Regulation: the West's new competitive disadvantage

Is it really the solution?

Regulation and more regulation have become the siren calls of governments and the general public across the Western world. The curtailment of banking freedoms and greater government oversight of the sector has been deemed by experts and laymen as the most effective way to prevent another financial crisis.

Whilst the banks were undoubtedly reckless in their pre-crisis activities, their behaviour did not occur in a vacuum and reflected the prevailing government and public sentiment of the time. Easy credit was a vote winner for both President Clinton in the US, where more African Americans were able to buy their own homes, and the Labour Party in Britain  who were buoyed by a property and credit boom in the traditionally poorer areas of the country. Governments were more than willing to tax banking profits and collect stamp duty revenue from house purchases and consumers were happy to spend money they didn’t have.

Despite efforts to hold the banks solely culpable for the financial crisis, governments across Europe have still fallen, swept away by disillusioned electorates. Against this backdrop, insufficient questions are being asked about the efficacy of the new regulation, its impact on trade and investment and the rebounding of the US and European economies. Far from being the salvation of Western capitalism, regulation may further accelerate the movement of the world’s economic centre of gravity eastward, a trend that increased in vigour during the economic crisis.

Whilst the US and the EU floundered under the burden of sovereign debt and banking failures, Asia rebounded from recession much more quickly thanks to its more robust banking system and debt dynamics. Cash-rich Asian banks seized the opportunity to ramp up their businesses and expand market share while Western banks retrenched.

In the wake of the financial crisis, growth has become the mantra of Asian markets whilst Western governments have adopted an ambitious programme of regulatory reform to address the fundamental weaknesses in the structure of financial regulation. The objective is to provide cohesion, consistency and coordination between countries and to ensure greater oversight of the financial sector and activities of private corporations. In the quest to achieve this noble objective little has been said about the impact tighter regulation will have on Western competitiveness.

The implications of this omission were quickly revealed when the panic associated with the global crisis dissipated and the emphasis on coordination and cohesion receded. While most regulatory changes are taking place under the auspices of the G20, significant differences are present between the EU, the US and Asia. The EU and to a lesser extent the US, are acting against a backdrop of fragility in the banking system and the sovereign debt markets, and are confronted with the unenviable task of solving the current problems whilst designing a regulatory system that will prevent future crises. All the while, the governments are facing increasing pressure from the public and large sections of the media to take action against the banking sector.

Europe’s reality stands in stark contrast to that of Asia. The region is booming and the focus is on the unimpeded development of the financial infrastructure rather than on crisis response. The debate centres on the benefits of a global approach to regulatory reform as opposed to the ability to retain local flexibility. Indeed there is a prime opportunity for the regional financial centres of Hong Kong and Shanghai to develop their own banking, brokerage and asset management sectors independently of the restrictive regulation of the West and to secure a competitive advantage in doing so. .

Capital adequacy and liquidity standards for banks are a key area to be targeted as a result of the crisis. Basel III, adopted in 2010, effectively triples the capital reserves for many banks to 7 per cent as compared with the 2 per cent required under Basel II. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) will also be tightened to ensure banks apply adequate capital to all their exposures, including those off balance sheet, to offset forecast cash outflows during a 30-day crisis. Such a system should prevent a future financial crisis from spreading beyond the financial sector into the real economy, thereby limiting the impact and making a crisis more containable.

The threat to Western competitiveness posed by Basel III derives from the fact that the accords will fail to create a truly global level playing field among international banks. They lack the binding force of a treaty and their adoption is likely to be limited to European banks. Basel III regulates the amount of lending that a bank can do - in conjunction with the central bank reserve requirements - and as a consequence also ends up partially regulating the money supply expansion for the entire economy. The impact on trading activity will be particularly severe because the application of the new leverage ratio to the trading book, with a 100% credit conversion factor for trade related business, will make trade and asset secured lending much more capital intensive. There is a real possibility of a significant drop in trade and a further reduction in the developed nations’ GDP, particularly in the Eurozone.

Laws and norms governing financial regulation generally reflect the ideological leanings of those at the highest levels of government. What is palpable at present is that the historically capitalist and entrepreneurial spirit of the UK and the US is being dampened by regulation and in reversal of its strong commitment to economic and financial liberalisation, the US has led efforts to nationalise its financial and some aspects of its manufacturing sectors, to an unprecedented degree. As many EU governments become increasingly left leaning, the efforts to restrict the operations of the financial sector intensify.

After the dominance of the West, we are moving towards a new economic paradigm characterised by competing ideologies and regulatory systems of governance. It is highly possible that different regions of the world will adopt contrasting regulatory systems, creating opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. While this may create a competitive disadvantage for sovereign states, investors who are not restricted by borders will be well placed to benefit from the investment opportunities increasingly divergent economies have to offer, with a greater scope for diversification and risk control. Over time, such diversification may reduce the high degree of correlation between stock markets in times of crisis and a more diverse regulatory world may be more resilient to shocks.

The creation of economic inefficiencies and limiting the optimal allocation of capital will impact Western markets more keenly than their rising Asian peers and it appears that the growth of Western economies will be stymied by regulatory restrictions.

Photograph: Getty Images

JLT Head of Credit & Political Risk Advisory

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Erdogan’s purge was too big and too organised to be a mere reaction to the failed coup

There is a specific word for the melancholy of Istanbul. The city is suffering a mighty bout of something like hüzün at the moment. 

Even at the worst of times Istanbul is a beautiful city, and the Bosphorus is a remarkable stretch of sea. Turks get very irritated if you call it a river. They are right. The Bosphorus has a life and energy that a river could never equal. Spend five minutes watching the Bosphorus and you can understand why Orhan Pamuk, Turkey’s Nobel laureate for literature, became fixated by it as he grew up, tracking the movements of the ocean-going vessels, the warships and the freighters as they steamed between Asia and Europe.

I went to an Ottoman palace on the Asian side of the Bosphorus, waiting to interview the former prime minister Ahmet Davu­toglu. He was pushed out of office two months ago by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan when he appeared to be too wedded to the clauses in the Turkish constitution which say that the prime minister is the head of government and the president is a ceremonial head of state. Erdogan was happy with that when he was prime minister. But now he’s president, he wants to change the constitution. If Erdogan can win the vote in parliament he will, in effect, be rubber-stamping the reality he has created since he became president. In the days since the attempted coup, no one has had any doubt about who is the power in the land.

 

City of melancholy

The view from the Ottoman palace was magnificent. Beneath a luscious, pine-shaded garden an oil tanker plied its way towards the Black Sea. Small ferries dodged across the sea lanes. It was not, I hasten to add, Davutoglu’s private residence. It had just been borrowed, for the backdrop. But it reminded a Turkish friend of something she had heard once from the AKP, Erdogan’s ruling party: that they would not rest until they were living in the apartments with balconies and gardens overlooking the Bosphorus that had always been the preserve of the secular elite they wanted to replace.

Pamuk also writes about hüzün, the melancholy that afflicts the citizens of Istanbul. It comes, he says, from the city’s history and its decline, the foghorns on the Bosphorus, from tumbledown walls that have been ruins since the fall of the Byzantine empire, unemployed men in tea houses, covered women waiting for buses that never come, pelting rain and dark evenings: the city’s whole fabric and all the lives within it. “My starting point,” Pamuk wrote, “was the emotion that a child might feel while looking through a steamy window.”

Istanbul is suffering a mighty bout of something like hüzün at the moment. In Pamuk’s work the citizens of Istanbul take a perverse pride in hüzün. No one in Istanbul, or elsewhere in Turkey, can draw comfort from what is happening now. Erdogan’s opponents wonder what kind of future they can have in his Turkey. I think I sensed it, too, in the triumphalist crowds of Erdogan supporters that have been gathering day after day since the coup was defeated.

 

Down with the generals

Erdogan’s opponents are not downcast because the coup failed; a big reason why it did was that it had no public support. Turks know way too much about the authoritarian ways of military rule to want it back. The melancholy is because Erdogan is using the coup to entrench himself even more deeply in power. The purge looks too far-reaching, too organised and too big to have been a quick reaction to the attempt on his power. Instead it seems to be a plan that was waiting to be used.

Turkey is a deeply unhappy country. It is hard to imagine now, but when the Arab uprisings happened in 2011 it seemed to be a model for the Middle East. It had elections and an economy that worked and grew. When I asked Davutoglu around that time whether there would be a new Ottoman sphere of influence for the 21st century, he smiled modestly, denied any such ambition and went on to explain that the 2011 uprisings were the true succession to the Ottoman empire. A century of European, and then American, domination was ending. It had been a false start in Middle Eastern history. Now it was back on track. The people of the region were deciding their futures, and perhaps Turkey would have a role, almost like a big brother.

Turkey’s position – straddling east and west, facing Europe and Asia – is the key to its history and its future. It could be, should be, a rock of stability in a desperately un­stable part of the world. But it isn’t, and that is a problem for all of us.

 

Contagion of war

The coup did not come out of a clear sky. Turkey was in deep crisis before the attempt was made. Part of the problem has come from Erdogan’s divisive policies. He has led the AKP to successive election victories since it first won in 2002. But the policies of his governments have not been inclusive. As long as his supporters are happy, the president seems unconcerned about the resentment and opposition he is generating on the other side of politics.

Perhaps that was inevitable. His mission, as a political Islamist, was to change the country, to end the power of secular elites, including the army, which had been dominant since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk created modern Turkey after the collapse of the Ottoman empire. And there is also the influence of chaos and war in the Middle East. Turkey has borders with Iraq and Syria, and is deeply involved in their wars. The borders do not stop the contagion of violence. Hundreds of people have died in the past year in bomb attacks in Turkish cities, some carried out by the jihadists of so-called Islamic State, and some sent by Kurdish separatists working under the PKK.

It is a horrible mix. Erdogan might be able to deal with it better if he had used the attempted coup to try to unite Turkey. All the parliamentary parties condemned it. But instead, he has turned the power of the state against his opponents. More rough times lie ahead.

Jeremy Bowen is the BBC’s Middle East editor. He tweets @bowenbbc

This article first appeared in the 28 July 2016 issue of the New Statesman, Summer Double Issue