Housing benefits and the Olympics

How housing benefit caps exacerbate the effects of the Olympics.

When the Government announced its cap on housing benefits, it dismissed critics who said that this would lead to increased social segregation and a displacement of the poor from inner city housing. Nothing of the sort would happen, but instead, the size of the welfare bill would go down and there would be lower rents for poor people renting from a private landlord. In reality, the critics were right: the poor are driven out of their communities, and rents continue to rise as fewer and fewer people can afford to buy. Nowhere can this be better observed than in the Olympic boroughs, where high-speed gentrification meets the benefit cap.

Hardly anyone expected that the Olympic Games would leave the population of Hackney, Newham and Tower Hamlets unchanged. The billions of pounds that poured into three of the most deprived boroughs in England led to upgraded infrastructure and housing stock and brought new shopping and leisure facilities. Many people on higher incomes will consider moving there where few would have done so before. Consequently, housing values and rents are on the up. Post-Olympics, the poor would have always found it hard to find affordable accommodation, and people on housing benefits would have struggled to find a private landlord willing to rent to them rather than a more affluent tenant.

But the housing benefit cap is massively exacerbating this development. Housing benefit is paid in the form of the Local Housing Allowance (LHA) to people on low incomes who rent from a private landlord (as opposed to a social landlord, such as a housing association).  Prior to the reform, the maximum amount was pegged at the median level of a given rental market area, meaning that private landlords would get a similar rent than if they let out their property to a more affluent tenant. The newly introduced cap limits the LHA to the 30th percentile, and also specifies an absolute cap, for example £250 per week for a one bedroom property. This may appear high – but in London, it is not an unusual price.

Since the introduction of the cap, landlords in East London quickly realised that they can charge the same or much higher rents in the open market rather than renting to LHA recipients. It is very tempting even for the most socially inclined of private landlords to do so, given that the system is fraught with complications: payments are made in arrears, and often arrive late. LHA recipients whose income level crosses and recrosses the eligibility threshold have their benefit payments stopped and restarted, making the system even more unreliable. The general demonisation of LHA recipients (or benefit recipients in general) does not help. The result: a shortage of housing for the poor. As a Guardian investigation has shown, there are hundreds of properties within the limits of the housing cap in Newham, but many of these are not available to people on LHA. Queue the exodus of LHA recipients. Newham Council has already asked a housing association in Stoke if they could take on 500 families for which the council has been unable to find properties. The legacy of the Games will be a homogenous island of wealth interspersed with remnants of social housing rather than the mix of rich and poor that is still the norm in most parts of London.

The developments here are a sign of the shape of things to come across the country – at different times, at different speeds, but it will happen elsewhere, as the rental market is rapidly overheating: people cannot afford to buy anymore and renting ceases to be the preserve of the poor. Landlords can chose who to let to, and unsurprisingly will chose richer tenants. It was always a complete folly to introduce price controls on a small segment of an overheating market – it simply means that this market segment will not be served. What is happening in the Olympic boroughs should act as a warning to the rest of the country: if we don't want ghettos of rich and poor, the cap has to be repealed. If we don't want to spend increasing amounts of money on housing the poor, we have to reform the whole of the housing market, not just that part that is meant to serve the vulnerable (and that serves them badly already). At the moment, it is barely working for most, and it isn't working for the poor at all.

Photograph: Getty Images

Veronika Thiel is a researcher and writer in the field of social economics and health policy. She tweets from @veronikathiel.

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Battle for Mosul: will this be the end of Islamic State?

The militant group's grip on power is slipping but it has proved resilient in the past.

The battle for Mosul is the latest stage in the long struggle to defeat Islamic State. The group has been around since the late 1990s in one form or another, constantly mutating in response to its environment. Undoubtedly its ejection from Mosul will be a significant moment in the group’s history, but it is unlikely to be its final chapter. The destruction of the group will only be complete when some fundamental changes occur within Iraq and the war in Syria comes to an end.

IS’s roots go back to a training camp established by the militant Islamist Abu Musab al Zarqawi in the late 1990s in Herat, Afghanistan. Founded as an army to overthrow the apostate regimes of the Levant, it fled to northern Iraq in the wake of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan post-9/11 where it re-established itself as a force alongside Ansar al Shariah, a hardline Salafi jihadi organisation.

As American attention shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq, the group was ideally placed to become one of the leading lights in the post-Saddam Iraqi insurgency. Brutally announcing itself to the world in August 2003 with successive attacks on the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, the UN headquarters and a Shia shrine in Najaf — the latter being the deadliest attack in Iraq that year with a death toll of 95 — the group grew to assume the mantle of al-Qaeda in Iraq. By 2006 this brand had become somewhat damaged through the brutal sectarian campaign the group waged, and when its founder, Zarqawi, died it sought to reinvent itself as the Mujahedeen Shura Council. This incarnation did not last long either, and eventually it assumed the title of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), alongside a more Iraqi leadership.

This was the start of a diffcult period in the group's history. Its excesses in Iraq (including indiscriminate slaughter of Shia Muslims to stir sectarian hatred and filmed decapitations of prisoners) lost it local support and led to the tribes in Sunni Iraq rising up and supporting the government in Baghdad's fight back against the group. By 2009, when the west abruptly stopped paying attention and withdrew from Iraq the group was largely perceived as in decline, with the Shia Muslim-led Iraqi government appearing to slowly assert itself more effectively across the country.

The terrorist attacks by the group continued. And the new government started to advance an increasingly sectarian agenda. These two played off each other in a downward spiral that was given a fresh boost of blood when the civil war in Syria erupted in 2011. Drawing on its existing networks (that were leftovers from when Syria was used as a staging point by the organisation to launch attacks into Iraq), the leadership sent a cell to Syria to explore what opportunities existed within the emerging fight there. This cell became the seed that grew into Jabhat al Nusrah and ultimately IS – a label the group adopted when in June 2013 IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi decided it was time to reveal this link between his Iraqi group and Jabhat al Nusrah. This led to divisions and the breaking up of the two organisations.

For IS, however, it was the beginning of an upward trajectory, building on this division to grow itself substantially in Syria (with Raqqa as its capital) and in 2014 taking over Iraq’s second biggest city of Mosul. We then reach the apex of IS’s success and the biggest expansion of the group yet.

It now seems that this growth had a shelf life of just two-and-a-half years. As the group appears to be losing Mosul, it is likely that we will see the beginning of a period of retraction. But this will not be its end – rather, it will flee back to the hills and the ungoverned spaces in Iraq and Syria from where it will continue a persistent terrorist strategy in both countries. Here it will bide its time until the moment presents itself to rise up. Waiting until the governance in Iraq and Syria fails its people again, the group can paint itself as the protector of Sunnis and once more build on that group's disenfranchisement to win supporters and occupy a space vacated by local governments.

IS's grip on power might currently be slipping but as history has shown, it has waxed and waned depending on the context it is operating in. We are now going to see a period of withdrawal, but unless attention is paid by the global community, it will expand again in the future.

Raffaello Pantucci is Director of International Security Studies at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Visit his website at http://www.raffaellopantucci.com