Why has Labour deserted Keynesian economics when the case has never been stronger?

The Coalition’s continued austerity drive maintains its stranglehold on British growth.

The Chancellor’s Comprehensive Spending Review surprised no one. Further cuts across the board, pay freezes for the public sector, more hoops for benefit claimants to jump through… and protection for elite sports and defence- Plan A all the way.

The Coalition’s continued austerity drive maintains its stranglehold on British growth, while their agenda of Hayekian reforms are less like rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic, and more like trying to cut wage costs by firing crew members as the waters rush in.

So how is plan A working out?

Fig 1: Source Econstats/IMF, 2013

Fig 2: Source: ONS: UK Public Sector Finances, Jun 2013 & OBR Economic & Fiscal Outlook, Mar 2013, Table 4.36 (pink=forecast)

Figure 1 shows how far the economy is operating below "potential growth"- the pace we would be growing at in normal times (neither boom nor bust). In the last 5 years, we have lost a compound GDP growth of almost 18 per cent. In current prices that equates to a shortfall of around £300bn - or almost three times the size of the current deficit, which incidentally - as can be seen in Figure 2 - is no longer falling.

And this is all against a backdrop of a labour market in tatters- chronically high joblessness (despite disingenuous statistics about private sector jobs), 20 per cent youth unemployment and what looks like a marked shift from cyclical to structural unemployment (temporary to long-term), as shown in the ONS’s latest report:

Fig 3: Source: ONS, Economic Review, June 2013

The figures above tell a story. The country’s resources- particularly labour- are unemployed, so our potential output is not realised, whilst individuals’ reduced spending power means less demand and less consumption - so the national income is lower. This causes an automatic reduction in tax receipts and an increase in social transfers which increase the deficit. And as growth stalls, the debt-to-GDP ratio is increased (via a smaller denominator), so the national debt looms ever larger.

Possibly the most shocking evidence of how bad things are can be shown by comparing our recent recovery to the recovery from the Great Depression of the 1930s:

Fig 4: Source: Eurostat, Maddison Project, 2013.

By this measure, the Great Depression doesn’t look so great, and we are deep in the worst economic crisis of the past century.

But since the very public bank bailouts and stimulus packages that followed the financial crash, policy makers the world over seem to have accepted that we are in a “new normal”. A crude reflection of this can be seen in the number of times the terms ‘crisis’, ‘recession’ and ‘new normal’ have been Google searched over the past few years.

Fig 5: Source: Google trends, accessed 2 July 2013

Why have crisis economics been abandoned in the middle of a crisis?

Instead, the economic discourse has defaulted back to the usual arguments between two dichotomised camps- call them what you want: Left-wing vs Right-wing, Socialists vs Free-marketeers, Aust(e)rians vs Keynesians, Nasty Party vs Scroungers, etc.

Some of the passengers on the Titanic might have thought that the ship would be faster and more efficient if it was not weighed down by the many third-class passengers, whose lowly ticket prices did not contribute as much to the vessel’s opulence. Equally, some may have felt that ticket prices should be lower, or that all passengers should have access to the ship’s offerings. But when she struck the iceberg, these quarrels were forgotten.

The longstanding question around the role of the state to intervene, distribute and employ is a fundamental one, but a state of crisis is not the time for fundamentalism.

Unfortunately, many on the right think that this is precisely the time for it. By dressing their long-held beliefs up as crisis-management tools, they can hold the country hostage “for the greater good”- the Tea Party’s obstinacy over taxation is one very public example of this, but it is just the tip of the iceberg…

The problem is, no right-wing economist has ever published a credible plan to recover from the kind of demand-driven shock we are facing, and recent attempts to contort their usual arguments for economic management into a path to recovery have been disastrous. Papers by Alesina & Ardagna, and Reinhart & Rogoff briefly showed that austerity could be expansionary and that government debt would hamper growth- before being thoroughly and publicly debunked.

But still we hear about the danger of inflation, the importance of encouraging job-creators by lowering top-rate taxes and the need to let austerity “do its work”, by shearing off the weak parts of the economy. These are not crisis management tools, they are the same arguments made by right-wing economists at all times!

But of course there is a custom-designed tool for our current situation.

Whilst their recoveries at year 5 may look different because of international policy choices, it remains the case that no economic crisis in history so perfectly mirrors our own as the Great Depression.

And written in response almost 80 years ago, Keynes’ General Theory clearly sets out the path for recovery in a world of low demand, private deleveraging and ineffective monetary policy: public borrowing to finance stimulus- if the private sector won’t create growth then the public sector must.

Fiscal policy is one of the most fundamental tools of government, and its use to rebalance the economy should not be thrown by the wayside because some people confuse it with a clandestine objective to impose socialism on the state.

With all this in mind, it was staggering to hear it announced that a Miliband Labour government would not borrow more to reverse Coalition spending cuts in 2015-16- in order to remain “credible”.

If the country has regained normal levels of growth by that stage, consolidation may be appropriate- but why explicitly rule out the use of one of the basic tools of government two years down the line?

If One Nation Labour aims to emulate its predecessors by courting Tory voters, abandoning the obvious case for fiscal stimulus is a new and irresponsible way of doing so.

Their change of course marks the retreat of the last bastions of Keynesianism from British politics: now we really are all in it together.

Meanwhile, the ship is still sinking…

Dom Boyle is a British economist.

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Hannan Fodder: This week, Daniel Hannan gets his excuses in early

I didn't do it. 

Since Daniel Hannan, a formerly obscure MEP, has emerged as the anointed intellectual of the Brexit elite, The Staggers is charting his ascendancy...

When I started this column, there were some nay-sayers talking Britain down by doubting that I was seriously going to write about Daniel Hannan every week. Surely no one could be that obsessed with the activities of one obscure MEP? And surely no politician could say enough ludicrous things to be worthy of such an obsession?

They were wrong, on both counts. Daniel and I are as one on this: Leave and Remain, working hand in glove to deliver on our shared national mission. There’s a lesson there for my fellow Remoaners, I’m sure.

Anyway. It’s week three, and just as I was worrying what I might write this week, Dan has ridden to the rescue by writing not one but two columns making the same argument – using, indeed, many of the exact same phrases (“not a club, but a protection racket”). Like all the most effective political campaigns, Dan has a message of the week.

First up, on Monday, there was this headline, in the conservative American journal, the Washington Examiner:

“Why Brexit should work out for everyone”

And yesterday, there was his column on Conservative Home:

“We will get a good deal – because rational self-interest will overcome the Eurocrats’ fury”

The message of the two columns is straightforward: cooler heads will prevail. Britain wants an amicable separation. The EU needs Britain’s military strength and budget contributions, and both sides want to keep the single market intact.

The Con Home piece makes the further argument that it’s only the Eurocrats who want to be hardline about this. National governments – who have to answer to actual electorates – will be more willing to negotiate.

And so, for all the bluster now, Theresa May and Donald Tusk will be skipping through a meadow, arm in arm, before the year is out.

Before we go any further, I have a confession: I found myself nodding along with some of this. Yes, of course it’s in nobody’s interests to create unnecessary enmity between Britain and the continent. Of course no one will want to crash the economy. Of course.

I’ve been told by friends on the centre-right that Hannan has a compelling, faintly hypnotic quality when he speaks and, in retrospect, this brief moment of finding myself half-agreeing with him scares the living shit out of me. So from this point on, I’d like everyone to keep an eye on me in case I start going weird, and to give me a sharp whack round the back of the head if you ever catch me starting a tweet with the word, “Friends-”.

Anyway. Shortly after reading things, reality began to dawn for me in a way it apparently hasn’t for Daniel Hannan, and I began cataloguing the ways in which his argument is stupid.

Problem number one: Remarkably for a man who’s been in the European Parliament for nearly two decades, he’s misunderstood the EU. He notes that “deeper integration can be more like a religious dogma than a political creed”, but entirely misses the reason for this. For many Europeans, especially those from countries which didn’t have as much fun in the Second World War as Britain did, the EU, for all its myriad flaws, is something to which they feel an emotional attachment: not their country, but not something entirely separate from it either.

Consequently, it’s neither a club, nor a “protection racket”: it’s more akin to a family. A rational and sensible Brexit will be difficult for the exact same reasons that so few divorcing couples rationally agree not to bother wasting money on lawyers: because the very act of leaving feels like a betrayal.

Or, to put it more concisely, courtesy of Buzzfeed’s Marie Le Conte:

Problem number two: even if everyone was to negotiate purely in terms of rational interest, our interests are not the same. The over-riding goal of German policy for decades has been to hold the EU together, even if that creates other problems. (Exhibit A: Greece.) So there’s at least a chance that the German leadership will genuinely see deterring more departures as more important than mutual prosperity or a good relationship with Britain.

And France, whose presidential candidates are lining up to give Britain a kicking, is mysteriously not mentioned anywhere in either of Daniel’s columns, presumably because doing so would undermine his argument.

So – the list of priorities Hannan describes may look rational from a British perspective. Unfortunately, though, the people on the other side of the negotiating table won’t have a British perspective.

Problem number three is this line from the Con Home piece:

“Might it truly be more interested in deterring states from leaving than in promoting the welfare of its peoples? If so, there surely can be no further doubt that we were right to opt out.”

If there any rhetorical technique more skin-crawlingly horrible, than, “Your response to my behaviour justifies my behaviour”?

I could go on, about how there’s no reason to think that Daniel’s relatively gentle vision of Brexit is shared by Nigel Farage, UKIP, or a significant number of those who voted Leave. Or about the polls which show that, far from the EU’s response to the referendum pushing more European nations towards the door, support for the union has actually spiked since the referendum – that Britain has become not a beacon of hope but a cautionary tale.

But I’m running out of words, and there’ll be other chances to explore such things. So instead I’m going to end on this:

Hannan’s argument – that only an irrational Europe would not deliver a good Brexit – is remarkably, parodically self-serving. It allows him to believe that, if Brexit goes horribly wrong, well, it must all be the fault of those inflexible Eurocrats, mustn’t it? It can’t possibly be because Brexit was a bad idea in the first place, or because liberal Leavers used nasty, populist ones to achieve their goals.

Read today, there are elements of Hannan’s columns that are compelling, even persuasive. From the perspective of 2020, I fear, they might simply read like one long explanation of why nothing that has happened since will have been his fault.

Jonn Elledge is the editor of the New Statesman's sister site CityMetric. He is on Twitter, far too much, as @JonnElledge.