The future of shale gas in the UK

The exponential growth in US shale gas production has been a boon for the country’s energy security over the past few years. Now the UK is looking to follow suit, with the government and big oil throwing their weight behind the dash for gas. But at what c

This morning David Cameron announced plans to give a greater share of tax revenues to those councils which support shale gas schemes. Under the proposed plans, local authorities would receive 100 per cent, as opposed to the usual 50, of business rates from shale gas projects, which could amount to up £1.7million extra per site for councils every year.

Over the weekend Total UK, one of the world’s largest oil companies, also announced that it would be investing in the UK’s shale gas industry, starting with the drilling of two exploratory wells in a project worth £30 million.

Such a vote of confidence in shale gas in this country is bound to encourage others to invest, but judging by the opposition from local communities witnessed so far, the industry still has a long way to go before it allays the fears surrounding the controversial fracking process used to extract the gas.

Ever since videos of flaming taps began appearing on YouTube in 2010, shale gas has been in the spotlight for its potential to contaminate groundwater and cause seismic disturbances. The mining industry has tried to respond to people’s fear by offering one per cent of revenues from shale projects to the local community. Responding to this morning’s announcement, the Local Government Association remained unimpressed:

Given the significant tax breaks being proposed to drive forward the development of shale gas and the impact drilling will have on local communities, these areas should not be short-changed by fracking schemes ... One percent of gross revenues distributed locally is not good enough; returns should be more in line with payments across the rest of the world and be set at 10 per cent.

This back and forth comes at a time when the UK is in need of fresh energy supplies to ward off the looming ‘energy gap’, in whatever form they might come. Without new electricity generation capacity, experts have been warning for several years that the UK is likely to suffer blackouts in the next decade as old power plants are taken offline and not replaced.

Emulating the successes of the US shale gas industry is clearly a sound means of warding off the energy gap, given the fantastic success achieved across the pond. In fact, 2012 saw 25.7 billion cubic feet of shale gas extracted per day in the US, making up a massive 39 per cent of its total natural gas production. Energy self-sufficiency, something thought impossible just a few years ago, could become a reality within the next two decades.

But you have to wonder what cost this renewed dependence of fossil fuels will have on the UK’s green commitments. David Cameron has already downsized funding for renewable energy in order to get household energy bills under control. By reducing the green levies that consumers have added to their bills, this vital source of support for the nascent renewable energy industries has been drastically cut.

To add insult to injury, several wind farm developers have recently cancelled or curtailed their plans for new offshore wind energy capacity in British waters, with RWE Npower Renwables announcing last week that its Triton Knoll project off the Lincolnshire coast will have its capacity almost halved, following news in November that it would also no longer develop the £5.4billion Atlantic Array project. This is compounded by the government’s recent decision to back several new nuclear power plants around the country, instead of investing in other green energy sources. New reactors will be built in Oldbury, Wylfa, Sizewell and Hinkley Point.

It seems that the path the government thinks best for achieving Britain’s energy security will be shale gas and nuclear, regardless of the concerns of local communities and of environmentalists.

Placards adorn the road alongside the campsite of anti-gas fracking activists next to The IGas Energy exploratorygas drilling site at Barton Moss. Photograph: Getty Images.

Mark Brierley is a group editor at Global Trade Media

Getty
Show Hide image

Brexit has opened up big rifts among the remaining EU countries

Other non-Euro countries will miss Britain's lobbying - and Germany and France won't be too keen to make up for our lost budget contributions.

Untangling 40 years of Britain at the core of the EU has been compared to putting scrambled eggs back into their shells. On the UK side, political, legal, economic, and, not least, administrative difficulties are piling up, ranging from the Great Repeal Bill to how to process lorries at customs. But what is less appreciated is that Brexit has opened some big rifts in the EU.

This is most visible in relations between euro and non-euro countries. The UK is the EU’s second biggest economy, and after its exit the combined GDP of the non-euro member states falls from 38% of the eurozone GDP to barely 16%, or 11% of EU’s total. Unsurprisingly then, non-euro countries in Eastern Europe are worried that future integration might focus exclusively on the "euro core", leaving others in a loose periphery. This is at the core of recent discussions about a multi-speed Europe.

Previously, Britain has been central to the balance between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, often leading opposition to centralising eurozone impulses. Most recently, this was demonstrated by David Cameron’s renegotiation, in which he secured provisional guarantees for non-euro countries. British concerns were also among the reasons why the design of the European Banking Union was calibrated with the interests of the ‘outs’ in mind. Finally, the UK insisted that the euro crisis must not detract from the development of the Single Market through initiatives such as the capital markets union. With Britain gone, this relationship becomes increasingly lop-sided.

Another context in which Brexit opens a can of worms is discussions over the EU budget. For 2015, the UK’s net contribution to the EU budget, after its rebate and EU investments, accounted for about 10% of the total. Filling in this gap will require either higher contributions by other major states or cutting the benefits of recipient states. In the former scenario, this means increasing German and French contributions by roughly 2.8 and 2 billion euros respectively. In the latter, it means lower payments to net beneficiaries of EU cohesion funds - a country like Bulgaria, for example, might take a hit of up to 0.8% of GDP.

Beyond the financial impact, Brexit poses awkward questions about the strategy for EU spending in the future. The Union’s budgets are planned over seven-year timeframes, with the next cycle due to begin in 2020. This means discussions about how to compensate for the hole left by Britain will coincide with the initial discussions on the future budget framework that will start in 2018. Once again, this is particularly worrying for those receiving EU funds, which are now likely to either be cut or made conditional on what are likely to be more political requirements.

Brexit also upends the delicate institutional balance within EU structures. A lot of the most important EU decisions are taken by qualified majority voting, even if in practice unanimity is sought most of the time. Since November 2014, this has meant the support of 55% of member states representing at least 65% of the population is required to pass decisions in the Council of the EU. Britain’s exit will destroy the blocking minority of a northern liberal German-led coalition of states, and increase the potential for blocking minorities of southern Mediterranean countries. There is also the question of what to do with the 73 British MEP mandates, which currently form almost 10% of all European Parliament seats.

Finally, there is the ‘small’ matter of foreign and defence policy. Perhaps here there are more grounds for continuity given the history of ‘outsourcing’ key decisions to NATO, whose membership remains unchanged. Furthermore, Theresa May appears to have realised that turning defence cooperation into a bargaining chip to attract Eastern European countries would backfire. Yet, with Britain gone, the EU is currently abuzz with discussions about greater military cooperation, particularly in procurement and research, suggesting that Brexit can also offer opportunities for the EU.

So, whether it is the balance between euro ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, multi-speed Europe, the EU budget, voting blocs or foreign policy, Brexit is forcing EU leaders into a load of discussions that many of them would rather avoid. This helps explain why there is clear regret among countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, at seeing such a key partner leave. It also explains why the EU has turned inwards to deal with the consequences of Brexit and why, although they need to be managed, the actual negotiations with London rank fairly low on the list of priorities in Brussels. British politicians, negotiators, and the general public would do well to take note of this.

Ivaylo Iaydjiev is a former adviser to the Bulgarian government. He is currently a DPhil student at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford

0800 7318496