Unemployment up and inflation down in the eurozone

ECB rate cuts expected

The latest unemployment figures in the Eurozone are really, really bad. In fact, they are – again – the worst they've ever been:

That's an average unemployment rate of 12.1 per cent in the eurozone (and 10.9 per cent in the wider EU). But that high rate disguises enormous disparities: unemployment in Greece is 27.2 per cent; unemployment in Spain is 26.7 per cent; but in Austria, just 4.7 per cent of people looking for work can't find it, and in Germany it's only 5.4 per cent.

At the same time, inflation in the eurozone has been plummeting. In the latest quarterly data, the all-items index is estimated to have grown by just 1.2 per cent over the year – well below the 1.6 per cent which was predicted.

That offers a ray of hope for the continent. Unlike the (claimed) British plan of fiscal restraint and monetary activism, Europe has experienced crippling austerity without any major monetary policy designed to ease the burden. Typically, that reluctance is ascribed to the stereotypical German fear of inflation. Regardless of whether or not the blame truly lies at the feet of Germany – and whether the fear of inflation is just a hangover from the harrowing experience of hyperinflation in the 1920s, or something more concrete – the ECB is an exceptionally inflation-averse central bank.

All eyes will be on the bank later this week, then, as it announces whether or not it will be cutting rates for the first time in almost a year. It's bumping against the lower bound, since the bank already pays 0 per cent on overnight deposits; but the rate it charges for overnight loaning is still at 1.5 per cent. And its headline rate, which it charges to the majority of the banking system, is still at 0.75 per cent, leaving ample room for a cut.

Alex Hern is a technology reporter for the Guardian. He was formerly staff writer at the New Statesman. You should follow Alex on Twitter.

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Forget planning for no deal. The government isn't really planning for Brexit at all

The British government is simply not in a position to handle life after the EU.

No deal is better than a bad deal? That phrase has essentially vanished from Theresa May’s lips since the loss of her parliamentary majority in June, but it lives on in the minds of her boosters in the commentariat and the most committed parts of the Brexit press. In fact, they have a new meme: criticising the civil service and ministers who backed a Remain vote for “not preparing” for a no deal Brexit.

Leaving without a deal would mean, among other things, dropping out of the Open Skies agreement which allows British aeroplanes to fly to the United States and European Union. It would lead very quickly to food shortages and also mean that radioactive isotopes, used among other things for cancer treatment, wouldn’t be able to cross into the UK anymore. “Planning for no deal” actually means “making a deal”.  (Where the Brexit elite may have a point is that the consequences of no deal are sufficiently disruptive on both sides that the British government shouldn’t  worry too much about the two-year time frame set out in Article 50, as both sides have too big an incentive to always agree to extra time. I don’t think this is likely for political reasons but there is a good economic case for it.)

For the most part, you can’t really plan for no deal. There are however some things the government could prepare for. They could, for instance, start hiring additional staff for customs checks and investing in a bigger IT system to be able to handle the increased volume of work that would need to take place at the British border. It would need to begin issuing compulsory purchases to build new customs posts at ports, particularly along the 300-mile stretch of the Irish border – where Northern Ireland, outside the European Union, would immediately have a hard border with the Republic of Ireland, which would remain inside the bloc. But as Newsnight’s Christopher Cook details, the government is doing none of these things.

Now, in a way, you might say that this is a good decision on the government’s part. Frankly, these measures would only be about as useful as doing your seatbelt up before driving off the Grand Canyon. Buying up land and properties along the Irish border has the potential to cause political headaches that neither the British nor Irish governments need. However, as Cook notes, much of the government’s negotiating strategy seems to be based around convincing the EU27 that the United Kingdom might actually walk away without a deal, so not making even these inadequate plans makes a mockery of their own strategy. 

But the frothing about preparing for “no deal” ignores a far bigger problem: the government isn’t really preparing for any deal, and certainly not the one envisaged in May’s Lancaster House speech, where she set out the terms of Britain’s Brexit negotiations, or in her letter to the EU27 triggering Article 50. Just to reiterate: the government’s proposal is that the United Kingdom will leave both the single market and the customs union. Its regulations will no longer be set or enforced by the European Court of Justice or related bodies.

That means that, when Britain leaves the EU, it will need, at a minimum: to beef up the number of staff, the quality of its computer systems and the amount of physical space given over to customs checks and other assorted border work. It will need to hire its own food and standards inspectors to travel the globe checking the quality of products exported to the United Kingdom. It will need to increase the size of its own regulatory bodies.

The Foreign Office is doing some good and important work on preparing Britain’s re-entry into the World Trade Organisation as a nation with its own set of tariffs. But across the government, the level of preparation is simply not where it should be.

And all that’s assuming that May gets exactly what she wants. It’s not that the government isn’t preparing for no deal, or isn’t preparing for a bad deal. It can’t even be said to be preparing for what it believes is a great deal. 

Stephen Bush is special correspondent at the New Statesman. His daily briefing, Morning Call, provides a quick and essential guide to domestic and global politics.