Uncertainty in the BRICS

The nature of today's economy is uncertainty, and nowhere is that more true than in developing nations.

In the third of these linked blog posts, we return to the general theme of "The Great Uncertainty" to explore the consequences of the shift in the balance of economic power that many discern, broadly from ‘West’ to ‘East’. The issues, we suggest, are rather more complex and involved than we are typically led to believe in popular accounts couched in terms of ‘rising powers’ and the challenge of the BRICS economies.

So where to start? Well, what is clear to us is that there is indeed a shift taking place in the balance of global economic power. That, at least, we can agree on. There is no need, we feel, to fill this post with figures because the broad picture is pretty well established. Indeed, it is captured, after a fashion, in those speculative pieces that we have all read about exactly when China will overtake the US as the largest economy in the world (although this, too, is more complicated a calculation than is often recognised).

The essential point, though, is that the combination of longish periods of (very) fast economic growth in some countries with slow growth, stagnation and recession in others cannot but alter the respective weights of different countries (and by extension regions) within the global economy. It is from that core shift that all the other features that are so much discussed – different patterns of FDI, aid, trade, bond purchases and the like – emanate.

However, the analytical problem is that economic power does not translate easily or automatically into political power. Or, to put it a little differently in what has been a common theme of ours, economics is not political economy. Economic power can be measured statistically by reference to GDP, proportion of world trade, level and direction of financial flows, and so on. Political power cannot. It has instead to be pondered and probed.

What do we find when we do this? Let’s start with China. In a simple sense it is the most obvious candidate to replace the US as the hegemon of the global political economy. But, for all its fast and continuing economic growth, it is in fact beset by a host of problems generated by its particular experience of late industrialisation and single-party politics. These include: a core imbalance in its economy between investment and consumption, considerable ongoing financial instability, deep social inequalities and tensions, and the confusion about intentions inevitably generated by its opaque and increasingly corrupt state structure. And this is not even to mention the big, looming issue of being pressured to move at some point in a democratic direction.

The reality is that, for all the talk a while ago of an emerging "Beijing Consensus", China has yet to produce a style of capitalism that is globally attractive.

Let’s move on to think about India, Brazil and other ‘rising powers’. Here, once more, the political picture is much less sharply defined than the economic one. In global terms India still lives mostly within itself. It has a very strong historical sense of the uniqueness of its continental civilisation and seems content for the moment to deploy an assertively ‘Southern’ rhetoric amidst broad acquiescence in a US-centred world order.

Brazil is best seen politically as the major regional power of South America. Given its location and history, it is always alert to the possibility of overbearing behaviour by the US and is ready to be stroppy if necessary. But it has yet to set out a coherent and convincing account of the global role that it might like to play in the future.

We could at this point go further on down a list to discuss Russia, South Africa, Mexico, Indonesia, even Turkey. But we already know that we are referring here to countries that have a power and a presence in global politics, without yet constituting major players when it comes to shaping policy outcomes in the UN, the IMF, the WTO or any other global, as opposed to regional or ‘Southern’, institution.

In a very interesting recent article, the veteran Indian political scientist, Achin Vanaik, has argued that what is emerging is a ‘new pentarchy’, consisting of the US, the EU, Russia, China and India. Others don’t quite make the grade. In his view, such a pentarchy will not be formalised like the G8 and G20. Nor will it be a concert of equals or near-equals, but rather a hub-and-spokes arrangement with the US at the centre and the others at the circumference.

Vanaik advances this proposition on the basis of an attempt to integrate economic and political power into his thinking. All his five entities have sufficient demographic, economic and military weight to qualify, as it were, but only the US has the soft – or ideological – power to ‘project a social-political-cultural model that is potentially generalisable’. He asks tellingly: ‘How many states and their ruling and middle classes want to become more and more like Russia, China or India rather than like the USA?’ What about the EU in this context? It is dismissed in a single brutal phrase: ‘The EU by its very nature cannot be a single unified aspirational model’.

Now, this is but one recent piece of political analysis. It’s quite persuasive in its way, but things almost certainly won’t work out in quite the manner that Vanaik suggests, and that is really the key point. Political economy analysis is contentious stuff. We don’t ever stand on especially firm ground. We make judgements, and then see how events unfold, adjusting our thinking as we go. Economic power in the world is shifting, but we can’t be certain quite what that will mean politically over the next few years and that just reinforces the sense of the uncertainty of the times in which we live.

This is the third in a five-post series on the "Great Uncertainty".

Professors Colin Hay and Tony Payne are Directors of the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Sheffield.

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Air pollution: 5 steps to vanquishing an invisible killer

A new report looks at the economics of air pollution. 

110, 150, 520... These chilling statistics are the number of deaths attributable to particulate air pollution for the cities of Southampton, Nottingham and Birmingham in 2010 respectively. Or how about 40,000 - that is the total number of UK deaths per year that are attributable the combined effects of particulate matter (PM2.5) and Nitrogen Oxides (NOx).

This situation sucks, to say the very least. But while there are no dramatic images to stir up action, these deaths are preventable and we know their cause. Road traffic is the worst culprit. Traffic is responsible for 80 per cent of NOx on high pollution roads, with diesel engines contributing the bulk of the problem.

Now a new report by ResPublica has compiled a list of ways that city councils around the UK can help. The report argues that: “The onus is on cities to create plans that can meet the health and economic challenge within a short time-frame, and identify what they need from national government to do so.”

This is a diplomatic way of saying that current government action on the subject does not go far enough – and that cities must help prod them into gear. That includes poking holes in the government’s proposed plans for new “Clean Air Zones”.

Here are just five of the ways the report suggests letting the light in and the pollution out:

1. Clean up the draft Clean Air Zones framework

Last October, the government set out its draft plans for new Clean Air Zones in the UK’s five most polluted cities, Birmingham, Derby, Leeds, Nottingham and Southampton (excluding London - where other plans are afoot). These zones will charge “polluting” vehicles to enter and can be implemented with varying levels of intensity, with three options that include cars and one that does not.

But the report argues that there is still too much potential for polluters to play dirty with the rules. Car-charging zones must be mandatory for all cities that breach the current EU standards, the report argues (not just the suggested five). Otherwise national operators who own fleets of vehicles could simply relocate outdated buses or taxis to places where they don’t have to pay.  

Different vehicles should fall under the same rules, the report added. Otherwise, taking your car rather than the bus could suddenly seem like the cost-saving option.

2. Vouchers to vouch-safe the project’s success

The government is exploring a scrappage scheme for diesel cars, to help get the worst and oldest polluting vehicles off the road. But as the report points out, blanket scrappage could simply put a whole load of new fossil-fuel cars on the road.

Instead, ResPublica suggests using the revenue from the Clean Air Zone charges, plus hiked vehicle registration fees, to create “Pollution Reduction Vouchers”.

Low-income households with older cars, that would be liable to charging, could then use the vouchers to help secure alternative transport, buy a new and compliant car, or retrofit their existing vehicle with new technology.

3. Extend Vehicle Excise Duty

Vehicle Excise Duty is currently only tiered by how much CO2 pollution a car creates for the first year. After that it becomes a flat rate for all cars under £40,000. The report suggests changing this so that the most polluting vehicles for CO2, NOx and PM2.5 continue to pay higher rates throughout their life span.

For ClientEarth CEO James Thornton, changes to vehicle excise duty are key to moving people onto cleaner modes of transport: “We need a network of clean air zones to keep the most polluting diesel vehicles from the most polluted parts of our towns and cities and incentives such as a targeted scrappage scheme and changes to vehicle excise duty to move people onto cleaner modes of transport.”

4. Repurposed car parks

You would think city bosses would want less cars in the centre of town. But while less cars is good news for oxygen-breathers, it is bad news for city budgets reliant on parking charges. But using car parks to tap into new revenue from property development and joint ventures could help cities reverse this thinking.

5. Prioritise public awareness

Charge zones can be understandably unpopular. In 2008, a referendum in Manchester defeated the idea of congestion charging. So a big effort is needed to raise public awareness of the health crisis our roads have caused. Metro mayors should outline pollution plans in their manifestos, the report suggests. And cities can take advantage of their existing assets. For example in London there are plans to use electronics in the Underground to update travellers on the air pollution levels.

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Change is already in the air. Southampton has used money from the Local Sustainable Travel Fund to run a successful messaging campaign. And in 2011 Nottingham City Council became the first city to implement a Workplace Parking levy – a scheme which has raised £35.3m to help extend its tram system, upgrade the station and purchase electric buses.

But many more “air necessities” are needed before we can forget about pollution’s worry and its strife.  

 

India Bourke is an environment writer and editorial assistant at the New Statesman.