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A right pig’s ear

The government panicked over the threat of swine flu – and got its response completely wrong

Brace yourself - swine flu is on the rise again. The second wave coincides with mounting disquiet among doctors about the way we as a nation are responding to the disease. A recent survey by Pulse, a leading GP periodical, found that 61 per cent of family doctors believe the government should review its policy of blanket provision of Tamiflu to all suspected sufferers. It also reported a growing number of cases that have resulted in death or serious harm after conditions such as meningitis have been misdiagnosed as flu, and wrongly treated.

Swine flu has wrong-footed everyone. For many years it was assumed that when the next pandemic arrived, it would create havoc: thousands would die in Britain alone; the exponential demand for services would be mirrored by the decreasing number of healthy doctors able to deliver them; societies would crumble. This projection was based in part on the 1918 global flu pandemic - which caused an estimated 50 to 100 million deaths - coupled with the high fatality rate among the few hundred cases of "bird flu" (H5N1) over the past few years.

In the UK, huge quantities of antiviral drugs were stockpiled, plans for establishing a national pandemic flu phone line were laid, and organisations both public and private were exhorted to draft detailed contingency plans for when the carnage began. Both chambers loaded, the shotgun was trained on the far horizon, the collective eye of the viral surveillance world squinting down the barrel, seeking out the first sign of an emergent threat.

Along came swine flu (H1N1). To be clear: people have died - 82 in the UK and an estimated 4,041 worldwide, at the time of writing. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), roughly 60 per cent of the severe or fatal cases have occurred in recognised risk groups, such as people with grave underlying health problems; the remaining 40 per cent have affected fit children and adults. Each death is tragic, but the mortality figures are tiny, viewed against the millions of mild cases globally.

Writing in the British Medical Journal in September, Peter Doshi, a doctoral student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, proposed a framework to differentiate between disease patterns. Type 1 infections are widespread and severe - exactly the kind towards which the current pandemic flu plans are geared. But swine flu sits in Doshi's type 3 - widespread but usually mild. These different beasts present different challenges, but because pandemic planning failed to anticipate anything other than a type 1 scenario, swine flu has triggered a completely inappropriate response.

Marginal effects

Central to doctors' unease is the National Pandemic Flu Service (NPFS). Telephone-based and web-based assessments of symptoms are made using a computer algorithm. If the computer says "swine flu", patients are given antiviral medication, usually Tamiflu. The problems are twofold.

First, data from the Health Protection Agency, which conducts confirmatory laboratory tests on a sample of cases, shows that less than 10 per cent of NPFS diagnoses are correct. The other 90 per cent of supposed swine flu sufferers have other illnesses whose symptoms happen to overlap. (Doctors fare only slightly better, diagnosing at best a quarter of cases accurately.) Second, the drugs being doled out are by and large worse than useless, even in the correctly diagnosed cases. Tamiflu makes only a marginal difference to the course of uncomplicated flu and causes side effects in up to 40 per cent of people who take it. On the whole, these are just bothersome - vomiting is the most frequent - but serious, even fatally adverse reactions do occasionally occur.

In late August, WHO advised that antivirals were not necessary for fit patients suffering from uncomplicated swine flu. The Department of Health defends its continued policy of Tamiflu-for-all on "safety first" grounds. Its concern is those exceptional cases of severe disease in fit individuals, where Tamiflu might (no one knows for sure) make a difference if started early. However, the logic - that it is better to treat everyone than risk missing those who might have benefited - belongs to a strategy for dealing with a Doshi type 1 pandemic, where the chance of severe disease is high. For swine flu, damage from indiscriminate use of antivirals outweighs the supposed benefits of catching atypical cases early.

The real challenge of a Doshi type 3 pandemic is identifying the small minority who actually and urgently require help. These could be those rare individuals with severe flu, or they might be patients in the early stages of another serious disease such as meningitis. Doctors are good at doing this (though far from infallible) and many GPs believe that only medically qualified staff should be undertaking flu assessments, but this is not achievable, given our capacity for mass hysteria. During the first wave of swine flu - before the NPFS was launched - the NHS front line was overwhelmed by waves of worried callers in flu hot spots. One of the main reasons for setting up the NPFS was to prevent a meltdown in services, but it should now change its focus from diagnosing swine flu (at which it is hopeless) to identifying patients in trouble.

The trickiest problem is when patients who initially feel mildly unwell start to deteriorate. The Department of Health stresses that patients are advised to consult a doctor if they get worse, but this fails to appreciate the Tamiflu effect. Having been "diagnosed" with swine flu and put on antivirals, patients are then falsely reassured that appropriate treatment is under way. By stopping its blanket use of Tamiflu, the NPFS would greatly increase the likelihood of patients consulting a doctor if they deteriorate.

Lessons in planning

Swine flu may in time be seen as a great learning opportunity. It has exposed a rigidity in pandemic planning that needs urgent correction. WHO has a scale to denote the spread of in­fection - level six being pandemic. It needs to develop a simple, parallel system to differen­tiate between Doshi types, one that should trigger responses appropriate to the particular challenge posed.

For now, the Department of Health should stop sticking doggedly to contingencies laid against a very different threat. The public and the NHS need clear identification of the at-risk groups and a message that the danger of swine flu, for everyone else, is almost certain to be minimal. They also need information about the warning signs of a more serious problem. The vast stocks of antivirals should be left on the shelf to go quietly out of date.

Yet it may be too late. Another facet of the Tamiflu effect is that we have educated hordes of people that what they thought felt like just a bad cold (and, most of the time, was just a bad cold) needed treatment with powerful drugs involving mystical rituals with a special authorisation number and a flu friend. Doctors will be dealing with mass hysteria in the face of ­minor illness for some time to come.

Phil Whitaker is a doctor and novelist. He is currently working on his fifth novel, "Sister Sebastian's Library"

 

Computer says flu

What do malaria, meningitis, diabetic coma, leukaemia and appendicitis have in common? They are just a few of the conditions that were originally diagnosed as swine flu during the first wave of the pandemic. Most patients have lived to tell the tale; some have not. The case reports have been appearing in the letters pages of medical journals, and on discussion forums of networking sites for doctors. The GPs reporting them are frequently unsure who in authority should be informed.

In fact, the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) has been tasked by the Department of Health with investigating alleged misdiagnoses. In a statement, John Scarpello, NPSA deputy medical director, confirmed that the agency had received "a small number of reports where swine flu may have been misdiagnosed", but was unwilling to go into detail while the facts had not been established. Given that the reporting system is entirely voluntary, and few clinicians know to contact the NPSA, this "small number" of reports is likely to be the tip of an iceberg.

The National Pandemic Flu Service is a first: never before have patients been diagnosed by computer or unqualified call-centre staff. There is a real need for research to examine this approach, yet none appears to be planned. The Department of Health refers inquiries about patient safety to the NPSA, while the NPSA believes commissioning such a study would be outside its capacity and brief.

Phil Whitaker

This article first appeared in the 12 October 2009 issue of the New Statesman, Barack W Bush

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Why Jeremy Corbyn is a new leader for the New Times

In an inspired election campaign, he confounded his detractors and showed that he was – more than any other leader – in tune with the times.

There have been two great political turning points in postwar Britain. The first was in 1945 with the election of the Attlee government. Driven by a popular wave of determination that peacetime Britain would look very different from the mass unemployment of the 1930s, and built on the foundations of the solidaristic spirit of the war, the Labour government ushered in full employment, the welfare state (including the NHS) and nationalisation of the basic industries, notably coal and the railways. It was a reforming government the like of which Britain had not previously experienced in the first half of the 20th century. The popular support enjoyed by the reforms was such that the ensuing social-democratic consensus was to last until the end of the 1970s, with Tory as well as Labour governments broadly operating within its framework.

During the 1970s, however, opposition to the social-democratic consensus grew steadily, led by the rise of the radical right, which culminated in 1979 in the election of Margaret Thatcher’s first government. In the process, the Thatcherites redefined the political debate, broadening it beyond the rather institutionalised and truncated forms that it had previously taken: they conducted a highly populist campaign that was for individualism and against collectivism; for the market and against the state; for liberty and against trade unionism; for law and order and against crime.

These ideas were dismissed by the left as just an extreme version of the same old Toryism, entirely failing to recognise their novelty and therefore the kind of threat they posed. The 1979 election, followed by Ronald Reagan’s US victory in 1980, began the neoliberal era, which remained hegemonic in Britain, and more widely in the West, for three decades. Tory and Labour governments alike operated within the terms and by the logic of neoliberalism. The only thing new about New Labour was its acquiescence in neoliberalism; even in this sense, it was not new but derivative of Thatcherism.

The financial crisis of 2007-2008 marked the beginning of the end of neoliberalism. Unlike the social-democratic consensus, which was undermined by the ideological challenge posed by Thatcherism, neoliberalism was brought to its knees not by any ideological alternative – such was the hegemonic sway of neoliberalism – but by the biggest financial crisis since 1931. This was the consequence of the fragility of a financial sector left to its own devices as a result of sweeping deregulation, and the corrupt and extreme practices that this encouraged.

The origin of the crisis lay not in the Labour government – complicit though it was in the neoliberal indulgence of the financial sector – but in the deregulation of the banking sector on both sides of the Atlantic in the 1980s. Neoliberalism limped on in the period after 2007-2008 but as real wages stagnated, recovery proved a mirage, and, with the behaviour of the bankers exposed, a deep disillusionment spread across society. During 2015-16, a populist wave of opposition to the establishment engulfed much of Europe and the United States.

Except at the extremes – Greece perhaps being the most notable example – the left was not a beneficiary: on the contrary it, too, was punished by the people in the same manner as the parties of the mainstream right were. The reason was straightforward enough. The left was tarnished with the same brush as the right: almost everywhere social-democratic parties, albeit to varying degrees, had pursued neoliberal policies. Bill Clinton and Tony Blair became – and presented themselves as – leaders of neoliberalism and as enthusiastic advocates of a strategy of hyper-globalisation, which resulted in growing inequality. In this fundamental respect these parties were more or less ­indistinguishable from the right.

***

The first signs of open revolt against New Labour – the representatives and evangelists of neoliberal ideas in the Labour Party – came in the aftermath of the 2015 ­election and the entirely unpredicted and overwhelming victory of Jeremy Corbyn in the leadership election. Something was happening. Yet much of the left, along with the media, summarily dismissed it as a revival of far-left entryism; that these were for the most part no more than a bunch of Trots. There is a powerful, often overwhelming, tendency to see new phenomena in terms of the past. The new and unfamiliar is much more difficult to understand than the old and familiar: it requires serious intellectual effort and an open and inquiring mind. The left is not alone in this syndrome. The right condemned the 2017 Labour Party manifesto as a replica of Labour’s 1983 manifesto. They couldn’t have been more wrong.

That Corbyn had been a veteran of the far left for so long lent credence to the idea that he was merely a retread of a failed past: there was nothing new about him. In a brilliant election campaign, Corbyn not only gave the lie to this but also demonstrated that he, far more than any of the other party leaders, was in tune with the times, the candidate of modernity.

Crises, great turning points, new conjunctures, new forms of consciousness are by definition incubators of the new. That is one of the great sources of their fascination. We can now see the line of linkage between the thousands of young people who gave Corbyn his overwhelming victory in the leadership election in 2015 and the millions of young people who were enthused by his general election campaign in 2017. It is no accident that it was the young rather than the middle-aged or the seniors who were in the vanguard: the young are the bearers and products of the new, they are the lightning conductors of change. Their elders, by contrast, are steeped in old ways of thinking and doing, having lived through and internalised the values and norms of neoliberalism for more than 30 years.

Yet there is another, rather more important aspect to how we identify the new, namely the way we see politics and how politics is conceived. Electoral politics is a highly institutionalised and tribal activity. There have been, as I argued earlier, two great turning points in postwar politics: the social-democratic era ushered in by the 1945 Labour government and the neoliberal era launched by the Tory government in 1979.

The average Tory MP or activist, no doubt, would interpret history primarily in terms of Tory and Labour governments; Labour MPs and activists would do similarly. But this is a superficial reading of politics based on party labels which ignores the deeper forces that shape different eras, generate crises and result in new paradigms.

Alas, most political journalists and columnists are afflicted with the same inability to distinguish the wood (an understanding of the deeper historical forces at work) from the trees (the day-to-day manoeuvring of parties and politicians). In normal times, this may not be so important, because life continues for the most part as before, but at moments of great paradigmatic change it is absolutely critical.

If the political journalists, and indeed the PLP, had understood the deeper forces and profound changes now at work, they would never have failed en masse to rise above the banal and predictable in their assessment of Corbyn. Something deep, indeed, is happening. A historical era – namely, that of neoliberalism – is in its death throes. All the old assumptions can no longer be assumed. We are in new territory: we haven’t been here before. The smart suits long preferred by New Labour wannabes are no longer a symbol of success and ambition but of alienation from, and rejection of, those who have been left behind; who, from being ignored and dismissed, are in the process of moving to the centre of the political stage.

Corbyn, you may recall, was instantly rejected and ridiculed for his sartorial style, and yet we can now see that, with a little smartening, it conveys an authenticity and affinity with the times that made his style of dress more or less immune from criticism during the general election campaign. Yet fashion is only a way to illustrate a much deeper point.

The end of neoliberalism, once so hegemonic, so commanding, is turning Britain on its head. That is why – extraordinary when you think about it – all the attempts by the right to dismiss Corbyn as a far-left extremist failed miserably, even proved counterproductive, because that was not how people saw him, not how they heard him. He was speaking a language and voicing concerns that a broad cross-section of the public could understand and identify with.

***

The reason a large majority of the PLP was opposed to Corbyn, desperate to be rid of him, was because they were still living in the neoliberal era, still slaves to its ideology, still in thrall to its logic. They knew no other way of thinking or political being. They accused Corbyn of being out of time when in fact it was most of the PLP – not to mention the likes of Mandelson and Blair – who were still imprisoned in an earlier historical era. The end of neoliberalism marks the death of New Labour. In contrast, Corbyn is aligned with the world as it is rather than as it was. What a wonderful irony.

Corbyn’s success in the general election requires us to revisit some of the assumptions that have underpinned much political commentary over the past several years. The turmoil in Labour ranks and the ridiculing of Corbyn persuaded many, including on the left, that Labour stood on the edge of the abyss and that the Tories would continue to dominate for long into the future. With Corbyn having seized the political initiative, the Tories are now cast in a new light. With Labour in the process of burying its New Labour legacy and addressing a very new conjuncture, then the end of neoliberalism poses a much more serious challenge to the Tories than it does the Labour Party.

The Cameron/Osborne leadership was still very much of a neoliberal frame of mind, not least in their emphasis on austerity. It would appear that, in the light of the new popular mood, the government will now be forced to abandon austerity. Theresa May, on taking office, talked about a return to One Nation Toryism and the need to help the worst-off, but that has never moved beyond rhetoric: now she is dead in the water.

Meanwhile, the Tories are in fast retreat over Brexit. They held a referendum over the EU for narrowly party reasons which, from a national point of view, was entirely unnecessary. As a result of the Brexit vote, the Cameron leadership was forced to resign and the Brexiteers took de facto command. But now, after the election, the Tories are in headlong retreat from anything like a “hard Brexit”. In short, they have utterly lost control of the political agenda and are being driven by events. Above all, they are frightened of another election from which Corbyn is likely to emerge as leader with a political agenda that will owe nothing to neoliberalism.

Apart from Corbyn’s extraordinary emergence as a leader who understands – and is entirely comfortable with – the imperatives of the new conjuncture and the need for a new political paradigm, the key to Labour’s transformed position in the eyes of the public was its 2017 manifesto, arguably its best and most important since 1945. You may recall that for three decades the dominant themes were marketisation, privatisation, trickle-down economics, the wastefulness and inefficiencies of the state, the incontrovertible case for hyper-globalisation, and bankers and financiers as the New Gods.

Labour’s manifesto offered a very different vision: a fairer society, bearing down on inequality, a more redistributive tax system, the centrality of the social, proper funding of public services, nationalisation of the railways and water industry, and people as the priority rather than business and the City. The title captured the spirit – For the Many Not the Few. Or, to put in another way, After Neoliberalism. The vision is not yet the answer to the latter question, but it represents the beginnings of an answer.

Ever since the late 1970s, Labour has been on the defensive, struggling to deal with a world where the right has been hegemonic. We can now begin to glimpse a different possibility, one in which the left can begin to take ownership – at least in some degree – of a new, post-neoliberal political settlement. But we should not underestimate the enormous problems that lie in wait. The relative economic prospects for the country are far worse than they have been at any time since 1945. As we saw in the Brexit vote, the forces of conservatism, nativism, racism and imperial nostalgia remain hugely powerful. Not only has the country rejected continued membership of the European Union, but, along with the rest of the West, it is far from reconciled with the new world that is in the process of being created before our very eyes, in which the developing world will be paramount and in which China will be the global leader.

Nonetheless, to be able to entertain a sense of optimism about our own country is a novel experience after 30 years of being out in the cold. No wonder so many are feeling energised again.

This article first appeared in the 15 June 2017 issue of the New Statesman, Corbyn: revenge of the rebel

Martin Jacques is the former editor of Marxism Today. 

This article first appeared in the 15 June 2017 issue of the New Statesman, Corbyn: revenge of the rebel

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