So we'll be bailing out the big energy companies if they crash: how likely is it anyway?

Keeping the flame alive.

As part of a team building exercise in my previous workplace, I once tried tight rope walking. Just to make the experience more exciting, I decided to do the dead-fall – something I had mastered at theatre workshops while in university – knowing there was a safety net below to catch me.

Had it not been for that safety net, I would have never tight rope walked in the first place – leave alone try the crowd pleasing antic. But my risky decision didn’t harm me or anyone around me.

Under a revised plan drawn up by the Government to avoid “market chaos”, UK consumers may be on the hook for a £4bn safety net if any of the six leading energy suppliers see a downfall.

Energy secretary Ed Davey is looking at a quick intervention with “adequate protection” if any of the ‘Big Six’ go out of business. Fair enough, but is it?

In a capitalist society such as the one we live in today, is it morally correct to ensure a safety net for corporates – such as big energy companies – to take risky decisions that could negatively affect millions in the UK market?

If the government is worried about any of these companies going out of business, the one thing it should not do is make it clear that it would be bailed out in case it does crash – providing the company with almost an incentive not to work towards keeping itself afloat.

The Big Six in the UK energy sector refer to German-owned E.On, Npower with its German parent company (RWE), France’s EDF, British Gas, Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE) and Scottish Power.

Competition is imperative to a company performing well. A safety net only reduces the need or will to compete.

A big energy company crashing would be unlike the crash of the banking sector where the crisis risked consumers losing their lives’ savings and government bail outs were imperative.

If a big energy company does go bust, the way it would affect a regular householder would be to find a new energy supplier. Would it be any more complicated than that? Why not let the private sector undertake the rescue?

Half of the Big Six are foreign owned companies, and it could perhaps make sense to draw up plans for the government to separate UK subsidiaries from foreign parents.

However, what are the chances of a big energy company on the whole going under in the first place? Highly unlikely – as Ed Davey himself accepts. Could this be anything more than a threat of nationalisation?

In January this year, a new survey by uSwitch found significant differences between satisfaction in the UK with smaller energy suppliers and the ‘Big Six’. EDF and Npower ranked at the bottom of the survey while Good Energy, the UK’s only 100 per cent renewable energy company, owned top spot.

Of the "Big Six", only two – E.ON and SSE – came in the top ten, sharing ninth place, whereas British Gas and ScottishPower came joint 11th.

Is it really justified, then, that consumers collectively face higher costs and pay up to almost £4bn to save any of the "Big Six" crashing when the satisfaction levels may not be up to mark?

Some may argue it will be better if the costs of the bail out came out of the profits of the energy firms instead of heightening the prices for householders. But ultimately it would amount to the same thing.

Albert Camus said all that he knew about morality and obligations he owed to football. Taking his cue, one thing we do know about the rules of any game is winning –not losing – should be rewarded. By that respect, the Big Six should fight to keep their heads up in stormy times instead of looking for that parachute they know the government is already making for them. And an expensive one at that.  

Photograph: Getty Images

Meghna Mukerjee is a reporter at Retail Banker International

Photo: Getty
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The three big mistakes the government has made in its Brexit talks

Nicola Sturgeon fears that the UK has no negotiating position at all. It's worse than she thinks. 

It’s fair to say that the first meeting of the government’s Brexit ministers and the leaders of the devolved legislatures did not go well.

Scotland’s Nicola Sturgeon told reporters outside that it had all been “deeply frustrating”, and that it was impossible for her to undermine the United Kingdom’s negotiating position as “I can’t undermine something that doesn’t exist, and at the moment it doesn’t seem to me like there is a UK negotiating strategy”.

To which cynical observers might say: she would, wouldn’t she? It’s in Sturgeon’s interest to paint the Westminster government as clueless and operating in a way that puts Scotland’s interests at risk. Maybe so, but Carwyn Jones, her Welsh opposite number, tends to strike a more conciliatory figure at these events – he’s praised both George Osborne and David Cameron in the past.

So it’s hard not to be alarmed at his statement to the press that there is still “huge uncertainty” about what the British government’s negotiating position. Even Arlene Foster, the first minister in Northern Ireland, whose party, the DUP, is seen as an increasingly reliable ally for the Conservative government, could only really volunteer that “we’re in a negotiation and we will be in a negotiation and it will be complex”.

All of which makes Jeremy Corbyn’s one-liner in the Commons today that the government is pursuing neither hard Brexit nor soft Brexit but “chaotic Brexit” ring true.

It all adds to a growing suspicion that the government’s negotiating strategy might be, as Jacqui Smith once quipped of Ed Miliband’s policy review, something of “a pregnant panda – it's been a very long time in the making and no one's quite sure if there's anything in there anyway”.

That’s not the case – but the reality is not much more comforting. The government has long believed, as Philip Hammond put when being grilled by the House of Lords on the issue:

"There's an intrinsic tension here between democratic accountability of the government and effective negotiation with a third party. Our paramount objective must be to get a good deal for Britain. I am afraid will not be achieved by spelling out our negotiating strategy."

That was echoed by Theresa May in response to Corbyn’s claim that the government has no plan for Brexit:

 “We have a plan, which is not to give out details of the negotiation as they are being negotiated”

Are Hammond and May right? Well, sort of. There is an innate tension between democratic accountability and a good deal, of course. The more is known about what the government’s red lines in negotiations, the higher the price they will have to pay to protect. That’s why, sensibly, Hammond, both as Foreign Secretary during the dying days of David Cameron’s government, and now as Chancellor, has attempted to head off public commitments about the shape of the Brexit deal.

But – and it’s a big but – the government has already shown a great deal of its hand. May made three big reveals about the government’s Brexit strategy it in her conference speech: firstly, she started the clock ticking on when Britain will definitely leave the European Union, by saying she will activate Article 50 no later than 31 March 2017. Secondly, she said that Brexit meant that Britain would control its own borders. And thirdly, she said that Brexit meant that Britain would no longer be subject to the judgements of the European Court of Justice.

The first reveal means that there is no chance that any of 27 remaining nations of the European Union will break ranks and begin informal talks before Article 50 is triggered.

The second reveal makes it clear that Britain will leave the single market, because none of the four freedoms – of goods, services, capital or people – can be negotiated away, not least because of the fear of political contagion within the EU27, as an exit deal which allowed the United Kingdom to maintain the three other freedoms while giving up the fourth would cause increased pressure from Eurosceptics in western Europe.

And the third reveal makes it equally clear that Britain will leave the customs union as there is no way you can be part of a union if you do not wish to accept its legal arbiter.

So the government has already revealed its big priorities and has therefore jacked up the price, meaning that the arguments about not revealing the government’s hand is not as strong as it ideally would be.

The other problem, though, is this: Theresa May’s Brexit objectives cannot be met without a hard Brexit, with the only question the scale of the initial shock. As I’ve written before, there is a sense that the government might be able to “pay to play”, ie, in exchange for continuing to send money to Brussels and to member states, the United Kingdom could maintain a decent standard of access to the single market.

My impression is that the mood in Brussels now makes this very tricky. The tone coming out of Conservative party conference has left goodwill in short supply, meaning that a “pay to play” deal is unlikely. But the other problem is that, by leaving so much of its objectives in the dark, Theresa May is not really laying the groundwork for a situation where she can return to Britain with an exit deal where Britain pays large sums to the European Union for a worse deal than the one it has now. (By the way, that is very much the best case scenario for what she might come back with.) Silence may make for good negotiations in Brussels – but in terms of the negotiation that may follow swiftly after in Westminster, it has entirely the opposite effect. 

Stephen Bush is special correspondent at the New Statesman. His daily briefing, Morning Call, provides a quick and essential guide to British politics.