"Authorities... misread the real cause of the crisis": former Greek finance minister

Yannos Papantoniou on the Eurozone crisis.

The Cyprus bailout deal is a watershed in the unfolding eurozone crisis, because responsibility for resolving banks’ problems has been shifted from taxpayers to private investors and depositors. But imposing major losses on Cypriot banks’ depositors violates the deposit-insurance guarantee that forms part of the proposed European banking union, while the imposition of capital controls further erodes the monetary union’s foundations. So, is Europe chasing its tail?

Germany and the other countries of the eurozone core are signalling that debt mutualisation within the monetary union is out of the question, and that bailouts of countries or financial institutions will be balanced by “bail-ins” of their creditors. Increased uncertainty concerning the safety of deposits will push up interest rates and deepen Europe’s recession, and may also trigger capital outflows from the eurozone’s weaker peripheral economies to the core.
 

The implications of this shift may be far-reaching. The German model for resolving the debt crisis and returning to internal or external balance relies on fiscal consolidation and structural reforms for the deficit countries. But, if all countries simultaneously attempt to improve their fiscal or external balances by cutting spending and raising taxes, all will fail, because each country’s austerity implies less demand for other countries’ output, in turn perpetuating both domestic and external imbalances. “Bailing in” creditors will exacerbate these trends.

Moreover, a deep and prolonged recession implies vanishing support for reforms, as governments fail to convince citizens that current sacrifice will ensure a better future. Privatization, market liberalization, the opening of closed professions, and government downsizing involve conflicts with powerful vested interests, such as businesses in protected industries, public-sector unions, or influential lobbies. Resolving such conflicts requires social alliances, which are invariably undermined by discontent, civil disorder, and political instability.

The recent Italian election has shown how toxic the association of austerity policies with the pursuit of reform has become. Anti-austerity anger swept away the reform agenda of Mario Monti’s previous technocratic government, leaving Italy, its future uncertain, to continue muddling through. The same scenario seems to be emerging in Greece, where the depth of the austerity-induced recession, with output down by 25 per cent over five years and unemployment at 27 per cent, is paralyzing a reform-minded center-right government.

The gaps in the strategy are clear. First, the eurozone authorities misread the real causes of the debt crisis, which stemmed mainly from a growing competitiveness gap between the core and periphery countries. The resulting private-sector imbalances culminated in banking problems that were eventually transferred to sovereigns. Greece’s fiscal profligacy was the exception rather than the rule.

Indeed, in contrast to the United States, eurozone authorities were slow to consolidate the banking system after the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, and failed to sever the ties between sovereigns’ and banks’ balance sheets. Nor did they push strongly for structural reforms. Instead, they emphasized harsh austerity, which was to be pursued everywhere.

Second, the effects of austerity were exacerbated by the choice to pursue nominal, rather than structural, fiscal-deficit targets. Countries with a stronger fiscal position (that is, smaller structural deficits) should be encouraged to adopt more expansionary policies in order to contribute to lifting overall demand. Moreover, the European Investment Bank’s lending capacity could be increased substantially, and European Union structural funds mobilized, to finance investment projects in the peripheral economies.

Third, the European Central Bank’s announcement last August of its “outright monetary transactions” program – through which it guarantees eurozone members’ sovereign debt, subject to policy conditionality – has contributed significantly to subduing financial turbulence in the eurozone. But the OMT scheme has not been reinforced by a reduction in key interest rates, which would boost inflation in core countries with external surpluses and thus help to close the competitiveness gap with the periphery. Crucially, monetary-policy measures do not address the underlying problem of lack of demand.

Last, but not least, the eurozone authorities misread the confidence factor. In theory, simultaneous fiscal consolidation and supply-side reform facilitates economic recovery, because it increases confidence among consumers and investors, thereby inducing higher spending and production. But this does not necessarily work in an imperfectly functioning monetary union, such as the eurozone, where the continual appearance of systemic flaws erodes confidence; in such circumstances, the result may be hoarding and capital outflows, rather than increased spending.

The rest of this article can be read on economia.

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Will Jeremy Corbyn stand down if Labour loses the general election?

Defeat at the polls might not be the end of Corbyn’s leadership.

The latest polls suggest that Labour is headed for heavy defeat in the June general election. Usually a general election loss would be the trigger for a leader to quit: Michael Foot, Gordon Brown and Ed Miliband all stood down after their first defeat, although Neil Kinnock saw out two losses before resigning in 1992.

It’s possible, if unlikely, that Corbyn could become prime minister. If that prospect doesn’t materialise, however, the question is: will Corbyn follow the majority of his predecessors and resign, or will he hang on in office?

Will Corbyn stand down? The rules

There is no formal process for the parliamentary Labour party to oust its leader, as it discovered in the 2016 leadership challenge. Even after a majority of his MPs had voted no confidence in him, Corbyn stayed on, ultimately winning his second leadership contest after it was decided that the current leader should be automatically included on the ballot.

This year’s conference will vote on to reform the leadership selection process that would make it easier for a left-wing candidate to get on the ballot (nicknamed the “McDonnell amendment” by centrists): Corbyn could be waiting for this motion to pass before he resigns.

Will Corbyn stand down? The membership

Corbyn’s support in the membership is still strong. Without an equally compelling candidate to put before the party, Corbyn’s opponents in the PLP are unlikely to initiate another leadership battle they’re likely to lose.

That said, a general election loss could change that. Polling from March suggests that half of Labour members wanted Corbyn to stand down either immediately or before the general election.

Will Corbyn stand down? The rumours

Sources close to Corbyn have said that he might not stand down, even if he leads Labour to a crushing defeat this June. They mention Kinnock’s survival after the 1987 general election as a precedent (although at the 1987 election, Labour did gain seats).

Will Corbyn stand down? The verdict

Given his struggles to manage his own MPs and the example of other leaders, it would be remarkable if Corbyn did not stand down should Labour lose the general election. However, staying on after a vote of no-confidence in 2016 was also remarkable, and the mooted changes to the leadership election process give him a reason to hold on until September in order to secure a left-wing succession.

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