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A thinker for our times

Global leaders are once again reminding themselves of the insights of the Cambridge academic who hel

John Maynard Keynes has been restored to life. Rusty Keynesian tools – larger budget deficits, tax cuts, accelerated spending programmes and other “economic stimuli” – have been brought back into use the world over to cut off the slide into depression. And they will do the job, if not next year, the year after. But the first Keynesian revolution was not about a rescue operation. Its purpose was to explain how shipwreck might occur; in short, to provide a theoretical basis for better navigation and for steering in seas that were bound to be choppy. Yet, even while the rescue operation is going on, we need to look critically at the economic theory that takes his name.

In his great work The General Theory of Employment, In terest and Money, written during the Great Depression of the 1930s, Keynes said of his ideas that they were "extremely simple, and should be obvious". Market economies were in herently volatile, owing to un certainty about future events being inescapable. Booms were liable to lead to catastrophic collapses followed by long periods of stagnation. Governments had a vital role to play in stabilising market economies. If they did not, the undoubted benefit of markets would be lost and political space would open up for extremists who would offer to solve economic problems by abolishing both markets and liberty. This, in a nutshell, was the Keynesian "political economy".

These ideas were a challenge to the dominant economic models of the day which held that, in the absence of noxious government interference, market economies were naturally stable at full employment. Trading in all markets would always take place at the "right" prices – prices that would "clear the market". This being so, booms and slumps, and prolonged unemployment, could not be generated by the market system itself. If they did happen, it was due to "external shocks". There were many attempts to explain the Great Depression of the 1930s along these lines – as a result of the dislocations of the First World War, of the growth of trade union power to prevent wages falling, and so on. But Keynes rightly regarded such explanations as self-serving. The Great Depression started in the United States, not in war-torn Europe, and in the most lightly regulated, most self-contained, and least unionised, market economy of the world. What were the "external shocks" that caused the Dow Jones Index to fall from 1,000 to 40 between 1929 and 1932, American output to drop by 20 per cent and unemployment to rise to 25 million?

He set out to save capitalism, a system he did not much admire, because he thought it the best hope for the future of civilisation

We can ask exactly the same question today as the world economy slides downwards. The present economic crisis has been generated by a banking system that had been extensively deregulated and in a flexible, largely non-unionised, economy. Indeed, the American capitalism of the past 15 years strongly resembles the capitalism of the 1920s in general character. To Keynes, it seemed obvious that large instabilities were inherent in market processes themselves.

 

John Maynard Keynes was a product of Cambridge civilisation at its most fertile. He was born in 1883 into an academic family, and his circle included not just the most famous philosophers of the day – G E Moore, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein – but also that exotic offshoot of Cambridge, the Bloomsbury Group, a commune of writers and painters with whom he formed his closest friendships. Keynes was caught up in the intellectual ferment and sexual awakening that marked the passage from Victorian to Edwardian England. At the same time, he had a highly practical bent: he was a supreme example of what Alasdair MacIntyre calls “the aesthete manager”, who partitions his life between the pleasures of the mind and the senses and the management of public affairs. After the First World War, Keynes set out to save a capitalist system he did not particularly admire. He did so because he thought it was the best guarantor of the possibility of civilisation. But he was always quite clear that the pursuit of wealth was a means, not an end. He did not much admire economics, either, hoping that some day economists would become as useful as dentists.

All of this made him, as his wife put it, "more than an economist". In fact, he was the most brilliant non-economist who ever applied himself to the study of economics. In this lay both his greatness and his vulnerability. He imposed himself on his profession by a series of profound insights into human behaviour which fitted the turbulence of his times. But these were never – could never be – properly integrated into the core of his discipline, which spewed them out as soon as it conveniently could. He died of heart failure in 1946, having worked himself to death in the service of his country.

The economic theory of Keynes's day, which precluded boom-bust sequences, seemed patently contrary to experience, yet its foundations were so deep-dug, its defences so secure, its reasoning so compelling, that it took Keynes three big books – including a two-volume Treatise on Money – to see how it might be cracked. His attempt to do so was the most heroic intellectual enterprise of the 20th century. It was nothing less than the attempt to overturn the dominant economic paradigm dating from Adam Smith and David Ricardo.

He finally said what he wanted to say in the preface to The General Theory: "A monetary economy, we shall find, is one in which changing views about the future are capable of in fluencing the quantity of employment and not merely its direction." In that pregnant sentence is the whole of the Keynesian revolution.

Keynes's understanding about how economies work was rooted in his theory of knowledge. The future was unknowable: so disaster was always possible. Keynes did not believe that the future was wholly unknowable. Not only can we calculate the probability of winning the Lottery, but we can forecast with tolerable accuracy the price movements of consumer goods over a short period. Yet we "simply do not know" what the price of oil will be in ten, or even five, years' time. Investments which promised returns "at a comparatively distant, and sometimes an indefinitely distant, date" were acts of faith, gambles on the unknown. And in that fact lay the possibility of huge mistakes.

Classical economists could not deny the possibility of unpredictable events. Inventions are by their nature unpredictable, especially as to timing, and many business cycle theorists saw them as generating boom-bust cycles. But mainstream economics, nevertheless, "abstracted" from such disturbances. The technique by which it did so is fascinatingly brought out in an argument about economic method between two 19th-century economists, which Keynes cited as a fork in the road. In 1817, Ricardo wrote to his friend Thomas Malthus: "It appears to me that one great cause of our differences . . . is that you have always in your mind the immediate and temporary effects of particular changes, whereas I put these immediate and temporary effects quite aside, and fix my whole attention on the permanent state of things which will result from them."

To this, Malthus replied: "I certainly am disposed to refer frequently to things as they are, as the only way of making one's writing practically useful to society . . . Besides I really do think that the progress of society consists of irregular movements, and that to omit the consideration of causes which for eight or ten years will give a great stimulus to production and population or a great check to them is to omit the causes of the wealth and poverty of nations . . ."

Keynes sided with Malthus. He regarded the timeless equilibrium method pioneered by Ricardo as the great wrong turning in economics. It was surely the Ricardo-Malthus exchange he had in mind when writing his best-known aphorism: "But this long run is a misleading guide to affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again."

Ricardo may have thought of the "long run" as the length of time it took storms to disperse. But under the influence of mathematics, economists abandoned the notion of time itself, and therefore of the distinction between the long run and the short run. By Keynes's time, "risks", as he put it, "were supposed to be capable of an exact actuarial computation". If all risks could be measured they could be known in advance. So the future could be reduced to the same epistemological status as the present. Prices would always reflect objective probabilities. This amounted to saying that unregulated market economies would generally be extremely stable. Only very clever people, equipped with adequate mathematics, could believe in anything quite so absurd. Under the influence of this theory, governments withdrew from active management and regulation of economic life: it was the age of laissez-faire.

Keynes commented: "The extraordinary achievement of the classical theory was to overcome the beliefs of the 'natural man' and, at the same time, to be wrong." It was wrong because it "attempts to apply highly precise and mathematical methods to material which is itself much too vague to support such treatment".

Keynes did not believe that "natural man" was irrational. The question he asked was: how do we, as rational investors, behave when we – unlike economists – know that the future is uncertain, or, in economist-speak, know that we are "informationally deprived"? His answer was that we adopt certain "conventions": we assume that the future will be more like the past than experience would justify, that existing opinion as expressed in current prices correctly sums up future prospects, and we copy what everyone else is doing. (As he once put it: "Bankers prefer to be ruined in a conventional way.") But any view of the future based on "so flimsy a foundation" is liable to "sudden and violent changes" when the news changes. "The practice of calmness and immobility, of certainty and security suddenly breaks down. New fears and hopes will, without warning, take charge of human conduct . . . the market will be subject to waves of optimistic and pessimistic sentiment, which are unreasoning yet in a sense legitimate where no solid basis exists for a reasonable calculation."

 

But what is rational for individuals is catastrophic for the economy. Subnormal activity is possible because, in times of crisis, money carries a liquidity premium. This increased "propensity to hoard" is decisive in preventing a quick enough fall in interest rates. The mainstream economics of Keynes's day viewed the interest rate (more accurately, the structure of interest rates) as the price that balances the overall supply of saving with the demand for investment. If the desire to save more went up, interest rates would automatically fall; if the desire to save fell, they would rise. This continual balancing act was what made the market economy self-adjusting. Keynes, on the other hand, saw the interest rate as the "premium" for parting with money. Pessimistic views of the future would raise the price for parting with money, even though the supply of saving was increasing and the demand for investment was falling. Keynes's "liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest" was the main reason he gave for his claim that market economies were not automatically self-correcting. Uncertainty was what ruined the classical scheme.

The same uncertainty made monetary policy a dubious agent of recovery. Even a "cheap money" policy by the central bank might not be enough to halt the slide into depression if the public's desire to hoard money was going up at the same time. Even if you provide the water, you can't force a horse to drink. This was Keynes's main argument for the use of fiscal policy to fight a depression. There is only one sure way to get an increase in spending in the face of falling confidence and that is for the government to spend the money itself.

This, in essence, was the Keynesian revolution. Keynesian economics dominated policymaking in the 25 years or so after the Second World War. The free-market ideologists gave this period such a bad press, that we forget how successful it was. Even slow-growing Britain chugged along at between 2 and 3 per cent per capita income growth from 1950-73 without serious interruptions, and the rest of the world, developed and developing, grew quite a bit faster. But an intellectual/ideological rebellion against Keynesian economics was gathering force. It finally got its chance to restore economics to its old tramlines with the rise of inflation from the late 1960s onwards – something which had less to do with Keynesian policy than with the Vietnam War. The truth was that "scientific" economics could not live with the idea of an unpredictable world. So, rather than admit that it could not be a "hard" science like physics, it set out to abolish uncertainty.

The "new" classical economists hit on a weak spot in Keynesian theory. The view that a large part of the future was unknowable seemed to leave out learning from experience or making efficient use of available information. Rational agents went on making the same mistakes. It seemed more reasonable to assume that recurrent events would initiate a learning process, causing agents to be less often surprised by events. This would make economies more stable.

The attack on Keynes's "uncertain" expectations developed from the 1960s onwards, from the "adaptive" expectations of Milton Friedman to the "rational" expectations of Robert Lucas and others. The development of Bayesian statistics and Bayesian decision-theory suggested that agents can always be modelled as having prior probability distributions over events – distributions that are updated by evidence.

 

Today, the idea of radical uncertainty, though ardently championed by “post-Keynesians” such as Paul Davidson, has little currency in mainstream economics; however, it is supported by financiers of an intellectual bent such as George Soros. As a result, uncertainty once more became “risk”, and risk can always be managed, measured, hedged and spread. This underlies the “efficient market hypothesis” – the idea that all share options can be correctly priced. Its acceptance explains the explosion of leveraged finance since the 1980s. The efficient market hypothesis has a further implication. If the market always prices financial assets correctly, the “real” economy – the one involved in the production of goods and non-financial services – will be as stable as the financial sector. Keynes’s idea that “changing views about the future are capable of influencing the quantity of employment” became a discarded heresy.

And yet the questions remain. Is the present crisis a once-in-a-lifetime event, against which it would be as absurd to guard as an earthquake, or is it an ever-present possibility? Do large "surprises" get instantly diffused through the price system or do their effects linger on like toxic waste, preventing full recovery? There are also questions about the present system that Keynes hardly considered. For instance: are some structures of the economy more conducive to macroeconomic stability than others?

This is the terrain of Karl Marx and the underconsump tionist theorists. There is a long tradition, recently revived, which argues that the more unequal the distribution of income, the more unstable an economy will be. Certainly globalisation has shifted GDP shares from wages to profits. In the underconsumptionist tradition, this leads to overinvestment. The explosion of debt finance can be interpreted as a way of postponing the "crisis of realisation".

Keynes did not have a complete answer to the problems we are facing once again. But, like all great thinkers, he leaves us with ideas which compel us to rethink our situation. In the long run, he deserves to ride again.

Lord Skidelsky is the author of "John Maynard Keynes" (three volumes), published in hardback by Macmillan

This article first appeared in the 22 December 2008 issue of the New Statesman, Christmas and New Year special

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The French millennials marching behind Marine Le Pen

A Front National rally attracts former socialists with manicured beards, and a lesbian couple. 

“In 85 days, Marine will be President of the French Republic!” The 150-strong crowd cheered at the sound of the words. On stage, the speaker, the vice-president of the far-right Front National (FN), Florian Philippot, continued: “We will be told that it’s the apocalypse, by the same banks, media, politicians, who were telling the British that Brexit would be an immediate catastrophe.

"Well, they voted, and it’s not! The British are much better off than we are!” The applause grew louder and louder. 

I was in the medieval city of Metz, in a municipal hall near the banks of the Moselle River, a tributary of the Rhine from which the region takes its name. The German border lies 49km east; Luxembourg City is less than an hour’s drive away. This is the "Country of the Three Borders", equidistant from Strasbourg and Frankfurt, and French, German and French again after various wars. Yet for all that local history is deeply rooted in the wider European history, votes for the Front National rank among the highest nationally, and continue to rise at every poll. 

In rural Moselle, “Marine”, as the Front National leader Marine Le Pen is known, has an envoy. In 2014, the well-spoken, elite-educated Philippot, 35, ran for mayor in Forbach, a former miner’s town near the border. He lost to the Socialist candidate but has visited regularly since. Enough for the locals to call him “Florian".

I grew up in a small town, Saint-Avold, halfway between Metz and Forbach. When my grandfather was working in the then-prosperous coal mines, the Moselle region attracted many foreign workers. Many of my fellow schoolmates bore Italian and Polish surnames. But the last mine closed in 2004, and now, some of the immigrants’ grandchildren are voting for the National Front.

Returning, I can't help but wonder: How did my generation, born with the Maastricht treaty, end up turning to the Eurosceptic, hard right FN?

“We’ve seen what the other political parties do – it’s always the same. We must try something else," said Candice Bertrand, 23, She might not be part of the group asking Philippot for selfies, but she had voted FN at every election, and her family agreed. “My mum was a Communist, then voted for [Nicolas] Sarkozy, and now she votes FN. She’s come a long way.”  The way, it seemed, was political distrust.

Minutes earlier, Philippot had pleaded with the audience to talk to their relatives and neighbours. Bertrand had brought her girlfriend, Lola, whom she was trying to convince to vote FN.  Lola wouldn’t give her surname – her strongly left-wing family would “certainly not” like to know she was there. She herself had never voted.

This infuriated Bertrand. “Women have fought for the right to vote!” she declared. Daily chats with Bertrand and her family had warmed up Lola to voting Le Pen in the first round, although not yet in the second. “I’m scared of a major change,” she confided, looking lost. “It’s a bit too extreme.” Both were too young to remember 2002, when a presidential victory for the then-Front National leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, was only a few percentage points away.

Since then, under the leadership of his daughter, Marine, the FN has broken every record. But in this region, the FN’s success isn’t new. In 2002, when liberal France was shocked to see Le Pen reach the second round of the presidential election, the FN was already sailing in Moselle. Le Pen grabbed 23.7 per cent of the Moselle vote in the first round and 21.9 per cent in the second, compared to 16.9 per cent and 17.8 per cent nationally. 

The far-right vote in Moselle remained higher than the national average before skyrocketing in 2012. By then, the younger, softer-looking Marine had taken over the party. In that year, the FN won an astonishing 24.7 per cent of the Moselle vote, and 17.8 per cent nationwide.

For some people of my generation, the FN has already provided opportunities. With his manicured beard and chic suit, Emilien Noé still looks like the Young Socialist he was between 16 and 18 years old. But looks can be deceiving. “I have been disgusted by the internal politics at the Socialist Party, the lack of respect for the low-ranked campaigners," he told me. So instead, he stood as the FN’s youngest national candidate to become mayor in his village, Gosselming, in 2014. “I entered directly into action," he said. (He lost). Now, at just 21, Noé is the FN’s youth coordinator for Eastern France.

Metz, Creative Commons licence credit Morgaine

Next to him stood Kevin Pfeiffer, 27. He told me he used to believe in the Socialist ideal, too - in 2007, as a 17-year-old, he backed Ségolène Royal against Sarkozy. But he is now a FN local councillor and acts as the party's general co-ordinator in the region. Both Noé and Pfeiffer radiated a quiet self-confidence, the sort that such swift rises induces. They shared a deep respect for the young-achiever-in-chief: Philippot. “We’re young and we know we can have perspectives in this party without being a graduate of l’ENA,” said another activist, Olivier Musci, 24. (The elite school Ecole Nationale d’Administration, or ENA, is considered something of a mandatory finishing school for politicians. It counts Francois Hollande and Jacques Chirac among its alumni. Ironically, Philippot is one, too.)

“Florian” likes to say that the FN scores the highest among the young. “Today’s youth have not grown up in a left-right divide”, he told me when I asked why. “The big topics, for them, were Maastricht, 9/11, the Chinese competition, and now Brexit. They have grown up in a political world structured around two poles: globalism versus patriotism.” Notably, half his speech was dedicated to ridiculing the FN's most probably rival, the maverick centrist Emmanuel Macron. “It is a time of the nations. Macron is the opposite of that," Philippot declared. 

At the rally, the blue, red and white flame, the FN’s historic logo, was nowhere to be seen. Even the words “Front National” had deserted the posters, which were instead plastered with “in the name of the people” slogans beneath Marine’s name and large smile. But everyone wears a blue rose at the buttonhole. “It’s the synthesis between the left’s rose and the right’s blue colour”, Pfeiffer said. “The symbol of the impossible becoming possible.” So, neither left nor right? I ask, echoing Macron’s campaign appeal. “Or both left and right”, Pfeiffer answered with a grin.

This nationwide rebranding follows years of efforts to polish the party’s jackass image, forged by decades of xenophobic, racist and anti-Semitic declarations by Le Pen Sr. His daughter evicted him from the party in 2015.

Still, Le Pen’s main pledges revolve around the same issue her father obsessed over - immigration. The resources spent on "dealing with migrants" will, Le Pen promises, be redirected to address the concerns of "the French people". Unemployment, which has been hovering at 10 per cent for years, is very much one of them. Moselle's damaged job market is a booster for the FN - between 10 and 12 per cent of young people are unemployed.

Yet the two phenomena cannot always rationally be linked. The female FN supporters I met candidly admitted they drove from France to Luxembourg every day for work and, like many locals, often went shopping in Germany. Yet they hoped to see the candidate of “Frexit” enter the Elysee palace in May. “We've never had problems to work in Luxembourg. Why would that change?” asked Bertrand. (Le Pen's “144 campaign pledges” promise frontier workers “special measures” to cross the border once out of the Schengen area, which sounds very much like the concept of the Schengen area itself.)

Grégoire Laloux, 21, studied history at the University of Metz. He didn't believe in the European Union. “Countries have their own interests. There are people, but no European people,” he said. “Marine is different because she defends patriotism, sovereignty, French greatness and French history.” He compared Le Pen to Richelieu, the cardinal who made Louis XIV's absolute monarchy possible:  “She, too, wants to build a modern state.”

French populists are quick to link the country's current problems to immigration, and these FN supporters were no exception. “With 7m poor and unemployed, we can't accept all the world's misery,” Olivier Musci, 24, a grandchild of Polish and Italian immigrants, told me. “Those we welcome must serve the country and be proud to be here.”

Lola echoed this call for more assimilation. “At our shopping centre, everyone speaks Arabic now," she said. "People have spat on us, thrown pebbles at us because we're lesbians. But I'm in my country and I have the right to do what I want.” When I asked if the people who attacked them were migrants, she was not so sure. “Let's say, they weren't white.”

Trump promised to “Make America Great Again”. To where would Le Pen's France return? Would it be sovereign again? White again? French again? Ruled by absolutism again? She has blurred enough lines to seduce voters her father never could – the young, the gay, the left-wingers. At the end of his speech, under the rebranded banners, Philippot invited the audience to sing La Marseillaise with him. And in one voice they did: “To arms citizens! Form your battalions! March, march, let impure blood, water our furrows...” The song is the same as the one I knew growing up. But it seemed to me, this time, a more sinister tune.