,
I am not going to call you any names. Associating an Afghan with ISI is an insult and you are wrong by associating me with that criminal organization. No one can justify and defend the Afghan brutal civil war under any pretext. Listen to all major players to civil war and how much they distrusted each other. Masoud celebrating the failures of Hekmatyar the ISI proxy, and denounces Mazari and Gen. Dostam as well which were once his close allies. Mohseni clearly mentions the involvement of foreigners and their support to different competing sides. Mr. Anwari openly stated that its a war for power-grab by selfish and self-centered elements. This is not me saying it but its all leaders of different competing sides admitting it through their own words. So, it was not just Pashtun Pakistani ISI puppet Hekmatyar or Wahabi Masoud allied Sayyaf but all against all. So, Mr. Roran if you are a true Afghan Patriot than this video would be enough to open your eyes and mind and its not the ISI propaganda or anything else but leaders exposing each other's real faces and real motives for that infamous proxy civil war. It seems that the hatrid and distrust was not just between Masoud-Hekmatyar but it was matual and widespread among all parties involved in that murderous civil war. There was great unity among all these major players during Soviet-Afghan war when the cause was just but as soon as it turn into power-grab and self-interest than that unity didn't remained among them. What a shame for not being able to resist their destructive desires after the retreat of Soviet forces and collapse of Dr. Najeebullah's regime. All of them plotted against each other even if it cost the lives of not only of the thousands of innocent Kabulis but they even betrayed, smeared and shamed their own colleagues and fallen heroes and their actions. Some few Panjsheris might be happy with what their leader achieved but Panjsher is not whole of Afghanistan. Afghan leaders should be acknowledged for their good and bad deeds like other leaders of the world. We should stop ignoring the wrongs and making excuses for the wrong of a Pashtun leader for being a Pashtun and a Tajik or Panjsheri for being Tajik or Panjsheri or any body else. Some times disengagement is better than engagement in criminal acts or atrocities and I would be supporting and defending Masoud, Hekmatyar, or Mullah Omar if they have not spilled the blood of innocent Afghans and others but unfortuantely they can't hide from their irresponsiblilities towards their country and people. I love and respect Masoud and other Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara and Hindu and Jew Afghan for their constructive contribution for their country and people but I have equal right to denounce anyone for their destructive deeds as an Afghan that have joined the Afghan Jehad against the Soviets at the young age of 14 years when I first crossed the borders into Afghanistan to join the fellow Mujahideen of my martyred father.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bksXJXcXnYc&feature=results_video&playnex...

Sun, 2011-11-13 23:51 — K. Jabbarkhail (not verified)

Mr. Roran you have extensively quoted Human Rights Watch in support of Masoud and I think you have missed this report from the rights group. I just present it as a sample and there are many other reports and videos that could reflect on his contribution and his archrival Hekmatyar's contribution to Afghan civil war and the crimes committed.
"In March 1995, Massoud [Defence Minister at that time] forces were responsible for rape and looting after they seized control of Kabul's predominantly Hazara neighborhood of Karte Seh.
On the night of Feb. 11, 1993, the Massoud and Sayyaf forces conducted a raid in west Kabul, killing Hazara civilians and committing widespread rape. Estimates of fatalities range from 70 to more than 100.

Human Rights Watch, October 10, 2001

Here is a report on Afshar Massacre of Hazaras by Ahmad Shah Masoud and his allies. A BBC report on Masoud and Soviet secret alliance which both sides regarded as beneficial to them but at the expense of the rest of brave Afghan nation.

"...On February 11, 1993, Massoud and Sayyaf’s forces entered the Hazara suburb of Afshar, killing – by local accounts – “up to 1,000 civilians”, beheading old men, women, children and even their dogs, stuffing their bodies down the wells.
* According to Los Angeles Times (Apr.26,1999) “In one terrible incident in 1993, documented by the State Department, Masoud’s troops rampaged through a rival neighborhood, raping, looting and killing as many as a thousand people.”

http://www.hazarapeople.com/2011/02/09/afshar-massacre-1993/

BBC report and interviews with former Afghan generals in regards to secret deals and its disastrous implication for rest of Afghanistan by allowing Soviet military conveys to pass through peacefully to re-enforce and supply their troops against Mujahideen in the rest of the country. It seems placed the interest of Panjsher and his affiliated so-called "130 commanders " before the interests of the rest of the country.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5zwnN9U4uDo&feature=related

Here is General Khodad's revealation about Ahmad Shah Masoud's secret deals with Soviets and blamed Ahmad Shah Masoud equally for the disasters, chaos and sufferings of Afghans. He said that Masoud spend most of his time in secretly dealing with the Soviets while fighting his Afghan counter-parts. He talked about Soviet Helicopters loaded with Soviet advisors routinely landings in Panjsher and meeting Ahmad Shah Masoud. Gen. Khaidad was one of the commanding officers of regime forces around Panjsher. He is not Pashtun to be accused as bias but is from Afghan Hazara ethnic back ground.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1rV1zWLxnY&feature=related

Here is Abdul Ali Mazari the Hazara leader and hero talking about dominance of Jamiat and its Shura-i-Nezaar of most of important ministries during the Mujahideen govt. He said that Pro.Rabani and Masoud both violated the agreed terms that the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Foreign affairs would be run by joint commissions of all important parties involved in the govt but Masoud and Prof. Rabani has not respected their words and ran the ministries on their own terms without consultation of the joint commissions. He indicated that it was pour greed for power. So, Mr. Roran, Ahmad Shah Masoud was not an angel and hope the diversity of the sources will help you realize that how destructive Masoud/Hekmatyar rivalry was and in the process it cost the lives of thousands of innocent Afghans. They were fighting for the spoils of war in the form of govt ministries and positions in disregard to the sufferings of Afghan civilian. The warring factions repeatedly betrayed each other due to their shifting alliances resulted in distrust among all of the warring factions' leaders and the above videos and statements of different are evidence for that. Majority of Afghans denounces the civil war era beside a very some close circle of individuals that were close in one way or another with the war criminals. Lucy, thank you for your excellent book in bringing the peace initiatives of real Afghan hero Abdul Haq to light. He was among very few Afghan leaders and Patriots that avoided unnecessary bloodshed and was not part of the secret deals with Soviets at the cost of Afghan resistance and fought bravely against the Soviets but when the war was over he kept his integerity by not indulging in that useless civil war on the bases of his Jehadi credentials.
In the memory of that true Afghan Patriot. He said these things in mid 1990s and how accurate and articulate he was.
Part 1-
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7pPPOw0kwlc&feature=related
Part 2-
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7pPPOw0kwlc&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VtRU1ibE_L0&feature=related

Thu, 2011-11-10 20:52 — Joe (not verified)

Abdul Haq was not the Lion of Kabul. He and his family were not the royalty of the resistance. This is pure wishful thinking. And to top it all off - this whole article of buying into the idea that the current fight is one of Pashtun VS Tajik is part of the same idiotic excuse making...and evidence of falling for the ISI version - hook, line and sinker. The CIA was backing the Taliban in their early days. In the end the Tajiks were not given all the ministries. Today - a simple look at the power structure will tell you that it is Pashtuns that are dominating the positions. The problem is that Pakistan is not happy that its own Pashtuns are excluded...hence they make the excuse that the government is too Tajik.