Renewable energy to save consumers between £25 and £100 billion

A new government report outlines the economic case for renewable energy, writes RenewableUK’s Gordon Edge.

An official report published today on the dangers of failing to invest in renewable energy represents a timely call for the Government to set clear long-term policies to boost the deployment of wind, wave and tidal power. The independent and highly authoritative study makes it clear that hard-pressed British consumers’ bills have shot up due to the UK’s dependence on imports of fossil fuels, and it therefore recommends measures to encourage investment in domestic low-carbon sources to bring the cost of electricity under control.

The official body which advises the Government on this issue, the Committee on Climate Change, says investing in low-carbon technologies between 2020 and 2030, such as wind and marine energy, will save UK consumers at least £25-£45bn over the lifetime of those projects, rising to £100bn if international gas prices continue to escalate.

The Committee says one of the best ways to stimulate investment in renewables is to set a carbon reduction target in the Energy Bill now going through Parliament, specifying a reduction to 10 per cent of 1990 levels by 2030 (from 500 grammes per kilowatt hour to 50g/kWh). MPs are due to vote on this issue in early June.

It also recommends that the Government should specify how much financial support will be available for low-carbon energy between now and 2030 – at present, the long-term vision for the power sector only goes as far as 2020. The report highlights the need to develop a specific strategy for the development of offshore wind, including ways to attract new sources of finance.

This thorough research by the most authoritative body in its field provides compelling evidence that investment in British renewables is cost-effective, whereas an unhealthy addiction to foreign fossil fuels is excruciatingly expensive, as well as being deeply irresponsible. RenewableUK’s own figures show that combined onshore and offshore wind are generating £2.5bn a year for the UK, and as such are one of the single biggest sources of investment into our economy – surely an opportunity we cannot afford to ignore. And with DECC’s own figures showing that 74 per cent of people are concerned about the UK’s reliance on imported fossil fuels, this is an issue the vast majority of the country is united on.

The Committee on Climate Change is also right to highlight the fact that the current lack of a long-term political vision is jeopardising investment in renewable energy projects – including the development of the supply chain which could create tens of thousands of jobs in wind and marine energy, with turbine factories opening around the UK.

Earlier this week the European Parliament voted in favour of setting a binding 2030 renewable energy target, to provide long-term clarity. The UK should be sending out similarly positive signals, so that we can maintain Britain’s global lead in the offshore wind, wave and tidal sectors, as well as maintaining our success in onshore wind which is the most cost effective way to generate large amounts of low carbon electricity to power our homes.

Photograph: CCC

Dr Gordon Edge is RenewableUK’s Director of Policy.

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Arsène Wenger: how can an intelligent manager preside over such a hollowed-out team?

The Arsenal manager faces a frustrating legacy.

Sport is obviously not all about winning, but it is about justified hope. That ­distinction has provided, until recently, a serious defence of Arsène Wenger’s Act II – the losing part. Arsenal haven’t won anything big for 13 years. But they have been close enough (and this is a personal view) to sustain the experience of investing emotionally in the story. Hope turning to disappointment is fine. It’s when the hope goes, that’s the problem.

Defeat takes many forms. In both 2010 and 2011, Arsenal lost over two legs to Barcelona in the Champions League. Yet these were rich and rewarding sporting experiences. In the two London fixtures of those ties, Arsenal drew 2-2 and won 2-1 against the most dazzling team in the world. Those nights reinvigorated my pride in sport. The Emirates Stadium had the best show in town. Defeat, when it arrived in Barcelona, was softened by gratitude. We’d been entertained, more than entertained.

Arsenal’s 5-1 surrender to Bayern Munich on 15 February was very different. In this capitulation by instalments, the fascination was macabre rather than dramatic. Having long given up on discerning signs of life, we began the post-mortem mid-match. As we pored over the entrails, the curiosity lay in the extent of the malady that had brought down the body. The same question, over and over: how could such an intelligent, deep-thinking manager preside over a hollowed-out team? How could failings so obvious to outsiders, the absence of steel and resilience, evade the judgement of the boss?

There is a saying in rugby union that forwards (the hard men) determine who wins, and the backs (the glamour boys) decide by how much. Here is a footballing equivalent: midfielders define matches, attacking players adorn them and defenders get the blame. Yet Arsenal’s players as good as vacated the midfield. It is hard to judge how well Bayern’s playmakers performed because they were operating in a vacuum; it looked like a morale-boosting training-ground drill, free from the annoying presence of opponents.

I have always been suspicious of the ­default English critique which posits that mentally fragile teams can be turned around by licensed on-field violence – a good kicking, basically. Sporting “character” takes many forms; physical assertiveness is only one dimension.

Still, it remains baffling, Wenger’s blind spot. He indulges artistry, especially the mercurial Mesut Özil, beyond the point where it serves the player. Yet he won’t protect the magicians by surrounding them with effective but down-to-earth talents. It has become a diet of collapsing soufflés.

What held back Wenger from buying the linchpin midfielder he has lacked for many years? Money is only part of the explanation. All added up, Arsenal do spend: their collective wage bill is the fourth-highest in the League. But Wenger has always been reluctant to lavish cash on a single star player, let alone a steely one. Rather two nice players than one great one.

The power of habit has become debilitating. Like a wealthy but conservative shopper who keeps going back to the same clothes shop, Wenger habituates the same strata of the transfer market. When he can’t get what he needs, he’s happy to come back home with something he’s already got, ­usually an elegant midfielder, tidy passer, gets bounced in big games, prone to going missing. Another button-down blue shirt for a drawer that is well stuffed.

It is almost universally accepted that, as a business, Arsenal are England’s leading club. Where their rivals rely on bailouts from oligarchs or highly leveraged debt, Arsenal took tough choices early and now appear financially secure – helped by their manager’s ability to engineer qualification for the Champions League every season while avoiding excessive transfer costs. Does that count for anything?

After the financial crisis, I had a revealing conversation with the owner of a private bank that had sailed through the turmoil. Being cautious and Swiss, he explained, he had always kept more capital reserves than the norm. As a result, the bank had made less money in boom years. “If I’d been a normal chief executive, I’d have been fired by the board,” he said. Instead, when the economic winds turned, he was much better placed than more bullish rivals. As a competitive strategy, his winning hand was only laid bare by the arrival of harder times.

In football, however, the crash never came. We all wrote that football’s insane spending couldn’t go on but the pace has only quickened. Even the Premier League’s bosses confessed to being surprised by the last extravagant round of television deals – the cash that eventually flows into the hands of managers and then the pockets of players and their agents.

By refusing to splash out on the players he needed, whatever the cost, Wenger was hedged for a downturn that never arrived.

What an irony it would be if football’s bust comes after he has departed. Imagine the scenario. The oligarchs move on, finding fresh ways of achieving fame, respectability and the protection achieved by entering the English establishment. The clubs loaded with debt are forced to cut their spending. Arsenal, benefiting from their solid business model, sail into an outright lead, mopping up star talent and trophies all round.

It’s often said that Wenger – early to invest in data analytics and worldwide scouts; a pioneer of player fitness and lifestyle – was overtaken by imitators. There is a second dimension to the question of time and circumstance. He helped to create and build Arsenal’s off-field robustness, even though football’s crazy economics haven’t yet proved its underlying value.

If the wind turns, Arsène Wenger may face a frustrating legacy: yesterday’s man and yet twice ahead of his time. 

Ed Smith is a journalist and author, most recently of Luck. He is a former professional cricketer and played for both Middlesex and England.

This article first appeared in the 24 February 2017 issue of the New Statesman, The world after Brexit