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Can social democracy rise to the challenge of the far right across Europe?

The rise of the populist radical right is an epiphenomenon of a profound crisis of the social-democratic left.

In the 2010 general election, my wife and I canvassed an elderly lady in the East Oxford constituency where we then lived. We broke the first rule that party canvassers are supposed to obey: instead of passing on to the next house as soon as we had ticked off the lady’s voting intentions on our clipboard, we stopped to talk. It was a disconcerting encounter – sad in many ways but also moving. The elderly lady hadn’t decided whom she would vote for; she may well not have voted in the end. But, in retrospect, her voting (or non-voting) behaviour seems to me beside the point. What mattered – and still matters – about her is that she was, in a profound sense, a lost soul. Her husband was dead; one of her sons was living in Australia; the other lived in the north of England and rarely saw her. Her neighbourhood had become alien. The shops on the other side of her road had once been kept by English people; now the shop-keepers were south Asians. I don’t think she was racially prejudiced. What upset her was that the social milieu in which she had grown up no longer existed, that she felt like a stranger in her own street. And conventional politics had nothing to say to her.

She was not alone. She was one exemplar of a pool of alienation, disaffection and distress which has become much wider and deeper in the past five years. (Gordon Brown’s 2010 encounter with a different ­elderly lady whom he traduced as “bigoted” was another.) The great achievement of Matthew Goodwin’s and Caitlin Milazzo’s path-breaking study is to show that pool as the sea in which Ukip swims. This doesn’t mean that all Ukip voters are nice, distressed and lonely old ladies. There are bigots, racists and what David Cameron once called “fruitcakes” among them. But to start from the premise that civilised, tolerant, educated and liberal-minded New Statesman readers now confront an army of lumpen barbarians with whom no conversation is possible is fatally to misunderstand the single most ominous feature of British politics and European politics in general.

In this year’s general election, Ukip’s share of the popular vote was nearly 10 percentage points higher than in 2010; by numbers of votes, it was the third-largest party in the United Kingdom. Viewers of the leaders’ TV debates rated Nigel Farage’s performance second only to Nicola Sturgeon’s. In mainland Europe, as Goodwin and Milazzo make clear, Ukip-style populist radical-right parties proliferate. Marine Le Pen’s Front National is the best organised and most successful, but there are many other examples: the Italian Northern League and Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement, Golden Dawn in Greece, the Danish People’s Party, Geert Wilders’s viciously Islamophobic Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, Jobbik in Hungary, the Freedom Party in Austria and Law and Justice in Poland, among others.

Almost by definition, these parties are nationally specific; they draw their strength from perceived threats to nationhood and to the myths, identities and traditions that make up national self-understandings. The Front National belongs to a French tradition that goes back to Vichy, to the anti-Dreyfusards at the start of the 20th century, to General Boulanger in the 1880s and even to Louis Napoléon, whose coup d’état in 1851 destroyed the Second French Republic. The Law and Justice party evokes an ancient, self-pitying, not to say paranoid, myth of Poland as the Christ among nations. With its anti-Semitism and nostalgia for the Third Reich, the Freedom Party harks back to some of the ugliest chapters in Austrian history. Jobbik’s strength in Hungary is reminiscent of Admiral Miklós Horthy’s fascist regime between the wars and his eventual alliance with Hitler. The Italian far right speaks to a mood that brought Mussolini to power in the 1920s.

Ukip’s rhetoric is a distinctly downmarket version of Sir Walter Scott’s “Patriotism”, of Lord Salisbury’s “splendid” isolationism, of Rupert Brooke’s belief that if he died in battle, some corner of a foreign field would be “for ever England” and of Shakespeare’s “precious stone set in the silver sea”.

Among other things, the rise of the populist radical right is an epiphenomenon of a profound crisis of the social-democratic left. Labour’s 2015 defeat fitted in to a pattern that extends right across Europe. The long Greek agony is the most striking case in point. PASOK, the nearest thing to a social-democratic party in that unfortunate country, accepted the austerity measures forced on Greece by its creditors and proceeded to implode, leaving a vacuum eventually filled by the originally far-left Syriza. “Pasokify” and “pasokification” have become terms of art in the discourse of the left. In France, François Hollande’s Parti Socialiste has haemorrhaged support to a life-threatening degree. It was thrashed both in last year’s European and in this year’s departmental elections. The PS is deeply split and has no discernible governing philosophy or vision for the future.

On the other side of the Rhine, the picture is almost as grim. At the start of this century, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) seemed securely in power, albeit in coalition with the Greens; in the most recent federal election, in 2013, they won only 26 per cent of the vote as against the Christian Democrats’ 41.5 per cent.

The right is also in power in Spain, despite an unemployment level of more than 20 per cent, albeit mitigated by an improving economic performance. The far-left Podemos, a Spanish equivalent of Syriza in Greece, is breathing down the necks of mainstream social democrats. Even in its Scandinavian redoubts, social democracy is in trouble. In the last Danish elections, the “blue” opposition bloc thrashed the “red” bloc led by the Social Democrats, and the social-democratic prime minister (Neil Kinnock’s daughter-in-law) stepped down. It’s the same story in Sweden. For more than 50 years from the early 1930s the Swedish Social Democrats’ vote share was invariably above 40 per cent. In the most recent general election, in 2014, it was down to 31 per cent. In a telling phrase, Goodwin and Milazzo suggest that Ukip owes its rise to its success in mobilising voters who have been “left behind”. There’s not much doubt that this is true of the populist radical right’s upsurge on the other side of the Channel as well.

But that is only the beginning of the story. Populist radical-right voters have indeed been left behind – by globalisation, by Europeanisation, by technological change, by the gales of creative destruction which have swept through the global economy, by the associated decay of settled communities and ways of life, by the rise of the super-rich and growth of inequality (most marked in the United Kingdom but visible everywhere) and, not least, by the professionalisation and remoteness of mainstream politics.

The last item in that catalogue is the most portentous. What might be called “governmental” social democracy – the social democracy of the British Labour Party, of PASOK, of the SPD in Germany, of the French Socialists and the Scandinavian social-democratic parties – has been professionalised at least as thoroughly as has the moderate centre right, and is at least as remote from its natural constituency.

The point of the preposterous Third Way, once expounded by Anthony Giddens and followed by Gerhard Schröder in Germany and Tony Blair in Britain, was to camouflage the betrayal of the left-behind by their ostensible defenders. In its glory years after the Second World War, governmental social democracy did more than any other political family to tame the harsh, inegalitarian, laissez-faire capitalism of the 19th and early 20th centuries – the capitalism that Ernest Bevin once deemed “red in tooth and claw” – in the name of solidarity and justice.

Unlike the communist parties of the era, social democrats did not attempt to abolish capitalism; they knew that any such attempt would end in tears as it had done in the Soviet Union. But they also knew that, although the capitalist market economy could be a good servant, it was a disastrous master. They were the chief architects of the reformed capitalism – the capitalism of welfare states, mixed economies and capacious public realms – that straddled the developed western world in the postwar period. Today’s governmental social democrats, by contrast, have not just acquiesced in capitalism’s return to the wild; they have connived in it. In doing so, they have spurned the left-behind.

Goodwin and Milazzo argue that economic factors, and even immigration and the spectre of a federal Europe, are only the proximate causes of Ukip’s surge. Behind these, they think, lies a much deeper, inarticulate, almost strangulated anxiety about identity. Ukip voters and potential voters feel that their identities and the traditions and structures that embody and transmit these identities are under threat: that the inherited integument of custom and habit that holds their society together is beginning to fragment. Goodwin and Milazzo do not quote Edmund Burke, but his vision of “the great primeval contract” that links the living to the dead and the unborn lurks between the lines of their analysis. On their showing, in other words, Ukip voters and potential voters are unconscious Burkeans; they sense, as he did, that a nation that turns its back on its past will imperil its future, that a people who forget the history that made them will cease to be a people.

All this poses a profound challenge to the social-democratic left. In times past, the labour movement was rooted in tradition. Memories of struggles – the mass protests that paved the way for the Great Reform Act 1832; the Great Dock Strike of 1889; the General Strike of 1926 and the miners’ sufferings during the lockout that followed – lived in the minds of later generations. Labour leaders as disparate as Keir Hardie, George Lansbury, Ernest Bevin, Aneurin Bevan and Neil Kinnock were acutely conscious of the histories that had shaped them. But those days have gone. Words such as “tradition”, “history” and “roots” have been banished from the social-democratic lexicon. A thin, glib, curiously mechanical presentism, in which the past is not just a foreign country but inconceivably distant, now pervades the discourse of the social-democratic centre left, as the robotic language of Jeremy Corbyn’s opponents in the Labour leadership election made clear.

One result is that suggestions that experience may suggest alternatives to the market fundamentalism of the past three decades are dismissed without examination. Another is that the left-behind have been virtually ignored. Ukip is their only champion. That its siren voices are delusive and dangerous does not weaken its appeal.

If the British social-democratic centre left continues on its present path it is doomed. Market fundamentalism will rule the roost, without an effective ideological or political challenge. The left-behind will sink even further behind. Inequality will go on rising, the state will continue to shrink, the public realm will suffer more depredations, marketisation will race ahead and the civic culture will continue to erode. The notion implicit in the stance of most of the Parliamentary Labour Party and shadow cabinet – that provided Labour does nothing to offend anyone, the swing of the pendulum will carry it to victory in the next election – is absurd. Pendulums don’t swing of their own accord. They have to be pushed. The pendulum failed to swing in 2015, and there is no reason to expect it to swing in 2020.

What is needed is a paradigm shift in the public culture, away from today’s historyless, rootless, cosmopolitan presentism and towards a rediscovery of the traditions that have made us who we are. The social-democratic centre left can’t do this all by ­itself. But it can make a start.

David Marquand’s books include Mammon’s Kingdom: an Essay on Britain, Now (Allen Lane)

UKIP: Inside the Campaign to Redraw the Map of British Politics by Matthew Goodwin and Caitlin Milazzo is published by Oxford University Press (464pp, £18.99)

This article first appeared in the 03 December 2015 issue of the New Statesman, Syria and the impossible war

Photo: NRK
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Skam, interrupted: why is the phenomenally popular teen drama ending before its peak?

The show has been building towards high school graduation – but now it’s ending before its lead characters finish school.

“Have you heard they started their bus already?”
“One month into high school – and they started their bus.”

This Skype conversation between Eva and Isak comes early in the first episode of Skam. The phenomenally internationally successful series follows teenagers at a high school in Oslo. The “bus” they're discussing is a key plot point and concern of the students' lives. That’s because, in Norway, graduating high school students participate in “russefeiring” – it’s a rite of passage into adulthood, a celebration of completing high school, and a farewell to friends departing for university or jobs around the country.

Students gather into groups, give their gang a name, wear matching coloured overalls, rent a big car or a van, and spend late April to mid May (17 May – Norwegian Constitution Day) continuously partying. They call it the “three week binge”. It’s a big fucking deal. 

Skam, with its focus on teens in high school, has therefore spent a lot of time thinking about “russ”. The show, which is set at the exact same time it airs, has followed its four main characters Eva, Noora, Isak and Sana (who each have a season of the show written from their perspective, a la Skins), as well as all their friends, from their first few weeks at school in September 2015. In other words, preparations take years, and we’ve heard a lot about the plans for their russ bus.

In season one, Eva has fallen out with her best friend, and is hurt when she hears she is moving on and has formed a new bus, with new friends, called Pepsi Max.

We meet one of the show’s most prominent characters, Vilde, when we see her trying to get a bus of girls together. The show’s five main girl characters, Eva, Noora, Vilde, Chris and Sana, become friends because of her efforts: they bond during their “bus meetings” and fundraising attempts. They flirt with a group of boys on a bus calling themselves “The Penetrators”.

The latest season follows Sana’s struggles to ensure the bus doesn’t fall apart, and an attempt to join buses with rivals Pepsi Max. The joyful climax of season four comes when they finally buy their own bus and stop social-climbing, naming themselves “Los Losers”. Bus drama is the glue that keeps the show together.

But now, in June 2017, a whole year before the characters graduate, Skam is ending. The architect of the girls’ bus, Vilde, has never had her own season, unlike most of her friends. Many assumed that Vilde would have had her own season during her final year at school. Fans insist the show’s creator Julie Andem planned nine seasons in total, yet Skam is ending after just four.

The news that Skam would stop after season four came during the announcement that Sana, a Muslim member of the “girl squad”, would be the next main character. The show’s intense fandom were delighted by the character choice, but devastated at the news that there would only be one more season. “I can’t accept that this is the last season,” one wrote on Reddit.

“I'm so shocked and sad. It’s honestly just...weird. It doesn’t make sense, and it’s not fair. It’s not fair that we’re not getting a Vilde season. Most importantly, it’s not fair that we’ll never get to see them on their russ, see them graduating, nothing. It seems like such an abrupt decision. It doesn’t serve the storyline at all.”

No one has given a concrete reason about why the show ended prematurely. Ina, who plays Chris, said in an interview that “we all need a break”.

Some fans went into denial, starting petitions to encourage Andem to continue with the show, while rumours abound suggesting it will return. 

Many speculated that the show simply became too popular to continue. “I think that the show would have had six seasons and a Vilde season if the show didn’t become popular outside of Scandinavia,” one wrote. “I think the pressure and the large amount of cringy fans (not saying that some Scandinavian fans aren’t cringy) has made making the show less enjoyable for the actors and creators.”

Andem has stayed mostly quiet on her reasons for ending the show, except for a statement made via her Instagram. She recalls how very early on, during a season one shoot, someone first asked her how long the show would last:

“We were standing in the schoolyard at Nissen High School, a small, low-budget production crew, one photographer, the sound engineer and me. ‘Who knows, but I think we should aim for world domination,’ I said. We all laughed, ‘cause I was obviously joking. None of us understood then how big Skam would turn out to be. This experience has been completely unreal, and a joy to be a part of.”

Skam has been a 24/7 job,” she continues. “We recently decided that we won’t be making a new season this fall. I know many of you out there will be upset and disappointed to hear this, but I’m confident this is the right decision.”

Many fans feel that season four has struggled under the burden of ending the show – and divisions and cracks have appeared in the fandom as a result.

Some feel that Sana’s season has been overshadowed by other characters and plotlines, something that is particularly frustrating for those who were keen to see greater Muslim representation in the show. Of a moment in season four involving Noora, the main character from season two, one fan account wrote, “I LOVE season tw- I mean four. That’s Noora’s season right? No wait, is it Willhell’s season??? What’s a Sana.”

Others feel that the subject of Islam hasn’t been tackled well in this season. Some viewers felt one scene, which sees Sana and her white, non-Muslim friend, Isak, discuss Islamophobia, was whitesplainy. 

One popular translation account, that provides a version of the show with English subtitles, wrote of the scene: “A lot of you guys have been disappointed by the latest clip and you’re not the only ones. We do want to finish this project for the fans but we are disappointed with how this season has gone.” They announced they would be translating less as a result.

The final week of the show has been light on Sana. Instead, each character who never received a full season has had a few minutes devoted to their perspective. These are the other girls from the girl squad, Vilde and Chris, and the boyfriends of each main character: Eva’s ex Jonas, Isak’s boyfriend Even, Eva’s current fling “Penetrator Chris” and Noora’s on-off boyfriend William.

It’s understandable to want to cover key perspectives in the show’s final week, but it can feel teasing – we get a short glimpse into characters' home lives, like Vilde struggling to care for her depressed mother, but the scene ends before we can really get into it. And, of course, it takes precious time away from Sana in the show’s final minutes.

Some were frustrated by the characters focused on. “Penetrator Chris” is a particularly minor character – one fan account wrote of his scene: “This is absolutely irrelevant. 1) It sidelines Sana 2) It asks more questions 3) It doesn’t answer shit. This isn’t even Sana’s season anymore and that’s absolutely disgusting. She didn’t even get closure or ten episodes or anything.

“Sana has been disrespected and disregarded and erased and sidelined and that is fucking gross. She deserved better. Yet here we are watching a Penetrator Chris clip. How ironic that it’s not even called just “Christopher” because that’s all he is. “Penetrator Chris”.

It’s been a dramatic close for a usually warm and tight-knit fan community. Of course, many fans are delighted with the final season: their only sadness is there won’t be more. One of the largest fan accounts tried to keep things positive. “I know people have mixed feelings about Skam and who deserves what in terms of screentime this season (etc),” they wrote, “which I totally understand.

"However, everything has already been filmed, so there is nothing we can do about it. I think this last week of Skam will be much more enjoyable for everyone if we focus on the positives in the clips ahead. Skam isn’t perfect. People are allowed to disagree. But let’s go into this week being grateful for everything Skam has given us.”

Some fans choose to look to what the future holds for the show – an American remake. It will keep the same characters and plotlines as the original, and Andem may be involved.

Few think it will be a patch on the current show, but some are excited to have the chance to watch it teasingly as a group regardless. It seems unlikely that the US remake will compare in terms of quality – not least because the original was so heavily researched and tied to Norwegian culture. But for fans struggling to let go of Skam, it can’t come soon enough.

Anna Leszkiewicz is a pop culture writer at the New Statesman.

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