Real wages down and unemployment stubbornly high, but could that be good news?

Unemployment's fall has stopped, but that could signal a recovery in productivity.

The ONS has released the latest labour market statistics, showing a 0.2 percentage point decline in the unemployment rate to 7.8 per cent in the last three months (2.51 million unemployed people, down by 57,000 people). The employment rate, however, was also down by 0.1 percentage points to 71.4 per cent over the same period (29.71 million employed people, up by 17,000 people).

Other headline stats show long term unemployment increasing by 15,000 to the highest level since 1996, youth unemployment decreasing by 0.2 percentage points to 20.9 per cent, and total pay increasing by 1.7 per cent, leading to a 1 per cent decrease in real wages.

As you can see from the first graph above, the quarter-on-quarter fall in unemployment is largely reversing the rise that was reported this spring. If you look at the month-on-month statistics, designated as "experimental" by the ONS due to their habit of fluctuating fairly wildly, we can see that unemployment was down by slightly over half a percentage point since April.

That's important, because it adds further support to the theory that the long-term improvement in the labour market has been replaced by stagnation. Economics reporters tend to focus on the fact that unemployment is down from a high of 8.4 per cent, even against a background of stagnant GDP. And indeed, for over a year, that decline was nearly constant. But the unemployment rate hit a low in December of last year, and since then it has been fluctuating in the high sevens.

That's bad news for Cameron and Osborne, because falling unemployment was frequently used as a fig leaf to cover the atrocious GDP growth. All the signs indicate that next week's GDP figures will be good, but they may not be good enough.

But it might paradoxically be good news for the country. The disconnect between employment and growth was due to productivity in Britain plummeting. In simple terms, a British worker doing an hour's work simply wasn't producing as much value after the recession as they were before. There's a lot of theories as to why, ranging from low morale and lazy workers to insipid investment and low demand, but regardless of why, they all point to the same conclusion: if GDP is to properly take off, productivity has to recover. The hope is that slowing decline in unemployment could be because the recovery is coming to productivity; and our catch-up growth might finally be around the corner.

Alex Hern is a technology reporter for the Guardian. He was formerly staff writer at the New Statesman. You should follow Alex on Twitter.

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Why Chris Grayling is Jeremy Corbyn's secret weapon

The housing crisis is Labour's best asset - and Chris Grayling is making it worse. 

It feels like the classic Conservative story: wait until the election is over, then cancel spending in areas that have the temerity to vote Labour. The electrification of rail routes from Cardiff to Swansea – scrapped. So too is the electrification of the Leeds to Manchester route – and of the Midland main line.

But Crossrail 2, which runs from north to south across London and deep into the capital's outer satellites, including that of Transport Secretary Chris Grayling, will go ahead as planned.

It would be grim but effective politics if the Conservatives were pouring money into the seats they won or lost narrowly. There are 25 seats that the Conservatives can take with a swing of 1 per cent from Labour to Tory, and 30 seats that they would lose with a swing of 1 per cent from Tory to Labour.

It wouldn’t be at all surprising if the Conservatives were making spending decisions with an eye on what you might call the frontline 55. But what they’re actually doing is taking money away from north-west marginal constituencies – and lavishing cash on increasingly Labour London. In doing that, they’re actually making their electoral headache worse.

How so? As I’ve written before, the biggest problem for the Conservatives in the long term is simply that not enough people are getting on the housing ladder. That is hurting them in two ways. The first is straightforward: economically-driven voters are not turning blue when they turn 30 because they are not either on or about to mount the first rungs of the housing ladder. More than half of 30-year-olds were mortgage-payers in 1992, when John Major won an unexpected Conservative majority, while under a third were in 2017, when Theresa May unexpectedly lost hers.

But it is also hurting them because culturally-driven voters are getting on the housing ladder, but by moving out of areas where Labour’s socially-concerned core vote congregates in great numbers, and into formerly safe or at least marginal Conservative seats. That effect has reached what might be its final, and for the Conservatives, deadly form in Brighton. All three of the Brighton constituencies – Hove, Brighton Kemptown and Brighton Pavilion – were Conservative-held in 1992. Now none of them are. In Pavilion they are third, and the smallest majority they have to overcome is 9,868, in Kemptown. The same effect helped reduce Amber Rudd’s majority in Hastings, also in East Sussex, to 346.

The bad news for the Conservatives is that the constituencies of Crawley, Reading, Swindon and in the longer-term, Bracknell, all look like Brightons in the making: although only Reading East fell to Labour this time, all saw swings bigger than the national average and all are seeing increasing migration by culturally-driven left-wing voters away from safe Labour seats. All are seeing what you might call “Hackneyfication”: commuters moving from inner city seats but taking their politics with them.

Add to that forced migration from inner London to seats like Iain Duncan Smith’s in Chingford – once a Conservative fortress, now a razor-thin marginal – and even before you add in the appeal of Jeremy Corbyn’s person and platform, the electoral picture for the Conservatives looks bleak.

(It should go without saying that voters are driven by both economics and culture. The binary I’ve used here is simplistic but helpful to understand the growing demographic pressures on the Conservatives.)

There is actually a solution here for the Tories. It’s both to build more housing but also to rebalance the British economy, because the housing crisis in London and the south is driven by the jobs and connectivity crisis in the rest of the United Kingdom.

Or, instead, they could have a number of measures designed to make London’s economy stride still further ahead of the rest, serviced by 5 per cent mortgages and growing numbers of commuter rail services to facilitate a growing volume of consumers from London’s satellite towns, all of which only increase the electoral pressures on their party. 

Stephen Bush is special correspondent at the New Statesman. His daily briefing, Morning Call, provides a quick and essential guide to domestic and global politics.