Osborne will score a financial own-goal tomorrow

The Chancellor, in turning down the chance to implement a Financial Transactions Tax, will cost the UK dearly.

A fiscal measure that could raise £8bn, boost GDP by 0.25 per cent, provide vital funds for job-creation, infrastructure projects and poverty reduction, calm excessive speculation and reduce the regularity of financial crashes would seem like a no-brainer for a Chancellor. Struggling to reduce the deficit and bring public finances under control, George Osborne is set to score an own goal by refusing to sign up for the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) which is rapidly becoming a reality in Europe.

Twelve European countries, including the big economies of Germany, France, Italy and Spain, have agreed to a small transaction tax of 0.1 per cent on equities and bonds and 0.01 per cent on derivatives. The initiative, which could generate €37bn per year, is expected to be given the green light by the European Parliament on 12 December.

The UK government’s reasons for rejecting the FTT are flawed on many counts. The Chancellor stubbornly clings to the argument that the FTT must be global to work. This ignores the fact that over 40 countries including some of the world’s leading financial centres and dynamic economies, have successfully implemented FTTs.

Hong Kong raises £1.7bn a year through taxes on derivative transactions while South Korea raises £3.8bn. Even Switzerland and the US have their own taxes on transactions which do not seem to have harmed their reputations as financial centres. Indeed, the UK’s very own stamp duty of 0.5 per cent on share transactions currently raises about £3bn a year for the Treasury; much of this tax (around 40 percent) is paid by people, including non-British, based abroad, who trade in UK shares.

Another myth often touted is that ordinary people and pensioners will end up paying the price. But the rate for the FTT is set so low precisely to avoid hitting longer term investments such as people’s pensions. On the contrary, a paper published this week shows that the FTT is an opportunity to help safeguard pensioners’ investments through reducing short-term speculative activity and encouraging pension funds to return to their traditional, less risky role as buy-and-hold investors - exactly the sort of cautious, long-term funds which experienced the most growth over the rocky 2008-2010 period.

Sparked by recent low interest rates, the increased turnover of assets amongst pension funds contributes to management costs of between two and 20 per cent. It is these high fees - reaped by intermediaries such as advisers, managers and brokers - that are having a major impact on pensioners’ returns.

The tax will also help improve market stability by reducing high-frequency trading including computer-driven trading in which shares are bought and sold hundreds of times a second. Virtually unheard of seven years ago, high frequency trading now accounts for up to 77 percent of all trading in UK equities.

Dictated by computers, too fast for humans to monitor, high frequency trading can create sudden crashes and wild fluctuations in stock prices that bear no relation to market fundamentals and serve little economic purpose. Applying a tiny tax every time a stock is traded will dramatically reduce the incentive to use computers at lightening speeds as the tax outweighs the wafer-thin profits. This will improve financial stability and help reduce the likelihood of future crises, which can lead to a higher level of GDP in the future.

If a levy of 0.1 per cent also makes other elements of City trading unprofitable, you have got to ask how valuable was that activity in the first place?

By triggering a shift away from short-term trading in favour of long-term holding the FTT will thus help reduce misalignments in markets and their subsequent abrupt adjustments or crashes, decreasing the likelihood of future crises. Indeed, countries with FTTs were amongst those least affected by the 2008 crash.

At a time when the UK government continues to struggle with the impact of a crisis that will according to the Bank of England, ultimately cost the UK at least £1.8trn and as much as £7.4trn in lost GDP, it seems reasonable to expect the financial sector, largely responsible for creating the crisis, not just to contribute to repair the damage but also to adopt measures to help reduce the likelihood of future crises.

To us and 50 other financiers who wrote to David Cameron and other European leaders in support of the tax, it is clear the FTT would help rein in markets, help kick-start national economies and provide money to help the world’s poorest countries. The FTT will shortly be a reality in Europe’s biggest economies. The UK cannot afford to ignore it.

Campaigners for a FTT protest in Westminster. Photograph: Getty Images

Jack Gray is currently an Adjunct Professor at the Paul Woolley Centre for Capital Market Dysfunctionality, University of Technology Sydney and an adviser to pension funds in Australia and overseas.

Professor Stephany Griffith-Jones is Financial Markets Director at the Initiative for Policy Dialogue, Columbia University.

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7 problems with the Snooper’s Charter, according to the experts

In short: it was written by people who "do not know how the internet works".

A group of representatives from the UK Internet Service Provider’s Association (ISPA) headed to the Home Office on Tuesday to point out a long list of problems they had with the proposed Investigatory Powers Bill (that’s Snooper’s Charter to you and me). Below are simplified summaries of their main points, taken from the written evidence submitted by Adrian Kennard, of Andrews and Arnold, a small ISP, to the department after the meeting. 

The crucial thing to note is that these people know what they're talking about - the run the providers which would need to completely change their practices to comply with the bill if it passed into law. And their objections aren't based on cost or fiddliness - they're about how unworkable many of the bill's stipulations actually are. 

1. The types of records the government wants collected aren’t that useful

The IP Bill places a lot of emphasis on “Internet Connection Records”; i.e. a list of domains you’ve visited, but not the specific pages visited or messages sent.

But in an age of apps and social media, where we view vast amounts of information through single domains like Twitter or Facebook, this information might not even help investigators much, as connections can last for days, or even months. Kennard gives the example of a missing girl, used as a hypothetical case by the security services to argue for greater powers:

 "If the mobile provider was even able to tell that she had used twitter at all (which is not as easy as it sounds), it would show that the phone had been connected to twitter 24 hours a day, and probably Facebook as well… this emotive example is seriously flawed”

And these connection records are only going to get less relevant over time - an increasing number of websites including Facebook and Google encrypt their website under "https", which would make finding the name of the website visited far more difficult.

2. …but they’re still a massive invasion of privacy

Even though these records may be useless when someone needs to be found or monitored, the retention of Internet Connection Records (IRCs) is still very invasive – and can actually yield more information than call records, which Theresa May has repeatedly claimed are the non-digital equivalent of ICRs. 

Kennard notes: “[These records] can be used to profile them and identify preferences, political views, sexual orientation, spending habits and much more. It is useful to criminals as it would easily confirm the bank used, and the time people leave the house, and so on”. 

This information might not help find a missing girl, but could build a profile of her which could be used by criminals, or for over-invasive state surveillance. 

3. "Internet Connection Records" aren’t actually a thing

The concept of a list of domain names visited by a user referred to in the bill is actually a new term, derived from “Call Data Record”. Compiling them is possible, but won't be an easy or automatic process.

Again, this strongly implies that those writing the bill are using their knowledge of telecommunications surveillance, not internet era-appropriate information. Kennard calls for the term to be removed, or at least its “vague and nondescript nature” made clear in the bill.

4. The surveillance won’t be consistent and could be easy to dodge

In its meeting with the ISPA, the Home Office implied that smaller Internet service providers won't be forced to collect these ICR records, as it would use up a lot of their resources. But this means those seeking to avoid surveillance could simply move over to a smaller provider.

5. Conservative spin is dictating the way we view the bill 

May and the Home Office are keen for us to see the surveillance in the bill as passive: internet service providers must simply log the domains we visit, which will be looked at in the event that we are the subject of an investigation. But as Kennard notes, “I am quite sure the same argument would not work if, for example, the law required a camera in every room in your house”. This is a vast new power the government is asking for – we shouldn’t allow it to play it down.

6. The bill would allow our devices to be bugged

Or, in the jargon, used in the draft bill, subjected to “equipment interference”. This could include surveillance of everything on a phone or laptop, or even turning on its camera or webcam to watch someone. The bill actually calls for “bulk equipment interference” – when surely, as Kennard notes, “this power…should only be targeted at the most serious of criminal suspects" at most.

7. The ability to bug devices would make them less secure

Devices can only be subject to “equipment interference” if they have existing vulnerabilities, which could also be exploited by criminals and hackers. If security services know about these vulnerabilities, they should tell the manufacturer about them. As Kennard writes, allowing equipment interference "encourages the intelligence services to keep vulnerabilities secret” so they don't lose surveillance methods. Meanwhile, though, they're laying the population open to hacks from cyber criminals. 


So there you have it  – a compelling soup of misused and made up terms, and ethically concerning new powers. Great stuff. 

Barbara Speed is a technology and digital culture writer at the New Statesman and a staff writer at CityMetric.