Rail fare hike: the 10 worst London commutes

Today's spike in train fares hits some journeys harder than others.

A moment's silence for those of us who have to get around by train. Over the last month we have had to deal with floods, signal failures, staff shortages and overcrowding. Now comes the news that rail fares are to be hiked once again.

The average rise is only 4.3 per cent, but as long as they stick to this average, train companies can increase the prices of some tickets as far as they like. The result is uneven, some routes are hit worse than others. Campaign groups point out that this is the 10th successive above-inflation rise, London commutes being particularly affected. Here are the 10 worst hit London travel routes:

1. Sevenoaks to London has gone up 87 per cent in the last 10 years. Weekly tickets have gone from £41.50 to £77.80 and season tickets from £1,660.00 to £3,112.00.

2. Ashford International in Kent to London has gone up 80 per cent in the last 10 years. Weekly tickets have gone from £66.50 to £119.50, and season tickets from £2,660.00 to £4,780.00.

3. Bracknell to London has gone up 78 per cent in the last 10 years. Weekly tickets have gone from £55.70 to £99.00, and season tickets from £2,228.00 to £3,960.00.

4. Canterbury to London has gone up 78 per cent in the last 10 years. Weekly tickets have gone from £67.50 to £120.30, and season tickets from £2,700.00 to £4,812.00

5. Tunbridge Wells to London has gone up 71 per cent in the last 10 years. Weekly tickets have gone from £60.30 to £103.30, and season tickets from £2,412.00 to £4,132.00.

6. Maidstone to London has gone up 68 per cent in the last 10 years. Weekly tickets have gone from £59.00 to £99.00, and season tickets from £2,360.00 to £3,960.00.

7. Tonbridge to London has gone up 68 per cent in the last 10 years. Weekly tickets have gone from £56.00 to £94.20, and season tickets from £2,240.00 to £3,768.00

8. Gillingham to London has gone up 67 per cent in the last 10 years. Weekly tickets have gone from £55.10 to £91.80, and season tickets from £2,204.00 to £3,672.00.

9. Hastings to London has gone up 59 per cent in the last 10 years. Weekly tickets have gone from £72.00 to £114.60, and season tickets from £2,880.00 and £4,584.00.

10. Eastbourne to London has gone up 58 per cent in the last 10 years. Weekly tickets have gone from £68.00 to £107.60, and season tickets from £2,720.00 to £4,304.00.

The data came from Campaign for Better Transport, and was calculated using the weekly and season ticket prices between 2003 and 2013. It took inflation into account. (There is not yet a complete data set for travel routes outside London).

Stephen Joseph, the executive director of Campaign for Better Transport, said:

“These fare spikes are bad for people and bad for the environment. Once again, the Government is talking tall but walking short when it comes to ensuring the transport sector tackles climate change. If it is serious about tackling climate change, it must ensure train journeys are an attractive, affordable option for people.”

The average rise in fares is 4.3 per cent. Photograph: Getty Images
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Leader: The unresolved Eurozone crisis

The continent that once aspired to be a rival superpower to the US is now a byword for decline, and ethnic nationalism and right-wing populism are thriving.

The eurozone crisis was never resolved. It was merely conveniently forgotten. The vote for Brexit, the terrible war in Syria and Donald Trump’s election as US president all distracted from the single currency’s woes. Yet its contradictions endure, a permanent threat to continental European stability and the future cohesion of the European Union.

The resignation of the Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi, following defeat in a constitutional referendum on 4 December, was the moment at which some believed that Europe would be overwhelmed. Among the champions of the No campaign were the anti-euro Five Star Movement (which has led in some recent opinion polls) and the separatist Lega Nord. Opponents of the EU, such as Nigel Farage, hailed the result as a rejection of the single currency.

An Italian exit, if not unthinkable, is far from inevitable, however. The No campaign comprised not only Eurosceptics but pro-Europeans such as the former prime minister Mario Monti and members of Mr Renzi’s liberal-centrist Democratic Party. Few voters treated the referendum as a judgement on the monetary union.

To achieve withdrawal from the euro, the populist Five Star Movement would need first to form a government (no easy task under Italy’s complex multiparty system), then amend the constitution to allow a public vote on Italy’s membership of the currency. Opinion polls continue to show a majority opposed to the return of the lira.

But Europe faces far more immediate dangers. Italy’s fragile banking system has been imperilled by the referendum result and the accompanying fall in investor confidence. In the absence of state aid, the Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the world’s oldest bank, could soon face ruin. Italy’s national debt stands at 132 per cent of GDP, severely limiting its firepower, and its financial sector has amassed $360bn of bad loans. The risk is of a new financial crisis that spreads across the eurozone.

EU leaders’ record to date does not encourage optimism. Seven years after the Greek crisis began, the German government is continuing to advocate the failed path of austerity. On 4 December, Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, declared that Greece must choose between unpopular “structural reforms” (a euphemism for austerity) or withdrawal from the euro. He insisted that debt relief “would not help” the immiserated country.

Yet the argument that austerity is unsustainable is now heard far beyond the Syriza government. The International Monetary Fund is among those that have demanded “unconditional” debt relief. Under the current bailout terms, Greece’s interest payments on its debt (roughly €330bn) will continually rise, consuming 60 per cent of its budget by 2060. The IMF has rightly proposed an extended repayment period and a fixed interest rate of 1.5 per cent. Faced with German intransigence, it is refusing to provide further funding.

Ever since the European Central Bank president, Mario Draghi, declared in 2012 that he was prepared to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the single currency, EU member states have relied on monetary policy to contain the crisis. This complacent approach could unravel. From the euro’s inception, economists have warned of the dangers of a monetary union that is unmatched by fiscal and political union. The UK, partly for these reasons, wisely rejected membership, but other states have been condemned to stagnation. As Felix Martin writes on page 15, “Italy today is worse off than it was not just in 2007, but in 1997. National output per head has stagnated for 20 years – an astonishing . . . statistic.”

Germany’s refusal to support demand (having benefited from a fixed exchange rate) undermined the principles of European solidarity and shared prosperity. German unemployment has fallen to 4.1 per cent, the lowest level since 1981, but joblessness is at 23.4 per cent in Greece, 19 per cent in Spain and 11.6 per cent in Italy. The youngest have suffered most. Youth unemployment is 46.5 per cent in Greece, 42.6 per cent in Spain and 36.4 per cent in Italy. No social model should tolerate such waste.

“If the euro fails, then Europe fails,” the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, has often asserted. Yet it does not follow that Europe will succeed if the euro survives. The continent that once aspired to be a rival superpower to the US is now a byword for decline, and ethnic nationalism and right-wing populism are thriving. In these circumstances, the surprise has been not voters’ intemperance, but their patience.

This article first appeared in the 08 December 2016 issue of the New Statesman, Brexit to Trump