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The 50 people who matter today: 41-50

41-50 on our diverse list of individuals, couples and families changing the world, for good and ill.

41. David Ray Griffin

Top truther

Conspiracy theories are everywhere, and they always have been. In recent years, one of the most pernicious global myths has been that the US government carried out, or at least colluded in, the 11 September 2001 attacks as a pretext for going to war. David Ray Griffin, a retired professor of religion, is the high priest of the "truther" movement. His books on the subject have lent a sheen of respectability that appeals to people at the highest levels of government - from Michael Meacher MP to Anthony "Van" Jones, who was recently forced to resign as Barack Obama's "green jobs" adviser after it emerged that he had signed a 9/11 truth petition in 2004.

42. Shahrukh Khan

Special K

For billions of people across Asia, Shahrukh Khan is the biggest star on earth. Since his film debut in 1992, King Khan has been the ruling monarch of Bollywood, the world's largest film industry. "I want people to scream and shout at me," he says. Which is lucky, as he is wildly popular in India, Pakistan and even Afghanistan, where his films were sold on the black market during Taliban rule. A Muslim hero in a Hindu nation, SRK, as he is affectionately known, is the symbol of a younger, confident, richer, globalised India.

43. Joaquín "Shorty" Guzmán

Cocaine knight

At a diminutive 5ft, Mexico's most wanted man is nicknamed "El Chapo" (Shorty). But don't let that fool you - as the top drug lord in a country that provides 90 per cent of all cocaine in the US, Guzmán is instrumental to the international drugs trade and the thousands of lives it claims each year. Head of the Sinaloa cartel, he escaped from prison in 2001 and has since eluded capture. His stake in the US drugs market has amassed him a fortune of $1bn, earning him a place on the Forbes rich list this year.

44. Hugo Chávez

Bolívar's boy

Since being elected president of Venezuela in 1998, Hugo Chávez, the standard-bearer of "21st-century socialism", has survived all attempts to unseat him and has vowed to continue leading the Bolivarian revolution until 2030. His victory earlier this year in a referendum to abolish term limits allows him to run for a third six-year term in 2013. The former army paratrooper's political philosophy, a fusion of Marxism, nationalism and Christian socialism, has inspired left-wing leaders across Latin America - and dismayed US politicians.

45. Peter Akinola

Unhappy clapper

As head of the Church of Nigeria, Akinola is one of the most controversial figures in the worldwide Anglican Communion. He campaigned in 2003 against the consecration of two gay men: Jeffrey John in Reading and Gene Robinson in New Hampshire. The Church of England backed down on John's appointment and a schism was avoided - just. In 2006, at Akinola's invitation, two disenchanted congregations in the US placed themselves under the authority of the Church of Nigeria. And last year's Lambeth Conference was boycotted by 250 traditionalists. Africa is the fastest-growing section of the Church, and Akinola's influence is sure to extend beyond his retirement in March 2010.

46. Anna Wintour

Atomic kitter

Her nickname, "Nuclear Wintour", says it all. The editor of American Vogue is the ultimate ice queen. Both films made about her - one fictional (The Devil Wears Prada) and the other a documentary (The September Issue) - depict her as a terrifying, dictator-like figure, able to shape fashion the world over, from the top designers to the high street chains. But fashion is never just fashion. Wintour's editorial eye will determine what we buy and what we see from one year to the next.

47. Jay-Z and Beyoncé

Pop idols

Beyoncé walks onstage in an explosion of lights and glitter and sequin leotards, and the 20,000-strong crowd bursts into a frenzy of excitement. When she sings "Ave Maria", the arena is hushed. But it's not simply her performance, or her charisma. The woman is a machine. She is somewhere beyond sweaty human reality. Her force and energy seem superhuman. There isn't a lapse, a misstep, not even a glimpse of uncertainty.

Beyoncé is a workaholic. Just as she conquers one thing, she seeks out another and beats that into submission, too. Destiny's Child seems an age ago, after "Crazy in Love", Dreamgirls and her Sasha Fierce incarnation. She has sold over 75 million records, spent more weeks at number one than any other female artist this decade and earned nearly $90m last year, making her the highest-paid entertainer under 30. She has also launched the inevitable fashion line, House of Deréon. She sang for the Obamas; she visits hospitals and rehabilitation centres; she encourages her fans to bring groceries to her US concerts to help feed America. Beyoncé is fast becoming a saint, with the power to convince millions of her cause.

As if Beyoncé weren't enough on her own, she became one half of arguably the most powerful showbiz couple in the world when she married Jay-Z in April 2008.

Jay-Z is a rapper by trade, but by founding Roc-A-Fella Records, running Def Jam and then starting Roc Nation, he has become a vastly influential music industry boss, launching the careers of Ne-Yo and Rihanna along the way. He, too, has a fashion label, Rocawear; and he owns the New Jersey Nets basketball team and invests in smart New York hotels. Together, Beyoncé and Jay-Z preside over an expanding empire. But it's about more than wealth, or power. They have a steeliness about them. They do not make mistakes. There is a feeling that they have somehow gone beyond the foibles of being human to a place where perfection is effortlessly within their control.
Sophie Elmhirst

48. Jóhanna Sigurdardóttir

Ice queen

Has Iceland ever made more headlines than in the past year? Still reeling from the banking collapse of last October, the country has started on the road to recovery with one giant step for womankind. In February, Sigurdardóttir - Iceland's only minister to have gained in popularity in 2008 - became not only the country's first female prime minister, but the world's first openly gay leader. After losing a bid to lead the Social Democrats in 1994, Saint Jóhanna (as Sigurdardóttir has been nicknamed) declared: "My time will come." That time is now.

49. Patricia Woertz

Grain goddess

As CEO of Archer Daniels Midlands (ADM), one of the largest food processors in the US, Patricia Woertz's influence in corn, wheat and soybean production extends across the world. She has been the driving force behind the conglomerate's switch from food to bio-energy, pushing ADM's investment in corn ethanol production and profiting from heavy government subsidies designed to "help the American farmer". ADM brandishes the slogan "Resourceful by Nature", yet it still ranks as the tenth worst polluter in the US.

50. Dan Brown

Conspiracy theorist

Love or hate him, Dan Brown is one of the bestselling authors of all time. The Da Vinci Code, a thriller about a conspiracy to conceal the marriage and modern-day descendants of Jesus Christ and Mary Magdalene, has sold 80 million copies and been translated into 44 languages. Its success triggered a deluge of similar novels, guides to the theories, and books refuting its claims - not to mention a huge spike in tourism to the places it featured. His latest novel, The Lost Symbol, which focuses on freemasonry and the Founding Fathers, has smashed first-day sales records. Watch this space for a mass exodus of conspiracy tourists to Washington, DC.

This article first appeared in the 28 September 2009 issue of the New Statesman, The 50 people who matter

ALEXEI FATEEV/ALAMY
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The Catalan cauldron

The prospect of the break-up of Spain poses yet another challenge to Europe.

As Britain prepares to mark the centenary of the bloodiest battle in the First World War, the Somme, in July, Spain is bracing itself for an even more traumatic anniversary. In July 2016 it will be 80 years since the start of a civil war that tore the country apart and continues to divide it today. In the four decades since the return of democracy in the mid-1970s, Spaniards slowly inched towards rejecting the extreme violence of the Francoist right (and elements of the opposing left) as well as acceptance of various federal arrangements to accommodate the national sentiments of the Basques and Catalans, whose aspirations Franco had so brutally suppressed. In recent years, however, this consensus has been called fundamentally into question, with severe potential consequences not only for the unity of Spain, but the cohesion of the European Union.

On 27 October 2015, after the Catalan elections, the new parliament in Barcelona passed a declaration requesting the start of a formal secession process from Spain, to be in place in 18 months. The immediate reaction of Spain’s prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, was to announce that the state was entitled “to use any available judicial and political mechanism contained in the constitution and in the laws to defend the sovereignty of the Spanish people and of the general interest of Spain”. The preamble to the constitution proclaims the Spanish nation’s desire to “protect all Spaniards and the peoples of Spain in exercising their ­human rights, their cultures and traditions, languages and institutions”. Probably the most disputed articles are 2 and 8, which state, respectively, that “the constitution is based upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, common and indivisible patria of all Spaniards” and that “the army’s mission is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional set-up”. Rajoy’s implication was clear: the unity of the country would be maintained, if necessary by military means.

It was Madrid, however, that broke with the federal consensus some years ago and thus boosted secessionist sentiment in Catalonia. José María Aznar’s government (1996-2004) failed to respond to demands for greater autonomy for Catalonia, at a time when secession was not even mentioned. This led to an increasing awareness among Catalans that the federal transfer system within Spain left them with an annual deficit of 8 per cent of Catalonia’s GDP because of the financial arrangements established by the Spanish state, an issue aggravated by the effect of the global financial crisis. Catalan nationalism thus became a matter of not only the heart, but also the pocket. Even more important was the Spanish legal challenge to the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 2006 and its subsequent dilution, after it had been sanctioned by the Catalan parliament, and by both the Spanish congress of deputies and the senate, not to mention the Catalan people in a legally binding referendum.

According to the Spanish high court of justice, some of the statute’s content did not comply with the Spanish constitution. This outraged many Catalans, who could not understand how the newly approved statute – after following all the procedures and modifications requested by Spain’s political institutions and constitution – could still be challenged. Four years later, the Spanish high court finally delivered its verdict on 28 June 2010. It removed vital points from the Statute of Autonomy 2006 and declared them non-constitutional. All this led to a revival of Catalan nationalism, culminating in a symbolic, non-binding referendum in November 2014, which was boycotted by opponents and produced a majority of 80 per cent in favour of independence.

The roots of this antagonism go deep, to the civil war that broke out on 17-18 July 1936 when some sectors of the army rebelled against the legitimate government of the Second Republic. The rebels rejected democracy, the party system, separation between church and state, and the autonomy of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. Their primary objective was to re-establish “order” by eliminating all vestiges of communism and anarchism, then quite strong in some parts of Spain.

High on the list of General Franco’s targets was Catalan nationalism, which had been growing since the late 19th century. The industrialisation of Catalonia and the Basque Country left the most economically developed parts of the Spanish state politically subject to the less prosperous Castile. By the end of the 19th century and influenced by German Romanticism, la Renaixença – a movement for national and cultural renaissance – prompted demands for Catalan autonomy, first in the form of regionalism
and later in demands for a federal state.

Catalan nationalism did not emerge as a unified phenomenon. Diverse political ideologies and cultural influences gave rise to various types of nationalism, from the conservative nationalism of Jaime Balmes to the federalism of Francesc Pi i Margall, to the Catholic nationalism of Bishop Torres i Bages and the Catalan Marxism of Andreu Nin, among others. Catalonia enjoyed some autonomy under the administrative government of the Mancomunitat or “commonwealth” from 1913 onwards. This was halted by the 1923 coup d’état of the dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera. Autonomy was granted again during the Second Spanish Republic from 1931-39 – but abolished by Francisco Franco’s decree of 5 April 1938.

Franco’s victory led to the suppression of Catalan political institutions, the banning of the Catalan language and proscription of all the symbolic elements of Catalan identity, from the national flag (the Senyera) to the national anthem (“Els Segadors”). In February 1939, the institutions of the autonomous Generalitat went into exile in France. In 1940 the Gestapo arrested the president of the Generalitat, Lluís Companys, and handed him over to Spanish officials. He was interrogated and tortured in Madrid, then sent to Barcelona, where he was court-martialled and executed at Montjuïc Castle on 15 October 1940. The most important representatives of the democratic parties banned by the regime went into exile, or were imprisoned or executed. The authoritarian state designed by Franco crushed dissent and used brute power to suppress the historical nations included within its territory. The regime’s aim was to annihilate the Catalans and the Basques as nations.

***

After almost 40 years of Franco’s dictatorship, Catalonia recovered its government, the Generalitat, in 1977 – before the drafting of the Spanish constitution in 1978 – and sanctioned a new statute of autonomy in 1979. The 2006 statute was expected, at the time, to update and expand Catalans’ aspiration for further devolution within Spain: never secession.

At present, a renewed nostalgia and enthusiasm for Francoism can be found among some sections of the Spanish right. One of the main challenges of the newly democratic government from the mid-1970s onwards was to get rid of the symbols of Francoism that had divided Spaniards between “winners” and “losers” in the civil war. It was only in 2007 that the then prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, guided the Law of Historic Memory through parliament with the aim of removing hundreds of Fascist symbols reminiscent of the Franco era from public buildings. It also sought to make reparations to victims of the civil war and the ensuing dictatorship.

There still exist hundreds of other references to the Fascist regime, however, with streets, colleges and roads named after Franco and his generals. The most controversial of these is the Valle de los Caídos (“Valley of the Fallen”), near Madrid, commissioned by Franco as his final resting place. It supposedly honours the civil war dead, but is primarily a monument to the general and his regime, housing the graves of Franco and José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the founder of the fascist Falange political party. Roughly 450,000 people visit it every year, and while most of them are foreign tourists, groups of Falangists and supporters of the old regime who come to pay tribute to the dictator have frequented it. Nostalgics for Francoism, though still a small minority within modern Spain, are becoming vociferous. They find common ground with far-right-wing conservatism, particularly in their shared aversion to federalism.

On 3 August last year Artur Mas, the then president of Catalonia, called an extraordinary parliamentary election after all attempts to negotiate and agree on a legally binding referendum with the Spanish government failed. Supporters of independence immediately announced that the forthcoming Catalan elections would be regarded as a plebiscite on independence.

On a turnout of more than three-quarters of the electorate, supporters of outright independence gained 48 per cent of the vote, while those backing a unitary state secured 39 per cent. On 9 November 2015 the Catalan parliament formally declared the start of the process leading to building an independent Catalan state in the form of a republic. It also proclaimed the beginning of a participative, open, integrating and active citizens’ constituent process to lay the foundations for a future Catalan constitution. The Catalan government vowed to move forward with its secession process. Immediately, the Spanish Constitutional Court suspended the Catalan law setting out a path to independence and warned that defiance could lead to criminal charges.

Worse still for Madrid, secessionism is gaining strength not only in Catalonia but also in the Basque Country, whose premier, Iñigo Urkullu, demands a “legal consultation” on the northern region’s future in Spain. He supports a new statute for the Basque Country and defends its status as a nation in the EU. Similarly to Catalonia, the Basque Country has a distinct language and culture, and benefits from the so-called concierto económico, an advantageous financial deal with the Spanish state.

***

The Spanish government’s refusal to engage constructively with Catalan nationalism contrasts markedly with London’s more relaxed and ultimately more successful response to Scottish nationalist aspirations. The “Edinburgh Agreement” between the British Prime Minister and the then first minister of Scotland to allow a binding referendum on Scottish independence stands in sharp contrast to the Spanish government’s outright opposition to a similar vote in Catalonia. Basques and Catalans find deaf ears regarding further devolution and binding referendums on self-determination. This highlights the distance between various conceptions of democracy that coexist inside the European Union, rooted in the diverse political cultures of nations with varying historical backgrounds.

All this matters, not only to Spain but to the EU, because it is part of a broad trend across the continent. In mainland Europe, demands for self-determination are running strong in Flanders as well as parts of Spain. In turn, tensions between Italy and Austria over control of South Tyrol (Trentino Alto Adige, to the Italians) remain high, as do demands advanced by the South Tyrol­ean secessionist movement. Bavarian regionalism is critical of the present German (and European) political order. Further to that, modern Venetian nationalism and its long-standing demands for independence have prompted a renewal of Venetian as a language taught in schools and spoken by almost four million people.

Matters are now coming to a head. Catalonia and Spain are in flux following two inconclusive elections. In January, after a prolonged stand-off, the sitting Catalan president, Artur Mas, made way for a fellow nationalist, Carles Puigdemont. He was the first to take the oath of office without making the traditional oath of loyalty to the Spanish constitution and the king. Felipe VI, in turn, did not congratulate Puigdemont.

The new president has announced that he plans to draw up a constitution, to be voted on in a referendum “to constitute the Catalan Republic” at the end of an 18-month consultation process. Puigdemont’s strategy envisages not a dramatic unilateral declaration
of independence, but a more gradual process of disconnection in constant dialogue with the Spanish government and Catalan political parties. Let no one be deceived by this “softly-softly” approach: it is designed to culminate, in a year and a half, perhaps sooner, in a vote on establishing a separate, sovereign state of Catalonia.

Meanwhile, Spanish politics are in flux. The elections to the Cortes on 20 December 2015 resulted in a victory for Conservatism, but also the most fragmented Spanish parliament ever and, as yet, no government. Almost the only thing the Spanish parties can agree on is opposition to Catalan independence, yet even here there are divisions over whether more autonomy should be granted and what response to make to unilateral moves by the Catalans.

The stakes are high for both sides. By pressing too hard, too early, Catalan nationalists may provoke Madrid. This would be a mistake. Strategy is important and recent events in Catalonia will weaken the Catalans’ democratic, peaceful and legitimate desire to hold a referendum on independence. Likewise, a heavy-handed response from Madrid will not only destroy the residual bonds between centre and periphery in Spain, but put the central government in the dock internationally. A confrontation will also cut across the only possible solution to this and all other national conflicts within the eurozone, which is full continental political union. Full union would render the separation of Catalonia from Spain as irrelevant to the functioning of the EU, and the inhabitants of both areas, as the separation of West Virginia from Virginia proper in the United States today.

In a nightmare scenario, radicalisation and unrest could emerge in Catalonia, with division between Catalans and memories of the Spanish Civil War coming to the fore. In this context, it might become very difficult to prevent violence.

This is the last thing that Brussels wants to hear as it grapples with the euro crisis, Russian territorial revisionism, Islamist terror, the migrant question and the prospect of Brexit. A meltdown in Catalonia will create dilemmas for Europe, starting from problems with Schengen, and raise questions about continued membership of the EU. It will also work against Catalans’ expectations of receiving EU support in their quest for independence, as turmoil in Europe will prompt nation states to close ranks. The EU will not be expected to intervene, because this scenario would – at least initially – be defined as an “internal affair of Spain”. Conflict between Barcelona and Madrid would shatter one of Europe’s biggest member states.

In that event, the peninsula will become the hottest point in an emerging “arc of crisis” across the southern flank of the EU, stretching from Portugal across Spain, an Italy struggling along with everything else to cope with the flow of migrants, the troubled Balkans, to Greece, which is perpetually perturbed. This highlights yet another flaw in the EU. It has no institutional framework for dealing with Catalan demands to become a nation within the Union, or those of other populations. Merely insisting on Spanish state sovereignty will not make the problem go away for Brussels, or for Europe as a whole. This is a potential matter of life and death not only for Spaniards and Catalans, but perhaps for the EU itself.

Brendan Simms is the director of the Forum on Geopolitics at the University of Cambridge and president of the Project for Democratic Union Montserrat Guibernau is a visiting scholar in the Department of Politics and International Studies at Cambridge and a member of the Forum on Geopolitics

This article first appeared in the 21 April 2016 issue of the New Statesman, Shakespeare 400 years Iater