Live the world, don't tell the story

The games industry doesn't need to model itself on the film industry, argues Bill Thompson

Around the turn of the century, people were encouraged to explore a new medium, one based around a technology that could tell stories in a way that tapped directly into the viewer's emotions.

The medium was not videogames but cinema. Between the late 1880s and the start of the 20th century, motion pictures developed from an experimental technology into an established entertainment medium. There were thousands of kinetoscope parlours around the US and Europe and, after Robert Paul introduced the projector in 1895, large audiences for the short films of the day.

The early years of the film industry were as chaotic as any high technology start-up of today, as new inventions flooded on to the market and audiences grew. In the US, film-making became concentrated around southern California.

The Hollywood studio system emerged, offering Ford-like production lines for films with vertically integrated giants controlling every stage of the process, a model that survived for decades.

The big studios remain, but today the film industry in the west is far more fragmented, with star directors and actors holding the real power. It is not even clear that Hollywood is profitable: in Do Movies Make Money? insider Roger Smith calculates that the 2006 releases from Hollywood will lose $1.9bn over five years, once every source of income is added up.

There are some obvious parallels between the film industry and the relatively young videogames industry. Early games were commissioned by the companies that built arcade systems or written by hobbyists for the home computers of the eighties, just as early films were made by the inventors who developed cameras and projectors. As the technology matured, many small companies were started, and a period of consolidation in the 1980s and 1990s created Electronic Arts and the other giants we see today. Major players like Sony, Nintendo and Microsoft funded games development for their consoles, hoping to bring audiences to their next-generation platforms.

Independent control

Now there are signs that the studio model is breaking down - as it did with film. Big name designers like Peter Molyneux are attempting to control their own destiny just as film directors do, although they remain reliant on the big-name publishers to distribute their work, in the same way as independent film-makers need a distribution deal.

From the outside, games seem very similar to films and, indeed, the term "cinematic" is often used approvingly in reviews and discussion. Both are industrialised forms of entertainment, which rely on sophisticated technology to create a product and advanced capitalism to provide a market within which the product can be promoted, sold and consumed.

However, the superficial similarity disguises fundamental differences between the two forms of entertainment which may lead the games industry to diverge from the path taken by film.

Back in 2005, film director Steven Spielberg announced a working partnership with games company Electronic Arts to develop three games, including one for Nintendo's family-friendly Wii. The attendant promotion gave the film industry another chance to claim superiority over mere games developers, and Spielberg remarked: "I am a gamer myself and game development has always intrigued me."

It may have intrigued him, but the assumption that being a good film director automatically equips him to design and develop games is not one that many in the industry would support. Respected games developers like Shigeru Miyamoto, Peter Molyneux, Andy Schatz and Jenova Chen could reasonably argue that their skills in creating engaging and interactive environments are somewhat different from those needed to persuade a bunch of highly-paid actors to sit up and beg in front of the camera.

Commercial relationship

One reason for the confusion may be that the commercial relationship between films and games has been very lucrative, and there is much at stake in encouraging the belief that the overlap is meaningful. Film tie-ins are among the most-hyped titles each year, with Star Wars and Lord of the Rings leading the sale charts and Spider-Man, Harry Potter and The Simpsons all crowding out other games from the shelves.

But a game is not a story. It is a space for interaction and exploration, a space that may be dressed as a medieval world or a vast alien planet, occupied by human-like characters or small yellow blobs. Games require a very different form of engagement from film. Do nothing in the cinema and the story will continue without you. Press no buttons in a game and the action pauses, at least until a character turns up and kills you.

Self-direction

The digital technology that supports film is now very similar to that used for gaming, but the end results are very different. The emotion felt by the audience at the end of Annie Hall was put there by Woody Allan. The sense of achievement my son felt when he completed Halo 3 in hero mode came from inside him, facilitated by developers Bungie - but not created by them.

This difference has provoked a wide-ranging debate online, much of it spurred by a blog entry from RJ Layton, a student at the film school at the University of Southern California.

Studio-system parallels

In a provocative post titled "movies suck" this experienced gamer expressed his profound frustration with the view that "film is something that videogames should aspire to", telling games developers that "instead of trying to make a video game that accomplishes things that films do, why not make a video game that accomplishes things films were never able to?"

Game developers could model their industry on Hollywood, but we should not assume that there are any necessary parallels between the two or even that the games developers of tomorrow would want to find themselves in the same situation as today's struggling, undervalued and exploited independent film-makers. In the fragmented multimedia online world we are currently creating, the space for gaming may owe more to web development and virtual worlds than the old media style of the film industry.

Gaming and me

When I was younger I played Doom and Quake, years ago, on Network Systems but I was never a hardcore gamer. In the eighties, there was a game I liked - an adventure text-based game, called Unix.

About four years ago my son got an Xbox and he insisted I played on Halo with him.

What I want for Christmas...

If I were to get a game for Christmas, I would like a preview of Halo Wars, which is a multiplayer game due out next summer.

Bill Thompson is a technology critic and a trustee of the Cambridge Film Trust

This article first appeared in the 17 December 2007 issue of the New Statesman, Christmas and New Year special 2007

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Inside the minds of the Isis murderers

As pressure on the terror group who claimed responsiblity for the Manchester attack intensifies, the threat to Britain will only become more acute.

The police and security services had consistently warned that a significant terrorist attack in Britain was inevitable. Yet no warning could have prepared us for the horror of the suicide attack on the Manchester Arena on Monday night. Twenty-two people were killed and at least 60 were wounded as they were leaving a concert by Ariana Grande in what was the most deadly attack in Britain since the London bombings of 7 July 2005, in which 56 people died.

Like the London bombers, the Manchester suicide attacker, Salman Ramadan Abedi, was British. He was 22, lived in Manchester and studied business management at Salford University before dropping out. He worshipped at Didsbury Mosque. The son of Libyans, Abedi is said to have returned recently from a visit to the North African country, where Islamic State has a foothold.

Ariana Grande is a former children’s TV star who made her name on channels such as Nickelodeon. Her fan base is overwhelmingly young and female, and many of those killed or wounded were children, including Saffie Rose Roussos, an eight-year-old girl from Leyland, Lancashire.

Islamic State inevitably claimed responsibility for the massacre, dismissing the victims as “crusaders”, “polytheists” and “worshippers of the cross”. This is not the first time Islamist terrorists have targeted children.

A Chechen jihadist group calling itself ­Riyad-us Saliheen (meaning “Gardens of the Righteous”) took more than 1,100 hostages, including 777 children, in a school siege in Beslan, Russia, in September 2004. In the event, more than 330 were massacred, including 186 children. Gunmen from the Pakistani Taliban also stormed a school in 2014, killing 148.

For terrorist actors, these are neither whimsical nor irrational acts. Contemporary jihadist movements have curated a broad and expansive intellectual ecosystem that rationalises and directs their actions. What they want is to create an asymmetry of fear by employing indiscriminate barbarism to intimidate and subdue their opponents into submission.

We have grown accustomed to a wave of terrorist attacks being carried out in the name of the self-styled Islamic State ever since the group’s official spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani began prioritising them in 2014. (He was killed in an American air strike on Aleppo province in Syria in August last year.)

The US-led coalition against Islamic State has weakened the terror group in its former strongholds of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria. In response, IS has been forced to concentrate more on what it calls “external operations” – by which it means inspiring its sympathisers and operatives to carry out attacks on Western countries. Indeed, al-Adnani encouraged the group’s supporters not to migrate towards IS-held territory but rather to focus their efforts on attacks in their home countries.

“The tiniest action you do in the heart of their [Western] land is dearer to us than the biggest action by us,” he said in an audio statement released last year. “There are no innocents in the heart of the lands of the crusaders.”

Islamic State refers to its strategy as “just terror”. Its framing places culpability for attacks on Western states on these nations themselves by claiming that IS actions are a response to aggression or assault. That much has been outlined in the group’s literature. “When will the crusaders end their hostilities towards Islam and the Muslims? . . . When will they recognise that the solution to their pathetic turmoil is right before their blinded eyes?” the militants ask in the IS magazine Dabiq. “Until then, the just terror will continue to strike them to the core of their deadened hearts.”

IS offered a rationale of this sort as justification for its bombing of a Russian commercial aircraft – Metrojet Flight 9268, travelling from Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt to St Petersburg. That attack in October 2015 killed 224. Similar reasoning was offered for the attacks in Paris the following month in which 137 people were killed, in a series of co-ordinated, commando-style gun and bomb outrages across the city.

“Revenge was exacted upon those who felt safe,” IS declared in Dabiq. “Let the world know that we are living today in a new era. Whoever was heedless must now be alert. Whoever was sleeping must now awaken . . . The [caliphate] will take revenge for any aggression against its religion and people, sooner rather than later. Let the ­arrogant know that the skies and the lands are Allah’s.”

***

Through my academic research at King’s College London, I have ­interviewed scores of Westerners who became foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq to quiz them about their motives. Last year, one man from High Wycombe who had joined IS told me that it wanted to attack British targets in response to the vote in the House of Commons to extend British air strikes against IS targets to include sites in Syria (the British had only been targeting the group in Iraq until that point). “Do they [the British government] expect us to sit back and do nothing? ­Idiots,” he said.

In this respect, IS frames its attacks as acts of “revenge” and predicates its response on the Islamic principle of qisas, which is comparable to lex talionis or the doctrine of “an eye for an eye”. Qisas was always intended to be a tool of private redress for an individual or his/her family to seek justice in matters relating to bodily harm. Typically, it relates to cases of murder and manslaughter, or acts involving physical mutilation (say, leading to loss of limbs). The principle creates a framework for retributive justice.

The contemporary Salafi-jihadi movement has adopted a particularly innovative approach to the concept of qisas in two ways. First, groups such as IS have taken the idea and construed it in a way that justifies indiscriminate terrorism, such as the attack in Manchester. They argue that qisas has a political dimension and that it can be applied to international affairs in a way that holds civilians responsible for the perceived crimes of their governments.

Second, qisas is normally applied only in cases where the aggressor is known. IS, by contrast, holds every citizen-stranger of an enemy state responsible for the actions of his or her government. Thus, when it released its statement claiming responsibility for the Manchester attack, it said that it had struck against a “gathering of the crusaders . . . in response to their transgressions against the lands of the Muslims”.

It is this militaristic construction of qisas that allows IS to rationalise the bombing of a venue where large numbers of young girls had gathered to watch a pop concert, dismissing them as “crusaders”.

This is not new. In 1997, Osama Bin Laden told CBS News that “all Americans are our enemies, not just the ones who fight us directly, but also the ones who pay their ­taxes”. His rationale was that all Americans, by virtue of citizenship alone, are vicariously liable for the actions of their government.

Just a few years later, Bin Laden used the same idea to justify the 11 September 2001 attacks and also invoked it in reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “The blood pouring out of Palestine must be equally revenged,” he wrote. “You must know that the Palestinians do not cry alone; their women are not widowed alone; their sons are not orphaned alone.”

IS used the concept most dramatically in January 2015, when it burned alive a Royal Jordanian Air Force pilot, Muath al-Kasasbeh, whose plane had crashed in its territory. A video of the killing was circulated on the internet and social media. The group claimed his bombing raids had killed civilians and that it wanted to punish him with “equal retaliation”, in keeping with qisas.

What is well known about al-Kasasbeh’s murder is that he was burned alive inside a cage – but that is not the whole story. To understand how IS tethered this to the principle of qisas, it is the end of the gruesome video that is invested with most significance. After al-Kasasbeh has died, a truck emerges and dumps rubble over the cage. It was claimed this was debris from a site he had bombed, thus completing the “equal retaliation” of returning like for like. The idea was that IS had retaliated using the two principal forms in which a missile attack kills – by fire or debris.

***

The Manchester attack came on the fourth anniversary of the brutal murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in Woolwich, south London. Rigby was killed by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale in the middle of the afternoon on a street outside a military barracks. That attack was in keeping with a pattern we have become increasingly accustomed to in Europe: an unsophisticated plot that employs ordinary, everyday items – a car, say, or a knife.

The consequences of such attacks have been seen across Europe, most notably in Nice on 14 July 2016, when 86 people were killed during Bastille Day celebrations after a jihadist drove a truck into crowds on the promenade. Similar attacks followed in Berlin, Westminster and Stockholm.

The security services find that these murderous attacks are extremely hard to disrupt because they typically involve lone actors who can mobilise quickly and with discretion. The Manchester attack was different. Explosives were used, which means the plot was inherently more sophisticated, requiring careful planning and preparation.

We know that two of the 7/7 bombers had previously trained in Pakistan’s lawless tribal regions, where they honed their skills. In other plots, such as the connected attacks in London and Glasgow Airport of 2007, the explosive devices failed mainly because the bomb-makers had found it difficult to travel abroad and develop their skills in safe environments. Whatever Abedi’s connections, the long war in Syria and Iraq has once again created a permissive environment for terrorist training and attack planning.

The devastating impact of this has already been felt across Europe. Since the Syrian uprising began in 2011, more than 800 Britons are believed to have travelled there to fight. From Europe as a whole, the figure is over 5,000, of which a significant number are believed to have joined IS. Of the British contingent, the security services estimate that about half have returned or become disengaged from the conflict. Of those who remained, a hundred are believed to be active, the rest having been killed.

It is improbable that Abedi acted alone in Manchester or that this plot had no international component. Indeed, he was already known to the authorities (and had returned recently from Libya). As pressure on IS intensifies across Syria and Iraq, the threat to Britain will only become more acute as the group’s sympathisers prepare for what they consider to be a fightback.

This speaks to the scale of the threat facing Britain, and Europe more generally. Our police and security services have been stretched and continuously tested in recent years. Just recently, in March, the Metropolitan Police assistant commissioner Mark Rowley told Radio 4’s Today programme that 13 plots had been thwarted since Lee Rigby’s murder in 2013. Put another way, the police have disrupted terrorist plots every four months for the past four years.

Naturally, Islamic State is not the only threat. On 13 May, one of Osama Bin Laden’s sons, Hamza, released a video, titled “Advice for martyrdom-seekers in the West”, on behalf of al-Qaeda. Hamza, 27, who was his father’s favoured successor to lead the group, called on its supporters to concentrate on attacks in the West rather than migrating to conflict zones in the Middle East and beyond. Scenes of previous ­terrorist attacks in Britain played throughout the video.

The central leadership of al-Qaeda is increasingly looking for opportunities to reassert itself after being eclipsed by Islamic State and losing control of its affiliates in Syria. It needs attacks and a cause in the West with which to revive itself. Hamza therefore cited the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris as a critical example, calling for the assassination of anyone deemed to have “insulted” Islam.

The Charlie Hebdo attack was especially important for al-Qaeda because it enabled the group to transcend the fratricidal conflicts that frequently define relations between the various jihadist groups. In Syria, for instance, al-Qaeda’s affiliates (when it had better control over them) and Islamic State have been in open war with each other.

Yet, the Charlie Hebdo attack brought warm praise from the group’s Islamist rivals because none of them wanted to appear ­unsupportive of an atrocity that had, as the terrorists proclaimed, “avenged” the Prophet Muhammad’s honour.

The British man from High Wycombe who joined IS told me the group had welcomed the attack for precisely those reasons. It was something that, in his view, had confirmed the “nobility” of the attackers, even if they had not been members of IS.

Is it too late for the West to save itself, I asked him. What if the West simply accepted all of Islamic State’s demands: would that provide respite?

The answer was as emphatic as it was stark: “We primarily fight wars due to ppl [sic] being disbelievers. Their drones against us are a secondary issue.”

He went on: “Their kufr [disbelief] against Allah is sufficient of a reason for us to invade and kill them. Only if they stop their kufr will they no longer be a target.”

In other words, we are all guilty, and we are all legitimate targets.

Shiraz Maher is a contributing writer for the New Statesman and a senior research fellow at King’s College London’s International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation.

This article first appeared in the 25 May 2017 issue of the New Statesman, Why Islamic State targets Britain

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